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1977 (4) TMI 186
Issues Involved:
1. Impact of newly introduced provisions in Articles 131A, 226, 226A, and 228A of the Constitution of India.
2. Validity and impact of interim orders made before the appointed day.
3. Jurisdiction of the High Court to admit and entertain writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of central laws.
4. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 when other remedies are available.
5. Applicability of new provisions in Article 226 to petitions for enforcement of fundamental rights.
6. Interpretation of the term "pending petition" in Section 58 of the Amending Act and its applicability to appeals.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Impact of Newly Introduced Provisions in Articles 131A, 226, 226A, and 228A:
The judgment addresses the scope and impact of the newly introduced provisions in Articles 131A, 226, 226A, and 228A of the Constitution, read with Section 58 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. The Court highlights that these provisions significantly alter the jurisdiction of the High Courts, particularly concerning the constitutional validity of central and state laws. Article 131A vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to determine the constitutional validity of central laws, while Article 226A bars High Courts from considering such validity in proceedings under Article 226. Article 228A deals with the jurisdiction of High Courts concerning the constitutional validity of state laws, requiring a minimum number of judges to decide such issues.
2. Validity and Impact of Interim Orders Made Before the Appointed Day:
The Court examines whether interim orders made before the appointed day, after hearing the parties or giving them an opportunity to be heard, remain unaffected. It concludes that such interim orders would remain unaffected if the parties had been given an opportunity to be heard, even if they did not avail themselves of it. The Court emphasizes that the urgency arising from the drastic provisions regarding abatement and vacating interim orders in Section 58 of the Amending Act necessitated a clear determination of this issue.
3. Jurisdiction of the High Court to Admit and Entertain Writ Petitions Challenging the Constitutional Validity of Central Laws:
The Court addresses whether Articles 131A and 226A, read with the amended Article 226, exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court to admit and entertain writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of central laws. It concludes that the High Court retains the power to admit such petitions but must refer the questions of constitutional validity to the Supreme Court as mandated by Article 131A. The Court underscores that the High Court's jurisdiction is not entirely ousted but is subject to the procedural requirement of referring constitutional questions to the Supreme Court.
4. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 When Other Remedies Are Available:
The Court considers whether the High Court is deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 226 when the petitioner has another remedy for redress of any injury. It determines that the jurisdiction is not entirely ousted but is restricted in cases where the other remedy is adequate, efficacious, convenient, and beneficial. The Court emphasizes that the adequacy and efficacy of the alternative remedy must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, considering factors such as the nature of the injury, the quality of the redress available, and the urgency for relief.
5. Applicability of New Provisions in Article 226 to Petitions for Enforcement of Fundamental Rights:
The Court examines whether the amended provisions of Articles 226(4), (5), and (6) apply to petitions for the enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 226(1)(a). It concludes that these provisions apply to all petitions under Article 226, including those for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The Court rejects the argument that the operation of these provisions should be restricted only to cases covered by Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 226(1). It emphasizes that the clear and unambiguous language of the provisions indicates the intention of the Parliament to apply them to all petitions under Article 226.
6. Interpretation of the Term "Pending Petition" in Section 58 of the Amending Act and Its Applicability to Appeals:
The Court addresses whether the term "pending petition" in Section 58 of the Amending Act includes an appeal pending in the High Court from an order finally deciding a petition under Article 226 before the appointed day. It concludes that Section 58 applies only to pending petitions and not to appeals. The Court emphasizes that the words "a petition under Article 226" have always been understood to mean the original petition under Article 226 and not an appeal from an order in such a petition. It underscores that there is no indication in Section 58 that it was intended to affect vested rights in appeals pending from decisions on petitions under Article 226.
Conclusion:
The judgment provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the newly introduced constitutional provisions on the jurisdiction of the High Courts, particularly concerning the constitutional validity of central and state laws, the validity of interim orders, and the applicability of alternative remedies. It emphasizes the need for a harmonious construction of the provisions to ensure that the jurisdiction of the High Courts is not unduly restricted while giving effect to the clear intention of the Parliament. The judgment also clarifies the interpretation of the term "pending petition" and its applicability to appeals, ensuring that vested rights in appeals are not affected by the new provisions.
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1977 (4) TMI 185
Issues:
1. Validity of notifications under Land Acquisition Act challenged by a company.
2. Interpretation of the term "incumbrances" under the Sick Textile Act.
3. Whether notifications under Land Acquisition Act constitute incumbrances affecting the property.
Analysis:
1. The judgment pertains to a case where the Maharashtra Government sought to acquire land owned by a company for a municipal school. The company challenged the validity of the acquisition notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The company's management was taken over by the Central Government under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, and subsequently, the textile undertaking vested in the National Textile Corporation under the Sick Textile Act.
2. The main issue revolved around the interpretation of the term "incumbrances" under the Sick Textile Act, specifically in Section 4(2). The National Textile Corporation contended that the notifications under the Land Acquisition Act should be considered incumbrances, thereby making them ineffective post-vesting in the Central Government. The High Court, however, held that the notifications did not fall under the definition of incumbrances.
3. The Supreme Court analyzed the provisions of the Sick Textile Act, emphasizing that the term "incumbrance" typically refers to a claim, lien, or liability attached to property. The Court referred to legal dictionaries to interpret the term and concluded that notifications under the Land Acquisition Act did not constitute incumbrances in the context of the Sick Textile Act. The Court highlighted that the Act aimed to free the property from specific burdens like trust, mortgage, charge, and lien, which did not encompass acquisition notifications.
4. The Court rejected the appellant's argument that any form of fetter on the property should be considered an incumbrance, noting that the Act's language indicated otherwise. The Court clarified that restrictions like attachments, injunctions, or court orders were distinct from incumbrances as defined in the Act. Consequently, the notifications under the Land Acquisition Act were deemed not to be incumbrances affecting the property post-vesting in the Central Government.
5. In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without any specific order on costs, affirming the High Court's decision that the notifications under the Land Acquisition Act did not qualify as incumbrances under the Sick Textile Act. The judgment clarified the interpretation of the term "incumbrances" in the context of property vesting and highlighted the specific nature of burdens intended to be removed by the Act.
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1977 (4) TMI 184
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the petitions abate based on the grounds mentioned in the respondents' affidavit.
2. Legality and validity of the Trade Notice issued by the Deputy Collector of Central Excise.
3. Jurisdiction and authority of the Deputy Collector to issue the Trade Notice.
4. Applicability of Article 226 of the Constitution after the Forty-Second Amendment.
5. Prima facie case for enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 31(1).
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the petitions abate based on the grounds mentioned in the respondents' affidavit:
The court examined whether the petitions abate due to the grounds mentioned in the respondents' affidavit, particularly focusing on the retrospective effect of Section 58 of the Forty-Second Amendment Act, 1976. This section mandates that every pending petition before a High Court, which would not have been admitted under the amended Article 226, must abate. The court concluded that the abatement question hinges on whether the petitions could have been admitted under the amended Article 226.
2. Legality and validity of the Trade Notice issued by the Deputy Collector of Central Excise:
The petitioners challenged the Trade Notice issued by the Deputy Collector of Central Excise as null and void, arguing that it changed the basis of excise duty assessment for blended yarn from the spindle point to the stage of cones, bobbins, and beams. The court noted that the Trade Notice was not legally binding on the assessing authority and emphasized that any quasi-judicial power exercised by the Collector could not be controlled by such directions.
3. Jurisdiction and authority of the Deputy Collector to issue the Trade Notice:
The court scrutinized whether the Deputy Collector had the jurisdiction to issue the Trade Notice. It was established that under Rule 233, only the Collector in Gujarat had the power to issue such instructions, not the Deputy Collector. Consequently, the Trade Notice issued by the Deputy Collector was deemed ultra vires and without jurisdiction.
4. Applicability of Article 226 of the Constitution after the Forty-Second Amendment:
The court analyzed the amended Article 226, which restricts the High Court's jurisdiction to cases of enforcement of fundamental rights and redress of substantial injuries resulting from contraventions of constitutional or statutory provisions or substantial failures of justice. The court emphasized that petitions for enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 31(1) are not subject to the fetter of alternative remedies under Article 226(3). The court reaffirmed that the High Court retains jurisdiction to entertain petitions for enforcement of fundamental rights without the need for exhausting alternative remedies.
5. Prima facie case for enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 31(1):
The court found that the petitioners had made a prima facie case for enforcement of their fundamental rights under Article 31(1), as the excise authorities sought to enforce a demand for excise duty by changing the settled basis of excise levy without jurisdiction and in breach of the principles of natural justice. The court noted that the petitioners' property rights were threatened by the implementation of the Trade Notice, thereby justifying their approach to the court without exhausting alternative remedies.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the petitions do not abate under the amended Article 226 and that the petitioners had established a prima facie case for enforcement of their fundamental rights. The Trade Notice issued by the Deputy Collector was deemed ultra vires and without jurisdiction. The petitions were directed to proceed to the Division Bench for final disposal. Costs were reserved to be determined in the petitions.
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1977 (4) TMI 183
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the notice (Exh. 'B') issued by the Municipal Commissioner.
2. Competence of the Municipal Commissioner to issue the notice after the expiry of the Bombay Act, 1944.
3. Whether the notice (Exh. 'B') constituted an order under Section 13(1)(hhh) of the Bombay Rents Control Act, 1947.
4. Requirement of the premises for the immediate purpose of demolition.
5. Suspension and variation of the Town Planning Scheme.
6. Authority to evict the tenant under the Town Planning Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Notice (Exh. 'B'):
The appellants argued that the notice (Exh. 'B') issued by the Municipal Commissioner was invalid because it was based on the conditions specified in a temporary statute, the Bombay Act, 1944, which had expired. The Supreme Court held that the rights and obligations arising from the conditions imposed by the Municipal Commissioner while granting the permit (Exh. 'A') were of a permanent nature and did not lapse with the expiry of the Act. The notice was valid and enforceable under the statutory provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954.
2. Competence of the Municipal Commissioner:
The appellants contended that the Municipal Commissioner ceased to have statutory authority after the expiry of the Bombay Act, 1944. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the Municipal Commissioner, being a creature of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, continued to have authority to enforce the conditions imposed under the Bombay Act, 1944. The conditions were annexed to the ownership of the building and survived the expiry of the Act.
3. Whether the Notice Constituted an Order:
The appellants argued that the notice (Exh. 'B') did not constitute an order under Section 13(1)(hhh) of the Bombay Rents Control Act, 1947, as it was not based on any statutory power. The Supreme Court found that the notice was issued under the Special Regulation No. 36, which became a part of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. The notice had its genesis in the statutory provisions and constituted an order within the meaning of Section 13(1)(hhh).
4. Requirement of the Premises for Immediate Demolition:
The appellants argued that the premises were not required for the immediate purpose of demolition as the town planning scheme was in abeyance. The Supreme Court held that the requirement for immediate demolition was satisfied as long as the order of demolition was issued by a competent authority. The statement of the Sub-Engineer regarding the general policy of the Corporation was irrelevant, as the instructions were based on past periods and did not affect the current requirement.
5. Suspension and Variation of the Scheme:
The appellants contended that the scheme had been suspended and varied, making the notice (Exh. 'B') ineffective. The Supreme Court found that the suspension of certain regulations did not amount to the withdrawal or abandonment of the scheme. The regulations relevant to the case, including Regulation No. 36, were specifically saved. The proposed variation of the scheme had not materialized and was of no legal consequence until carried into effect.
6. Authority to Evict the Tenant:
The appellants argued that it was the local authority, not the landlord, who had the power to evict the tenant under the Town Planning Act. The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, stating that nothing in the provisions indicated that only the local authority could evict the tenant. The landlord had the right to evict the tenant under Section 13(1)(hhh) of the Bombay Rents Control Act, 1947, and could seek reasonable facilities to comply with the notice under Section 507 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the Municipal Commissioner had the authority to issue the notice (Exh. 'B'), which constituted an order under Section 13(1)(hhh) of the Bombay Rents Control Act, 1947. The premises were required for the immediate purpose of demolition, and the suspension or variation of the scheme did not affect the validity of the notice. The landlord had the authority to evict the tenant under the relevant statutory provisions. The respondents agreed not to evict the appellants until the end of the year 1977 unless required by the Municipal Commissioner to implement the scheme.
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1977 (4) TMI 182
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of Clauses 5 and 9 of the Redistribution Stockists Agreement.
2. Definition and application of "restrictive trade practice" under the Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969.
3. Relevance of motives of the informant in proceedings before the Commission.
4. Applicability of the "per se rule" versus the "rule of reason."
5. Justification of powers under Clause 9 through public interest (section 38 of the Act).
6. Necessity of extraneous evidence in interpreting the clauses.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of Clauses 5 and 9 of the Redistribution Stockists Agreement:
Clause 5 required stockists to maintain adequate stocks and follow the company's instructions, including maximum resale prices. Clause 9 restricted stockists from conveying stocks outside specified towns without the company's written permission. The Commission found these clauses to constitute unreasonable and illegal restrictions. Clause 5 was modified to remove the company's discretion in sending stock to stockists, and Clause 9 was declared void.
2. Definition and Application of "Restrictive Trade Practice":
The Court examined whether the clauses amounted to restrictive trade practices under section 2(o) of the Act, which includes practices that prevent, distort, or restrict competition. The Court held that the introduction of such clauses itself constituted a trade practice that could restrict competition, thus falling within the definition of restrictive trade practice.
3. Relevance of Motives of the Informant:
The Court deemed the motives of the informant irrelevant. The focus was on whether the clauses in the agreements amounted to restrictive trade practices, not on the informant's reasons for filing the complaint.
4. Applicability of the "Per Se Rule" versus the "Rule of Reason":
The appellant argued for the application of the "rule of reason" as opposed to the "per se rule," citing the Telco case. The Court clarified that the rule of reason involves considering the facts peculiar to the business, the condition before and after the restraint, and the nature and probable effect of the restraint. The Court found that the clauses in question, by their plain meaning, imposed unreasonable restrictions and did not require further extraneous evidence.
5. Justification of Powers under Clause 9 through Public Interest (Section 38 of the Act):
The appellant failed to justify the wide powers conferred by Clause 9 as serving public interest under section 38 of the Act. The Commission and the Court found no evidence to justify such powers, which were deemed unreasonable and restrictive.
6. Necessity of Extraneous Evidence in Interpreting the Clauses:
The Court held that extraneous evidence was unnecessary for interpreting the clauses, as their meanings and effects were clear from the language used. The introduction of such clauses was itself a restrictive practice, and their potential misuse justified their modification or removal.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the Commission's order, modifying Clause 5 and voiding Clause 9 of the Redistribution Stockists Agreement. The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the company was directed to comply with the modifications within six months. The judgment emphasized the importance of interpreting contractual clauses in light of their potential to restrict trade, without necessarily relying on extraneous evidence.
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1977 (4) TMI 181
Issues:
Challenge to the sentence imposed in a murder case.
Analysis:
In this judgment, the Supreme Court addressed the challenge to the sentence imposed in a murder case. The appellant had been convicted of murder, with one accused receiving life imprisonment and the appellant being sentenced to death by the Sessions Court, a decision upheld by the High Court. The appeal focused solely on the question of the sentence imposed. The Court discussed Section 235 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, which allows for personalized sentencing based on individual circumstances. It emphasized the importance of considering personal, social, and other factors while determining the appropriate sentence, especially in cases of conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
The Court noted that the appellant was not given an opportunity under Section 235(2) of the Cr.P.C. to present reasons why a lesser sentence should be imposed. However, this failure did not impact the conviction but was relevant only to the sentencing. Referring to the Santa Singh v. State of Punjab case, the Court highlighted that the hearing under Section 235(2) should involve presenting facts and materials relevant to the sentencing decision. While the Court could have sent the case back to the Sessions Court for compliance, it opted to allow both parties to rely on the existing record for sentencing considerations, avoiding unnecessary delays and expenses.
After considering the facts of the case, including the circumstances surrounding the murder and the absence of a clear motive for the appellant's actions, the Court concluded that life imprisonment would be a more just and appropriate sentence than the death penalty. The Court observed that the death sentence should be reserved for cases with aggravating factors and where the crime is particularly brutal or depraved. Given the lack of a compelling reason to impose the death penalty in this case, the Court directed that the sentence of life imprisonment be substituted for the death sentence originally imposed by the Trial Court and upheld by the High Court. The appeal was allowed to this extent, with another appeal being dismissed as not pressed.
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1977 (4) TMI 180
Issues:
1. Whether the debts sought to be recovered are affected by the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act.
2. Whether the debts due to the Corporation are excluded from the Madras Act under Section 4(e).
3. Interpretation of Sections 7 and 9 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 regarding the transfer of liabilities to the Corporation.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The appeals involved determining if the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act applied to debts sought to be recovered by the Life Insurance Corporation of India. The suits were filed before the Corporation was established, and the mortgagors claimed debt scaling under the Madras Act. Both the trial court and the High Court upheld the scaling down of debts, which the Corporation resisted based on Section 4(e) of the Madras Act. The key issue was whether the Madras Act was barred from applying to the debts in question.
2. The interpretation of Section 4(e) of the Madras Act was crucial in deciding whether the debts due to the Corporation were exempt from the provisions of the Madras Act. The contention was that since the debts were originally owed to insurance companies before being taken over by the Corporation, Section 4(e) did not apply. However, both the trial court and the High Court held that the genesis of the debts did not exclude them from the Madras Act, leading to the question of whether the debts were affected by the Madras Act.
3. The judgment delved into the provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, specifically Sections 7 and 9. Section 7 mandated the transfer of assets and liabilities to the Corporation, including debts relating to the life insurance business of insurers. Section 9 clarified the effect of vesting, stating that contracts and legal proceedings could be enforced by the Corporation post-vesting. The argument centered around whether a legal fiction was created by Section 9(1) regarding debts owed to the Corporation from the beginning, ultimately affirming that the liabilities and obligations were indeed transferred to the Corporation under the Act.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the decision of the High Court that the debts were subject to scaling down under the Madras Act. The judgment clarified the transfer of liabilities to the Corporation under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, emphasizing that the debts owed to insurers were now obligations of the Corporation and could not be exempt from the provisions of the Madras Act.
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1977 (4) TMI 179
Issues Involved:
1. Denial of fair hearing by the Land Tribunal.
2. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
3. Validity of the appellant's claim as a 'deemed tenant' under Section 4 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act.
4. Impact of previous proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act on the current claim under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Denial of Fair Hearing by the Land Tribunal
The High Court found that the Land Tribunal denied a fair hearing to respondents 1 and 2, which constituted a breach of the Rules of Natural Justice. The Tribunal's proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated these principles, such as detaining one of the respondents by the police and refusing to accept documents supporting their case. The judgment emphasized that "violation of the Rules of Natural Justice renders the decision void even where the law provides for an appeal." This conclusion was not contested by the appellant or the State.
2. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
The appellant argued that the High Court should not have decided on the merits of the case but should have remanded the matter to the Tribunal. The High Court acknowledged that the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to decide claims under Section 45 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. However, the High Court also noted that it has the authority to intervene when a Tribunal transgresses its jurisdiction, as provided under Section 141 of the Act, which prohibits reopening decisions made under the Inams Abolition Act.
3. Validity of the Appellant's Claim as a 'Deemed Tenant' under Section 4 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act
The appellant claimed to be a 'deemed tenant' under Section 4 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, asserting that he and his predecessors had been cultivating the land on a crop-share basis for over 40 years. The High Court required the appellant to clarify his position regarding his tenancy status. The appellant conceded that he was not recognized as a tenant under Section 9-A of the Inams Abolition Act and did not claim any tenancy rights originating after the grant of occupancy to Muniswamappa in 1958. The High Court concluded that the appellant's claim did not meet the criteria for being a 'deemed tenant' as he did not establish a lawful relationship of tenancy or license post-1958.
4. Impact of Previous Proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act on the Current Claim under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act
The High Court analyzed the relationship between the Inams Abolition Act and the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. It noted that the Inams Abolition Act aimed to convert Inam tenures into Ryotwari tenures, while the Karnataka Land Reforms Act focused on radical agrarian reforms, including the termination of landlord-tenant relationships and the conferment of occupancy rights on tenants. The High Court emphasized that the material dates and purposes of the two Acts are different, and concluded that the termination of proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act does not bar an investigation of claims under Section 45 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act by the Land Tribunal. However, since the appellant did not establish a valid tenancy or license post-1958, his claim could not be sustained.
Conclusion:
The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the appellant did not meet the criteria for being recognized as a 'deemed tenant' under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. The Court also upheld the principle that violations of Natural Justice render Tribunal decisions void, and emphasized its jurisdiction to intervene when Tribunals exceed their authority. The appeal was dismissed, and parties were directed to bear their own costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 178
Issues Involved:
1. Authority to Bind the Second Defendant
2. Applicability of the Indemnity Policy to Advances Made Prior to its Date
3. Prematurity of the Claim Against the Insurer
4. Extent of Liability of the Insurer Relative to the Principal Debtor
5. Deduction of Payments Made During Suit Pendency
Summary:
Issue 1: Authority to Bind the Second Defendant
The appellant contended that K.G. Merchant, who executed Exhibit P-6, lacked authority to bind the second defendant. However, the court found that the premium paid by the first defendant was appropriated by the appellant, indicating ratification of the contract by the appellant. The court held that the appellant was disabled from disowning the contract, and the contract under Ext. P-6 was binding on the appellant.
Issue 2: Applicability of the Indemnity Policy to Advances Made Prior to its Date
The appellant argued that Ext. P-6 could only be invoked for advances made after 28-12-1967. The court noted that the first defendant continued to make withdrawals after this date, which were permitted due to the guarantee under Ext. P-6. Therefore, the court held that the continued operation of the account and further withdrawals were in pursuance of the Policy Ext. P-6, and the liability covered advances made after 28-12-1967.
Issue 3: Prematurity of the Claim Against the Insurer
The appellant contended that the remedy against the insurer would arise only after exhausting remedies against the principal debtor. The court clarified the distinction between a contract of indemnity and a guarantee, noting that the liability under Ext. P-6 arose upon default by the first defendant. The court held that the claim was not premature as the liability of the appellant arose in consequence of the default by the first defendant.
Issue 4: Extent of Liability of the Insurer Relative to the Principal Debtor
The appellant argued that the decree against the insurer should be limited to the extent of the personal decree against the principal debtor. The court noted that the liability of the surety and the principal debtor, though arising from the same transaction, are distinct. The court held that the decree against the appellant should not be limited to the personal decree against the principal debtor and answered this point against the appellant.
Issue 5: Deduction of Payments Made During Suit Pendency
The appellant pointed out that the sum of Rs. 33,760.85 paid during the pendency of the suit was not deducted in the decree against the first defendant. The court acknowledged this and directed that in drawing up the decree against the first defendant, this payment should be taken into account. The court also ordered that two separate decrees be drawn up, one against the appellant and the other against the first defendant, with appropriate adjustments for any realizations made under either decree.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed except for the modification regarding the deduction of payments made during the pendency of the suit. The court directed the parties to bear their own costs in the appeal.
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1977 (4) TMI 177
Issues Involved:
1. Proprietary interest in the trade mark "RAJARANI".
2. Establishment of a prima facie case for interim injunction.
3. Balance of convenience between the parties.
4. Irreparable injury to the appellant.
Summary:
Proprietary Interest in the Trade Mark "RAJARANI":
The appellant claimed proprietary interest in the trade mark "RAJARANI" based on user, while the respondents contested this on the grounds that the mark belonged to respondent No. 3, was common to the trade, and had prior registrations. The learned Single Judge concluded that neither party could claim proprietary interest due to earlier registrations and the trade mark registry's view that no proprietary interest could be given in the words "RAJARANI" or "King and Queen".
Establishment of a Prima Facie Case for Interim Injunction:
The prima facie case in favor of the appellant was established by admitted user of the mark on voiles produced and marketed by it. However, this was weakened by the mark being common to the trade and various registrations. The court emphasized that in a passing off action, registration of the trade mark is immaterial (u/s 27 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958). The appellant had to establish user of the mark prior to the respondents' use, and mere presence of the mark in the trade mark registry did not prove its user.
Balance of Convenience Between the Parties:
The balance of convenience was in favor of the appellant, who was the first user of the mark. The court noted that there was no evidence of actual user of the mark by any party other than the parties before it. The appellant's right to property in the trade mark should be protected, and the balance of convenience favored the appellant.
Irreparable Injury to the Appellant:
The irreparable injury would be the likely confusion caused if respondents were allowed to use the mark. If the respondents continued to market their goods with the offending mark, it might lead to long user and the ultimate relief of permanent injunction might be refused on the plea of common or concurrent user. The likelihood of confusion and the potential for a plea of common or concurrent user constituted irreparable injury to the appellant.
Conclusion:
The appeal was accepted, the judgment of the learned Single Judge was reversed, and an interim injunction was issued against the respondents restraining them from using the trade mark "RAJARANI" on any voiles they may manufacture, market, or process. The injunction was restricted to voiles only, as claimed by the appellant. The appeal was disposed of without any order as to costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 176
The Supreme Court of India considered the scope of Section 377(1) and (2), Cr.P.C. in appeals by the State of Maharashtra regarding inadequate sentences under the Indian Forest Act. The High Court initially deemed the appeals incompetent, but also found no reason to change the sentences. The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court on the competency of the appeals but agreed on the sentence issue. The High Court's decision on maintainability was set aside, and the appeals were dismissed. (Case Citation: 1977 (4) TMI 176 - Supreme Court)
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1977 (4) TMI 175
Issues Involved:
1. Competency of the State's appeal u/s 377(1) Cr.P.C.
2. Justification for interference with the sentence by the High Court.
3. High Court's power of enhancement of sentence suo motu.
4. Interpretation of section 377(2) Cr.P.C. in relation to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
5. Adequacy of reasons for awarding a lesser sentence by the Magistrate.
Summary:
1. Competency of the State's Appeal u/s 377(1) Cr.P.C.:
Mr. Tarkunde argued that the appeal by the State of Maharashtra u/s 377(1) Cr.P.C. was incompetent due to the provisions of sub-section (2) of that section. The Court clarified that section 377(2) Cr.P.C. is not attracted in this case, and the appeal u/s 377(1) Cr.P.C. at the instance of the State Government is maintainable. The Court held that the first submission of the appellant has no force.
2. Justification for Interference with the Sentence by the High Court:
The High Court enhanced the appellant's sentence to six months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. The appellant contended that the trial court had given adequate reasons for imposing a lesser sentence. The Supreme Court found that the Magistrate had jurisdiction under the first proviso to section 16(1) to award less than the minimum sentence by recording adequate and special reasons. The reasons given by the Magistrate were not grossly inadequate, and the High Court was not justified in interfering with the sentence in this petty case.
3. High Court's Power of Enhancement of Sentence Suo Motu:
The Court clarified that the High Court's power of enhancement of sentence by exercising revisional jurisdiction suo motu is still extant u/s 397 read with section 401 Cr.P.C. The provision of section 401(4) does not stand in the way of the High Court's exercise of power of revision suo motu.
4. Interpretation of Section 377(2) Cr.P.C. in Relation to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act:
The Court examined whether the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act empowered the Food Inspectors to make investigations under the Act. It concluded that there is no express provision in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act empowering the Food Inspectors to make investigations. Therefore, section 377(2) Cr.P.C. is not applicable, and the appeal by the State Government u/s 377(1) Cr.P.C. is maintainable.
5. Adequacy of Reasons for Awarding a Lesser Sentence by the Magistrate:
The Magistrate noted that the appellant was a small retail shopkeeper and considered the nature of the offence as disclosed in the report of the Public Analyst. There was no evidence to show that any injurious ingredient to health was mixed with the article. The Supreme Court found that the reasons given by the Magistrate were adequate and special, justifying the lesser sentence.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the judgment and order of the High Court were set aside. The appellant was discharged from his bail bond. The Court also emphasized the importance of judicial discipline and decorum, noting that the learned single Judge should have referred the matter to a larger bench instead of taking a contrary view to a coordinate court's decision.
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1977 (4) TMI 174
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of eviction under section 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
2. Status of the first respondent as the landlord.
3. Applicability of section 14A(1) proviso regarding multiple evictions.
4. Procedural objections regarding the absence of co-heirs.
Summary:
1. Validity of Eviction u/s 14A:
The case pertains to an ejectment proceeding u/s 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The Controller directed eviction, refusing leave to the tenant to contest the application. The High Court affirmed the eviction on different grounds, missing a plea fatal to the landlord's claim. The Supreme Court granted special leave to appeal, resulting in a re-adjustment between the parties.
2. Status of the First Respondent as Landlord:
The respondent, an Under Secretary to the Government, was required to vacate government-allotted residential premises as he owned a house in Delhi. The appellant contested that the first respondent was not the landlord and that the premises were not let out by him. The Court held that the first respondent, as an heir stepping into his father's shoes, represented the former owner and lessor, thus falling within section 14A. The Court emphasized that the respondent, who collected rent and issued receipts, functioned as the landlord.
3. Applicability of Section 14A(1) Proviso:
The appellant argued that the first respondent had already evicted another tenant using section 14A and kept the premises vacant. The Court agreed, stating that section 14A cannot be used to evict multiple tenants. The proviso to section 14A(1) restricts a landlord owning multiple dwelling houses from recovering possession of more than one. The Court concluded that the first respondent's right to evict was exhausted after recovering one dwelling house.
4. Procedural Objections Regarding Absence of Co-Heirs:
The appellant raised an objection that other heirs of the late Das were necessary parties but were not impleaded at the trial stage. The High Court later impleaded the co-heirs. The Court found that the presence of co-heirs at the High Court level was sufficient and their absence at the trial stage did not vitiate the Controller's order. The Court dismissed the appellant's contention regarding the will and the co-heirs' consent.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed on the ground that the first respondent could not use section 14A to evict multiple tenants. The Court directed an exchange of premises between the parties, with the appellant moving into the vacant three-room apartment and surrendering the four-room apartment involved in the eviction proceedings. The appeal was allowed with the parties bearing their own costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 173
Issues Involved:
1. Whether Shri John was born on May 14, 1946, or May 14, 1943.
2. Whether the election of Shri John was valid given his age.
3. Whether Shri V. Subramanyam should be declared elected in lieu of Shri John.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Whether Shri John was born on May 14, 1946, or May 14, 1943.
The primary contention was the birthdate of Shri John. The petitioners argued that Shri John was born on May 14, 1946, making him less than 30 years old on the date of nomination scrutiny (March 9, 1974), thus disqualifying him under Article 84(b) of the Constitution. The appellant, Shri John, claimed he was born on May 14, 1943.
The court found that the burden of proof was on the election petitioners, who successfully discharged it by presenting overwhelming documentary evidence. This included multiple applications and declarations made by Shri John himself between 1964 and 1973, consistently stating his birthdate as May 14, 1946. These documents were:
- Application for Pre-University Examination (Ex.P.7)
- Application for B.A. Examination (Ex.P-9)
- Application for appearing in University Examination (Ex. P-l4)
- Application for the first B.G.L. Examination (Ex.P-l5)
- Application for admission to B.G.L. Examination (Ex.P-l7)
- Application for second B.G.L. Examination April 1972 (Ex.P-l8)
- Application for second BGL Examination, October 1972 (Ex.P-19)
- Application for admission into Law College (Ex.P-21)
- Application for B.L. Degree Examination (Ex.-22)
- Applications dated 23-7-1973 for enrolment as Advocate submitted to the Bar Council (Ex.P-23(a), (b) & (c))
- Voters Card containing declaration of his age as 28 years signed by Shri John (Ex.P-27)
- A book written by Shri John, containing a passage suggesting he was born in 1946 (Ex.P-87)
Additional documentary evidence included:
- St. Xavier's College School records (Exhibit P-1)
- Secondary School Leaving Certificate (Ex.P-4)
- Fort St. George Gazette (Ex.P-50)
- Marriage Register (Ex.P-29) showing Shri John's age as 26 years on 6-4-1972
- Periodical report from the Churches (Ex.P-30)
The court found no material error in the trial judge's appreciation of this evidence and held that Shri John was indeed born on May 14, 1946.
Issue 2: Whether the election of Shri John was valid given his age.
Given the established birthdate of May 14, 1946, Shri John was less than 30 years old on the date of nomination scrutiny. As per Article 84(b) of the Constitution, this disqualified him from contesting the Rajya Sabha election. Hence, his nomination was improperly accepted, materially affecting the election's result. Consequently, the High Court rightly set aside Shri John's election.
Issue 3: Whether Shri V. Subramanyam should be declared elected in lieu of Shri John.
The court considered whether Shri V. Subramanyam, who secured 300 votes, should be declared elected in place of Shri John. Shri Subramanyam argued that since Shri Mohana Rangam did not secure any votes, he should be automatically excluded, leaving Shri Subramanyam as the sole continuing candidate.
However, the court held that Shri Mohana Rangam was not automatically excluded and remained a continuing candidate. The election rules did not provide for automatic exclusion of a candidate who secured no votes in the first count. Both Shri Subramanyam and Shri Mohana Rangam were continuing candidates, and Shri Subramanyam did not secure the required quota of 3,201 votes.
The court also rejected the argument that votes cast for Shri John should be treated as thrown away. The electors were unaware of Shri John's disqualification at the time of voting. It was speculative to assume how the votes would have been distributed had the electors known about the disqualification. The court cited the precedent from R.M. Seshadri v. G.V. Pai, emphasizing the unpredictability of voting patterns under such circumstances.
The court concluded that Shri Subramanyam could not be declared elected as he neither secured the required quota nor was the sole continuing candidate. The appeals were dismissed, and parties were left to bear their own costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 172
Issues Involved:
1. Acquittal of accused Nos. 1 and 2.
2. Conviction of accused No. 3 under s. 302 read with s. 34 and the sentence of death.
3. Conviction of accused Nos. 9 to 12 under s. 302 read with s. 34 and the enhancement of their sentence from life imprisonment to death.
4. The procedural compliance concerning the hearing on the question of sentence under s. 235(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Acquittal of Accused Nos. 1 and 2:
The High Court acquitted accused Nos. 1 and 2, holding that the offence of conspiracy was not proven. The prosecution's reliance on the evidence of the two approvers, Ganpat and Shankar, was critical. The Sessions Judge accepted both approvers' testimonies, but the High Court rejected Ganpat's evidence and accepted Shankar's. The legal position regarding accomplice evidence requires corroboration in material particulars. Ganpat's testimony was found unreliable due to contradictions and lack of credibility. Shankar's evidence, though more credible, lacked independent corroboration regarding the involvement of accused Nos. 1 and 2 in the conspiracy. The High Court's acquittal of accused Nos. 1 and 2 was confirmed as there was no justification to interfere with the conclusion.
2. Conviction of Accused No. 3:
Accused No. 3 was convicted for the murders of Gayabai, Shakila, Sugandhabai, and Nasima. The prosecution relied on the evidence of the approvers, the discovery of incriminating articles, and the retracted confession of accused No. 3. The evidence of Ganpat was discarded, but Shankar's testimony, corroborated by the discovery of article 17 (shirt pieces stained with blood), was sufficient to uphold the conviction. The High Court and the Sessions Court's concurrent view that the complicity of accused No. 3 was proven beyond a reasonable doubt was affirmed. The charge of conspiracy failed, and the conviction under s. 302 read with s. 34 was upheld, along with the sentence of death.
3. Conviction and Sentence of Accused Nos. 9 to 12:
Accused Nos. 9 to 12 were convicted for the murders of Haribai, Taramati, and Kamal. The evidence against them included the eyewitness account of Umaji, discoveries of incriminating articles, injuries on accused No. 10, and the movements of the accused. The High Court enhanced their sentence from life imprisonment to death. The evidence of Umaji was found credible and corroborated by the discovery of blood-stained articles and injuries. Accused No. 12 was acquitted due to insufficient corroboration and doubts about his identification. The conviction of accused Nos. 9, 10, and 11 under s. 302 read with s. 34 was upheld, and the death sentence was confirmed.
4. Procedural Compliance under s. 235(2) Cr.P.C.:
The accused contended that they were not heard on the question of sentence, violating s. 235(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The Court provided an opportunity to the accused to make submissions on the question of sentence. The provision requires the Court to hear the accused on the question of sentence after recording the conviction. The Court concluded that it is not always necessary to remand the matter to the trial court for hearing on the sentence. Instead, the higher court can remedy the breach by giving the accused an opportunity to present their case on the sentence. The death sentence for accused Nos. 3, 9, 10, and 11 was upheld after considering their submissions.
Conclusion:
1. The acquittal of accused Nos. 1 and 2 was upheld.
2. The conviction and death sentence of accused No. 3 were affirmed.
3. The conviction and death sentence of accused Nos. 9, 10, and 11 were upheld, while accused No. 12 was acquitted.
4. The procedural compliance under s. 235(2) Cr.P.C. was addressed by hearing the accused on the question of sentence at the appellate stage.
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1977 (4) TMI 171
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the sanction for prosecution.
2. Competency of the authority issuing the sanction.
3. Applicability of the delegation of powers under relevant rules.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Sanction for Prosecution:
The primary issue in this case was whether the sanction for prosecution of the respondent under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 161 of the Penal Code was valid. The High Court had set aside the conviction on the sole ground that the sanction for prosecution had not been accorded by a competent authority. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, emphasizing that the sanction must be given by an authority competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the alleged offense was committed.
2. Competency of the Authority Issuing the Sanction:
The Supreme Court examined whether Brig. Naresh Prasad, Chief Engineer, North Western Zone, Chandigarh, had the authority to sanction the prosecution of the respondent. The Court noted that, as per the relevant rules, the authority competent to appoint the respondent on 24-6-1971 was the Chief Engineer Western Command, Simla, and not the Zonal Chief Engineer. Therefore, the sanction for prosecution given by Brig. Naresh Prasad was invalid.
3. Applicability of the Delegation of Powers Under Relevant Rules:
The Court analyzed the delegation of powers under the Civilians in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1952, and 1965. It was argued that the delegation of power to appoint and remove Class III officers was given to Chief Engineers of Commands and not to Zonal Chief Engineers. The Court found that the reorganization in December 1962, which created Zonal Chief Engineers, did not automatically extend the delegation of powers to these new positions. The letter dated 27-4-1956, which delegated appointment powers to Chief Engineers of Commands, did not cover Zonal Chief Engineers created later. The Court concluded that the Zonal Chief Engineers were a separate class under the overall control of the Chief Engineers of Commands.
The Court also addressed the letter dated 23-1-1963, which purportedly extended the powers of appointment to Zonal Chief Engineers. The Court found this letter insufficient as it was not issued by the Engineer-in-Chief and did not constitute a valid delegation of powers under Rule 10. The Court emphasized that the assumption made in the letter regarding the delegation of powers was incorrect, leading to the necessity of a proper order on 14-1-1972 delegating such powers to Zonal Chief Engineers.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to set aside the conviction of the respondent due to the lack of a valid sanction for prosecution. The Court clarified that the authority issuing the sanction must be competent to remove the public servant from office at the time of the alleged offense. The Court dismissed the appeal, noting that this does not preclude a fresh prosecution if the State chooses to pursue it.
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1977 (4) TMI 170
Issues Involved:
The judgment deals with the powers of the Court in indemnifying the owner of property lost while in custody of the Court.
Summary:
Issue 1: Custody of Stolen Property
The theft of ornaments and cash from the complainant's house led to a legal process where the stolen articles were recovered by the police, produced before the Court, and then retained by the Sub-Inspector under the Court's directions. The Court's control over the articles established them as custodia legis.
Issue 2: Court's Power in Indemnification
The Court has the authority to order the return of stolen property or payment of its equivalent value if the property is lost, stolen, or destroyed. In this case, the Court found the complainant entitled to the cash equivalent of the lost property, amounting to Rs. 10,000, which the State was directed to pay.
The judgment emphasizes that the Court's control over property extends to cases where the property is not physically in its possession but under its direction. It clarifies that the Court can order payment of the value of lost property if the State fails to protect it adequately. In this instance, the Court ordered the State to compensate the complainant for the lost property's value, highlighting the State's responsibility in safeguarding property under its custody.
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1977 (4) TMI 169
Issues Involved:
1. Competency of the Deputy Inspector General of Police to dismiss the respondent.
2. Applicability of the principle of constructive res judicata.
Summary:
1. Competency of the Deputy Inspector General of Police to dismiss the respondent:
The respondent, a confirmed Sub-Inspector of Police, was dismissed from service by an order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police. The respondent challenged this dismissal on the grounds that he was appointed by the Inspector General of Police and thus could not be dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police as per Article 311(1) of the Constitution. The trial court and the District Judge upheld the dismissal, but the High Court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, stating that the Deputy Inspector General of Police was not competent to dismiss him.
2. Applicability of the principle of constructive res judicata:
The High Court ruled that the suit was not barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. However, the Supreme Court found that the High Court committed an error of law in this regard. The principle of estoppel per rem judicatam, a rule of evidence, prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action. The Supreme Court emphasized that it is not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, as it would lead to conflicting judgments and multiplicity of actions. The Court referred to previous decisions, including *Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Bombay* and *Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam*, to highlight that the principle of constructive res judicata applies to writ petitions as well. The respondent did not raise the plea regarding the incompetence of the Deputy Inspector General of Police in the earlier writ petition, which was within his knowledge. Therefore, it was not permissible for him to challenge his dismissal on this ground in the subsequent suit.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, and dismissed the respondent's suit. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 168
Issues involved: Interpretation of section 3 of the Punjab Professions, Trades, Callings and Employments Taxation Act, 1956 regarding taxation on income made within the State of Punjab and the validity of the amendment to section 2 of the Act.
Interpretation of Section 3:
The High Court of Punjab & Haryana considered whether section 3 of the Act restricts taxation to income made within Punjab. The section mandates taxation on persons carrying on trade, profession, or employment within Punjab. The determination of tax is based on the total "gross income" derived from various sources, including those outside Punjab. The High Court's interpretation focused on taxing income made only within Punjab, which was deemed erroneous. The Court clarified that the section aims to identify individuals with taxable activities within Punjab, while the calculation of tax considers income from both inside and outside Punjab.
Validity of Amendment to Section 2:
The Legislature amended the Act in 1962 to include whether the profession or calling is followed within or outside Punjab in the definition of "total gross income." The High Court's interpretation, based on a previous decision, disregarded the impact of this amendment on tax calculation. The Court criticized the High Court's approach, stating that it rendered the amended provisions ineffective and amounted to legislative overreach. The question of the Act's validity under Article 245(1) of the Constitution was left open by the High Court, necessitating further consideration.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgments, and remanded the cases for a decision on the validity of the amendment to section 2 of the Act. The Court emphasized the importance of interpreting statutory provisions in line with legislative intent and constitutional principles. The parties were directed to bear their own costs in the matter.
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1977 (4) TMI 167
The judgment upheld the Assistant Collector's order, rejecting the appeal by the appellants who admitted to excesses and shortages in raw materials due to the dealing Clerk being on leave. The absence of the Dealing Clerk was deemed inadequate for non-maintenance of accounts. Pleas regarding Stearic Acid absorbing moisture and Liquid Paraffin recovery were rejected for lack of evidence. The appellants' high reputation was deemed irrelevant to the issue.
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