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1986 (4) TMI 371
Issues:
Jurisdiction of trial Court after remand by appellate Court.
Analysis:
The judgment revolves around the jurisdiction of the trial Court post a remand by the appellate Court in a partition suit. The trial Court initially decreed the suit, but the appellate Court remanded the matter, directing the trial Court to allow the parties to prove or disprove a specific document. The key issue is whether the trial Court, after the remand, can entertain new documents or matters beyond the remand order.
The petitioner argues that the trial Court's jurisdiction post-remand is confined to the directions of the appellate Court and cannot entertain new documents or issues. Conversely, the non-petitioners contend that in an open remand, the trial Court can dispose of the suit as per law without limitations imposed by the appellate Court.
Citing precedents, the judgment discusses the scope of trial Court's jurisdiction post-remand. It highlights that the trial Court must adhere to the remand order's specifications and cannot exceed the limits set by the appellate Court. The judgment emphasizes that the trial Court's powers post-remand depend on the nature of the remand order - whether it is open or specific.
The judgment analyzes various case laws to determine the trial Court's authority post-remand. It distinguishes between open remands, where trial Courts have broader discretion, and specific remands, where trial Courts must adhere strictly to the appellate Court's directions.
In this case, the order of remand was specific, directing the trial Court to admit a particular document and allow evidence related to it. The judgment concludes that the trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by admitting new documents not specified in the remand order. Consequently, the revision is accepted, and the trial Court's order is set aside for acting with material irregularity and illegality.
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1986 (4) TMI 370
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the oral agreement for the transfer of the suit shop.
2. Determination of the plaintiff's role in the business (proprietor vs. manager).
3. Impact of the Small Cause Court's order on the current proceedings.
4. Entitlement to interim relief and possession of the suit shop.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Oral Agreement for the Transfer of the Suit Shop:
The plaintiff contended that he acquired the suit shop from defendant 1 in December 1981 for Rs. 20,000 under an oral agreement, and began operating the business from January 1982. The plaintiff supported his claim with evidence such as bills, vouchers, and receipts (Exs. 18/1 to 18/19), showing purchases and business activities in his name. The court found that defendant 1's failure to produce any written agreement or receipt for the Rs. 20,000 received, along with keeping the licenses in his name, was an attempt to take unfair advantage of the lack of documentation.
2. Determination of the Plaintiff's Role in the Business (Proprietor vs. Manager):
The primary dispute was whether the plaintiff was running the business as a proprietor or as a manager for defendant 1. The plaintiff produced substantial documentary evidence indicating his proprietorship, including a membership receipt from the Ahmedabad Hotel Owners Association and affidavits from shopkeepers. Conversely, defendant 1 failed to provide cogent evidence, such as a pay register, to substantiate his claim that the plaintiff was merely a manager. The court found the plaintiff's evidence more credible and rejected defendant 1's argument based on the plaintiff's bank passbook, which listed his occupation as "service."
3. Impact of the Small Cause Court's Order on the Current Proceedings:
The trial court had vacated the ex parte ad interim injunction on the grounds that it conflicted with a Small Cause Court order directing possession of the suit shop to a Receiver in a suit between defendant 1 and defendant 6. The High Court held that the plaintiff, not being a party to that suit, was not bound by the Small Cause Court's order. The trial court should have granted the interim relief based on the merits of the present case, without being influenced by the other court's order.
4. Entitlement to Interim Relief and Possession of the Suit Shop:
The High Court criticized the trial court for vacating the interim injunction and emphasized that the court must consider all evidence, not just documentary statements, to determine actual possession. The court concluded that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of lawful possession and forceful dispossession by defendant 1. The plaintiff's possession was confirmed by the restoration of furniture and other articles through a court order in criminal proceedings. The High Court directed the Receiver to hand over possession of the suit shop to the plaintiff, despite the lack of a specific prayer for possession in the interim relief application, recognizing the plaintiff's right to possession as custodia legis.
Conclusion:
The appeal was partly allowed, restoring the ex parte interim injunction and directing the Receiver to hand over possession of the suit shop to the plaintiff. The court granted a stay on the operation of its order for three weeks to allow the respondents to seek further legal recourse. No order as to costs was made.
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1986 (4) TMI 369
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the suit is barred by res judicata in view of the decision in the previous civil suit filed by plaintiff No. 2.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of Civil Court under the Bombay Public Trusts Act:
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the suit is barred by res judicata due to a previous civil suit's decision. The appellant contends that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction under Section 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act to decide on matters regarding the trusteeship and ownership of the trust property. Section 79 of the Act stipulates that questions about the existence of a trust, whether it's a public trust, or if a particular property is trust property, must be decided by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner. The findings of these authorities are final and conclusive unless overturned by a higher court. Therefore, the Civil Court's decision in the previous suit, which addressed these issues, was without jurisdiction and thus void.
2. Incidental Findings and Res Judicata:
The appellant argues that any incidental findings by the Civil Court in the previous suit cannot form the basis for res judicata. The previous suit was dismissed on technical grounds due to the non-production of necessary certificates from the Charity Commissioner, meaning there was no decision on the merits. The principle of res judicata applies only when a matter has been heard and finally decided on its merits. The Supreme Court in Pragdasji v. Ishwarlalbhai and Gangabai v. Chhabubai has held that findings incidental to the main issue do not constitute res judicata.
3. Previous Suit Dismissal on Technical Grounds:
The previous suit was dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to produce necessary certificates, a technical ground. The principle of res judicata does not apply if the previous suit was not decided on its merits. The court cited several cases, including Bai Shakri v. Bapusinghji Takhatsinhji and Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar, to support this view. The dismissal of a suit on technical grounds does not prevent a subsequent suit on the same cause of action.
4. Non-Binding Nature of Negligent Trustee Decisions:
Although not necessary to decide in this case, the court noted the principle that decisions against trustees due to their gross negligence in defending a suit are not binding on subsequent trustees. This principle, discussed in Subramania v. Vaithilinga, suggests that negligent defense by trustees does not preclude future suits by new trustees.
5. Remand to District Court:
Since the suit was dismissed solely on the ground of res judicata and other issues were decided in favor of the plaintiffs, the court remanded the matter to the District Court. The District Court is directed to pass an appropriate decree after considering the findings of the trial court and the High Court on the issue of res judicata.
Conclusion:
The appeal is partly allowed, and the judgment and decree by the District Judge, Jamnagar, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 76/75, are set aside. The District Court is instructed to issue a new decree considering the trial court's findings and this court's decision on res judicata within four months of receiving the writ. There will be no order regarding costs throughout the proceedings.
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1986 (4) TMI 368
Issues Involved:
1. Whether workers employed for the construction of additional buildings for factory expansion are employees within the meaning of Section 2(9) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948.
2. Whether casual workers come within the purview of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Definition of 'Employee' under Section 2(9) of the Act:
The primary issue in these appeals and Special Leave Petitions is whether workers employed for the construction of additional buildings for factory expansion are considered employees under Section 2(9) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. Section 2(9) defines an employee as any person employed for wages in or in connection with the work of a factory or establishment to which the Act applies. This includes those directly employed by the principal employer on any work incidental or preliminary to or connected with the work of the factory or establishment, whether done in the factory or elsewhere.
The Court emphasized that the definition is broad and includes various types of employees. It is sufficient if the conditions under the definition are met for one to be considered an employee.
2. Inclusion of Casual Workers under the Act:
The Court also addressed whether casual workers fall within the Act's purview. Referring to the case of Gnanambikai Hills Ltd., the Madras High Court had previously held that casual workers do not come within the Act's purview, despite being covered by the definition of 'employee' under Section 2(9). This was based on the reasoning that casual workers, due to their short employment duration, may not be entitled to sickness benefits, suggesting it was not the Act's intention to include them.
However, the Supreme Court noted that this view overlooked other provisions of the Act, specifically Sections 39(4) and 42(3), which indicate the inclusion of casual employees. Section 39(4) mentions contributions payable for employees employed for part of the week, implicitly including casual workers. Section 42(3) further supports this by addressing employer liability for contributions even when wages are payable for only part of the week.
The Court concluded that the Act indeed intends to include casual employees, as they are entitled to other benefits, such as disablement benefits under Section 51, which do not require a benefit period or contribution period.
3. Connection of Construction Work with Factory Work:
The investigation into whether construction work for factory expansion is incidental or preliminary to or connected with the factory's work involved interpreting the term 'work of the factory' broadly. The Court noted that the definition of 'employee' under Section 2(9) is wide and includes any work conducive to or necessary for the factory's augmentation.
The Court held that constructing additional buildings for factory expansion is linked to the factory's work, as it facilitates increased production and work. Thus, such construction work is incidental or preliminary to or connected with the factory's work.
4. Interpretation of Social Security Legislation:
The Court emphasized that the Act is a piece of social security legislation aimed at providing benefits to employees in cases of sickness, maternity, and employment injury. Interpreting the Act to exclude workers employed for constructing factory buildings would contradict its purpose. The Court stressed the need for a liberal interpretation of such legislation in favor of the beneficiaries.
5. Supporting Precedents:
The Court referred to the decision in Royal Talkies, Hyderabad v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, where it was held that workers employed in ancillary services like canteens and cycle stands within a cinema theatre's compound were employees under Section 2(9). This precedent supported the view that work ancillary, incidental, or connected to the establishment's object falls within the definition of 'employee.'
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that workers employed for constructing additional factory buildings for expansion are employees under Section 2(9) of the Act. The Court set aside the judgments of the Madras High Court, which had held otherwise, and allowed the appeals and Special Leave Petitions filed by the ESI Corporation. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
Judgment:
Civil Appeals Nos. 801 of 1976 and 819 (NL) of 1976 were allowed, and the judgments of the Madras High Court were set aside. Special Leave Petitions Nos. 1143-1145 (NL) of 1978 were granted, the judgment of the Madras High Court was set aside, and the connected appeals were allowed.
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1986 (4) TMI 367
Issues:
Impugning order of Financial Commissioner rejecting partition under Punjab Land Revenue Act due to title question. Applicability of doctrine of lis pendens in case of transfer during civil litigation. Validity of subsequent order by Assistant Collector directing petitioner to go to Civil Court. Request for remitting the case back to Financial Commissioner for fresh decision.
Analysis:
The petitioner challenged the order of the Financial Commissioner rejecting her partition application under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, citing a title dispute. The petitioner had previously won a decree for specific performance against the respondents, who had transferred the land in question to third parties during the civil litigation. The court emphasized the doctrine of lis pendens, stating that subsequent purchasers during ongoing litigation are bound by any decrees against the original vendors. The court dismissed the argument of good faith by the subsequent purchasers, emphasizing that the title issue was settled by the earlier decree. The court rejected the validity of the Assistant Collector's subsequent order directing the petitioner to go to the Civil Court, noting that it was a consequential order based on the now-set-aside order of the Financial Commissioner.
The respondents requested remitting the case back to the Financial Commissioner for further consideration, claiming additional points were raised in their revision petition. However, the court found no merit in this request, as the original order did not indicate any other contentions raised before the Financial Commissioner. Therefore, the court allowed the petition, set aside the order of the Financial Commissioner, and directed the authorities to proceed with the petitioner's partition application under the Punjab Land Revenue Act. The petitioner was also awarded costs of litigation amounting to Rs. 500.
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1986 (4) TMI 366
Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
2. Applicability of the proviso to Section 14(2) concerning previous benefits under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.
3. Entitlement of tenants to the benefit of non-eviction under Section 14(2) of the 1958 Act after having benefited under Section 13(2) of the 1952 Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:
The primary issue in this case revolves around the interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. This section provides that no order for the recovery of possession shall be made if the tenant makes the required payment or deposit as stipulated by Section 15. The proviso to Section 14(2) states that no tenant shall be entitled to this benefit if they have already obtained such benefit once and then defaulted again for three consecutive months. The court had to determine whether the benefit derived under Section 13(2) of the 1952 Act could be considered under the 1958 Act.
2. Applicability of the Proviso to Section 14(2) Concerning Previous Benefits Under the 1952 Act:
The appellants argued that the tenants had already received the benefit of non-eviction under Section 13(2) of the 1952 Act and should not be entitled to the same benefit again under Section 14(2) of the 1958 Act. The respondents contended that the benefit derived under the 1952 Act should not preclude them from obtaining the benefit under the 1958 Act. The court examined whether the proviso to Section 14(2) of the 1958 Act, which restricts the benefit to tenants who have not obtained it previously, should include benefits derived under the 1952 Act.
3. Entitlement of Tenants to the Benefit of Non-Eviction Under Section 14(2) of the 1958 Act After Having Benefited Under Section 13(2) of the 1952 Act:
The Additional Rent Controller, Rent Control Tribunal, and the High Court had all ruled in favor of the tenants, stating that the benefit obtained under the 1952 Act did not bar them from receiving the benefit under the 1958 Act. The Supreme Court upheld this view, stating that the benefit under Section 14(2) of the 1958 Act is contingent upon the tenant making a deposit as required by Section 15 of the 1958 Act. Since the deposit made under Section 13(2) of the 1952 Act is excluded by Section 14(2) of the 1958 Act, the tenants were entitled to the benefit of non-eviction under the 1958 Act despite having received a similar benefit under the 1952 Act.
The court emphasized that the Legislature's intent was to remove the vice of the 1952 Act, which allowed tenants to repeatedly default and still avoid eviction by making payments on the first hearing. However, the court concluded that the specific language of Section 14(2) and its proviso in the 1958 Act did not support the appellants' interpretation that previous benefits under the 1952 Act should be considered.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the tenants were entitled to the benefit of non-eviction under Section 14(2) of the 1958 Act, despite having previously benefited under Section 13(2) of the 1952 Act. The court found no reason to differ from the view taken by the Tribunal and the High Court, and there was no order as to costs.
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1986 (4) TMI 365
Issues Involved:
1. Whether Section 10(1) of the Essential Commodities Act requires the incorporation of specific words in complaints against partners of a firm.
2. Whether Section 10(2) of the Act mandates the incorporation of allegations regarding consent, connivance, or neglect in the complaint itself.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Incorporation of Specific Words in Complaints (Section 10(1) of the Essential Commodities Act)
The court examined whether Section 10(1) of the Essential Commodities Act mandates the explicit inclusion of the words "was in charge of and was responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm" in complaints against partners. The court noted the broader perspective of the Essential Commodities Act, which aims to address rampant economic offenses. The Act's provisions are intended to be construed liberally to protect the populace.
Section 10(1) creates a deeming legal fiction whereby every person who is in charge of or responsible to the firm for the conduct of its business becomes automatically guilty of the offense committed by such a firm. The court emphasized that this vicarious liability does not require the complaint to explicitly plead the rule of evidence or the deeming fiction provided by the statute. The administration of criminal law should focus more on substance than on form, avoiding hyper-technical arguments.
The court concluded that Section 10(1) does not necessarily mandate the incorporation of the specific words "was in charge of and was responsible to the firm for the conduct of business of the firm" in all complaints against partners for offenses under the Act. This conclusion was supported by binding precedents, including Full Bench judgments in Mahmud Ali v. State of Bihar and Badri Prasad Gupta v. State of Bihar.
Issue 2: Allegations of Consent, Connivance, or Neglect (Section 10(2) of the Essential Commodities Act)
The court examined whether Section 10(2) of the Act mandates the incorporation of allegations that the offense was committed with the consent, connivance, or neglect of the partner in the complaint itself. Section 10(2) begins with a non-obstante clause, indicating its independent effect and wider application compared to Section 10(1). It applies to a larger class of officers, including directors, managers, secretaries, or other officers of the company, and imposes vicarious liability if the offense is committed with their consent, connivance, or neglect.
The court emphasized that Section 10(2) is both a rule of evidence and a deeming fiction for vicarious culpability. The use of the word "proved" indicates that this subsection comes into play during the trial when adequate proof is available. The court held that rules of evidence or deeming fictions of law are not required to be pleaded at the foundational stage of a complaint. Therefore, the complaint need not inflexibly plead consent, connivance, or neglect at the threshold stage.
The court concluded that Section 10(2) does not mandate the incorporation of allegations regarding consent, connivance, or neglect in the complaint itself. This conclusion was supported by the Full Bench judgment in Mahmud Ali v. State of Bihar.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the criminal miscellaneous petition, concluding that there was no merit in the arguments presented. The trial court was directed to expeditiously proceed with the trial, noting the significant delay caused by the pendency of the petition.
Separate Judgments:
- P.S. Sahay, J.: Agreed with the majority view, emphasizing that the point of law stands concluded by the Full Bench decision.
- S.S. Hasan, J.: Dissented, reiterating his views from previous cases and emphasizing the need for specific facts in the complaint to indicate how an accused is in charge of and responsible for the firm's affairs.
The majority view prevailed, leading to the dismissal of the petition and the continuation of the trial.
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1986 (4) TMI 364
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the failure of the Advisory Board to adjourn the hearing when it rejected the detenu's request for the assistance of a legal practitioner will vitiate the order of detention.
2. Whether the confessional statement made by the detenu to the police officer is admissible in cases of detention under a Preventive Detention Act such as Tamil Nadu Act No. 14 of 1982.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Failure of the Advisory Board to Adjourn the Hearing:
The petitioner argued that the Advisory Board should have adjourned the hearing when it rejected his request for legal assistance, even though he did not request an adjournment. The Division Bench in Suresh's case had previously held that the Advisory Board should give sufficient time for the detenu to prepare his case for oral representation if legal assistance is denied. However, the Full Bench found that this view needed reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Tusher Govindji Shah v. Union of India, which held that unless the detenu specifically requests assistance, there is no duty on the Advisory Board to adjourn the hearing.
The Full Bench referred to the procedural provisions of the Act, specifically Section 11(1) and 11(5), which do not entitle the detenu to legal representation during the Advisory Board's proceedings. The Supreme Court's decision in A. K. Roy v. Union of India was also cited, which clarified that the denial of legal representation to a detenu is not unfair, unjust, or unreasonable. The Full Bench concluded that the Advisory Board is not obligated to adjourn the hearing unless the detenu requests it, and any failure to adjourn does not automatically vitiate the detention order unless prejudice is shown.
2. Admissibility of Confessional Statements:
The second issue concerned whether a confessional statement made by the detenu to a police officer can be considered by the detaining authority. The Division Bench in Duraiswamy Mudaliar's case had held that Section 25 of the Evidence Act, which bars the use of confessions made to police officers against the accused, should apply by analogy to preventive detention cases. However, another Division Bench in W.P. No. 351 of 1985 disagreed, stating that the provisions of the Evidence Act do not apply to preventive detention proceedings.
The Full Bench agreed with the latter view, emphasizing that preventive detention is an administrative action based on suspicion and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. The proceedings are neither criminal nor quasi-criminal, and the detaining authority can consider any material, including confessional statements. The Full Bench concluded that the confessional statement made by the detenu to a police officer can be considered relevant material for detention, but its weight is for the detaining authority to decide.
Conclusion:
1. The Advisory Board is not obligated to adjourn the hearing suo motu when it rejects the detenu's request for legal assistance, and the detention order is not vitiated unless prejudice is shown.
2. Confessional statements made by the detenu to a police officer can be considered as relevant material by the detaining authority for making an order of detention.
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1986 (4) TMI 363
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Indian Limitation Act to U.P. Sales Tax Act cases.
2. Consideration of limitation period under Article 96 of the Limitation Act for refund claims based on Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act.
3. Legality of refund of sales tax deposited by the Company for the year 1949-50.
4. Justification of entertaining the revision application after a significant lapse of time.
Summary:
Issue 1: Applicability of Indian Limitation Act to U.P. Sales Tax Act cases
The High Court decided that question No. 1 need not be answered. This decision was based on the precedent set in Commr. of Sales Tax. U.P. Lucknow v. Auraiya Chambers of Commerce, which was for the assessment year 1948-49.
Issue 2: Consideration of limitation period under Article 96 of the Limitation Act for refund claims based on Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act
The High Court answered question No. 2 in the negative, implying that the period of limitation under Article 96 of the Limitation Act could not be taken into consideration by the Sales Tax authorities in refusing to allow refund. The Supreme Court affirmed this view, noting that the tax was collected without authority of law, hence refundable to the assessee. The Court emphasized that Article 265 of the Constitution mandates no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.
Issue 3: Legality of refund of sales tax deposited by the Company for the year 1949-50
The High Court answered question No. 3 in the affirmative, stating that the Additional Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax was legally justified in holding that the sums deposited by the Company towards sales tax for the year 1949-50 were refundable. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, noting that the tax was collected under a mistaken view of law, as determined by the Court's decision in Budh Prakash Jai Prakash's case [1955] 1 SCR 243. The Court also recognized the principle under Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act that money paid by mistake must be repaid.
Issue 4: Justification of entertaining the revision application after a significant lapse of time
The High Court answered question No. 4 in the affirmative, justifying the entertainment of the revision application despite the lapse of several years from the date of the assessment order. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the application for refund was made within a reasonable time after the mistake was discovered, and there was no specific prohibition against the refund. The Court highlighted that procedural rules should not obstruct substantial justice.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, dismissing the appeals with costs. The Court emphasized the importance of fairness and justice in interpreting fiscal statutes and ensuring that taxes collected without authority of law are refunded to the rightful party.
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1986 (4) TMI 362
Issues Involved:
1. Inherent jurisdiction of Sub-ordinate Criminal Courts outside the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.
2. Scope of Article 141 of the Constitution.
Summary:
Inherent Jurisdiction of Sub-ordinate Criminal Courts:
The primary issue was whether a Sub-ordinate Criminal Court has any inherent jurisdiction outside the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The appellants were accused in a complaint filed u/s 67 and 72C(1)(a) of the Mines Act, 1952, read with Regulation 106 of the Metalliferous Mines Regulation, 1961. The complaint was dismissed by the Magistrate due to the absence of both the complainant and the accused. The Magistrate later restored the complaint upon the complainant's application, which was contested by the accused on the grounds that the Magistrate had become functus officio. The Magistrate rejected this contention, asserting inherent powers to review and recall his earlier orders. Subsequent revisions by the accused to higher courts were dismissed, with the Delhi High Court relying on an earlier decision that criminal courts had certain inherent powers.
The Supreme Court, referencing its decision in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh, held that no criminal court has inherent jurisdiction not provided for in the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court emphasized that the Criminal Procedure Code does not contain any provision enabling a Magistrate to exercise inherent jurisdiction to recall a dismissed complaint. The Court concluded that the Magistrate's order to recall the dismissal was without jurisdiction, rendering all subsequent proceedings null and void.
Scope of Article 141 of the Constitution:
The judgment also addressed the scope of Article 141 of the Constitution, which mandates that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts within India. The Additional Sessions Judge had incorrectly interpreted the Supreme Court's decision as not having retrospective effect, treating it as a form of legislation by Parliament. The Supreme Court clarified that its judgments apply to all pending proceedings and are binding on all subordinate courts. The Court cited Shenoy and Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer to reinforce that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in one appeal affects all related cases, even if appeals were not filed against all parties involved in a common judgment.
The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for dismissing the revision in limine without considering the binding nature of its previous decisions. The Court reiterated that the law declared by it under Article 141 has an all-pervasive nature and must be followed by all subordinate courts.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, allowed the appeal, and restored the Magistrate's original order dismissing the complaint. The judgment underscored the lack of inherent jurisdiction in subordinate criminal courts to recall dismissed complaints and reinforced the binding nature of Supreme Court decisions under Article 141 of the Constitution.
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1986 (4) TMI 360
Issues Involved:
1. Conviction under Section 302 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.
2. Conviction under Section 3 of the Explosive Substance Act.
3. Conspiracy to commit murder.
4. Validity of extra-judicial confession.
5. Identification of the accused.
6. Sentencing and the appropriateness of the death penalty.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Conviction under Section 302 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code:
The court found that appellant Yadav threw a bomb at the Collector, causing his instantaneous death. The evidence of eye-witnesses and other circumstances, such as the presence of injuries on Yadav and the smell of explosives from his clothes, supported this finding. The court also held that appellant Tripathi conspired with Yadav to kill the Collector due to the demolition of his Ashram and other grievances.
2. Conviction under Section 3 of the Explosive Substance Act:
Yadav was found guilty under Section 3 of the Explosive Substance Act as he used a bomb to kill the Collector. The bomb was recovered from a Jhola found at the scene, which was linked to Yadav. The forensic evidence confirmed that the bomb caused the injuries and death of the Collector.
3. Conspiracy to commit murder:
The court held that a conspiracy was hatched between Tripathi and Yadav to kill the Collector. Evidence showed that Yadav frequently visited Tripathi in jail and brought him food and other items. Witnesses testified that Yadav met Tripathi on the day of the murder and discussed the plan. The court also considered the background and actions of Tripathi, who had a motive to kill the Collector due to the demolition of his Ashram and other legal actions against him.
4. Validity of extra-judicial confession:
The court admitted the extra-judicial confession made by Yadav immediately after his arrest. Yadav confessed to killing the Collector at the behest of Tripathi. The court found this confession to be voluntary and spontaneous, not influenced by any threat or promise, and thus admissible under the law.
5. Identification of the accused:
The court rejected the argument that the identification of Yadav was unreliable due to the lack of a test identification parade. The court held that the overwhelming evidence, including the chase and arrest of Yadav immediately after the incident, made the identification reliable. Witnesses had seen Yadav with a Jhola before the incident and identified him as the person who threw the bomb.
6. Sentencing and the appropriateness of the death penalty:
The court affirmed the death penalty for both appellants, considering the premeditated nature of the crime and the manner in which it was executed. The court referred to guidelines from previous Supreme Court judgments, emphasizing that the murder of a high-ranking officer like the Collector in his office warranted the death penalty. The court held that the crime shocked the collective conscience of the community and required a strong deterrent sentence to maintain law and order.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the convictions and death sentences of both appellants. The judgment emphasized the need for strict punishment to deter such heinous crimes and maintain the rule of law. The court also highlighted the efficient and fair investigation conducted in the case and called for stricter adherence to jail rules and procedures to prevent such incidents in the future.
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1986 (4) TMI 359
Issues:
1. Jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 to set aside findings of Surplus Land Determination Tribunal.
2. Validity of order of remand made by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal.
3. Waiver of right to object against the order of remand by Respondent No. 1.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a dispute regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 to set aside the findings of the Surplus Land Determination Tribunal. The Respondent was found to be holding surplus land by the Tribunal, and the case was remanded by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal for fresh enquiry. The High Court set aside the Tribunal's decision, stating that the remand order was erroneous. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision could not be sustained as the Respondent had waived the right to object to the remand order by submitting to it. The Tribunal's revised findings were affirmed by the Supreme Court, emphasizing the Respondent's waiver of objection.
2. The validity of the remand order made by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal was also a crucial issue in the case. The Tribunal remitted the case back to the Surplus Land Determination Tribunal for fresh enquiry, setting aside the earlier decision. The Respondent did not raise any objection to this remand order and submitted to it. The Supreme Court noted that the State did not file any cross-objection against the findings of the Surplus Land Determination Tribunal, further strengthening the validity of the remand order.
3. The issue of waiver of the right to object against the order of remand by the Respondent was significant in the case. Despite the remand order being made by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, the Respondent did not challenge it and participated in the proceedings without objection. The Supreme Court considered this waiver of objection by the Respondent as a crucial factor in affirming the Tribunal's decision and setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Respondent's submission to the remand order was deemed as a waiver of the right to contest the same.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the remand order made by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and affirmed the revised findings of the Surplus Land Determination Tribunal. The Court emphasized the Respondent's waiver of the right to object against the remand order as a pivotal factor in reaching its decision. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and no costs were awarded due to the peculiar circumstances of the case.
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1986 (4) TMI 358
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the District Judge under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act.
2. Applicability of Sections 31 and 32 to co-mortgagors or guarantors.
3. Legislative intent and statutory interpretation of the Act.
4. Procedural fairness and notice requirements under Section 32.
5. Comparison with judicial precedents and other statutory provisions.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the District Judge under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act:
The primary issue was whether the District Judge has jurisdiction to proceed against the properties of co-mortgagors or guarantors in proceedings initiated under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act. The court noted that Section 31 enables the Financial Corporation to apply to the District Judge for reliefs such as the sale of property pledged or mortgaged as security for the loan. The provision does not distinguish between property belonging to the industrial concern and property mortgaged by third-party sureties. The jurisdiction is conferred on the District Judge within whose limits the industrial concern carries on business, emphasizing the focus on the industrial concern but not excluding third-party properties.
2. Applicability of Sections 31 and 32 to co-mortgagors or guarantors:
The appellant contended that Sections 31 and 32 create a special jurisdiction only for the industrial concern, not for co-mortgagors or guarantors. The court rejected this argument, stating that the Act's provisions, including Section 29, do not restrict the Corporation's rights to proceed only against the industrial concern's property. The Act envisages that the Corporation can seek an order for the sale of mortgaged property, including that belonging to third-party sureties. The court emphasized that the statutory scheme allows for the expeditious recovery of loans, which would be hindered if the Corporation had to resort to civil suits for third-party properties.
3. Legislative intent and statutory interpretation of the Act:
The court examined the legislative intent behind the State Financial Corporations Act, which aims to provide medium and long-term credit to industrial undertakings and ensure the expeditious recovery of loans. The Act's provisions override inconsistent laws and provide additional remedies beyond those in the Transfer of Property Act or the Code of Civil Procedure. The court highlighted that the Act's purpose is to facilitate industrial development by ensuring quick loan recovery, which supports the inclusion of third-party properties within its ambit.
4. Procedural fairness and notice requirements under Section 32:
The appellant argued that the absence of a specific provision for issuing notice to third-party sureties in Section 32 indicates that such sureties cannot be proceeded against. The court disagreed, stating that the audi alteram partem rule (the right to be heard) is implied in the provision. The District Judge is expected to issue notice to the concerned parties, including third-party sureties, to ensure procedural fairness. The court noted that in the present case, the District Judge had issued notice to the appellant, ensuring compliance with natural justice principles.
5. Comparison with judicial precedents and other statutory provisions:
The court referred to judicial precedents, including the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Munnalal v. U.P. Financial Corporation, which held a contrary view. However, the court preferred the earlier Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, which supported the Corporation's right to proceed against third-party properties. The court also cited the Supreme Court's observations in Director of Industries, U.P. v. Deep Chand, emphasizing the need for expeditious recovery of public funds advanced as loans.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the Corporation could proceed against the mortgaged property of third-party sureties in an application before the District Judge under Section 31. The duty to issue notice to the surety is implied to ensure procedural fairness. The appeal was dismissed, and the order of the District Judge was upheld, allowing the Corporation to recover the loan amount from the properties mortgaged by the co-mortgagors, including the appellant. The court emphasized that the statutory scheme aims to facilitate quick loan recovery to support industrial development and public interest.
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1986 (4) TMI 357
Issues Involved:
1. Expunction of derogatory remarks against a prosecution witness.
2. Evaluation of the prosecution's evidence and the application of legal presumptions.
3. Necessity and appropriateness of adverse remarks by the Appellate Judge.
Summary of Judgment:
1. Expunction of Derogatory Remarks:
The appeal was filed by a prosecution witness seeking expunction of derogatory remarks made against him by a High Court Judge while allowing Criminal Appeal No. 31 of 1982. The appellant, who was a Cabinet Minister at the time of the appeal, had resigned due to these remarks.
2. Evaluation of Prosecution's Evidence:
The case involved the arrest of the first respondent for accepting a bribe of Rs. 2,000, with marked currency notes recovered from his briefcase. The prosecution's case was based on the testimony of eleven witnesses, including the appellant (P.W.8). The Special Judge convicted the first respondent u/s 5(2) read with 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. However, the High Court acquitted the first respondent, finding the prosecution's evidence insufficient and the respondent's explanation for the currency notes plausible.
3. Necessity and Appropriateness of Adverse Remarks:
The Supreme Court found that the Appellate Judge had unnecessarily magnified the appellant's role and failed to apply legal presumptions against the first respondent. The Judge's comments on the appellant's credibility were deemed uncalled for, as the appellant was not a material witness. The Appellate Judge also overlooked Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which provides immunity to witnesses from prosecution u/s 165A of the Indian Penal Code. The Supreme Court emphasized that judicial remarks should be made with sobriety, moderation, and restraint, especially when they affect the character and reputation of individuals.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, directing that the derogatory remarks against the appellant be expunged from the High Court's judgment. The Court reiterated the importance of judicial restraint and the necessity of making adverse remarks only when absolutely integral to the case's decision.
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1986 (4) TMI 356
Issues Involved:
1. Treatment of hotel building as a plant for depreciation purposes.
2. Disallowance of traveling expenses under Rule 6-D of the IT Rules.
3. Disallowance of Rs. 10,022 in the assessment year 1978-79.
4. Classification of the assessee-company as an industrial company for concessional tax rates.
5. Grant of investment allowance under Section 32A of the IT Act.
6. Disallowance of telephone expenses.
7. Disallowance of bad debts.
8. Charge of interest under Section 215.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Treatment of Hotel Building as a Plant for Depreciation Purposes:
The Tribunal considered whether the hotel building could be treated as a plant for the purpose of granting a higher rate of depreciation. The Tribunal referenced the decision in the case of Hotel Srelekha (P) Ltd. vs. Third ITO, where it was held that a hotel building could be treated as a plant. The Tribunal stated, "The building was thus the assessee's tool of trade, without which the assessee could not carry on its business." The Tribunal agreed with this principle and directed the authorities to treat the buildings used by the hotel as a plant and allow the appropriate rate of depreciation. However, buildings used as offices or residences of officers should not be treated as a plant.
2. Disallowance of Traveling Expenses Under Rule 6-D:
The Tribunal addressed the disallowance of traveling expenses by applying Rule 6-D of the IT Rules. The Tribunal noted that the Special Bench of the Tribunal in Sundaram Finance Ltd. vs. IAC had observed that the expression "including hotel expenses" in Section 37(3) of the IT Act is limited to the daily allowance stipulated in Rule 6-D and does not cover other expenditures. The Tribunal directed the ITO to re-examine the claim in light of the Special Bench's directions and arrive at the correct sums to be disallowed.
3. Disallowance of Rs. 10,022 in the Assessment Year 1978-79:
The assessee contested the disallowance of Rs. 10,022, which was given up at the time of the hearing. The Tribunal confirmed this disallowance.
4. Classification of the Assessee-Company as an Industrial Company for Concessional Tax Rates:
The Tribunal considered whether the assessee-company could be treated as an industrial company engaged in the manufacture or processing of goods, thus entitled to concessional tax rates. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had relied on the Kerala High Court decision in CIT vs. Casino (P) Ltd., which held that a hotel is mainly a trading concern and not an industrial company. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s view, stating, "We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken by the authorities below has to be upheld."
5. Grant of Investment Allowance Under Section 32A of the IT Act:
The Tribunal considered whether the assessee was entitled to investment allowance under Section 32A. The Tribunal referenced the decision in the case of Orient Express Co. (P) Ltd. vs. IAC, where it was held that a hotel is an industrial undertaking within the meaning of Section 32A and is entitled to investment allowance. The Tribunal directed the ITO to examine whether the other conditions laid down in Section 32A are satisfied and, if so, to grant the investment allowance to the assessee.
6. Disallowance of Telephone Expenses:
The Tribunal addressed the disallowance of Rs. 10,000 out of telephone expenses, which was reduced to Rs. 5,000 by the CIT(A). The Tribunal found force in the assessee's submission that the directors had personal telephones, and the expenses claimed were only for the hotel-installed telephones. The Tribunal concluded that no disallowance was justified.
7. Disallowance of Bad Debts:
The Tribunal considered the disallowance of Rs. 17,894, out of which Rs. 10,463 and Rs. 4,135 were not pressed by the assessee. The remaining amount of Rs. 3,296 was contested as a remission granted to a party. The Tribunal directed that this amount should be treated as a deduction on the ground that it was a remission granted in rates, not a bad debt.
8. Charge of Interest Under Section 215:
The Tribunal noted that the interest levied under Section 215 would be consequential and directed the ITO to recompute the interest based on the income finally determined after giving effect to the Tribunal's order.
Conclusion:
The appeals were allowed in part, with specific directions provided for each issue. The Tribunal's detailed analysis and directions ensured that the matters were addressed comprehensively and in accordance with the relevant legal principles and precedents.
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1986 (4) TMI 355
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act.
2. Functional integrality between the Churchgate Division and Trombay factory.
3. Registration under different Acts and its impact on the legal status of the divisions.
4. Whether non-compliance with Section 25-O constitutes unfair labour practice under the Maharashtra Act.
5. Entitlement and adjustment of back wages and retrenchment compensation.
Summary:
1. Applicability of Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act:
The first issue considered was whether Section 25-O applied to the closure of the Churchgate Office. The Union argued it was governed by Section 25-O, while the Company contended Section 25FFA applied. Section 25-O requires an employer intending to close an undertaking of an industrial establishment to apply for prior permission at least ninety days before the intended closure. The Court found that the aggregate number of workmen employed in the Trombay factory and the Churchgate Division exceeded one hundred, thus making Section 25-O applicable.
2. Functional Integrality between the Churchgate Division and Trombay Factory:
The Court examined whether the Churchgate Division and Trombay factory constituted one establishment. Evidence showed that the Churchgate Division performed essential functions such as procurement of raw materials, marketing, sales, and accounting for the Trombay factory. The Court concluded there was functional integrality between the two, thus making them one establishment under Section 25-O.
3. Registration under Different Acts:
The Company argued that the Trombay factory and the Churchgate Division were separate legal entities because they were registered under different Acts'the Factories Act and the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, respectively. The Court rejected this argument, stating that registration under regulatory statutes does not create separate legal entities unless incorporated under the Companies Act. The Court emphasized that an undertaking of an industrial establishment need not itself be an industrial establishment.
4. Non-compliance with Section 25-O and Unfair Labour Practice:
The Court addressed whether the Company's non-compliance with Section 25-O constituted an unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV to the Maharashtra Act. The Court disagreed with the Industrial Court's reliance on the Bombay High Court decision in Maharashtra General Kamgar Union v. Glass-Containers Pvt. Ltd., stating that non-compliance with statutory provisions like Section 25-O does amount to a failure to implement a settlement. Thus, the closure was deemed illegal, and the Company was guilty of unfair labour practice.
5. Entitlement and Adjustment of Back Wages and Retrenchment Compensation:
The Court held that the eighty-four workmen were entitled to receive their full salary and benefits from the date of the illegal closure. The Court also addressed the issue of retrenchment compensation already accepted by the workmen, stating that the amount of back wages should be set off against the retrenchment compensation. Any remaining balance of retrenchment compensation would be adjusted by deducting twenty percent from the periodic salary payable to the workmen.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Industrial Court's order, and declared the closure of the Churchgate Division illegal. The workmen were entitled to full salary and benefits from the date of closure, with adjustments for retrenchment compensation already received. The Respondent Company was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.
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1986 (4) TMI 354
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
2. Impact of the lease agreement on land acquisition proceedings.
3. Effect of the decree for specific performance on land acquisition proceedings.
4. Applicability of the proviso to Section 6(1) regarding the three-year period for issuing a declaration.
5. Relevance of the Explanation to Section 6(1) of the Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
The appellant challenged the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, issued on 3-12-1983, on the grounds that it was void and illegal as it was made beyond the period of three years as contemplated by the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act. The court, however, upheld the validity of the declaration, relying on the Full Bench decision in Chinnathambi Gounder v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, which held that a subsequent declaration under Section 6(1) need not be made within three years if the original declaration was quashed by a court order.
2. Impact of the Lease Agreement on Land Acquisition Proceedings
The appellant argued that the State Government could not proceed with the land acquisition while the lease agreement executed on 20-8-1980 was in force. The court found no merit in this contention, stating that the lease agreement between the appellant and the Corporation did not affect the statutory powers of the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act. The court clarified that the Land Acquisition proceedings are independent of any lease agreements and the interim order of injunction did not survive after the decision of the suit.
3. Effect of the Decree for Specific Performance on Land Acquisition Proceedings
The appellant contended that the decree for specific performance against the Corporation rendered the land acquisition proceedings ineffective. The court rejected this argument, emphasizing that the decree for specific performance was only against the Corporation and did not bind the State Government. The court further noted that the appellant's subsequent suit to quash the land acquisition proceedings indicated that the decree for specific performance did not automatically invalidate the land acquisition.
4. Applicability of the Proviso to Section 6(1) Regarding the Three-Year Period for Issuing a Declaration
The appellant argued that the declaration under Section 6(1) was invalid as it was issued beyond the three-year period from the notification under Section 4(1). The court held that the proviso to Section 6(1) did not apply in cases where the original declaration was quashed by a court order. The court explained that the proviso only required the initial declaration to be made within three years, and a fresh declaration could be issued beyond this period if the original was quashed.
5. Relevance of the Explanation to Section 6(1) of the Act
The appellant contended that the Explanation to Section 6(1), which allows the exclusion of the period during which proceedings are stayed by a court order, did not apply. The court agreed that the Explanation was not relevant in this case since it pertains to the period during which proceedings are held up due to a stay or injunction, not to the quashing of a declaration. The court concluded that the Explanation did not affect the validity of the fresh declaration issued on 3-12-1983.
Conclusion
The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the validity of the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The court clarified that the lease agreement and the decree for specific performance did not impact the State Government's statutory powers under the Act. The court also ruled that the proviso to Section 6(1) regarding the three-year period did not apply to fresh declarations issued after the original was quashed. The pending appeal before the Subordinate Judge, Tuticorin, concerning the notification under Section 4(1), was directed to be disposed of before 31st August 1986. The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected.
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1986 (4) TMI 353
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 68 of the Transfer of Property Act.
2. Personal liability of guarantors.
3. Rights of the creditor to proceed against guarantors before exhausting remedies against the principal debtor.
4. Nature of the suit - whether it is a mortgage suit or a suit on promissory notes and guarantees.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of Section 68 of the Transfer of Property Act:
The appellants argued that the plaintiff Bank should not be allowed to proceed against the guarantors for the realization of its dues until the Bank has exhausted all its securities against the principal debtor. They relied on the case of Sukhadakanta Bhattacharjya v. Jogineekanta Bhattacharjya, which held that a mortgagee is not entitled to sue upon the debt ignoring the mortgage. The court examined whether the instant suit was a mortgage suit and if Section 68 of the Transfer of Property Act applied. The court concluded that the present suit was based on a promissory note and agreements of guarantee, which are independent of the mortgage, thus Section 68 did not apply.
2. Personal Liability of Guarantors:
The court analyzed the personal liability of the guarantors, noting that the liability arises from the independent agreements of guarantee and promissory notes, not from the mortgage. The court referenced the case of Nityananda Ghose v. Rajpur Chhaya Beni Cinema Ltd., which supported the view that a suit on a promissory note is distinct from a suit on a mortgage. The court concluded that the personal liability of the guarantors in this case was created by independent transactions and not connected with the mortgage.
3. Rights of the Creditor to Proceed Against Guarantors Before Exhausting Remedies Against the Principal Debtor:
The court stated that a creditor is not bound to exhaust remedies against the principal debtor before suing the surety. The court cited the Supreme Court judgment in Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Dr. Damodar Prasad, which held that the liability of the surety is immediate and not deferred until the creditor exhausts his remedies against the principal debtor. The court emphasized that the very object of the guarantee would be defeated if the creditor were required to postpone remedies against the surety.
4. Nature of the Suit - Whether It Is a Mortgage Suit or a Suit on Promissory Notes and Guarantees:
The court examined the frame of the suit and concluded that it was not a suit by the creditor qua mortgagee but a suit to enforce the promissory note and agreements of guarantee. The court referenced the case of Sm. Manoda Sundari Saha v. Mercantile Bank Ltd., which supported the view that a suit on promissory notes and guarantees is distinct from a mortgage suit. The court held that the instant suit was for a money decree based on the overdraft account and enforcement of guarantees, not for the recovery of mortgage money.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the suit was not a mortgage suit and that the Bank was entitled to proceed against the guarantors based on the promissory notes and agreements of guarantee. The court reiterated that a creditor is not required to exhaust remedies against the principal debtor before pursuing the guarantors. The appeal was dismissed with costs, and all interim orders were vacated.
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1986 (4) TMI 352
Issues Involved:
1. Compliance with Section 83 of the Representation of People Act.
2. Dismissal of the election petition at the threshold.
3. Justification of dismissal by the High Court on specific grounds of alleged corrupt practices.
4. Validity of dismissal under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC.
Summary:
Issue 1: Compliance with Section 83 of the Representation of People Act
The appellant's election petition was dismissed for non-compliance with the mandatory requirement to furnish material facts and particulars as per Section 83 of the Representation of People Act. The High Court held that the petition did not disclose a cause of action. The appellant contended that the Act does not provide for dismissal of an election petition for non-compliance with Section 83, as Section 86 of the Act, which provides for summary dismissal, does not refer to Section 83. However, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's view, citing precedents that an election petition can be summarily dismissed if it does not furnish a cause of action or comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 83.
Issue 2: Dismissal of the election petition at the threshold
The appellant argued that the powers to reject an election petition summarily should not be exercised at the threshold but only after recording evidence. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the purpose of such powers is to ensure that meaningless litigation does not occupy the court's time. The Court emphasized that the litigation should be terminated at the earliest if it is bound to prove abortive, to relieve the elected representative from the psychological burden of litigation.
Issue 3: Justification of dismissal by the High Court on specific grounds of alleged corrupt practices
The High Court dismissed the election petition on several grounds, including:
- Ground I: The petition did not disclose material facts or particulars regarding the alleged corrupt practice involving a government servant, Mr. Beg. The Supreme Court upheld this view, stating that the petition failed to mention who procured Mr. Beg's services, how, and with what consent.
- Ground II(i): The petition lacked material facts and particulars regarding the slogans allegedly painted by the respondent's workers. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that the petition was vague and did not disclose a cause of action.
- Ground II(ii): The petition did not provide the time, date, and place of the speeches delivered by the respondent. The Supreme Court found the High Court's view justified.
- Ground II(iii): The petition failed to produce a copy of the poster it referenced, and lacked material facts regarding the distribution of the poster. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision.
- Ground XIII: The petition did not show that the publication of a book was done with the respondent's consent. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's view.
- Ground XIV: The petition did not specify who distributed the pamphlets, when, where, and how. The Supreme Court found the High Court's view justified.
- Ground XV: The petition lacked material facts regarding the printing, publication, and circulation of another pamphlet. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision.
Issue 4: Validity of dismissal under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC
The appellant contended that the High Court should have "rejected" the petition under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC instead of "dismissing" it. The Supreme Court found this contention insignificant, as the petition was filed on the last day of the limitation period. Whether the petition was "rejected" or "dismissed" made no difference, as a fresh petition could not have been presented within the limitation period.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision to dismiss the election petition for non-compliance with Section 83 of the Representation of People Act and for not disclosing a cause of action. The Court emphasized the importance of terminating meaningless litigation at the earliest to allow elected representatives to focus on their duties. The appeal was dismissed with no costs throughout.
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1986 (4) TMI 351
Issues Involved:
1. Reorganization of States and its impact on state services.
2. Inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees in the cadre of Deputy Collectors.
3. Validity of promotions made during the period 1960-1962.
4. Interpretation of the term "regularly appointed" in the context of promotions.
5. Application of the principle of res judicata in writ petitions under Article 226.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Reorganization of States and its Impact on State Services:
The judgment discusses the reorganization of states under the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960, which divided the State of Bombay into Maharashtra and Gujarat. This reorganization led to various administrative issues, particularly concerning the allocation and seniority of state service personnel. The Act provided specific provisions for the provisional and final allotment of personnel to the newly formed states, ensuring their conditions of service were not varied to their disadvantage without the Central Government's approval.
2. Inter se Seniority Between Direct Recruits and Promotees in the Cadre of Deputy Collectors:
The dispute in the appeals relates to the inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees in the cadre of Deputy Collectors. The cadre was recognized for recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service. Historically, the seniority was determined based on continuous officiation for promotees and the date of appointment on probation for direct recruits. The government resolutions from 1941 and 1959 played a crucial role in determining this seniority.
3. Validity of Promotions Made During the Period 1960-1962:
The promotions of Mamlatdars to Deputy Collectors between 1960 and 1962 were challenged by direct recruits. The court in Chauhan's case validated these promotions under the "as far as practicable" proviso, acknowledging the State's inability to hold competitive examinations due to administrative queries. The court held that the promotions during this period were regular and saved by the proviso.
4. Interpretation of the Term "Regularly Appointed":
A significant point of contention was the interpretation of "regularly appointed" in the context of promotions. The Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court interpreted this term to mean appointments to substantive vacancies in the cadre of Deputy Collectors. However, the Supreme Court found this interpretation erroneous, stating that the appointments made during period A (1960-1962) were regular, including those to temporary and ex-cadre posts, as they were made in accordance with the rules and were not ad hoc or fortuitous.
5. Application of the Principle of Res Judicata in Writ Petitions Under Article 226:
The principle of res judicata was applied to bar the direct recruits from re-agitating the issue of the validity of promotions made during 1960-1962. The Supreme Court emphasized that this issue had already been decided in the earlier writ petition and was not disturbed in subsequent appeals, including Chauhan's case. Therefore, the High Court should not have allowed this point to be raised again.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal filed by the promoters, confirming the dismissal of Special Civil Application No. 2199 of 1978 and setting aside the order making absolute the rule issued in Special Civil Application No. 1407 of 1978. The court held that the promotions made during period A were regular and that the principle of continuous officiation applied to determine seniority. The appeals highlighted the complexities arising from state reorganization and the challenges in maintaining administrative fairness and consistency in service matters.
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