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1995 (4) TMI 324
ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDEREDThe judgment primarily revolves around the following core legal issues: 1. Whether the exercise of power under Clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. 2. If judicial review is permissible, what is the extent and scope of such review in relation to the satisfaction of the President or the Governor under Article 311(2)(c)? 3. Whether the Government is obliged to disclose the material upon which the satisfaction of the President or the Governor was based, especially when a claim of privilege is invoked under Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act. 4. Whether the dismissal orders were mala fide or based on extraneous or irrelevant considerations, particularly considering the appellants' involvement with the Intelligence Bureau Employees Association (IBEA). ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1: Judicial Review of Article 311(2)(c) The Court examined whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor under Article 311(2)(c), which allows for dismissal without an inquiry in the interest of the security of the State, is subject to judicial review. The Court referenced previous judgments, including S.R. Bommai and Tulsiram Patel, to determine that judicial review is indeed permissible. The Court emphasized that such review is limited to examining whether the satisfaction was vitiated by mala fides or based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds. Issue 2: Scope of Judicial Review The Court discussed the extent of judicial review, noting that while the sufficiency of the material cannot be questioned, the legitimacy of the inference drawn from such material is open to judicial review. The Court highlighted that the satisfaction must be based on relevant considerations related to the security of the State, and it is not immune from judicial scrutiny if it is based on extraneous or irrelevant grounds. Issue 3: Disclosure of Material and Claim of Privilege The Court addressed whether the Government must disclose the material upon which the satisfaction was based. It concluded that while Article 74(2) protects the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers, it does not extend to the material on which the advice was based. However, this is subject to claims of privilege under Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act. The Court emphasized that even if privilege is claimed, the Government must disclose the nature of the activities that led to the satisfaction, distinguishing between the nature of activities and the material supporting such activities. Issue 4: Allegation of Mala Fides and Extraneous Considerations The appellants argued that their dismissal was motivated by their involvement with the IBEA. The Court examined the Tribunal's findings, which concluded that the dismissal orders were based on activities prejudicial to the security of the State and unrelated to the appellants' association activities. The Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding no evidence of mala fides or extraneous considerations. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS The Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, affirming that the dismissal orders were not vitiated by mala fides or based on irrelevant considerations. The Court reiterated that: "The satisfaction of the President or the Governor under Article 311(2)(c) is subject to judicial review, limited to examining whether it was vitiated by mala fides or based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds." It emphasized that the Government is required to disclose the nature of the activities leading to dismissal, even if the material itself is privileged, to enable effective judicial review. In conclusion, the Court dismissed the appeals, finding no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's decision, and maintained that the dismissal orders were justified based on considerations of state security.
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1995 (4) TMI 323
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeal in the case with citation 1995 (4) TMI 323 - SC. Judges were Mr. P.B. Sawant and Mr. G.T. Nanawati.
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1995 (4) TMI 322
Issues:
1. Imposition of penalty for contravention of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.
2. Allegations of aiding and abetting in transferring foreign exchange.
3. Validity of charge under section 8(1) read with section 64(2) of the Act.
4. Admissibility and evidentiary value of statements and documents.
5. Compliance with procedural requirements in adjudication proceedings.
Analysis:
1. The appeal stemmed from an adjudication order imposing a penalty on the appellant for contravening the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The appellant complied with the pre-deposit requirement, leading to the disposal of the appeal on its merits.
2. The case involved allegations of aiding and abetting in the transfer of foreign exchange, based on statements and documents seized during investigations. The appellant was charged with contravening section 8(1) read with section 64(2) of the Act.
3. The charge against the appellant was scrutinized for its compliance with the legal provisions. It was observed that the charge did not establish a contravention of section 8(1) and abetment thereof. The act of sending or taking foreign exchange out of India was deemed to fall under section 13(2) rather than section 8(1) of the Act.
4. The evidentiary value of statements recorded under section 108 and documents, such as a letter from Hong Kong Customs authorities, was questioned. The statements were disputed by the appellant, and discrepancies in factual details raised doubts about the validity of the evidence presented.
5. Procedural aspects of the adjudication proceedings were analyzed, highlighting deficiencies in the investigation and evidence collection process. The lack of verification of factual details and reliance on inadmissible evidence raised concerns about the fairness of the proceedings.
6. Ultimately, the appellate tribunal concluded that the charge of aiding and abetting in transferring foreign exchange could not be sustained against the appellant. The impugned order was set aside, directing the refund of the pre-deposit amount and clarifying that the decision did not impact separate proceedings related to alleged contraventions of section 13(2) before Customs authorities.
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1995 (4) TMI 321
Issues:
1. Adjustment of decretal amount towards principal or interest and other charges.
2. Appropriation of payment by judgment-debtor towards interest and principal.
3. Requirement of notice to decree-holder for payment adjustment.
4. Effect of deposit by judgment-debtor without specifying appropriation.
5. Impact of court order on deposit and payment appropriation.
Issue 1: Adjustment of decretal amount
The Supreme Court considered whether the decretal amount deposited by the judgment-debtor should be adjusted towards the principal amount due first or against interest and other charges. The Court analyzed the amounts due under the Land Acquisition Award, including market value, solatium, and interest, and the subsequent enhancements granted by the High Court. The Court clarified the nature of the deposit and the appropriateness of adjusting it towards the principal or interest based on legal principles and previous judgments.
Issue 2: Appropriation of payment by judgment-debtor
The Court discussed the right of the decree-holder to appropriate the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor towards interest and other expenses. It highlighted the importance of fairness and necessity in such appropriations and cited legal precedents to support the principle that payments should first be applied towards interest before the principal amount. The Court examined the provisions of the Contract Act and Order XXI Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code to determine the creditor's discretion in applying payments to lawful debts.
Issue 3: Requirement of notice for payment adjustment
The Court emphasized the necessity for the judgment-debtor to provide notice to the decree-holder regarding the manner of payment appropriation, especially in cases of deposit in court. It discussed the implications of the amended Rule 1 of Order XXI, which mandated the judgment-debtor to inform the decree-holder through written notice for proper adjustment of payments. The Court highlighted the significance of serving notice to cease the running of interest and protect the rights of both parties involved.
Issue 4: Effect of deposit without specifying appropriation
The Court addressed the situation where the judgment-debtor deposited the amount without specifying the appropriation towards principal or interest. It examined the legal consequences of such deposits and reiterated the creditor's authority to appropriate payments in the absence of clear instructions from the judgment-debtor. The Court relied on previous judgments to uphold the principle that payments could be appropriated towards interest and cost in the absence of specific directions.
Issue 5: Impact of court order on deposit and payment appropriation
The Court reviewed the impact of the court's order on the deposit and subsequent payment appropriation by the judgment-debtor. It clarified that the deposit made in pursuance of the court's order did not automatically imply appropriation towards the principal amount unless specifically directed. The Court underscored the importance of following legal procedures, including providing notice to the decree-holder, for proper payment adjustment. Ultimately, the Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the Executing Court's decision, allowing the appellant to recover the balance amount with interest and costs.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court's judgment delved into various legal aspects concerning the adjustment and appropriation of payments in a decree execution scenario, emphasizing the importance of following legal procedures, providing notice, and upholding fairness in payment allocations.
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1995 (4) TMI 320
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the amended paragraph 26(2) of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. The High Court's decision was affirmed, rejecting challenges based on non-compliance of the Act, denial of minimum wages, impracticability, and violation of constitutional provisions. Special leave petitions and intervention applications were dismissed. (Case citation: 1995 (4) TMI 320 - Supreme Court)
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1995 (4) TMI 319
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeal in the case with citation 1995 (4) TMI 319 - SC. Judges were Mr. J.S. Verma and Mr. K. Jayachandra Reddy.
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1995 (4) TMI 318
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Floor Space Index (FSI) amendment.
2. Doctrine of promissory estoppel.
3. Legality of the agreement between the appellant and respondent No. 1.
4. Availability of writ of mandamus to the appellant.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Floor Space Index (FSI) Amendment:
The appellant, a firm engaged in building and development, entered into an agreement with respondent No. 1, a Government Company, for a commercial plot in New Bombay. Initially, the FSI for the plot was set at 1, but respondent No. 1 proposed an amendment to increase it to 2. This proposal was awaiting approval from the State Government. However, the State Government later sanctioned an increase in FSI to only 1.50. The Court emphasized that the prior sanction of the State Government is essential for any final Development plan or minor modifications thereof under Sections 31 and 37 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. Thus, the agreement regarding FSI did not bestow any legal right upon the appellant until such sanction was obtained.
2. Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel:
The appellant argued that the prescription of FSI was an administrative decision taken by respondent No. 1 and that the agreement should be honored based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The Court, however, rejected this argument, stating that the FSI fixation becomes legally binding only after the State Government's approval. Therefore, any agreement made without this approval is not legally enforceable. The Court further noted that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot compel public bodies to carry out promises that are contrary to law or beyond their authority.
3. Legality of the Agreement between the Appellant and Respondent No. 1:
The Court found that the agreement between the appellant and respondent No. 1 regarding the FSI was not legally valid as it lacked the necessary approval from the State Government. The Court highlighted that any modification to the final Development plan, including changes in FSI, requires the State Government's sanction. The agreement, therefore, could not bestow any legal right upon the appellant without such sanction.
4. Availability of Writ of Mandamus to the Appellant:
The appellant sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent No. 1 and the State of Maharashtra to withdraw or cancel the impugned notification and enforce the original agreement. The Court dismissed this request, stating that the appellant did not have a legally protected and judicially enforceable right to claim such a writ. The Court reiterated that the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not be invoked to enforce an agreement that was contrary to statutory provisions.
Conclusion:
The Court concluded that the reliefs sought by the appellant were not available, as the agreement regarding the FSI was not legally enforceable without the State Government's approval. The appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1995 (4) TMI 317
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... ... ..... volved is small, we are not inclined to interfere in this matter. Appeal is dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 316
Issues Involved: Entitlement to ex-gratia payment, interpretation of "actual VIP security duty," application of the theory of notional extension, and causal relationship between accident and employment.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Entitlement to Ex-Gratia Payment:
The primary issue is whether the appellant is entitled to an ex-gratia payment of Rs. 50,000 as per the circular dated 13.6.1986 of the Cabinet Secretariat. The appellant, a security assistant in the Special Protection Group (SPG), claimed this amount due to permanent partial disablement from injuries sustained in a motor accident while traveling in an SPG vehicle on 20.6.1986. The circular stipulates Rs. 50,000 to SPG personnel who suffer permanent partial disablement due to injuries received while performing actual VIP security duty.
2. Interpretation of "Actual VIP Security Duty":
The core question is the meaning of "actual VIP security duty" within the circular. The tribunal and the respondent argued that "actual VIP security duty" implies the period when the person is actively providing security to the VIP, excluding the journey to and from the duty post. The appellant contended that the journey in the official SPG vehicle should be considered part of the duty.
3. Theory of Notional Extension:
The court examined the concept of notional extension, which extends the employer's premises to include areas the employee passes through while going to and from work. The court referenced the Workmen's Compensation Act, stating that the journey in the official SPG vehicle should be considered a notional extension of the duty premises. The appellant was traveling in an official vehicle, not a public or private vehicle, indicating he was on duty during the journey.
4. Causal Relationship Between Accident and Employment:
The court emphasized the necessity of a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. The appellant's travel in the official SPG vehicle was an incident of his employment, fulfilling an official duty. The court cited precedents, including Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja and Ors. and Maokinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommed Issak, to support the notion that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the meaning of "actual VIP security duty" in the circular should align with "in the course of the employment" under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The tribunal's narrow interpretation was erroneous. The authorities were urged to adopt a humane and liberal approach to advance the circular's objective. Consequently, the appeal was allowed with Rs. 10,000 as costs.
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1995 (4) TMI 315
Issues Involved:
The issues involved in this case are related to the enforcement of a bank guarantee in the context of a sick industrial company under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The key questions for consideration are:
(i) Interpretation of section 22(1) of the Act regarding the applicability to liabilities arising from transactions post declaration as a sick industry.
(ii) Whether invoking a bank guarantee constitutes proceedings for execution against the company's properties.
(iii) Whether the conditions for enforcing the bank guarantee were fulfilled by the appellant.
Summary:
The writ appeal was filed against an interim order made absolute by a single judge, restraining the appellant from encashing a bank guarantee issued by the second respondent. The first respondent, a sick industry under the Act, argued that section 22(1) prevented the appellant from enforcing the bank guarantee. The court considered past judgments but decided the case without delving into the interpretation of the Act.
The court held that the bank guarantee was not the property of the first respondent and that encashing it did not constitute execution against the company's properties. The court referenced a previous case where a similar argument was rejected by a single judge.
Regarding the conditions for enforcing the bank guarantee, the court cited a Supreme Court decision and a judgment by a single judge, stating that challenges to bank guarantee enforcement were not permissible. The court dismissed the writ petition and deemed the writ appeal infructuous, denying the request for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court.
The court allowed a two-week stay on the judgment's operation for the writ petitioner to move a special leave petition in the Supreme Court, with a clear understanding that the period would not be extended.
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1995 (4) TMI 314
The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition challenging the constitutional validity of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The High Court's view was upheld, stating that the High Court must consider the Board's opinion but still retains the authority to decide on the company's winding up. Delay was condoned.
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1995 (4) TMI 313
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of consolidation authorities vs. civil courts.
2. Validity of decrees obtained against minors due to guardian negligence.
3. Applicability of Section 44 of the Evidence Act to cases involving minor litigants.
4. Res judicata effect of judgments obtained through negligence or fraud.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of Consolidation Authorities vs. Civil Courts:
The appellant contended that the consolidation authorities had the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate rights of tenure-holders under Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, which bars civil courts from entertaining suits regarding such rights. The Supreme Court referenced Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh, which clarified the distinction between documents that are invalid and those that need to be set aside by a competent court. The Court concluded that consolidation authorities could not declare a decree from a competent court as nullity unless it falls within the exceptions provided by law.
2. Validity of Decrees Obtained Against Minors Due to Guardian Negligence:
The Supreme Court examined whether a minor could avoid a decree obtained due to the gross negligence of their guardian. It was noted that historically, Indian courts have allowed minors to challenge decrees on these grounds. The Court agreed with the view that minors could file a suit to set aside such decrees, aligning with the consensus among various High Courts and the Privy Council's decision in Talluri Ventaka Seshayya v. Thadikonda Koliswara Rao.
3. Applicability of Section 44 of the Evidence Act to Cases Involving Minor Litigants:
The Court considered whether Section 44 of the Evidence Act, which allows judgments to be avoided if obtained by fraud or collusion, could be extended to cases of gross negligence by a guardian. The Privy Council had stated that negligence or gross negligence could be treated as fraud or collusion only if such an inference is proper from the facts. The Supreme Court determined that if gross negligence by a guardian could be inferred as fraud or collusion, the judgment could be avoided under Section 44 without needing a separate suit.
4. Res Judicata Effect of Judgments Obtained Through Negligence or Fraud:
The Court noted that judgments from competent courts generally operate as res judicata, binding the parties in subsequent proceedings. However, under Section 44 of the Evidence Act, a judgment obtained by fraud or collusion does not have this binding effect. The Court emphasized that if gross negligence by a guardian could be inferred as fraud or collusion, the earlier judgment would not operate as res judicata.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and the Deputy Director (Consolidation)'s order. The matter was remitted to the Deputy Director (Consolidation) to determine if an inference of fraud or collusion could be drawn from the gross negligence of the appellant's next friend in the earlier suit. If such an inference is drawn, the earlier judgment would not bind the appellant; otherwise, it would remain binding until set aside by a competent court. No order as to costs was made.
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1995 (4) TMI 312
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal due to lack of evidence, but left room for reconsideration if proper evidence is presented. No costs were awarded. (Case citation: 1995 (4) TMI 312 - SC)
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1995 (4) TMI 311
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Case citation: 1995 (4) TMI 311 - SC. Judges: Mr. J.S. Verma and Mr. K. Jayachandra Reddy.
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1995 (4) TMI 310
Issues Involved:
1. Grant of registration/continuation of registration under section 184(7).
2. Clubbing of income of sister-concerns with the main firm.
3. Disallowance of inter-firm interest.
4. Lump sum addition to declared gross profit.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Grant of Registration/Continuation of Registration under Section 184(7):
The main appeal concerns the refusal to grant registration/continuation of registration to H. Bhagwati & Sons and its sister-concerns. The Assessing Officer (AO) concluded that no genuine firm existed and refused registration under section 184(7). The Commissioner (Appeals) reversed this decision, holding that the firms were genuine and entitled to registration. The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's decision, noting that the firms had been separately assessed to tax for several years and complied with all legal requirements for registration.
2. Clubbing of Income of Sister-Concerns with the Main Firm:
The AO clubbed the income of four sister-concerns with the main firm, H. Bhagwati & Sons, based on several factors, including common premises, identical nature of business, common employees, and control by the same family groups. The Commissioner (Appeals) found that these sister-concerns were genuine and had been separately assessed for years. The Tribunal agreed, stating that the AO's conclusion was based on mere suspicion without admissible evidence. The Tribunal emphasized that the burden of proving the sister-concerns as benami (fictitious) entities lay with the Department, which had failed to provide any material evidence.
3. Disallowance of Inter-Firm Interest:
The AO disallowed interest paid to sister-concerns, considering them non-genuine. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted this disallowance, recognizing the sister-concerns as separate taxable entities. The Tribunal confirmed this view, stating that since the sister-concerns were genuine, the interest transactions were legitimate.
4. Lump Sum Addition to Declared Gross Profit:
The AO made a lump sum addition to the declared gross profit, suspecting manipulation of stock and book results. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted this addition, noting that all purchases and sales were vouched, and the stock was identifiable and separate for each concern. The Tribunal upheld this deletion, finding no justification for the AO's lump sum addition, especially when the accounts were audited and supported by vouchers.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal confirmed the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) on all issues. The main firm and its sister-concerns were recognized as genuine, and their incomes were not clubbed. The disallowance of inter-firm interest and the lump sum addition to gross profit were also deleted. Consequently, all appeals by the Revenue were dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 309
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... ... ..... wami, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (4) TMI 307
Issues Involved:
1. Quashing of charge framed u/s 500 IPC by the Magistrate.
2. Revisional jurisdiction of Sessions Judge and High Court.
3. Application of Section 482 CrPC by the High Court.
4. Delay in proceedings and its impact on justice.
Summary:
1. Quashing of Charge Framed u/s 500 IPC by the Magistrate:
The appellant filed a complaint against the respondents u/s 500 IPC. The Magistrate framed the charge after considering the evidence u/s 244 CrPC. The respondents challenged this in a Revision Petition, which was dismissed by the Sessions Judge. The High Court quashed the charge, stating that the lower courts did not apply their minds to the material on record and incorrectly exercised their jurisdiction.
2. Revisional Jurisdiction of Sessions Judge and High Court:
The Sessions Judge dismissed the Revision Petition, observing that the Magistrate had framed the charge based on a prima facie case. The High Court, however, quashed the charge, acting beyond its revisional jurisdiction and entering into the merits of the case, which was not appropriate at the interlocutory stage.
3. Application of Section 482 CrPC by the High Court:
The High Court quashed the charge u/s 482 CrPC, which is meant to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court held that the High Court should not act as a second Revisional Court under the garb of exercising inherent powers. The High Court erred in assessing the material and concluding that the complaint could not be proceeded with.
4. Delay in Proceedings and Its Impact on Justice:
The respondents argued that the matter should not proceed after twelve years. The Supreme Court noted that the complainant was not responsible for the delay and emphasized the need for expeditious proceedings. The Court criticized the frequent interference by superior courts at initial or interlocutory stages, which hampers the progress of criminal cases.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and directed that the case proceed according to law and as expeditiously as possible.
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1995 (4) TMI 306
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in the case. The judges were Mr. J.S. Verma and Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar.
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1995 (4) TMI 305
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the writ petition against the Governor.
2. Validity of the sanction order for prosecution.
3. Allegations of mala fides and violation of fundamental rights.
4. Public interest and consequences of prosecuting a Chief Minister.
5. Procedural aspects of sanction and investigation under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of the Writ Petition Against the Governor:
The court examined whether a writ petition against the Governor is maintainable, referencing the earlier Division Bench ruling in Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu (1994)1 L.W. 145, which held that a writ petition against the Governor is not maintainable due to the immunity provided under Article 361 of the Constitution of India. The court noted that Article 361 provides absolute immunity to the Governor, and this immunity extends to both bona fide and mala fide acts. The court also referenced the judgment in Mathialagan v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (1973)1 M.L.J. 131, which supported this view. The petitioner's counsel attempted to distinguish the present case from the earlier ruling and argued for reconsideration based on the Supreme Court's ruling in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India. However, the court found that the Bommai case did not address Article 361 and thus did not warrant reconsideration of the earlier ruling.
2. Validity of the Sanction Order for Prosecution:
The petitioner challenged the validity of the Governor's order granting sanction for prosecution under Section 169 of the IPC and Sections 13(1)(d) and (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The court reiterated that the sanction to prosecute is an administrative order and does not affect the rights of any party. It referenced several judgments, including Rameshwar Bhatia v. The State of Assam and Biswabhusan Naik v. The State of Orissa, which clarified that sanction is a permission rather than a command and does not need to be based on legal evidence. The court also noted that the Governor's order does not cast any stigma on the petitioner and that the petitioner has ample opportunity to raise contentions in the proceedings under the Act if initiated.
3. Allegations of Mala Fides and Violation of Fundamental Rights:
The petitioner alleged mala fides on the part of the Governor and claimed that the sanction order violated her fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The court found these allegations premature and noted that the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal stated that allegations of mala fides must be substantiated with evidence collected during the investigation. The court also referenced State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, which held that an order sanctioning prosecution is an administrative act and does not violate Article 21. The court concluded that the petitioner's fundamental rights were not affected at this stage.
4. Public Interest and Consequences of Prosecuting a Chief Minister:
The petitioner argued that prosecuting a Chief Minister would harm public interest. The court disagreed, citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Kazi Lhendun Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation, which emphasized the importance of judicially determining allegations of corruption against public officials to maintain public interest and morality. The court also referenced Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, which stated that individual interests must be subservient to social interests.
5. Procedural Aspects of Sanction and Investigation Under the Prevention of Corruption Act:
The petitioner contended that there could be no private complaint under the Prevention of Corruption Act and that sanction should not have been granted before an investigation. The court rejected these arguments, referencing A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, which upheld the maintainability of private complaints under the Act. The court also cited D. Lakshmi Narayanan v. V. Narayana, which clarified that sanction could be granted before an investigation.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petition, holding that it was not maintainable based on the earlier Division Bench ruling in Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu. The court found no merit in the petitioner's contentions regarding the validity of the sanction order, allegations of mala fides, violation of fundamental rights, and public interest. The court emphasized that the petitioner could raise her contentions in the proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act if initiated. The court also expressed displeasure at certain media practices during the pendency of the case and warned against contemptuous publications.
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1995 (4) TMI 304
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... ... ..... and circumstances of the case, we decline to admit the appeal.
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9911796707
