Home Case Index All Cases Income Tax Section Wise 2009 2009 (3) This

Law	-- All -- GST Income Tax Benami Property Customs Corporate Laws Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy FEMA Law of Competition PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Wealth tax Indian Laws
Court	-- Any -- Supreme Court SC Orders / Highlights High Court Appellate Tribunal Tribunal Appellate authority for Advance Ruling Advance Ruling Authority National Financial Reporting Authority Competition Commission of India ANTI-PROFITEERING AUTHORITY Commission Central Government Board DISTRICT/ SESSIONS Court Commissioner / Appellate Authority Other
Citation	--Year-- 2025 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 Upto 1949 - -Volume- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 -
Landmark	Nil - N/A Referred in >= 2 Cases Referred in >= 4 Cases Referred in >= 5 Cases Referred in >= 10 Cases Referred in >= 15 Cases Referred in >= 25 Cases Referred in >= 50 Cases Referred in >= 100 Cases
Order by	TMI Citation Date of Decision

Advanced Search Options

Case Laws

Showing 1 to 20 of 861 Records

• 2009 (3) TMI 1111
  
  1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

  The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:

  • Whether the deposit of the decretal amount by the judgment debtor (DDA) in a non-executing court satisfies the requirement of payment to the decree holder under Order XXI Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).
  • Whether the interest on the decretal amount ceases to accrue from the date of such deposit.
  • Whether the judgment debtor is entitled to a concessional rate of interest when the payment is not made directly to the decree holder within the stipulated time.
  • Whether the decree holder is entitled to withdraw the deposited amount and claim additional amounts with interest.

  2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

  Issue 1: Deposit as Payment under Order XXI Rule 1 CPC

  Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Order XXI Rule 1 CPC outlines the modes of paying money under a decree, including direct payment to the decree holder or deposit into the executing court. The court referenced precedents such as Hindustan Construction Corporation v. DDA and A. Tosh & Sons India Ltd. v. N.N. Khanna, which held that deposits in non-executing courts do not constitute payment to the decree holder.

  Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court held that a deposit in a non-executing court does not amount to payment under Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. Payment requires either direct payment to the decree holder or deposit into the executing court, with notice to the decree holder.

  Application of Law to Facts: The DDA's deposit in FAO(OS) 93/2002 was not in the executing court and lacked notice to the decree holder, thus failing to satisfy the requirements of Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.

  Issue 2: Accrual of Interest

  Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Supreme Court's decision in Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India was considered, which discusses cessation of interest upon deposit in the executing court. However, this was distinguished from the present case.

  Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court concluded that interest does not cease to accrue merely because of a deposit in a non-executing court. The deposit must be in the executing court with notice to the decree holder for interest to stop accruing.

  Application of Law to Facts: Since the deposit was not in the executing court, interest continued to accrue on the decretal amount.

  Issue 3: Concessional Rate of Interest

  Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The decree dated 15th July 2005 granted a concessional interest rate of 9% if payment was made within six weeks. The Court relied on precedents that emphasized the need for direct or facilitated payment to avail such concessions.

  Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court held that the DDA did not avail the concessional rate as it failed to facilitate the withdrawal or make the payment within the stipulated time.

  Application of Law to Facts: The DDA's failure to act within six weeks disqualified it from the concessional interest rate.

  Issue 4: Entitlement to Withdraw and Additional Claims

  Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Court examined the entitlement of the decree holder to withdraw the deposited amount and claim additional amounts with interest.

  Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court allowed the decree holder to withdraw the amount deposited, as the deposit did not satisfy the payment requirements, and the decree holder was entitled to claim the balance with interest.

  Application of Law to Facts: The decree holder was entitled to withdraw the deposited amount and claim additional amounts due, as the conditions for cessation of interest were not met by the DDA.

  3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

  Core Principles Established:

  • Deposits made in non-executing courts do not constitute payment to the decree holder under Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.
  • Interest on the decretal amount continues to accrue unless payment is made in accordance with the prescribed modes under Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.
  • Concessional interest rates are contingent upon timely payment directly to the decree holder or through facilitated means.
  • The decree holder is entitled to withdraw deposited amounts and claim additional amounts with interest if the payment requirements are not met.

  Final Determinations on Each Issue:

  • The appeal by the DDA was dismissed, affirming that the deposit did not satisfy the payment requirements under Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.
  • The decree holder was entitled to withdraw the deposited amount and claim additional amounts with interest.
  • The DDA was not entitled to the concessional interest rate due to its failure to facilitate payment within the stipulated time.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1110
  
  The Supreme Court of India rendered a judgment concerning a dispute between the appellant, engaged in the cement manufacturing business, and respondent Deepak Jain, who applied for a Clearing and Forwarding Agency in the name of "M/s. Deepak Jain." However, the appellant alleged that Deepak Jain also operated under the name "M/s. Surya Trading Company, Proprietor, D.K. Jain." The appellant filed a suit against "M/s. Surya Trading Company, Proprietor D.K. Jain" for recovery, which was decreed ex-parte. When Deepak Jain objected during execution proceedings, the Executing Court initially held that the decree could only be executed against D.K. Jain and not Deepak Jain. Subsequently, the High Court directed an inquiry into the identity of the proprietor of M/s. Surya Trading Company.The key issues in the case revolved around whether Deepak Jain and D.K. Jain were the same person and the propriety of executing the decree against Deepak Jain. The Executing Court found that Deepak Jain was indeed the proprietor of M/s. Surya Trading Company and that both identities belonged to the same person. Deepak Jain challenged this decision in Civil Revision No. 364 of 2004, arguing that the Executing Court wrongly placed the burden of proof on him to establish his identity.The High Court, in its impugned order, held that the Executing Court could not delve into the identity issue under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) and that the appellant should have sought amendment of the decree under Section 152 of the CPC. The appellant appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Executing Court had the jurisdiction to determine the identity issue as directed by the High Court.The Supreme Court found the High Court's judgment unsustainable, emphasizing that the Executing Court, following the High Court's direction, had the authority to decide the identity issue under Section 47 of the CPC. The Court noted that the High Court failed to consider its earlier order mandating an inquiry into the identity of the judgment debtor. It also highlighted that Section 152 CPC only allows rectification of clerical errors, not reconsideration of substantive issues.The Court criticized the misuse of the judicial process in the case, noting that the delay caused by frivolous objections hindered the enforcement of the money decree. Ultimately, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and awarding costs to the appellant.In summary, the Supreme Court's judgment clarified the Executing Court's jurisdiction to determine the identity of the judgment debtor as directed by the High Court and criticized the misuse of legal processes to delay enforcement of decrees.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1109
  

  1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

  The Supreme Court of India considered the following core legal issues in this judgment:

  • Whether Article 137 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 applies to applications for probate or letters of administration under the Indian Succession Act, 1925.
  • The interpretation of the term "right to apply" within the context of Article 137.
  • The implications of any delay in filing applications for probate or letters of administration beyond the period prescribed by Article 137.

  2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

  Issue 1: Applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act to Probate Applications

  Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents:

  Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a limitation period for "any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Division." The period of limitation is three years, beginning when the right to apply accrues. The Court referred to precedents, including The Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, which clarified that Article 137 applies to applications made to a civil court under any Act.

  Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:

  The Court interpreted that Article 137 is applicable to applications for probate or letters of administration. It rejected the view that such applications are not covered by Article 137, as held by the Delhi High Court. The Supreme Court emphasized that any application to a civil court, including those under the Indian Succession Act, falls within the scope of Article 137.

  Key Evidence and Findings:

  The Court relied on the interpretation in The Kerala State Electricity Board case, which stated that Article 137 is not confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure but extends to applications under any Act.

  Application of Law to Facts:

  The Court applied the legal principles established in the precedents to conclude that applications for probate or letters of administration are indeed subject to the limitation period prescribed by Article 137.

  Treatment of Competing Arguments:

  The Court addressed the competing argument that probate applications are not actions in law and thus not subject to Article 137. It refuted this by emphasizing the legal nature of seeking court recognition to perform duties under a will.

  Conclusions:

  The Court concluded that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to applications for probate or letters of administration, and the High Court's interpretation to the contrary was incorrect.

  Issue 2: Interpretation of "Right to Apply" and Delay in Filing

  Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents:

  Article 137's limitation period begins when the "right to apply" accrues. The Court discussed the interpretation of this term in the context of the Indian Succession Act.

  Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:

  The Court interpreted that the "right to apply" accrues when it becomes necessary to apply for probate or letters of administration, not necessarily at the date of the deceased's death.

  Key Evidence and Findings:

  The Court referred to Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani v. Sajni Prem Lalwani, which highlighted that the right to apply is a continuous right and can be exercised as long as the right survives and the object of the trust exists.

  Application of Law to Facts:

  The Court applied this understanding to conclude that the timing of the application for probate is flexible, but unexplained delays may raise suspicions.

  Treatment of Competing Arguments:

  The Court acknowledged the argument that delays beyond three years could raise suspicions but clarified that such delays do not impose an absolute bar of limitation.

  Conclusions:

  The Court concluded that while Article 137 applies, the right to apply for probate is a continuous right, and delays must be explained but do not automatically bar the application.

  3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

  Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning:

  "The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court."

  Core Principles Established:

  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to applications for probate or letters of administration under the Indian Succession Act.
  • The "right to apply" for probate is a continuous right and is not strictly confined to the date of death of the deceased.
  • Delays in filing applications for probate must be explained, but they do not impose an absolute bar to the application.

  Final Determinations on Each Issue:

  • The Supreme Court remitted the matter for reconsideration in light of its findings on the applicability of Article 137 and the interpretation of the "right to apply."

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1108
  
  The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition against the Bombay High Court's judgment in a winding-up case involving Bills of Exchange. The Court ruled that the matter should be decided in a suit due to the genuine dispute raised by the respondent company. The petitioner can pursue remedies in other forums.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1107
  
  Issues:
  Challenge to order sanctioning scheme of amalgamation based on lack of notice and statutory compliance.
  
  Analysis:
  The appeal challenged the order granting sanction of the scheme of amalgamation due to alleged non-compliance with notice requirements and statutory procedures. The appellant contended that no notice was served to shareholders as directed, and the meeting took place without proper notice. It was argued that the quorum for the meeting was not met, and fraud was perpetrated on the court by the respondents in obtaining the sanction order. The appellant sought the recall of the sanction order based on these grounds.
  
  The appellant, represented by learned counsel, argued that the order should be recalled as the statutory procedures were violated, instances of fraud were committed, and materials on record showed irregularities in obtaining the sanction order. It was highlighted that the appellant was shown to be represented by a proxy without authorization, and the meeting lacked the required number of shareholders for a valid meeting. The appellant's lack of significant shareholding in the companies involved was also raised as a point of contention.
  
  The court noted that the appellant's delay in challenging the order, filed after more than two years, raised questions about the merit of the application. The appellant's claim of lack of knowledge about the amalgamation was refuted based on published notices in newspapers. The court also considered the actions of the appellant's supporters who had knowledge of the scheme but did not challenge the order, indicating their acceptance of the amalgamation.
  
  The court further analyzed the legal aspects related to voluntary winding up, quorum requirements, and voting procedures at meetings held under court orders. It was emphasized that the appellant failed to establish a case based on the facts presented and the legal arguments made. The court found no illegality or irregularity in the order passed by the Company Judge and affirmed the decision, dismissing the appeal.
  
  In conclusion, the court rejected the appellant's arguments, upheld the order sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation, and dismissed the appeal. The judgment highlighted the importance of compliance with statutory procedures, notice requirements, and the significance of timely challenges to court orders.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1106
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the arbitral awards rejecting claims as time-barred under the byelaws of the National Stock Exchange (NSE).
  2. Applicability of Section 28 of the Contract Act to the byelaws of NSE.
  3. Whether the arbitration under NSE byelaws constitutes a statutory arbitration.
  4. Entitlement of petitioners to pursue civil suits if arbitration claims are time-barred.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of the Arbitral Awards:
  The petitions challenged the arbitral awards dated 6th November 2006, which rejected the claims as being beyond the six-month limitation period prescribed in Bye-law 3 of Chapter XI of the NSE byelaws. The Arbitral Tribunal held that the arbitration was under the byelaws and not under Section 89 of the CPC, and thus, the limitation period set by the byelaws was applicable. The Tribunal also rejected the argument that the period of limitation could not be curtailed by agreement, emphasizing that parties could fix any period for making a reference to arbitration by their contract.
  
  2. Applicability of Section 28 of the Contract Act:
  The court examined whether Bye-law 3, which limited the period for reference of disputes to six months, was void under Section 28 of the Contract Act. It was argued that Section 28 applies to contracts and that the byelaws, being a special or local law, were not subject to this section. The court, however, found that the byelaw was contractual and not statutory, thus subject to Section 28. Consequently, the part of Bye-law 3 prescribing a six-month limitation for arbitration was deemed void, and the limitation period would be governed by the Limitation Act.
  
  3. Nature of Arbitration under NSE Byelaws:
  The court considered whether arbitration under the NSE byelaws constitutes a statutory arbitration. It was noted that the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, under which the byelaws were framed, does not itself provide for arbitration but mandates that contracts be regulated by the byelaws. The court concluded that the arbitration under the byelaws is contractual, albeit with a statutory flavor, and thus not a statutory arbitration under any enactment.
  
  4. Pursuit of Civil Suits:
  The court addressed whether the petitioners could pursue civil suits if the arbitration claims were time-barred. It was held that if the parties have mandatorily agreed to arbitration, then they are bound by the arbitration rules, and a civil suit cannot be pursued if the arbitration claim is time-barred. The court emphasized that allowing a civil suit would make the arbitration agreement contingent, which is impermissible.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court set aside the arbitral awards, holding that the part of Bye-law 3 limiting the time for arbitration to six months was void under Section 28 of the Contract Act. The petitioners were allowed to approach the NSE or the Arbitral Tribunal for adjudication of their claims, with each party bearing its own costs. The decision reinforced the applicability of the Limitation Act to arbitration agreements, emphasizing the contractual nature of the NSE byelaws.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1105
  
  Issues involved: Challenge to termination of services of Executive Officer of a temple, delay in disposal of revision petition, non-approval of appointment of new Executive Officer.
  
  Challenge to termination of services of Executive Officer: The petitioner, a trustee of a temple, challenged the directive to terminate the services of the Executive Officer appointed by filing a revision petition before the Government. The High Court had earlier directed the 1st respondent to consider a stay petition and dispose of the revision petition within a specified time frame. The petitioner sought approval for the appointment of a new Executive Officer, which was rejected by the Commissioner due to the pending revision petition.
  
  Delay in disposal of revision petition: The Government Pleader informed that the stay petition had been dismissed, and the revision petition had not been disposed of yet. The time limit set by the High Court for disposing of the revision petition had already lapsed, and the petitioner had not received the order passed on the stay petition.
  
  Non-approval of appointment of new Executive Officer: The petitioner requested approval for the appointment of a new Executive Officer, but the Commissioner rejected the request citing the pending revision petition. The High Court directed the 1st respondent to ensure that the revision petition mentioned in the previous judgment is disposed of within six weeks from the date of receipt of the current judgment.
  
  Judgment: The High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the 1st respondent to expedite the disposal of the revision petition within the specified time frame.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1104
  
  The Supreme Court granted bail to the appellant after notice and hearing both parties. The decision was made based on the refusal of bail by the Sessions Judge and the High Court, despite bail being granted to some co-accused.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1103
  
  Issues involved:
  The issues involved in this case include illegal construction on a property, jurisdiction of the Dy. Director of Panchayats, appointment of a Commissioner to inspect the property, burden of proof in proving legality of construction, and the powers of the Dy. Director u/s 66(5) of the Panchayat Raj Act.
  
  Illegal Construction Issue:
  The Petitioner filed an application claiming mundkar status while the property owner alleged illegal construction by the Petitioner. The Dy. Director found the construction to be illegal and ordered its demolition. The Director of Panchayats upheld this decision, leading to the filing of a Writ Petition challenging the orders.
  
  Jurisdiction of Dy. Director:
  The Petitioner argued that the Dy. Director acted illegally in appointing a Commissioner to inspect the property. However, the Court found that the appointment was within the Dy. Director's powers u/s 239(A) of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act. The Court deemed the proceedings as quasi-judicial and justified the appointment to ascertain factual details.
  
  Burden of Proof Issue:
  The Court addressed the burden of proof, stating that the onus lies on the constructor to prove legality, not on the complainant to prove illegality. As the Petitioner failed to provide evidence of permission for the construction, the Court upheld the decision of the Dy. Director regarding the demolition.
  
  Powers of Dy. Director u/s 66(5) Issue:
  The Court clarified that u/s 66(5) of the Panchayat Raj Act, if the Panchayat fails to act on illegal construction complaints, the Dy. Director is empowered to assume the Panchayat's powers and take necessary steps for demolition. In this case, since the Panchayat did not act on complaints, the Dy. Director's intervention was deemed appropriate.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Court dismissed the Writ Petition, finding no illegality in the orders passed by the Dy. Director and the Director of Panchayats. The Petitioner's failure to prove the legality of the construction led to the affirmation of the demolition order. No costs were awarded in this matter.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1102
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality of the order passed by the Hon'ble Minister for Food and Civil Supply and Consumer Protection.
  2. Procedural irregularities in the decision-making process.
  3. Implementation of procedural guidelines for quasi-judicial authorities.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legality of the Order Passed by the Hon'ble Minister for Food and Civil Supply and Consumer Protection:
  The petition challenged the order dated 24th November 2006 by the Hon'ble Minister for Food and Civil Supply and Consumer Protection, which dismissed the revision petition filed by the petitioner against the Controller of Rationing's order dated 17th December 2004. The Controller of Rationing had initially allotted a "Ration shop" to respondent No.4, which was maintained upon review. The petitioner contended that the decision-making process was flawed, leading to the filing of the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
  
  2. Procedural Irregularities in the Decision-Making Process:
  The petitioner presented two conflicting orders from the revisional authority: one draft allowing the revision and another signed order rejecting it. The affidavits filed by the Hon'ble Minister and other officials revealed that the decision-making process was marred by procedural irregularities. The Deputy Secretary and Desk Officer prepared conflicting drafts without the Minister's direct dictation, indicating that the orders were not based on the merits of the case as heard by the Minister. The Minister admitted in his affidavit that he did not dictate the order and relied on departmental officers to prepare the draft, which was later revised based on additional evidence.
  
  3. Implementation of Procedural Guidelines for Quasi-Judicial Authorities:
  In light of the procedural lapses, the Court mandated the establishment of comprehensive guidelines to streamline the decision-making process for quasi-judicial authorities. The guidelines included specific steps for filing appeals, revisions, and review applications, ensuring transparency and adherence to natural justice principles. Key points included:
  - Clear mention of the legal provisions under which appeals or applications are filed.
  - Submission of a synopsis of dates and events.
  - Filing within stipulated periods and including applications for condonation of delay if necessary.
  - Verification of the identity of appellants or applicants.
  - Provision of sufficient copies for respondents and the authority.
  - Procedures for serving notices and handling urgent interim reliefs.
  - Maintenance of records and communication of orders promptly.
  
  The Court emphasized that these guidelines apply to all quasi-judicial authorities in Maharashtra, including Ministers, Secretaries, and officials, to ensure fair and transparent hearings. The Court also referenced parameters from a previous judgment to be followed while considering stay applications, ensuring that reasons for granting or refusing interim relief are clearly recorded.
  
  Conclusion:
  The judgment highlighted significant procedural flaws in the decision-making process of the Hon'ble Minister for Food and Civil Supply and Consumer Protection, necessitating the establishment of detailed guidelines to ensure transparency and fairness in quasi-judicial proceedings. The Court's directives aimed to rectify these issues and prevent future irregularities, reinforcing the principles of natural justice and due process. The Chief Secretary, State of Maharashtra, was directed to circulate the judgment and ensure compliance, with a report on implementation to be submitted to the Court.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1101
  
  Issues involved: Determination of the entitlement of interest to the decree holder in an execution case.
  
  Summary:
  1. The execution case involved the question of interest entitlement to the decree holder until the date of payment. The arbitral award directed the judgment debtor to pay the awarded amount within 90 days, failing which interest at 18% was payable. The decree holder applied for execution after dismissal of the judgment debtor's application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
  
  2. The judgment debtor raised objections and sought stay of execution, claiming the award had not become final. However, the execution proceeded, and monies were attached and received in court. The judgment debtor's objections were dismissed, and a portion of the attached monies was released to the decree holder.
  
  3. The Registrar General recorded discrepancies in interest calculations between the parties. The court held that interest would continue to run until payment to the decree holder, irrespective of the execution filing date. The court analyzed the impact of attachment on interest calculation and referred to relevant legal provisions.
  
  4. Considering the circumstances and legal principles, the court determined the amount due to the decree holder based on the date when the monies were deemed releasable. The judgment debtor's objections were rejected, and a specific sum was ordered to be released to the decree holder, with the remaining balance to be refunded to the judgment debtor.
  
  5. The court's decision was in line with established legal principles and previous judgments, ensuring fair treatment of both parties and resolving the issue of interest entitlement in the execution case.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1100
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Quashing of the criminal complaint and charge sheet.
  2. Application of Section 482 CrPC for quashing proceedings.
  3. Allegations and evidence against the accused.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Quashing of the criminal complaint and charge sheet

  The appeals were filed against the common judgment dated 01.03.2007 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which dismissed the petition for quashing the complaint against Accused Nos. 1 to 9. The complaint alleged offences u/s 406 and 420 read with Section 34 IPC. The High Court held that the allegations made in the complaint did not warrant quashing.

  Issue 2: Application of Section 482 CrPC for quashing proceedings

  The appellants argued that the criminal complaint was a counterblast to the insolvency petition filed by Accused No. 1 and that the matter was essentially civil in nature. They contended that the High Court failed to apply its mind and did not consider that the rice mill was a sole proprietary concern run by Accused No. 1, and Accused Nos. 2 and 3 had no involvement in the business. The Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 482 CrPC, referencing several precedents including *Drugs Inspector v. Dr. B.K. Krishna*, *Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi*, and *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal*. The Court reiterated that the inherent power u/s 482 CrPC should be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice.

  Issue 3: Allegations and evidence against the accused

  The Supreme Court analyzed the allegations in the charge sheet, noting that most were directed against Accused No. 1. The allegations against Accused Nos. 2 and 3, and Accused Nos. 6 to 8 were found to be vague and lacking specific roles. The Court held that the allegations did not make out a prima facie case against these appellants. Consequently, the proceedings against Accused Nos. 2 and 3, and Accused Nos. 6 to 8 were quashed. The Court clarified that its observations were limited to the criminal proceedings and did not affect any civil liability.

  Conclusion:

  The appeals were allowed to the extent of quashing the proceedings against Accused Nos. 2 and 3, and Accused Nos. 6 to 8. No costs were ordered.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1099
  
  Issues involved: Challenge to judgment and order of acquittal u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Challenge to acquittal u/s 138 of N.I. Act
  
  The appellant challenged the judgment and order of acquittal u/s 138 of the N.I. Act. The main point for determination was whether the Trial Court was justified in acquitting the accused of the offence u/s 138 by finding that the complainant failed to prove the existence of a legally enforceable debt payable to her by the accused.
  
  Details: The appellant's counsel argued that despite the accused admitting to issuing the cheque, the Trial Court erred in acquitting him as the complainant failed to prove lending the amount. On the other hand, the respondent's counsel contended that since the complainant had no direct transaction with the accused and the transactions were through her husband, the Trial Court's acquittal was justified.
  
  Analysis: The complainant claimed to have lent Rs. 50,000 to the accused and received the cheque for repayment. However, she admitted that her husband had actually lent the money to the accused, not her directly. As the husband was not examined as a witness, the Trial Court rightly held that the complainant failed to prove the lending and receipt of the cheque. Therefore, the finding was upheld.
  
  Issue 2: Presumption u/s 139 of N.I. Act
  
  The appellant argued that the Trial Court should have raised a presumption u/s 139 of the N.I. Act regarding the debt and the cheque issuance. However, it was clarified that the presumption requires the complainant to establish receiving the cheque from the accused, which was disputed. The Supreme Court precedent highlighted that the existence of a legally recoverable debt is not presumed, and the complainant must prove the debt existed at the time of the cheque.
  
  Conclusion: The Court found the Trial Court's decision justified, as the complainant failed to prove the lending and receipt of the cheque. The appeal was dismissed for lacking merit.
  
  This summary provides a detailed breakdown of the judgment, focusing on the issues raised and the reasoning behind the decision.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1098
  
  Issues involved: Petition to quash orders of depositing rent and maintaining status-quo in a civil suit.
  
  Summary:
  The petitioner, the original defendant, filed a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking to quash the order passed by the 3rd Joint Civil Judge and the judgment in a civil suit. The lower courts had directed the petitioner to deposit rent from the disputed property in court and maintain status-quo. The Single Judge stayed the deposit order but maintained status-quo. The matter was set for final hearing, and the petitioner's advocate requested for the interim order to be made absolute. The High Court directed the trial court to dispose of the suit by a specified date, emphasizing that the decision should be based on evidence and not influenced by the interim order. The Special Civil Application was disposed of, with costs not awarded, and the registry was instructed to send the order to the trial court promptly.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1097
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Jurisdiction of the revisional authority to exercise suo motu power of revision.
  2. Validity of the revisional authority's action based on previously rejected audit objections.
  3. Maintainability of the writ petition without exhausting alternative statutory remedies.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Jurisdiction of the Revisional Authority to Exercise Suo Motu Power of Revision:
  The petitioner challenged the suo motu revisional orders dated 31st December 2007, arguing that the revisional authority lacked jurisdiction to exercise its suo motu power of revision. The revisional authority had revised the re-assessment orders on the grounds that the allowance of the claim of penultimate sales under Section 5(3) of the CST Act by the Assessing Officer was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. However, the court noted that the pre-requisite for exercising jurisdiction under Rule 80 of the OST Rules read with Rule 22 of the CST (O) Rules is that the order must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The court found that the revisional authority did not independently apply its mind and mechanically accepted the objections raised by the A.G. Audit Party without assigning any reasons for rejecting the explanations furnished by the petitioner and accepted by the Assessing Officer. The revisional authority's order was thus found to be vitiated due to lack of independent reasoning and failure to point out errors in the Assessing Officer's orders.
  
  2. Validity of the Revisional Authority's Action Based on Previously Rejected Audit Objections:
  The court examined whether the revisional authority could exercise jurisdiction based on the same audit objections that had been rejected by the Assessing Officer. The revisional authority relied on the audit objections which stated that the goods sold by the petitioner were not exported in the same form and that the sales were for home consumption, not for export purposes. The Assessing Officer had previously rejected these objections, providing detailed reasons and verifying that the goods were indeed exported. The court held that the revisional authority could not exercise its jurisdiction merely because it did not agree with the view of the Assessing Officer, especially when the view taken by the Assessing Officer was sustainable in law. The court emphasized that the revisional authority must provide cogent reasons and cannot revise an order simply based on a difference of opinion.
  
  3. Maintainability of the Writ Petition Without Exhausting Alternative Statutory Remedies:
  The court addressed whether the writ petition was maintainable without exhausting alternative remedies, such as an appeal before the Commissioner of Sales Tax. The court noted that if a court or authority wrongly assumes the existence of a jurisdictional fact, the order can be questioned by a writ of certiorari. The court cited the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment in Arun Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., which held that a jurisdictional fact must exist before a court or authority assumes jurisdiction. The court also referred to the judgment in State of H.P. and Ors. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. and Anr., which stated that the rule of alternative remedy is a rule of policy and discretion. The court concluded that the writ petition was maintainable as the petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the revisional authority and the exercise of suo motu power based on previously rejected audit objections.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court quashed the suo motu revisional orders dated 31st December 2007 and the notice dated 19th February 2008, finding that the revisional authority acted without jurisdiction and failed to provide independent reasoning for revising the Assessing Officer's orders. The writ petition was allowed, and the orders of the revisional authority were declared illegal and without jurisdiction.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1096
  
  Issues involved: Delayed supply of information, penalty imposed by CIC under Section 20, appeal against CIC order.
  
  Delayed supply of information: The applicant sought information in August 2006, which was forwarded to Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) by the Ministry of Human Resources and Development. The Public Information Officer (PIO) received the application on 9.10.2007 and forwarded it to various agencies. The Central Information Commission (CIC) noted delays in furnishing information and granted time until 31.3.2007 for production of records. The petitioner contended that some information had been weeded out as per a policy decision. The applicant expressed satisfaction with the information received by March 2007.
  
  Penalty imposed by CIC under Section 20: CIC directed recovery of penalty of Rs.25,000 in two installments for delayed supply of information. The CIC held that the penalty order issued on 31.5.2007 would bind the petitioner, despite the applicant's request to drop the proceedings. Section 20 empowers CIC to impose penalties for unreasonable delays or malafide denials of information.
  
  Appeal against CIC order: The Court found that the assumption made by CIC regarding the date of the information application was incorrect. The Court observed that there were no allegations to establish malafide withholding of information by the petitioner. The Court concluded that the petitioner was entitled to succeed, quashing the impugned orders and directing refund of the penalty amount within four weeks.
  
  This judgment highlights the importance of timely provision of information under the Right to Information Act and the need for CIC to assess delays and refusals to provide information in a reasonable and diligent manner.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1095
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legitimacy of the General Secretary's position.
  2. Validity of the judgment and decree in Suit No. 518/99.
  3. Entitlement of the plaintiffs to relief claimed in the injunction application.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Legitimacy of the General Secretary's position:
  The plaintiffs contended that Mr. Bhandari wrongfully represented himself as the General Secretary of the Club since 1995, despite Mr. Arvinder Singh being elected to the position. No elections were held until 2005, and the results of the 2005 elections were stayed by court orders. Consequently, Mr. Bhandari's actions were unauthorized and illegal.
  
  2. Validity of the judgment and decree in Suit No. 518/99:
  The plaintiffs alleged that the judgment and decree dated 20th October 2002 in Suit No. 518/99 were fraudulently obtained by the Trust in collusion with Mr. Bhandari. The Club had failed to pay lease money as per the sub-lease agreement, leading to the Trust terminating the sub-lease and filing Suit No. 518/99 for recovery of possession and mesne profits. The Club's written statement admitted the Trust's ownership and the outstanding lease payments. The learned single Judge passed a decree in favor of the Trust, which was upheld by the Division Bench on 9th January 2009. The court found no grounds to re-examine the findings of the previous judgments.
  
  3. Entitlement of the plaintiffs to relief claimed in the injunction application:
  The court examined whether the plaintiffs, as members of the Club, were entitled to any relief based on their allegations. The plaintiffs cited previous judgments to support their claims of fraud. However, the defendants argued that the suit was an abuse of the court process, as the issues had already been decided by two courts. The court noted that the Club had authorized Mr. Bhandari to contest matters and file appeals, indicating awareness of the litigation. The court found the plaintiffs' allegations of fraud to be general and unsupported by evidence. The court concluded that the present suit was another round of unsustainable litigation and dismissed the application for interim injunction, stating that no prima facie case or balance of convenience was in favor of the plaintiffs.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1094
  
  Issues involved: Interpretation and application of provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as amended by the State of Tamil Nadu; Initiation of proceeding under Section 47A of the Act for collection of deficit stamp duty; Calculation of period of limitation for initiating proceedings under Section 47A of the Act; Application of subsequent amendments to the Act on the present case.
  
  Interpretation and Application of Provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899:
  The case involved the purchase of properties in Tamil Nadu and Kerala by the appellants through a registered deed of sale. The Sub-Registrar initiated proceedings under Section 47A(1) of the Act and Section 19B for collection of deficit stamp duty. The legality of the notice issued by the Sub-Registrar was challenged in a writ petition, which was dismissed by a Single Judge. The High Court upheld the dismissal, stating that the action taken was not barred by limitation as per Section 19B(1) of the Act. The High Court's decision was based on the fact that the documents were registered in Kerala in 1990 but received by the Sub-Registrar in Tamil Nadu in 1996, within the limitation period specified in Section 19B(4) of the Act.
  
  Initiation of Proceeding under Section 47A of the Act:
  The appellants argued that the proceeding under Section 47A should have been initiated within two years from the date of registration, but it was initiated after more than eight years, thus being barred by limitation. The High Court's decision was challenged on the grounds that subsequent amendments to the Act were not applicable to the present case. The respondents contended that Section 19B being a special provision, the period of limitation starts from the date of knowledge of the authorities, not from the date of registration. The proviso to Section 19B(4) provided for a four-year limitation period, which was deemed sufficient in this case.
  
  Calculation of Period of Limitation for Initiating Proceedings under Section 47A of the Act:
  The Act originally provided a two-year limitation for proceedings under Section 47A, which was later extended to five years by an amendment. The registration authorities of Tamil Nadu became aware of the registration of the documents in 1996, and the proceeding for deficit stamp duty was initiated in 1998. The limitation period under Section 47A was two years, while Section 19B provided for a four-year limitation from the date of registration. The amendments to the Act were held to have prospective operation only, and the period of limitation should start from the date of knowledge, not registration.
  
  Application of Subsequent Amendments to the Act:
  The subsequent amendment to Section 19B(4) of the Act clarified that the period of limitation starts from the date of receipt of the copy of the instrument in Tamil Nadu, not from the date of registration. The Court held that this clarification was not retrospective and that the period of limitation should be computed from the date of knowledge. The State's amendment was not considered retrospective, and the Court emphasized that a penal statute must be strictly construed, with penalties imposed within the statutory limitations.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision, holding that the impugned judgment could not be sustained. The Court allowed the appeal, emphasizing that the amendments to the Act had prospective operation, and the period of limitation for initiating proceedings should be calculated from the date of knowledge, not registration.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1093
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against dismissal of complaint u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 420 of IPC due to premature filing.
  
  The judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh addressed the appeal against the dismissal of a complaint u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant was aggrieved by the judgment of the Additional C.J.M., Una, which dismissed the complaint on the grounds of premature filing before the accrual of the cause of action. The complaint was regarding a cheque issued by the respondent for Rs. 9500 in favor of the complainant, which was dishonored. The complainant issued a notice to the respondent on 19th August 1993, a day before the expiry of the 15-day waiting period required by law before filing a complaint. However, the complaint was filed on 3rd September 1993, before the waiting period ended on 4th September 1993. The Trial Magistrate took cognizance of the matter after the expiry of the prescribed 15 days, leading to the dismissal of the complaint.
  
  The High Court referred to the decision in Narsingh Das Tapadia v. Goverdhan Das Partani and Anr. (2000) 7 SCC 183, where the Supreme Court held that if a complaint is filed before the expiry of the 15-day waiting period, the Magistrate should postpone taking cognizance instead of dismissing the complaint. In this case, the Magistrate had taken cognizance much after the 15-day period had lapsed, emphasizing the applicability of the Supreme Court's ruling. Therefore, the High Court accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and remanded the case to the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate for a fresh decision on merits in accordance with the law. The parties were directed to appear before the trial Court on 24.4.2009, and the trial Court's record was to be returned promptly along with a copy of the judgment to ensure timely proceedings.

  ---

• 2009 (3) TMI 1092
  

  Petition filled without pre-deposit - appeals are pending - Act was amended deleting the condition for pre-deposit for entertaining the appeal - notices issued to the Petitioner to make the deposit of the 50% of the total demand - Entertain' - sale of petroleum products- High Speed Diesel & lubricants - entry tax on the scheduled goods - HELD THAT:- It is the settled legal proposition that taxing statute must be construed strictly. Manish Maheshwari v. Asst. CIT and Ors.[2007 (2) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT]; The purpose of imposing the pre-deposit condition is that right of appeal may not be abused by any recalcitrant party & there may not be any difficulty in enforcing the order appealed against if ultimately it is dismissed. There must be speedy recovery of the amount of tax due to the authority.

  'Entertain' means either "to deal with or admit to consideration". 'Entertain' means when it is admitted & the matter is kept under consideration for hearing i.e. for consideration on merit. State of Haryana v. Maruti Udyog Ltd. and Ors.[2000 (9) TMI 946 - SUPREME COURT].

  In CIT, Bombay v. Filmistan Limited [1961 (2) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT], the Supreme Court examined a case where appeal under the provisions of Income Tax Act, 1922 was filed within limitation without meeting requirement of pre-deposit condition. However, tax was paid after the period of limitation prescribed for presenting the appeal. The provisions read that "no appeal shall lie" in view of the proviso to Section 30(1) of the Income Tax Act & it mean that appeal could not be held have been properly filed until tax was paid & any memorandum of appeal could not be presented.

  In view of the above, law can be summarised that if a condition of pre-deposit is imposed, a party while filing the appeal is bound to meet the requirement of the pre-deposit condition. However, it will depend upon the language of statutory provisions & particularly the words use therein as to whether the memo of appeal can be presented/filed or instituted without meeting the pre-deposit condition.

  In case "entertaining" the appeal is not permissible, the appeal can be filed, but may not be heard on merit unless the pre-deposit condition is met. The pre-deposit condition is imposed to regulate the procedure of appeal. Therefore, in such an eventuality, where there is no prohibition for filing the memorandum of appeal without meeting "the pre-deposit condition, the appeal can be heard only after meeting it.

  In the instant case, as the provision of the pre-deposit condition for entertaining the appeal has been deleted prior to entertaining the appeal being a procedural matter, the amendment would apply retrospectively. The instant case is squarely covered by the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lakshmi Rattan Engineering Works Ltd.[1967 (9) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT].

  The Writ Petition succeeds & is allowed. The impugned notices dated 28th November, 2006 in connection with Second Appeal are quashed.

  ---

12345........ 44