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1978 (4) TMI 245
Issues:
- Violation of principles of natural justice in dismissal from service
- Applicability of Article 311 of the Constitution
- Merger of dismissal order in revisional authorities
Analysis:
The Supreme Court heard an appeal challenging the judgment of the Allahabad High Court regarding the dismissal of an employee from service. The Court noted that all lower courts had found that the employee was not given a fair opportunity to defend himself before the dismissal. The Court emphasized the importance of providing a full and complete opportunity to the delinquent employee before taking any action against him, as per the established legal principle of audi alteram partem. The Court highlighted that the department failed to comply with the notification requiring a reasonable opportunity, including the right to cross-examine witnesses and present a defense. Consequently, the Court rejected the argument that Article 311 of the Constitution did not apply to the employee and upheld the lower courts' findings regarding the lack of due process in the dismissal.
Another issue raised in the appeal was the contention that the dismissal order had merged in the revisional authorities, namely the District Magistrate and the Government, and therefore, the suit for wrongful dismissal could not be decreed unless the orders of these authorities were set aside. The Court noted that this point was raised for the first time during the special leave hearing in the Supreme Court. The Court held that this issue, being a mixed question of fact and law, should have been raised at the Trial Court. Allowing the appellant to raise this point at a later stage would result in substantial injustice to the plaintiff due to negligence on the appellant's part. Consequently, the Court did not permit the appellant to raise this point at that stage. As no other points were pressed before the Court, the appeal was dismissed without any merit, and no costs were awarded in the circumstances of the case.
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1978 (4) TMI 244
Issues:
1. Suit for specific performance of an agreement to reconvey properties.
2. Maintainability of the suit when some promisees do not want to enforce the contract.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a suit for specific performance of an agreement to reconvey properties between the plaintiffs and defendants. The first defendant, who had executed the agreement, refused to execute the sale deed despite the plaintiffs tendering the consideration within the stipulated time. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, citing precedent, but the District Judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, allowing specific performance of the entire contract. The first defendant appealed this decision.
2. The central legal question in the appeal was whether a suit for specific performance could be maintained by some promisees when others do not wish to enforce the contract. Section 45 of the Contract Act was invoked, but the Supreme Court clarified that a joint promisee who does not want to join as a co-plaintiff can be made a pro forma defendant. The Privy Council also affirmed that joint promisees can file a suit even if some refuse to join. The judgment highlighted that the refusal of some promisees does not jeopardize the right of the plaintiff seeking specific performance. The court emphasized that the plaintiff, upon depositing the entire consideration, is entitled to the conveyance of the entire property, regardless of the refusal of other promisees.
3. The court referenced prior judgments that supported the stance that one joint promisee can file a suit and include unwilling promisees as defendants. It was emphasized that the rights between the parties should be determined based on the agreements between them, and a defendant cannot claim to execute the conveyance only for a portion of the properties. The judgment concluded that the lower appellate court's decision was correct, dismissing the second appeal with no costs. The ruling affirmed the entitlement of the plaintiff to specific performance of the entire contract, irrespective of the refusal of other promisees.
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1978 (4) TMI 243
Issues:
1. Appeal against conviction under Rule 132(3) of Defence of India Rules, 1962.
2. Possession of small coins beyond personal or business requirements.
3. Relevance of evidence presented during trial.
4. Interpretation of "small coins" under Rule 132 of Defence of India Rules.
5. Discrepancies in the amount of seized coins.
6. Burden of proof on prosecution regarding possession of small coins.
7. Justification of acquittal by the lower appellate court.
Analysis:
1. The appeal was filed challenging the conviction of the respondent under Rule 132(3) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, by the Special Magistrate. The prosecution alleged that the respondent possessed small coins beyond his personal or business requirements, leading to the charge against him.
2. The respondent, an excise vendor, was found in possession of a significant quantity of small coins during a search conducted at his premises. The prosecution argued that the coins exceeded his personal or business needs. The respondent claimed that a portion of the coins belonged to his family members and were collected for a Puja Committee, of which he was the Treasurer.
3. The trial court admitted irrelevant evidence during the proceedings, leading to a bulk of oral and documentary evidence being considered unnecessary for the case. The trial Magistrate convicted the respondent based on the large quantity of coins found at his residence, his role as the head of the family, and the lack of evidence supporting the coins' ownership by other family members.
4. The interpretation of "small coins" under Rule 132 was crucial in determining the respondent's guilt. The rule prohibited possession of small coins in excess of personal or business requirements. The court clarified that "small coins" did not include one-rupee coins, and the prosecution failed to provide clear evidence regarding the denomination of the seized coins.
5. Discrepancies in the amount of seized coins and the lack of denomination-wise specification in the seizure list raised doubts about the prosecution's case. The lower appellate court noted inconsistencies in the total amount of coins seized and the charges brought against the respondent, leading to questions about the prosecution's evidence.
6. The burden of proof rested on the prosecution to establish the extent of the respondent's possession of small coins beyond his needs. The respondent's admission regarding a portion of the coins belonging to him did not conclusively prove guilt, especially considering the absence of clear evidence on the denomination of the seized coins.
7. The lower appellate court acquitted the respondent based on the prosecution's failure to provide sufficient evidence regarding the possession of small coins. The court upheld the acquittal, emphasizing the lack of clarity in the prosecution's case and the absence of concrete proof against the respondent.
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1978 (4) TMI 242
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the search warrant issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Police under Section 6 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887.
2. Interpretation of the term "Commissioner of Police" in the context of the Gambling Act and the Police Act.
3. Applicability of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1886, to the interpretation of the Gambling Act.
4. Legality of the assignment of powers by the Commissioner of Police to the Assistant Commissioner under the Police Act.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Search Warrant:
The appellant was convicted under Sections 4 and 5 of the Gambling Act and challenged the validity of the search warrant issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Police. The appellant argued that the search warrant was legally invalid as it was not issued by the Commissioner of Police, as mandated by Section 6 of the Gambling Act. The High Court dismissed this contention, stating that the term "Commissioner of Police" includes an Assistant Commissioner under the Police Act.
2. Interpretation of the Term "Commissioner of Police":
The appellant contended that the term "Commissioner of Police" in the Gambling Act could not be interpreted to include an Assistant Commissioner because the Gambling Act does not define the term, and it was enacted before the Police Act. The Supreme Court found this argument to merit serious consideration. However, upon examining Section 6 of the Gambling Act and Section 17(1) of the Bombay General Clauses Act, the Court concluded that the term "Commissioner of Police" could include any officer executing the functions of the Commissioner of Police, as defined under the Police Act.
3. Applicability of the Bombay General Clauses Act:
The Supreme Court analyzed Section 17(1) of the Bombay General Clauses Act, which allows for the substitution of functionaries by their official titles. The Court held that this section applies to the present case, enabling the Assistant Commissioner to discharge the functions of the Commissioner of Police under Section 6 of the Gambling Act. The Court emphasized that the General Clauses Act, being enacted before the Gambling Act, could be used to interpret the latter.
4. Legality of the Assignment of Powers:
The Court examined Sections 10(2) and 11 of the Police Act, which allow the State Government to appoint Assistant Commissioners and assign them the powers and functions of the Commissioner of Police. The High Court found that a government notification dated March 10, 1967, conferred such powers on the Assistant Commissioners. The Supreme Court upheld this finding, stating that the Assistant Commissioner was legally and validly assigned the powers of the Commissioner of Police, making the search warrant valid.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant under Sections 4 and 5 of the Gambling Act but reduced the sentence of imprisonment to the period already served, maintaining the sentence of fine. The Court dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the combined reading of the General Clauses Act and the Police Act justified the inclusion of the Assistant Commissioner within the term "Commissioner of Police" for the purposes of issuing search warrants under the Gambling Act.
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1978 (4) TMI 241
Issues:
Validity of registration fee charged under a notification by the Chief Commissioner.
Analysis:
The case involved an appeal against the judgment of the High Court regarding the legality of a registration fee levied under a notification by the Chief Commissioner. The respondent company had executed a debenture trust deed and paid the stipulated stamp duty. However, an additional registration fee was demanded during registration, leading to a legal challenge by the trustees. The primary issue was whether the registration fee imposed was a legal levy justified by the Constitution.
The High Court held that the fee charged under the notification was an illegal impost as it did not meet the essential conditions of a legal fee. The court emphasized that for a fee to be legal, there must be a quid pro quo, meaning the authority levying the fee must provide a service in return for the fee. Additionally, the fee collected should be utilized for the specific purpose of the imposition and not become part of the general state revenue.
The appellant argued that the registration of the document provided a benefit to the respondents by serving as evidence of title, justifying the fee. However, the Supreme Court reiterated that the fee collected must be directly linked to the expenses incurred for the service provided, which was not the case in this instance. Citing previous judgments, the court emphasized the importance of earmarking the fee for the designated service and not allowing it to merge with general state revenue.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, stating that the fee imposed was not valid as it did not meet the necessary criteria for a legal fee. The court noted that the notification had not been amended, and a maximum fee had been fixed at Rs. 100, rendering the issue largely academic except for cases arising during a specific period. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.
In conclusion, the judgment reaffirmed the principles governing the legality of fees, emphasizing the need for a direct correlation between the fee collected and the service provided. The decision underscored the importance of earmarking fees for specific purposes and not allowing them to contribute to the general revenue of the state.
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1978 (4) TMI 240
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the investigation of an offence is considered complete under Section 173(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) without the reports of experts such as the Chemical Examiner, Serologist, Ballistic Expert, or Finger Print Expert.
2. Whether a charge-sheet submitted without these expert reports qualifies as a police report under Section 190(1)(b) of the CrPC, enabling the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Completeness of Investigation under Section 173(2) CrPC
The core issue in the judgment is whether an investigation is deemed complete in terms of Section 173(2) of the CrPC if the investigating police officer has not yet received the reports from experts like the Chemical Examiner, Serologist, Ballistic Expert, or Finger Print Expert. The court concluded that the investigation is considered complete once the police officer has collected all evidence and facts detailed in Section 173(2) and is satisfied that a case can be initiated against the accused. The court emphasized that the collection of evidence does not necessarily mean that the investigating officer must have received the expert reports. The investigation is deemed complete when the material is dispatched for expert opinion, and the expert is cited as a witness.
Issue 2: Qualification of Charge-Sheet as a Police Report
The second issue is whether a charge-sheet without the expert reports qualifies as a police report under Section 190(1)(b) of the CrPC, enabling the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence. The court held that a police report in terms of Section 173(2) does not need to include the expert reports for the investigation to be considered complete. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Tara Singh v. The State, which established that a report is complete if it sets forth the names of the parties, the nature of the information, and the names of persons acquainted with the circumstances of the case. The court also noted that the addition of sub-section (5) to Section 173 in the new Code did not change the concept of a 'police report' as envisaged in the unamended Code.
Additional Observations:
- The court clarified that the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the CrPC ensures that an accused is not detained for more than sixty days during the investigation. If the investigation is not completed within this period, the Magistrate must release the accused on bail.
- The court also noted that if the Magistrate can legally take cognizance of the offence within sixty days, he can remand the accused for trial under Section 309 of the CrPC.
- The court emphasized that the discretion to permit the prosecution to adduce additional evidence, including expert reports, lies with the court. If the court allows such evidence, a copy must be furnished to the accused.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 5812-M and 6077-M of 1977 and 169-M and 293-M of 1978, denying the bail requested by the petitioners. However, the court allowed Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 4766-M of 1977 filed by the State, setting aside the order of the Additional Sessions Judge and ordering the accused-respondents to surrender to custody forthwith.
Separate Judgments:
All three judges, D.S. Tewatia, Bhupinder Singh Dhillon, and Gurnam Singh, agreed on the judgment, delivering a common judgment for all five petitions.
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1978 (4) TMI 239
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Endowment for the Matam and Samadhi.
2. Alienation of Trust Properties.
3. Removal of Trustee and Accounting.
4. Framing of a Scheme for Trust Administration.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Endowment for the Matam and Samadhi:
The core issue revolves around the validity of the endowment under the B Schedule properties, specifically whether the endowment for the Matam and the Samadhi is legally valid. The trial court found that the Samadhi (tomb) and the Matam (monastery) were so closely intertwined that they could not be separated, rendering the endowment invalid. The High Court disagreed, holding that the Matam and the Samadhi were distinct, with the endowment for the Matam being valid and the endowment for the Samadhi invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed that the Samadhi was a tomb of an ancestor and thus invalid in law. However, it held that the properties vested in the Matam with a charge for the expenses of the Puja at the Samadhi, which is unsustainable in law.
2. Alienation of Trust Properties:
Both the trial court and the High Court found that the trust properties were improperly alienated. The High Court invalidated the alienations of items 4, 7, 8, and 15 of the B Schedule properties. The Supreme Court upheld these findings, affirming that the alienations were not valid or binding on the trust.
3. Removal of Trustee and Accounting:
The trial court ordered the removal of the first defendant from trusteeship and directed him to render accounts for the entire period of his management. The High Court modified this, limiting the accounting to five years prior to the date of the suit. The Supreme Court upheld the removal of the trustee and the five-year accounting period, noting that the first defendant was guilty of breach of trust.
4. Framing of a Scheme for Trust Administration:
The High Court directed the framing of a scheme for the administration of the two trusts, with a Board of Trustees consisting of three members: two respectable residents of the village and one member from the family of the donors. The Supreme Court agreed with this direction, noting that the prohibition against the first defendant being a trustee had expired, and his claim to be appointed as one of the trustees could be considered by the Subordinate Judge. The Supreme Court also directed that the income from the properties should be used in conformity with the directions in the trust deed, with surplus income utilized for feeding poor school-going children in the village, applying the Cy-pres doctrine due to changed circumstances.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals in part, affirming the High Court's findings on the invalidity of the Samadhi endowment and the improper alienation of trust properties. It upheld the removal of the first defendant as trustee and the limited accounting period. The Court also agreed with the High Court's direction to frame a scheme for trust administration, with modifications to utilize surplus income for charitable purposes in line with the donors' intentions.
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1978 (4) TMI 238
The High Court of Allahabad quashed an order by the Central Board of Direct Taxes transferring a petitioner's Income Tax case without communicating reasons, citing a Supreme Court ruling that such reasons must be recorded and communicated. The writ petition was allowed, and the order was deemed erroneous in law. (Case Citation: 1978 (4) TMI 238 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT)
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1978 (4) TMI 237
Issues Involved
1. Privity of Contract
2. Amendment of Written Statement and Additional Evidence
3. Implied Contract
4. Liability for Payment
Detailed Analysis
1. Privity of Contract
The primary issue was whether there was a privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendants. The plaintiff, a registered partnership firm, supplied 630 bags of tobacco to the defendants, a partnership business. The defendants argued that there was no privity of contract between them and the plaintiff, claiming they had placed the order with Shri Abdul Rahim Nabisaheb Bagwan and not directly with the plaintiff. The Trial Court found that the goods were sold to the defendants by the plaintiff through Rahim, who acted as the defendants' agent, establishing privity of contract. However, the High Court disagreed, stating that a new implied contract came into existence by the conduct of the parties, as the goods were supplied by the plaintiff on its own account and accepted by the defendants, making them liable to pay the price of the goods.
2. Amendment of Written Statement and Additional Evidence
The defendants sought to amend their written statement and adduce additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They filed applications in the High Court for these purposes. The High Court initially set aside the Trial Court's judgment and remitted the case back for retrial, allowing the plaintiff to adduce further evidence. However, upon appeal, the Supreme Court ordered the High Court to dispose of the defendants' applications for amendment and additional evidence and then decide the appeal based on the evidence already presented in the Trial Court. The High Court ultimately declined the defendants' requests, stating that the amendment would have completely changed the nature of their original defense, introducing an entirely new plea not previously taken up.
3. Implied Contract
The High Court found that an implied contract was formed between the plaintiff and the defendants. The defendants had originally placed orders with Rahim, but the goods were supplied by the plaintiff on its own account and accepted by the defendants. The High Court noted that the defendants' vague claim of having paid Rahim was unsubstantiated, and there was no evidence showing that Rahim had paid the plaintiff the balance of the price of the goods. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's finding, stating that the conduct of the parties indicated an implied contract, as the defendants accepted the goods and made part payments to the plaintiff, thereby incurring liability for the balance.
4. Liability for Payment
The defendants were found liable to pay the balance of the price of the goods supplied by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had initially claimed Rs. 90,000, including interest, for the balance of the price of the goods. The defendants had made partial payments through cheques and cash, but a balance remained unpaid. The High Court and the Supreme Court both found that the defendants were liable to pay this balance to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court dismissed the defendants' appeal, upholding the High Court's judgment that the defendants were liable to pay the balance of the price directly to the plaintiff.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment that an implied contract existed between the plaintiff and the defendants, making the defendants liable to pay the balance of the price of the goods supplied. The defendants' applications for amendment of their written statement and additional evidence were rightly rejected by the High Court. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 236
Issues Involved:
1. Right to Silence and Self-Incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution.
2. Scope of Section 161(2) of the Cr. P. Code.
3. Applicability of Article 20(3) during police interrogation.
4. Definition and scope of "compelled to be a witness against himself."
5. Parameters of Section 179 I.P.C. and its mens rea component.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Right to Silence and Self-Incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution:
The judgment emphasizes the importance of Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which protects individuals from being compelled to be witnesses against themselves. The court stated, "The principle against self-incrimination enshrined in Art. 20(3) of our Constitution and embraced with specificity by Section 161(2) of the Cr. P. Code." The judgment underlines that this protection extends beyond court proceedings to police interrogations, ensuring that individuals are not forced to incriminate themselves at any stage of the criminal justice process.
2. Scope of Section 161(2) of the Cr. P. Code:
Section 161(2) of the Cr. P. Code mandates that a person must answer all questions truthfully except those that would expose them to a criminal charge. The court noted, "Section 161(2) Cr. P.C. enjoins: 'such person shall be bound to answer truly all questions relating to such case put to him by such officer, other than questions the answers to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture.'" This provision is seen as a parliamentary gloss on Article 20(3), ensuring that individuals are not compelled to provide self-incriminating information during police investigations.
3. Applicability of Article 20(3) during police interrogation:
The court clarified that the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) applies not only in court but also during police interrogations. "The ban on self-accusation and the right to silence, while one investigation or trial is underway, goes beyond that case and protects the accused in regard to other offences pending or imminent." This interpretation ensures that individuals are protected from self-incrimination at all stages of the criminal process, including police questioning.
4. Definition and scope of "compelled to be a witness against himself":
The judgment elaborates on what constitutes being "compelled to be a witness against himself." It includes not only physical coercion but also psychological pressure and environmental factors that may compel an individual to provide self-incriminating information. "We are disposed to read 'compelled testimony' as evidence procured not merely by physical threats or violence but by psychic torture, atmospheric pressure, environmental coercion, tiring interrogative prolixity, overbearing and intimidatory methods and the like." This broad interpretation ensures comprehensive protection against various forms of compulsion.
5. Parameters of Section 179 I.P.C. and its mens rea component:
Section 179 I.P.C. penalizes individuals who refuse to answer questions posed by public servants when legally bound to do so. The court emphasized the necessity of mens rea, stating, "We have no doubt that section 179 I.P.C. has a component of mens rea and where there is no wilful refusal but only unwitting omission or innocent warding off, the offence is not made out." The judgment further clarifies that the refusal to answer must be willful and not based on a reasonable apprehension of self-incrimination.
Conclusion:
The court quashed the prosecution against the appellant, emphasizing that the right against self-incrimination must be protected at all stages of the criminal justice process. The judgment underscores the need for safeguards to ensure that individuals are not compelled to incriminate themselves, whether through physical or psychological means. The appellant was directed to answer all non-incriminatory questions while being protected from self-incriminatory interrogation, reinforcing the constitutional protections under Article 20(3).
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1978 (4) TMI 235
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the appellant's removal from government service.
2. Adequacy of evidence in disciplinary proceedings.
3. High Court's jurisdiction in reappraising evidence in writ petitions.
Summary:
1. Legality of the appellant's removal from government service:
The appellant, Nand Kishore Prasad, was removed from government service following allegations of dishonestly receiving Rs. 1,068/- and conspiring to misappropriate the amount. The Commissioner reversed the District Magistrate's order, which had dropped proceedings due to insufficient evidence, and directed the appellant's removal from service. The appellant's revision to the Board of Revenue was dismissed, and his writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was also dismissed by the Patna High Court.
2. Adequacy of evidence in disciplinary proceedings:
The disciplinary inquiry, held by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sasaram, concluded with the District Magistrate finding the appellant's conduct suspicious but dropping proceedings due to insufficient evidence. The Commissioner, however, found "strong suspicion" against the appellant based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's initials on Money Order coupons and his failure to take further action for the realization of the fine. The High Court noted that while the Commissioner's order was cryptic, it was supported by circumstantial evidence and the Board of Revenue's more detailed order.
3. High Court's jurisdiction in reappraising evidence in writ petitions:
The appellant contended that the impugned orders were based on suspicions and conjectures, not evidence, and that the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction by reappraising evidence. The Supreme Court reiterated that disciplinary proceedings must be based on some evidence pointing to the guilt of the delinquent. The High Court examined the record to ensure the impugned orders were based on circumstantial evidence, not to reconstruct a new case. The Supreme Court found that the High Court acted appropriately and that the impugned orders did not suffer from any error of law warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision that the impugned orders were based on circumstantial evidence and did not warrant interference in writ proceedings. The appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 234
Issues Involved:
1. Voluntariness of the Confession
2. Truthfulness of the Confession
3. Corroboration of the Confession by Circumstantial Evidence
4. Handling and Integrity of Physical Evidence (Dibbi and Fingerprints)
5. Procedural Compliance in Recording Confession
Detailed Analysis:
1. Voluntariness of the Confession:
The court first examined whether the confession was voluntary. The appellant was arrested on June 3, 1974, and remained in police custody until June 12, 1974, when he was moved to judicial custody. On June 13, 1974, the Superintendent of Police requested the Magistrate to record the appellant's confession. The Magistrate conducted a preliminary examination on June 14, 1974, to ensure the appellant's willingness to confess. The appellant was asked multiple questions to ascertain that he was not coerced, threatened, or promised any benefit for making the confession. The Magistrate recorded the confession after being satisfied that it was voluntary. The court found no substance in the appellant's claim of coercion and threats, as he had ample time (38-40 hours) in judicial custody to reflect on his decision to confess.
2. Truthfulness of the Confession:
The court evaluated the truthfulness of the confession by comparing it with the rest of the evidence. The appellant's confession included detailed descriptions of the crime scene and the sequence of events, which were corroborated by circumstantial evidence. The confession was found to be a spontaneous account, with vivid details that only the perpetrator could know. The court concluded that the confession was true and trustworthy.
3. Corroboration of the Confession by Circumstantial Evidence:
The confession was corroborated by various pieces of circumstantial evidence:
- The site-plan and explanatory memorandum prepared by A.S.I. Bhagwan Singh noted the presence of three cots, blood-stained Kassi, and scattered goods, consistent with the appellant's confession.
- The presence of bare-foot prints at the scene of the crime matched the appellant's description of his movements.
- The appellant's stay at a hotel in Haridwar after the crime was confirmed by the hotel record and witness testimony.
- Medical evidence supported the injuries described in the confession, although the exact number of blows could not be determined.
4. Handling and Integrity of Physical Evidence (Dibbi and Fingerprints):
The court addressed concerns about the integrity of the physical evidence, specifically the Dibbi (small tin-box) with the appellant's fingerprint. The Dibbi was seized and sealed by A.S.I. Bhagwan Singh on September 9, 1973, and sent to the Finger-Print Bureau on June 29, 1974. The seals on the Dibbi were found intact upon examination by the Finger-Print Expert. The court found no evidence of tampering and concluded that the fingerprint on the Dibbi was genuine and matched the appellant's fingerprint.
5. Procedural Compliance in Recording Confession:
The court examined whether the procedural requirements for recording the confession under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were followed. The Magistrate ensured that the appellant was aware of his rights and the consequences of making a confession. The Magistrate's preliminary examination and the recording of the confession complied with the legal requirements. The court found no violation of procedural rules and confirmed that the confession was recorded properly.
Conclusion:
The court affirmed the judgment of the High Court and maintained the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murders of Kartar Singh and Mada Singh, and sentenced him to death. The appeal was dismissed, and the sentence of death was upheld due to the brutal nature of the crimes and the overwhelming evidence against the appellant.
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1978 (4) TMI 233
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 151 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954.
2. Interpretation of "personal law" in Section 151 of the Code.
3. Determination of heirs under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Summary:
1. Applicability of Section 151 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954:
The appellants contended that Section 151 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, was a law for the devolution of tenancy rights in agricultural holdings. They argued that Bhumiswamis and Bhumidharis were tenure-holders who could be included in the term "tenants," thus invoking Section 4(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, to save Section 151 of the Code. The High Court, however, held that Bhumiswami and Bhumidhari rights are not tenancy rights and that Section 151 of the Code deals with the devolution of interest of a tenure-holder, not tenancy rights.
2. Interpretation of "personal law" in Section 151 of the Code:
The appellants argued that the expression "personal law" in Section 151 of the Code referred to Hindu law as it existed before the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The High Court, however, interpreted "personal law" to mean Hindu law as amended by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, prevailing at the time of the tenure-holder's death. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent was that "personal law" as amended up to the date of the tenure-holder's death would govern the devolution of interest.
3. Determination of heirs under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956:
The High Court held that the case falls under Section 15(2)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as Smt. Sarji died issueless and intestate, and the property was inherited from her husband. The Court applied the fiction in Rule 3 of Section 16, which deems the husband to have died intestate immediately after the female intestate's death. According to Section 8 of the Act, the property would devolve upon the heirs specified in Class II of the Schedule. Since the respondent, Smt. Gopikabai, is the daughter of the sister of the last male holder, Punjya, she is a preferential heir over the appellants, who are remote agnates.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the High Court, holding that the respondent, Smt. Gopikabai, is entitled to succeed to the estate of Smt. Sarji under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 232
Issues:
Classification of imported projection lamps under Customs Tariff items 60(2) and 72(3) - Refund of duty difference - Writ petition seeking quashing of orders.
Analysis:
The petitioner imported projection lamps for use in a grinding machine, claiming lower duty under item 72(3) of the Customs Tariff. However, the lamps were classified under item 60(2) by the respondents, leading to duty payment and subsequent refund denial. The petitioner argued the lamps were essential for the machine, had unique characteristics, and were unfit for general lighting purposes.
The appellate and revisional authorities acknowledged the lamps' special nature but classified them as electric lighting bulbs under item 60(2). They contended that despite unique features, the lamps served the purpose of illumination and were not exclusive to the grinding machine. The Central Board of Excise and Customs' tariff advices supported this classification.
The petitioner emphasized that the lamps were specifically designed for the grinding machine and were integral to its functioning. The technical instructions from the machine manufacturer highlighted the lamps' specialized use within the machine, including cooling mechanisms and optical components, reinforcing their role as essential component parts.
The judgment referred to a precedent where component parts were accorded concessional tax treatment, drawing parallels to the present case. Item 72(3) required the article to be essential as a component part, a criterion met by the unique projection lamps. The lamps' distinct characteristics and essentiality for the machine's operation aligned with the requirements of item 72(3), leading to a favorable decision for the petitioner.
In conclusion, the court allowed the writ petition, quashing the previous orders and granting the petitioner the refund claimed. The judgment clarified that the projection lamps fell under item 72(3) as component parts of machinery, emphasizing their specialized nature and essential role in the grinding machine.
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1978 (4) TMI 231
Issues Involved:
1. Assessability to sales tax of the turnover on containers (bottles) in which liquor was sold.
2. Justification of the Appellate Tribunal in affording the assessee an opportunity to produce C forms for concessional assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act.
3. Exclusion of insurance charges from the turnover.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Assessability to Sales Tax on Containers:
The primary issue in the first batch of revisions (T.R.C. Nos. 4, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 24 of 1977) was whether the turnover on containers (bottles) in which liquor was sold is assessable to sales tax. The assessee, M/s. McDowell & Co., argued that the amounts described as "deposit on bottles" were not part of the sale price of the liquor. The Sales Tax Officer allowed deductions only for the bottles returned, while the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal found that the deposits were part of the sale price. The Tribunal's findings, which were accepted by the High Court, included that the deposits were separately invoiced and treated differently in the accounts, and thus did not satisfy the definitions of "turnover" and "sale price" under the Central Sales Tax Act. The Court distinguished this case from the Supreme Court's decision in Punjab Distilling Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Simla, noting that the facts and statutory provisions were different. The High Court affirmed the Tribunal's conclusion that the deposits were not part of the sale price and thus not assessable to sales tax.
2. Opportunity to Produce C Forms:
In the second batch of cases (T.R.C. Nos. 25, 27, and 28 of 1977), the additional issue was whether the Tribunal was justified in allowing the assessee to produce C forms for concessional assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act. Section 8(1) and (4) of the Act require the dealer to furnish a declaration in the prescribed form to avail of concessional rates. The Tribunal had set aside the orders of the lower authorities and directed the Sales Tax Officer to allow the assessee to produce the C forms. However, the High Court found that this direction was beyond the Tribunal's authority, as Rule 12(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957, allows the prescribed authority (Sales Tax Officer) discretion to permit the furnishing of such declarations within a further time. The High Court vacated the Tribunal's direction and allowed the revisions to this limited extent, affirming that the matter should be left to the discretion of the Sales Tax Officer.
3. Exclusion of Insurance Charges from Turnover:
In the third batch of cases (T.R.C. Nos. 55 to 59, 62, and 104 of 1977), the additional issue was whether insurance charges should be excluded from the turnover. The definition of "turnover" under the Central Sales Tax Act excludes the cost of freight or delivery when separately charged. The High Court agreed with the assessee's counsel that the cost of freight or delivery should include the cost of insurance, given that insurance has become an integral part of commercial transactions due to the risks involved. Consequently, the High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision allowing the deduction of insurance charges from the turnover.
Conclusion:
The High Court dismissed all the tax revision cases except T.R.C. Nos. 25, 27, and 28 of 1977, which were allowed to the limited extent of vacating the Tribunal's direction to afford the assessee an opportunity to produce the C forms. No order as to costs was made.
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1978 (4) TMI 230
The Karnataka High Court held that the turnover of plates used in switch gear boxes sold to a manufacturer of electrical switch gears qualifies for a concessional tax rate under section 5(3A) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act. The goods sold were deemed to be component parts of the finished product, entitling the petitioner to the concessional rate. The Tribunal's decision was overturned, and the Commercial Tax Officer was directed to revise the assessment accordingly. The petition was allowed with no costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 229
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the suit.
2. Jurisdiction of the civil court.
3. Validity of the assessment and recovery proceedings.
4. Compliance with statutory provisions under the Orissa Sales Tax Act and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of the Suit:
The trial court held that the suit was not maintainable in its present form, citing the bar under section 22 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act and sections 42 and 45 of the Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act. The appellate court reversed this decision, stating that the suit was maintainable because the notice of demand had not been served as required under section 13(4) of the Act.
2. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court:
The trial court ruled that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit due to section 22 of the Sales Tax Act, which bars any court from questioning assessments or orders made under the Act. However, the appellate court found that the civil court did have jurisdiction, as the statutory provisions had not been complied with, making the certificate proceeding invalid. This decision was supported by precedents from the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, which state that exclusion of civil court jurisdiction must be explicitly expressed or clearly implied, and even then, civil courts can examine cases where statutory provisions have not been followed or where the tribunal has not acted in conformity with fundamental judicial principles.
3. Validity of the Assessment and Recovery Proceedings:
The trial court found the assessment to be legal and valid, stating that the notice of demand and the copy of the order of assessment had been duly served on the plaintiff. However, the appellate court disagreed, finding that the notice of demand had not been served as required under section 13(4) of the Act. This non-service meant that the amount had not become recoverable as arrears of land revenue, and thus, the certificate proceeding was not tenable.
4. Compliance with Statutory Provisions:
The appellate court emphasized the importance of compliance with section 13(4) of the Act, which requires that the amount assessed must be paid within thirty days from the date of service of the notice issued by the Commissioner. Rule 32(1) of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules further mandates that a notice of demand in Form X must be served on the dealer. The appellate court found that this notice had not been served, making the amount not a "public demand" and the certificate officer's proceedings invalid. The court also cited various precedents to support the view that non-compliance with mandatory statutory provisions renders the proceedings void and subject to challenge in civil court.
Conclusion:
The appellate court's judgment was upheld, stating that the suit was maintainable, the civil court had jurisdiction, and the certificate proceeding was invalid due to non-compliance with statutory provisions. The appeal was dismissed with costs throughout.
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1978 (4) TMI 228
Issues:
- Interpretation of the term "dealer" under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.
- Whether the applicant, Tata Aircraft Ltd., was engaged in the business of selling goods and thus liable to sales tax.
Analysis:
The judgment by the High Court of Calcutta revolved around the interpretation of the term "dealer" under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, and whether Tata Aircraft Ltd. was conducting the business of selling goods, thereby being subject to sales tax. Tata Aircraft Ltd. claimed it was not a dealer as per the Act, as it was involved in disposing of surplus stores of the Government of India under an agreement. The Commercial Tax Officers assessed sales tax on the turnover of these surplus stores, which was contested through appeals and revisions up to the Board of Revenue.
The applicant contended that its activities did not constitute a business of selling goods, citing a Supreme Court case where the government's disposal of surplus war materials was deemed non-taxable as it was not conducted for profit but for capital realization. The Court noted the agreement between Tata Aircraft Ltd. and the Government of India, where Tata acted as the agent for the disposal of surplus stores, receiving service charges and selling fees. The Court also referred to precedents like the Council of Law Reporting case and the Food Corporation of India case to support the argument that even if profit was not the motive, engaging in activities akin to business could still qualify as trading.
The Court examined the clauses of the agreement, emphasizing that Tata Aircraft Ltd. acted as the agent for the Government in selling surplus war materials, akin to the situation in the Supreme Court case cited earlier. It was concluded that if the principal, the Government of India, was not engaged in the business of selling goods through such activities, then its agent could not be considered as conducting such business either. Therefore, the Court accepted the applicant's contentions, ruling in their favor and answering the question referred in the negative. The judgment was agreed upon by both judges, and the reference was answered in the negative.
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1978 (4) TMI 227
The High Court of Allahabad ruled that chirwa and kheel are different forms of rice and should be taxed at 1½ per cent as foodgrains. The Sales Tax Officer's decision to tax them at 2 per cent was overturned. The court held that chirwa and kheel are not unclassified items but fall within the purview of cereals. The judgment favored the assessee, with no costs awarded.
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1978 (4) TMI 226
Issues Involved:1. Whether the Board was right in remanding the case to the Commissioner for giving an opportunity to the dealer to rectify the defect in the C form No. M 073138. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Whether the Board was right in remanding the case to the Commissioner for giving an opportunity to the dealer to rectify the defect in the C form No. M 073138:This reference arises out of an assessment proceeding, the period of assessment being 1st July, 1957, to 31st March, 1958. In the assessment proceedings, the C form, which was produced by the assessee, was accepted by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Indore. It is also not in dispute that the C form was defective as it bore no date of issue. The Commissioner of Sales Tax noticed this defect and exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction and, after hearing the revision, held that the C form was not in order and further held that the assessing authority was wrong in accepting the form. Against this order of the Commissioner, the assessee went up in appeal before the appellate authority, i.e., the Board of Revenue. The learned Member of the Board of Revenue felt that when the form was produced before the assessment and, apparently, there was a clerical error, the assessment officer should have got it corrected. But it appears that the assessment officer did not notice the defect and, therefore, did not give an opportunity to the assessee to remove the defect. But the defect was noticed when the Commissioner of Sales Tax suo motu initiated proceedings for revision of the assessment. The learned Member of the Board of Revenue, therefore, felt that, under such a situation, the assessee should have been given an opportunity to rectify the mistake as apparently it is a clerical mistake, and remanded the case with a direction that the matter be considered in the light of the observations made by the learned Member. On an application submitted by the Commissioner of Sales Tax the Board has made this reference on the question stated above. The learned counsel appearing for the department contended that no opportunity for rectification or correction could be given to the assessee in view of the decision of this Court reported in Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Bombay Textile Stores, Ujjain[1978] 41 S.T.C. 484; 1977 Vikraya Kar Nirnaya However, the learned counsel contended that there are two decisions of this Court taking a contrary view as well, they being Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Dayaram Balchand[1973] 31 S.T.C. 249. and K.S. Nazarali Mills v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.[1973] 31 S.T.C. 243. Admittedly, in the present case, the C form was produced before the assessing authority and it is not in dispute that the defect was that wrong date was mentioned in the certificate. It is also not in dispute that the assessing authority accepted this certificate in form C to be correct and assessed on that basis. The mistake was discovered by the Commissioner who instituted suo motu revision proceedings. The learned Member of the Board felt that, when the Commissioner detected the mistake and initiated suo motu proceedings in revision, an opportunity should have been given to the assessee to rectify the defect. In the decision on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the department, i.e., Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Bombay Textile Stores, Ujjain[1978] 41 S.T.C. 484; 1977 Vikraya Kar Nirnaya (10) 59., the question that arose was that form C, which was produced before the assessing authority, was defective, as it did not contain the purchasing dealer's date of registration and, for three out of eight such forms, a certificate from the Sales Tax Officer, Orai (U.P.), mentioning the date was not accepted in evidence by the Assistant Commissioner, relying on the decisions in Deputy Commissioner (Commercial Taxes), Coimbatore v. Parekutti Hajee Sons[1962] 13 S.T.C. 680. and K.M. Chopra & Co. v. Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.[1967] 19 S.T.C. 46. In that case also, the Board on appeal held that evidence should have been allowed and, in this decision, the Division Bench of this Court, placing reliance on Deputy Commissioner (Commercial Taxes), Coimbatore v. Parekutti Hajee Sons[1962] 13 S.T.C. 680. and K.M. Chopra & Co. v. Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.[1967] 19 S.T.C. 46., took the view: "In our opinion, when the statute gives a concession to an assessee subject to his compliance with certain provisions of the Act or the Rules, then, in that event, the assessee, to get the benefit given to him by the statute, has to strictly comply with the conditions which entitle him to that benefit. The reasoning, which weighed with the learned Member, Board of Revenue, is the principle of natural justice, which, in our opinion, in the circumstances, would be inapplicable. A declaration form, which leaves the column of date of registration blank and thus is not completely filled in, would not give the requisite information and details to the assessing authority as has been contemplated by the Act and the Rules in that behalf. In view of this, the assessing authority will have no option but to ignore such an incomplete C form. In this view, the three declaration forms in question being incomplete in themselves as they did not mention the date of registration, the assessee was not entitled to have the benefit of section 8(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act. The letters filed in the reassessment proceedings were thus of no avail." The two cases on which reliance has been placed, i.e., K.M. Chopra & Co. v. Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.[1967] 19 S.T.C. 46 and Deputy Commissioner (Commercial Taxes), Coimbatore v. Parekutti Hajee Sons[1962] 13 S.T.C. 680., were cases where the C form was not produced at the time of assessment but an attempt was made to produce it at the appellate stage and the Division Bench of this Court in K.M. Chopra Co. v. Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.[1967] 19 S.T.C. 46, held: "There is no doubt considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the words 'in the prescribed manner' used in sub-section (4) of section 8 only empowered the Government to lay down by rules the manner of filing a declaration in form C and not the time within which it is to be filed. The words 'in manner and form' were construed by Lord Campbell, C.J., in Acraman v. Herniman[1851] 16 Q.B. 999; 117 E.R. 1164., as referring only to 'the mode in which the thing is to be done' and not the time for doing it. This construction put by Lord Campbell on the words 'in manner and form' was accepted in Abraham v. Sales Tax Officer[1964] 15 S.T.C. 110 (F.B); A.I.R. 1964 Ker. 131 (F.B.). and Murli Dhar v. Sales Tax Officer[1965] 16 S.T.C. 21; A.I.R. 1965 All. 483., and it has been held in those cases that a rule framed under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, prescribing time-limit for submission of declarations spoken of by subsection (4) of section 8 is repugnant to section 8(4) of the Act. Rule 8(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax (Central) Rules, 1957, in so far as it lays down that the declaration must be attached to the return cannot, therefore, be held to be valid. In any case, it cannot be construed as having a mandatory force so as to deprive the dealer of the benefit of the rate of tax under section 8(1) if he omits to attach to his return the declaration but files it before the assessment. The time-limit for the filing of the declaration required by sub-section (4) of section 8 is to be found in that provision itself. Sub-section (4) of section 8 requires that the declaration has to be furnished 'to the prescribed authority' and the prescribed authority is the one under section 9(2) empowered to assess the tax. The declaration must, therefore, be produced before the taxing authority. It is plain enough that when a dealer claims that his turnover is liable to tax at the rate of one per cent of his turnover, then the declaration for claiming the benefit of the lower rate of tax must be produced before the assessment and not afterwards. It is thus implicit in sub-section (4) of section 8 that, for claiming the benefit of the rate of tax prescribed by section 8(1), the declaration must be produced before the taxing authority and before the assessment. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner did not produce before the Sales Tax Officer the declarations which it should have produced for claiming the benefit of the rate of tax laid down in section 8(1) of the Act. The production of the declarations before the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax was of no avail and the Additional Commissioner was right in not taking any notice of the C form declarations produced before him. If he had given effect to those declarations, he would have acted contrary to the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 8 requiring that the declarations must be furnished before the taxing authority and before the assessment." In that case, the question before their Lordships was a little different. The certificates in form C as required to be produced before the assessing authority were not produced before the assessing authority, as, in this decision, it was observed: "In any case, it cannot be construed as having a mandatory force so as to deprive the dealer of the benefit of the rate of tax under section 8(1) if he omits to attach to his return the declaration but files it before the assessment." Admittedly, in the present case, the declarations have been filed before the assessment and before the assessing authority and they have even been accepted by the assessing authority, although, admittedly, there is some defect about date. Apparently, therefore, this decision reported in K.M. Chopra & Co. v. Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.[1967] 19 S.T.C. 46., cannot be pressed into service to hold that, if the defect is discovered at a later stage, no opportunity could be granted to the assessee for rectifying the defect. In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Dayaram Balchand[1973] 31 S.T.C. 249., the question referred to this Court was: "Whether the assessing authority is required to give an opportunity to the dealer to explain errors or omissions noticed by the assessing authority in declarations in form C prescribed under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, before rejecting them as invalid?" and a Division Bench of this Court ruled: "In this case, it is pointed out that the only mistake was that the registration number of the purchasing dealer was not mentioned. It was also pointed out that the registration certificate number of the same dealer was mentioned in the certificates produced in the previous year. The assessee was prepared to satisfy the department that the purchasing dealer was a registered dealer, and it was a mere clerical mistake not to mention the number of his registration certificate. We see no reason why in such a case the taxing authorities should not permit either amendment of the C form, if satisfied of the facts, or the filing of a duplicate C form properly filled. " In the decision reported in K.S. Nazarali Mills v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.[1973] 31 S.T.C. 243., the question was about production of A forms at a late stage and still a Division Bench of this Court held: "In our opinion, the revising authority had power to admit and consider additional material, if it found it necessary so to do for effectively exercising its revisional jurisdiction and the Commissioner was not right in refusing to accept or consider the certificates in form A, which had been produced earlier before the assessing authority and rejected by it on account of delay, on the view that it was not possible or appropriate to permit production of additional evidence at the stage of revision." In this case, the decision in K.M. Chopra & Co. v. Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.[1967] 19 S.T.C. 46., was also considered. In view of these decisions, it could not be disputed that, in the present case, the view taken by the learned Member of the Board of Revenue appears to be correct, especially because the C form was accepted by the assessing authority. If the assessing authority had refused to accept it, then there was no difficulty for the assessee to rectify the defect as he could file the forms during the proceedings of assessment; and, admittedly, the assessing authority did not notice the defect and the form was accepted. But, it was only the Commissioner of Sales Tax who detected the mistake and suo motu instituted proceedings in revision. In Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Bombay Textile Stores, Ujjain[1978] 41 S.T.C. 484; 1977 Vikraya Kar Nirnaya (10) 59., the situation was a little different. The question was about additional evidence in the proceedings after the assessment was reopened and it appears that, in that decision, the question of production of additional evidence was considered and, in view of the decisions reported in Deputy Commissioner (Commercial Taxes) v. Parekutti Hajee Sons[1962] 13 S.T.C. 680. and K.M. Chopra & Co. v. Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.[1967] 19 S.T.C. 46., their Lordships did not accept the view of the Board that opportunity for additional evidence should have been granted. But the question before us is directly covered by the decision reported in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Dayaram Balchand[1973] 31 S.T.C. 249. and, as it is clear that the C form originally was accepted by the assessing authority in this case, in our opinion, the case reported in Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Bombay Textile Stores, Ujjain[1978] 41 S.T.C. 484; 1977 Vikraya Kar Nirnaya (10) 59., does not come in the way so far as the facts of the present case are concerned. In fact, it appears that, in view of this situation, now the rule has been framed, which is sub-rule (4) of rule 33 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules, 1959, which has been made effective from 1st November, 1968. It reads: "Any declaration or certificate required to be filed under the Act or the Rules or any notification issued thereunder, shall not be rejected as invalid on the ground that it lacks in certain material particulars or is defective until the dealer is given a reasonable opportunity to supply the omissions or to remove the defects occurring in such declaration or certificate or to furnish a fresh declaration or certificate." In this view of the matter, therefore, in our opinion, the view taken by the Board appears to be right and, consequently, we answer the question in the affirmative. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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