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1978 (5) TMI 131
Issues Involved:
1. Suit for Permanent Injunction
2. Interim Injunction Application
3. Jurisdiction of Civil Court vs. Company Court
4. Prematurity of Injunction Application
5. Validity of Board Resolution to Remove Directors
6. Legal Precedents on Removal of Managing Directors
Detailed Analysis:
1. Suit for Permanent Injunction:
The plaintiffs instituted a suit seeking a permanent injunction to restrain M/s. Sylvania & Laxman Limited and its Board of Directors from holding a meeting aimed at removing Mr. L. S. Aggarwal and Mrs. S. K. Aggarwal from their respective offices. The plaintiffs argued that the removal was beyond the power of the Board of Directors during the subsistence of their contractual terms.
2. Interim Injunction Application:
An application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code was moved to obtain an interim injunction to restrain the holding of the said meeting. The Subordinate Judge denied the interim injunction, stating that the contract of personal service (Managing Director/Joint Managing Director) cannot be specifically enforced through an injunction, and the only remedy available was compensation for damages. The Senior Subordinate Judge, however, granted an ex-parte interim injunction restraining the meeting.
3. Jurisdiction of Civil Court vs. Company Court:
The plaintiffs also filed a petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, alleging oppression and prejudicial actions by the company. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC, differs from that of the Company Court under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act. The appeal concerning the interim injunction was transferred to the Company Judge to avoid conflicting interim orders from different courts.
4. Prematurity of Injunction Application:
The court held that the application for an injunction was premature. The calling of a meeting to discuss the removal of the Managing Director and Joint Managing Director is not the same as their actual removal. The plaintiffs could have no grievance unless a resolution was actually passed to remove them from their offices. The court emphasized that the jurisdiction to grant an injunction arises only when the Board of Directors takes positive action on the proposed resolution.
5. Validity of Board Resolution to Remove Directors:
The plaintiffs contended that the Board of Directors could not terminate the contracts during their subsistence. The court noted that if a resolution is passed to remove the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director, it could be challenged as ultra vires or wrongful, leading to claims for damages or declarations of invalidity based on the Articles of Association.
6. Legal Precedents on Removal of Managing Directors:
The court referred to two significant cases:
- Southern Foundries v. Shirlaw (1940) 2 All. E.R. 445: The House of Lords held that the termination of a Managing Director's contract was wrongful, leading to a claim for damages.
- Ram Kissendas v. Satya Charan (1949) 2 I.A. 128: The Privy Council held that a resolution removing directors was ultra vires and invalid, granting a declaration that the Articles of the company must be observed.
The court concluded that the present case was premature for an injunction as the removal had not yet taken place. The holding of a meeting is merely the first stage, and any wrongful or ultra vires action can only be challenged after it occurs.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeal for an interim injunction, emphasizing that the plaintiffs' grievances could only be addressed if and when a resolution to remove them was actually passed by the Board of Directors. The decision aligns with the principles established in the cited legal precedents, affirming that premature injunctions in matters of personal service contracts are not warranted.
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1978 (5) TMI 130
Issues:
1. Limitation period for recovery of damages for unlawful use and occupation.
2. Applicability of proper Article for mesne profits claim.
3. Liability of defendants for damages for use and occupation.
Analysis:
Issue 1:
The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of damages for unlawful use and occupation for a specific period. The defendants raised the issue of limitation, arguing that the suit was governed by Article 120 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. However, the trial court held that the suit fell under Article 113 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, with a limitation of three years. The trial court decreed the suit against the first defendant only, based on the privity of contract between the plaintiff and the first defendant.
Issue 2:
The defendants contended that the claim for mesne profits for more than three years before the suit was time-barred. They argued that the proper Article applicable was Article 109 of the old Act or Article 51 of the new Act. However, the court clarified that Article 109 applied when profits were wrongfully received by the defendant from the plaintiff's property. Since there was no evidence or allegation that the first defendant received profits from the other defendants, the court held that Article 120 of the old Act applied, which had a six-year limitation period.
Issue 3:
The defendants further argued that no decree could be passed against them due to lack of privity of contract with the plaintiff. However, the court cited precedent stating that the right to recover damages for use and occupation is not based on the Transfer of Property Act but on general law. As the defendants were in possession of the property, they were held liable to pay damages decreed by the lower appellate court.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower court's decision to decree the suit for damages against all defendants.
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1978 (5) TMI 129
Issues:
Jurisdiction of Small Cause Court to try the suit for ejectment and recovery of mesne profits and damages.
Analysis:
The case involved a revision by the defendants against the order of the Additional District Judge decreeing the plaintiff's claim for ejectment in a suit tried as a small cause court suit. The main issue was whether the Small Cause Court Judge had inherent jurisdiction to try the suit for ejectment and recovery of mesne profits and damages. The suit was initially filed in the court of Munsif, Moradabad, for ejectment of the defendants from a shop and for recovery of mesne profits and damages. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants were unauthorized occupants of the shop and sought ejectment and damages on that basis. The suit was transferred to the Small Causes Court after the enforcement of Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972). The trial court decreed the suit for recovery of mesne profits and damages only, but on revision, the Additional District Judge granted relief for ejectment as well.
The question of jurisdiction depended on the nature of the suit as originally brought and the allegations made in the plaint. The relevant provision of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, specified suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes. The suit in question was not cognizable by the Small Causes Court as per Article 4 of the Act, which excluded suits for possession of immovable property or recovery of interest in such property. The suit was based on the termination of a tenancy, and the relationship between the parties was not that of lessor and lessee. The court held that the suit was rightly instituted in the court of Munsif and its transfer to the Small Causes Court was illegal. The lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Small Causes Court rendered the decree passed by the lower courts a nullity.
The court rejected the argument that the decree could not be a nullity based on previous judgments, emphasizing that the Small Causes Court lacked inherent jurisdiction to try suits excepted from its purview. The court cited precedents to support its conclusion that lack of inherent jurisdiction makes a decree null and void. The court also addressed the issue of exercising discretion in favor of the applicants due to the prolonged litigation, distinguishing previous cases where discretion was refused. Ultimately, the court allowed the revision, set aside the decree of the lower courts, and directed the re-registration and fresh trial of the suit by the court of Munsif, Moradabad.
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1978 (5) TMI 128
Issues Involved:
1. Computation of deduction under section 80-I of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Deductibility of development rebate and depreciation in computing profits and gains for section 80-I.
3. Claim for deduction under section 80-J.
4. Disallowance of certain small expenditure items.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Computation of Deduction under Section 80-I
The core issue was whether the deduction under section 80-I should be computed on the profits and gains of the priority industry before or after deducting depreciation and development rebate. The Tribunal examined whether these deductions should be applied when calculating the eligible profits for section 80-I benefits.
2. Deductibility of Development Rebate and Depreciation
The assessee argued that development rebate and depreciation should not be deducted in computing the profits and gains of the priority industry for section 80-I. The Tribunal noted that the Income-tax Officer (ITO) had deducted Rs. 34,64,271 for depreciation and Rs. 6,58,720 for development rebate from the profits. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) upheld this view, leading to the assessee's appeal.
The Tribunal reviewed various High Court decisions and the statutory provisions. It concluded that the expression "profits and gains" in section 80-I should be interpreted as profits computed in accordance with sections 30 to 43A of the Act, which includes deductions for depreciation and development rebate. The Tribunal emphasized that the Income-tax Act, being a self-contained code, necessitates such deductions to determine the net profits.
3. Claim for Deduction under Section 80-J
The assessee contended that the AAC failed to consider the claim for deduction under section 80-J based on gross assets without deducting liabilities. The Tribunal restored this issue to the AAC for reconsideration and appropriate disposal in accordance with the law.
4. Disallowance of Certain Small Expenditure Items
The Tribunal addressed several smaller disallowances made by the AAC:
- Presentation Articles: The AAC disallowed Rs. 1,868 for presentation articles. The Tribunal allowed all except Rs. 447, which was for sarees, as the assessee could not justify their business relevance.
- Patent Expenses: The AAC disallowed Rs. 1,815 for patent-related expenses. The Tribunal sustained disallowance of Rs. 710 for new patents but allowed the remaining amount as it related to renewal and protection of existing patents.
- Air Freight on Slag Cement Samples: The AAC disallowed Rs. 1,314 for air freight on samples sent for testing. The Tribunal found that the production of slag cement was an existing business activity, not a new one, and allowed the expenditure.
Conclusion
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's contention regarding the computation of deduction under section 80-I, affirming the inclusion of depreciation and development rebate in the computation. It restored the issue of section 80-J deduction to the AAC and provided partial relief on the disallowed small expenditure items. The appeal was partly allowed.
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1978 (5) TMI 127
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to appeals filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, as amended by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976.
2. Interpretation of Sub-section (4) of Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
3. Comparison with precedents set in Mangu Ram v. Delhi Municipality and Hukumdev Narain v. Lalit Narain Mishra.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to Appeals Filed Under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:
The court had to determine whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows for the condonation of delays, applies to appeals filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, as amended by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. The appellant's counsel argued that Section 5 should apply because Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963, are expressly made applicable by Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The respondent's counsel contended that the specific limitation of thirty days prescribed in Sub-section (4) of Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, excluded the applicability of Section 5 by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
2. Interpretation of Sub-section (4) of Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:
Sub-section (4) of Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, states: "Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree or order." The court examined whether this provision, by its language, excluded the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The court noted that the mere provision of a period of limitation, even in peremptory or imperative language, is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5, unless there is an express exclusion.
3. Comparison with Precedents:
The court referred to two significant precedents:
- Mangu Ram v. Delhi Municipality (AIR 1976 SC 105): The Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applied to an application for special leave made under Section 417(3) of the Cr. P. C. 1898, despite the mandatory language of Sub-section (4) of Section 417. The court emphasized that the mere provision of a period of limitation, in however peremptory or imperative language, does not exclude the applicability of Section 5.
- Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra (AIR 1974 SC 480): The Supreme Court held that the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to an election petition filed under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, was necessarily excluded by the scheme of the special law. The court examined whether the special law was a complete code in itself, which would exclude the applicability of the Limitation Act.
The court found that the decision in Mangu Ram's case was more directly applicable to the present case. The nature of the right of appeal under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act and the scheme of the special law were not inconsistent with the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to appeals filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is not excluded since there is no such exclusion as contemplated by Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The question of whether the delay in filing such an appeal should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a matter of fact to be decided based on the circumstances of each case.
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1978 (5) TMI 126
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the document Ext. 1 is a will or a gift.
2. Admissibility of the document due to lack of proper stamping and registration.
3. Whether the right to worship by turn in a Hindu temple constitutes immovable property.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the document Ext. 1 is a will or a gift:
The primary issue was to determine the nature of the document Ext. 1 executed by deceased Mst. Acharaj. The plaintiff claimed it was a will, entitling him to a right of worship by turn for 10 days in an 18-month cycle in the Kalyanji Maharaj Temple. However, upon examining the document, it was found to be a deed of gift rather than a will. The court noted the recital in the deed stating, "now Ram Rattan will acquire legal rights and possession of my entire property from the date the will is written the details of the property are in Schedule 'A' and after him, his legal heirs will acquire those rights." This indicated that the document intended to pass the title to the property in presenti, thus classifying it as a gift rather than a will.
2. Admissibility of the document due to lack of proper stamping and registration:
When the plaintiff attempted to introduce the document as evidence, the defendants objected, arguing it was inadmissible due to being improperly stamped and unregistered. Initially, the trial court allowed the document to be marked as Exhibit 1, subject to objection. However, the court failed to judicially determine the admissibility of the document at that stage. According to Section 36 of the Stamp Act, once a document is admitted in evidence, its admissibility cannot be questioned later on the grounds of insufficient stamping. But, since the trial judge had not judicially determined the objection, Section 36 was not applicable. The court emphasized the need for the trial court to impound the document and recover the requisite stamp duty and penalty as per Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act before admitting it into evidence. The plaintiff had not paid the duty or penalty, rendering the document stricto sensu inadmissible.
3. Whether the right to worship by turn in a Hindu temple constitutes immovable property:
The core of the dispute was whether the right to worship by turn (Osra) in a Hindu temple is considered immovable property. The court explored the concept of Shebaitship under Hindu law, which combines elements of office and property, duties, and personal interest. The court cited various precedents and texts of Hindu law, concluding that the hereditary office of Shebait is regarded as immovable property. The court referenced the case of Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick, which recognized the right of a family to succeed to the religious office of Shebaitship as immovable property. The court also noted that Hindu law and judicial decisions over a century have consistently treated hereditary offices, including Shebaitship, as immovable property. Given this classification, any transfer of such property must be executed through a registered instrument. Since Exhibit 1 was not registered, the High Court rightly excluded it from evidence.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, concluding that the document Ext. 1 was a gift deed and not a will. It was inadmissible in evidence due to improper stamping and lack of registration. The hereditary office of Shebait, including the right to worship by turn, was deemed immovable property, necessitating a registered instrument for its transfer. Consequently, the plaintiff's suit was dismissed, and the appeal failed.
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1978 (5) TMI 125
Issues Involved:
1. Competence of the authority to terminate the respondent's service.
2. Whether the termination was punitive in nature.
3. Compliance with principles of natural justice and the requirement of a disciplinary inquiry.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Competence of the Authority to Terminate Service:
The primary issue was whether the Executive Assistant to the General Manager had the authority to terminate the respondent's service. The respondent contended that the Executive Assistant's position did not exist on the relevant date, rendering the termination invalid. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the termination order was, in fact, passed by the General Manager, who was the competent authority as per Standing Order 3(e), and merely communicated by the Executive Assistant. The Court emphasized that the form of the signature (whether full or initials) on the termination order did not affect its validity, as long as it was consciously made by the competent authority.
2. Nature of the Termination - Punitive or Simpliciter:
The second issue was whether the termination was punitive, requiring a disciplinary inquiry. The Court noted that under the Standing Orders, two distinct powers exist: one to impose punishment for misconduct after a disciplinary inquiry (Standing Order 21(2) read with Standing Order 23) and another to terminate service simpliciter with one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof (Standing Order 26). The Court found that the reason for termination cited was an "unsatisfactory record of service," not misconduct. Thus, the termination was not punitive but a simple termination under Standing Order 26. The Court clarified that merely stating the reason for termination does not necessarily make it punitive unless misconduct is the foundation for the termination.
3. Compliance with Principles of Natural Justice:
The respondent argued that the termination violated principles of natural justice as it was done without a proper inquiry or an opportunity to defend against the allegations. The Supreme Court held that even if the termination were considered punitive, the employer could justify the action before the Labour Court by presenting evidence. The Court referred to several precedents, including *Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Its Workmen* and *Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ludh Budh Singh*, which allow employers to substantiate their actions before a tribunal if a domestic inquiry is found invalid or not conducted. The appellant had provided sufficient evidence before the Labour Court to justify the termination, thereby curing any procedural defects.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and upholding the appellant's action. The Court also ordered the appellant to pay Rs. 1,500 as costs to the respondent and an additional Rs. 15,000 as an ex-gratia payment due to the respondent's unfortunate position.
This comprehensive analysis preserves the legal terminology and significant phrases from the original judgment, ensuring a thorough understanding of each issue involved.
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1978 (5) TMI 124
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the plaintiff deposited the various sums of money mentioned in the plaint with the defendant bank.
2. Whether the amounts mentioned in the plaintiff's Pass Book are binding on the defendant bank.
3. Whether the plaintiff made any deposit in contravention of any rule of the bank and the effect thereof.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Whether the plaintiff deposited the various sums of money mentioned in the plaint with the defendant bank.
The plaintiff claimed to have deposited sums totaling Rs. 12,205, while the defendant bank admitted only Rs. 1,932/-. The trial court found that except for Rs. 4,000 and Rs. 105, the other amounts were deposited by the plaintiff, and the bank was bound by those entries. The High Court, on appeal, found that the disputed amount of Rs. 8,000 consisted of two items: Rs. 7,000 in the form of a cheque drawn by Bhagwati Prasad and Rs. 1,000 in cash. The High Court held that the cheque was fraudulently credited to the account of Kapil Deo Shukla, an employee of the bank, and thus the plaintiff had to suffer due to Shukla's actions. The Supreme Court re-examined the evidence and found that the cheque for Rs. 4,000 was not deposited in the usual course of business and was instead credited to someone else's account. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that the amount was handed over to an employee of the bank in the course of his employment.
Issue 2: Whether the amounts mentioned in the plaintiff's Pass Book are binding on the defendant bank.
The trial court held that the entries in the plaintiff's Pass Book were binding on the bank. The High Court found that the bank was liable for the fraudulent actions of its employee, Kapil Deo Shukla, as the entries in the Pass Book were made by him during his employment. The Supreme Court, however, held that the fraudulent entries made by Shukla in the Pass Book and Ledger could not shift the burden of proof to the bank. The court emphasized that the employer is not liable for the acts of the servant if the cause of the loss arose without the employer's actual fault or privity and without the fault or neglect of the servant in the course of their employment.
Issue 3: Whether the plaintiff made any deposit in contravention of any rule of the bank and the effect thereof.
The trial court found that the bank did not strictly enforce its rules, and thus the plaintiff was not debarred from claiming the deposit even if it was in contravention of the bank's rules. The Supreme Court did not specifically address this issue in detail, as it focused more on the fraudulent actions of the bank's employee and the liability of the bank.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the defendant bank's appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's claim regarding Rs. 11,000 (Rs. 4,000 plus Rs. 7,000) and the interest thereon. The court reduced the decretal amount granted by the High Court by Rs. 11,000 and interest thereon, with no order as to costs. The court held that the bank was not liable for the loss caused by the fraudulent actions of its employee, Kapil Deo Shukla, as he was not acting within the scope of his employment when he committed the fraud.
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1978 (5) TMI 123
Issues:
1. Dismissal of objection under U. P. Public Premises Act.
2. Validity of notice issued under U. P. Public Premises Act.
3. Allegations regarding sale-deed date and mutation.
4. Examination of petitioner's resistance against eviction.
5. Status of Amarnath as a tenure-holder and effect of surplus land declaration.
6. Petitioner's remedy under Section 14(3) of the Act.
7. Executive action for possession of declared surplus land.
Analysis:
1. The petitioner, a transferee under a sale deed, objected to an eviction notice under U. P. Public Premises Act, which was dismissed due to late filing. The appellate court held that a wrong section mention did not invalidate the proceeding, emphasizing the transfer before the prescribed date and mutation in records were correct. However, the petitioner's failure to object under Section 14(3) was noted.
2. The respondents alleged the sale-deed post-prescribed date made the land surplus of Amarnath, contradicting findings that the sale-deed was validly dated and mutated in the petitioner's name. The question arose whether the petitioner could resist eviction successfully under the Act's scheme, focusing on the Collector's power to dispossess a tenure-holder.
3. The petitioner's status as a tenure-holder was crucial. Amarnath, the original holder, transferred the land, ceasing to be a tenure-holder. The Prescribed Authority's declaration of surplus land without notice to the petitioner was deemed void and non-binding, violating legal procedures.
4. The State argued the petitioner's failure to object under Section 14(3) barred resistance to eviction. However, the court rejected this, emphasizing that the State's vested surplus land post-notification did not validate the invalid orders declaring surplus land, allowing the petitioner, in possession, to defend against eviction.
5. The executive action for possession of declared surplus land was discussed, highlighting the Collector's authority to take possession over validly declared surplus land. The judgment cited a case emphasizing the need for the Collector to clarify his power when challenged regarding the Act's application.
6. Ultimately, the petition was allowed, quashing the Prescribed Authority and District Judge's orders. The petitioner was awarded costs, with the Prescribed Authority permitted to initiate proper proceedings after inquiry and service of statement on the petitioner.
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1978 (5) TMI 122
The High Court of Allahabad held that the rate of tax on pumping sets was increased from 2% to 6% under section 22 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. Pumping sets were deemed liable to tax as machinery, not agricultural implements. The decision was in favor of the Department, and each party was to bear their own costs. (Case citation: 1978 (5) TMI 122 - High Court Of Allahabad)
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1978 (5) TMI 121
Issues Involved:
1. Whether a marriage contracted in contravention of the proviso to Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is void or merely invalid.
2. The impact of the proviso to Section 15 on the legitimacy of children born out of such a marriage.
3. The interpretation and application of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act in comparison with similar provisions in other marriage laws.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Marriage Contravening Proviso to Section 15:
The primary issue is whether a marriage contracted in violation of the proviso to Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is void or merely invalid. The Court observed that the Act prescribes conditions for a valid Hindu marriage under Section 5 and specifies which contraventions render a marriage void under Section 11. It was noted that while some conditions, if violated, render a marriage void, others do not. The proviso to Section 15 prohibits remarriage within one year of a divorce decree but does not explicitly state that such a marriage is void. The Court concluded that the absence of an explicit declaration of voidness and the lack of penal consequences for violating the proviso suggest that such a marriage is not void. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent was not to treat every contravention of the conditions for a valid marriage as rendering the marriage void unless expressly stated.
2. Legitimacy of Children Born from Such a Marriage:
The Court considered the impact of the proviso to Section 15 on the legitimacy of children born from a marriage contracted in contravention of it. Section 16 of the Act legitimizes children born from marriages that are annulled by a decree of nullity. However, since a marriage in violation of the proviso to Section 15 is not explicitly declared void, Section 16 does not apply. The Court noted that treating such marriages as void would result in discriminatory treatment of children born from such marriages, as they would be illegitimate without any provision in the Act conferring legitimacy. This further supports the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to treat such marriages as void.
3. Interpretation and Application of Section 15:
The Court examined the interpretation of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act in light of similar provisions in other marriage laws, such as the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. The Court noted that while the Indian Divorce Act contains provisions that explicitly render certain marriages void, the Hindu Marriage Act does not do so for marriages in contravention of the proviso to Section 15. The Court also considered the legislative history and amendments to the Act, specifically the deletion of the proviso to Section 15 by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, which allows parties to remarry soon after a divorce decree. This deletion reinforces the view that the legislature did not intend to treat such marriages as void.
The Court also referred to the principle in Mohammedan Law, where marriages performed during the period of Iddat are considered irregular but not void, drawing a parallel to the situation under the Hindu Marriage Act.
Separate Judgment Analysis:
Pathak, J.:
Pathak, J. agreed with the conclusion that the appeals should be allowed but provided additional reasoning. He emphasized that the object behind the proviso to Section 15 was to prevent hasty remarriages and avoid confusion in parentage. However, he noted that the temporary nature of the prohibition and its deletion by Parliament indicate that the proviso was not intended to render marriages void. Pathak, J. also referred to judicial interpretations of similar provisions in other laws, such as the Indian Divorce Act, which have consistently treated marriages in violation of such provisions as void. However, he distinguished these cases based on the specific language and context of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act. He concluded that the marriage in question was not void, and the appellant was entitled to be considered the wife of Rajendra Kumar.
Conclusion:
The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of the Division Bench and the learned single Judge of the High Court, and dismissed the writ petitions. The Court held that a marriage contracted in contravention of the proviso to Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is not void, and the appellant was entitled to be recognized as the wife and widow of Rajendra Kumar.
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1978 (5) TMI 120
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Roster off system for Grade II Supervisors and Markers/Sorters/Checkers should be discontinued.
2. Whether Grade II Supervisors and Markers/Sorters/Checkers should be given half day's additional wages and another day off for working on Sunday.
3. Whether the demand of these employees is justified.
4. Whether the dismissal of the special leave petition by the Supreme Court operated as res judicata in the writ petition.
Summary:
Issue 1: Discontinuation of Roster off System
The Tribunal found that continuing the Roster off system only for Grade II Supervisors and Markers/Sorters/Checkers amounted to unfair discrimination, as other supervisory staff were not on such a system. The High Court, however, held that the management has the right to determine how work is carried out and holidays are fixed, and interference is permissible only if this power is exercised unreasonably or unfairly.
Issue 2: Additional Wages and Day Off for Working on Sunday
The Tribunal noted that while the roster staff gets one day off for working on Sunday, they do not receive half day's additional wages, unlike other supervisory staff. The High Court pointed out that the roster staff are paid one day's additional wages and a compensating holiday for working on their weekly holiday, and the Tribunal's award to pay additional wages for working on Sundays was beyond the scope of the reference.
Issue 3: Justification of Employees' Demand
The Tribunal concluded that the demand for discontinuing the Roster off system and providing additional half day's wages and another day off for working on Sundays was just and fair. The High Court disagreed, emphasizing that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by granting relief not within the terms of the reference.
Issue 4: Res Judicata
The High Court ruled that the dismissal of the special leave petition by the Supreme Court did not operate as res judicata in the writ petition. The Supreme Court clarified that the doctrine of res judicata, although codified in section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not exhaustive and does not apply to the dismissal of a special leave petition by a non-speaking order. The dismissal of a writ petition in limine by a non-speaking order does not bar the entertainment of another writ petition or other proceedings on the same cause of action.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the appeal and confirming that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction. The Roster off system was necessary for the successful working of the Port, and the relief granted by the Tribunal was beyond the scope of the reference. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1978 (5) TMI 119
Issues Involved:
1. Cancellation of bail
2. Allegations of tampering with witnesses
3. Application of Section 437 and Section 439(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code
4. Burden of proof for cancellation of bail
5. Judicial discretion and fairness in the trial process
Detailed Analysis:
1. Cancellation of Bail:
The primary issue in this case revolves around the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent. The prosecution argued that the respondent, charged with serious offences including conspiracy and theft under Section 120B read with Section 409 of the Penal Code, should not have been granted bail initially. The prosecution emphasized that the respondent was accused of a non-bailable offence, punishable by life imprisonment, and had misused his liberty by attempting to tamper with witnesses.
2. Allegations of Tampering with Witnesses:
The prosecution presented multiple instances to support their claim that the respondent tampered with witnesses. Key incidents included:
- Complaints by Kanwar Singh Yadav and R.B. Khedkar on February 14, 1978, stating that the respondent was attempting to contact Yadav through his driver, Ram Chander.
- Affidavits from Sat Pal Singh, Ganpat Singh, and Digambar Das confirming that Yadav was seen leaving with the respondent on February 17, 1978.
- An affidavit by Sarup Singh, dated February 28, 1978, stating that he overheard the respondent assuring Yadav not to worry.
- Earlier complaints by Charan Singh and A.K. Dangwal in July 1977, alleging attempts by the respondent to tamper with their testimonies.
3. Application of Section 437 and Section 439(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code:
The Court discussed the application of Section 437, which governs bail in non-bailable offences, and Section 439(2), which allows the High Court or Sessions Court to cancel bail if the accused interferes with the course of justice. The Court emphasized that the power to cancel bail, though extraordinary, must be exercised with care and only when it is clear that the accused is tampering with witnesses.
4. Burden of Proof for Cancellation of Bail:
The Court clarified that the prosecution does not need to prove tampering with witnesses beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the standard of proof is based on a preponderance of probabilities, similar to civil cases. The prosecution must show that there is a reasonable apprehension that the accused is interfering with the course of justice by tampering with witnesses.
5. Judicial Discretion and Fairness in the Trial Process:
The Court stressed the importance of ensuring a fair trial and avoiding undue hardship or harassment to the accused. The Court noted that the trial is still pending, and any observations made in this incidental proceeding should not influence the trial. The Court also highlighted that the cancellation of bail should be limited to a period necessary to examine the key witnesses, ensuring that the respondent's liberty is not unduly restricted.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the High Court's judgment and canceling the respondent's bail for a period of one month. The Court directed that the respondent be taken into custody and be entitled to fresh bail after the specified period. The Sessions Judge was given the liberty to fix the amount and conditions of bail. The Court's order emphasized the need for a balanced approach, ensuring both the integrity of the judicial process and the rights of the accused.
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1978 (5) TMI 118
Issues involved: Determination of whether coke briquettes are declared goods under Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, and the consequent applicability of a lower tax rate under Section 15.
Controversy: The controversy in the petitions revolves around whether coke briquettes manufactured by the assessee qualify as declared goods under Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, thereby being subject to a lower tax rate as per Section 15.
Interpretation of Section 14(ia) of the Central Sales Tax Act: Section 14(ia) of the Central Sales Tax Act declares certain goods as of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce, including coal and coke in all its forms, excluding charcoal. The interpretation of this provision was crucial in determining the status of coke briquettes.
Judicial Precedents: Previous judicial decisions such as India Carbon Ltd. v. Superintendent of Taxes and State of Gujarat v. Sakarwala Brothers were cited to support the broad interpretation of similar entries in tax laws, emphasizing the expansive scope of such provisions.
Manufacturing Process and Composition: The process of manufacturing coke briquettes involved mechanically pressing a mixture of coal-dust, multani mitti, and molasses. The composition and characteristics of coke, as a carbonaceous material, were also highlighted to establish the nature of the product.
Legal Arguments: The petitioner argued that coke briquettes, being a preparation of coke dust, fell within the ambit of "coke in all its forms" as per the statutory provision. The contention was supported by the assertion that the essential properties of coke remained unchanged despite the mechanical pressing process.
Alternative Remedies and Court Jurisdiction: The petitioner's reliance on Article 226 of the Constitution of India for judicial intervention was challenged on the grounds of having alternative remedies like appeal and revision. However, the court considered the practical implications and complexities involved in the case, leading to a decision in favor of the petitioner.
Court Decision: The High Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, holding that the coke briquettes were covered under the expression "coke in all its forms" as per Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. Consequently, the order of the Sales Tax Officer was quashed, along with the assessment notices for the relevant years, and the petitioner was awarded costs.
Significant Legal References: The judgment referenced various legal precedents, statutory provisions, and constitutional interpretations to arrive at a decision regarding the classification and taxation of coke briquettes under the Central Sales Tax Act.
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1978 (5) TMI 117
Detenu release orders - Held that:- Appeal allowed. Questions whether the confessional statements recorded on December 13 and 14, 1977 were voluntary statements or were statements which were obtained from the detenu under duress or whether the subsequent retraction of those statements by the detenu on December 22, 1977 was in the nature of an after thought, were primarily for the detaining authority to consider before deciding to issue the impugned detention order but since admittedly the aforesaid vital facts which would have influenced the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other were neither placed before nor considered by the detaining authority it must be held that there was non application of mind to the most material and vital facts vitiating the requisite satisfaction of the detaining authority thereby rendering the impugned detention order invalid and illegal. For these reasons we set aside the impugned detention order.
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1978 (5) TMI 116
Issues involved: Valid rejection of accounts books of the assessee.
Summary:
The High Court of Allahabad, in the case before them, considered the question of whether the accounts books of the assessee were validly rejected. The revising authority had rejected the accounts books citing reasons such as sales being recorded after counting the till, absence of separate cash memos for retail sales, and discrepancies in turnover versions. However, it was noted that there was no concrete evidence to support these findings, and the assessing and appellate authorities did not provide any backing for the rejection. The only issue highlighted was the absence of separate cash memos for retail sales, which the assessee explained as a practice of passing a consolidated cash memo for all petty sales at the end of the day to reconcile with the books of account. The court found this practice reasonable and not indicative of any malpractice to evade taxes. Consequently, the rejection of the accounts books was deemed unjustified, and the question was answered in the negative in favor of the assessee. The assessee was awarded costs amounting to Rs. 200.
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1978 (5) TMI 115
Issues:
1. Taxability of amount received on account of devaluation of currency as part of turnover for sales tax assessment.
The judgment of the Court analyzed the case where the assessee, engaged in manufacturing and selling shoes, received an additional amount from the State Trading Corporation due to currency devaluation. The assessing authority included this amount in the turnover of the assessee for sales tax assessment, considering it as part of the sale consideration. The appellate authority upheld this view, but the revising authority found that there was no agreement between the parties regarding the additional amount due to devaluation. The revising authority held that the disputed amount did not form part of the sale consideration and invalidated its inclusion in the turnover.
The revising authority referred the question of law to the High Court, seeking clarification on whether the amount received on account of devaluation should be considered part of the turnover for sales tax assessment. The High Court examined the contract between the assessee and the State Trading Corporation, emphasizing that there was no agreement regarding the treatment of excess amount due to devaluation. The Court concluded that the additional amount received was a casual receipt not forming part of the sale consideration, as it was not agreed upon in the sale transaction.
The Court referred to the definition of turnover under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, which requires the amount to be the consideration for the sale or supply of goods. Since the additional amount was not received as part of the sale consideration but due to a fortuitous circumstance, and the corporation decided to distribute it among its suppliers, the Court held that it was not liable to sales tax. The Court ruled in favor of the assessee, answering the question in the negative and holding that the amount received on account of devaluation did not form part of the turnover for sales tax assessment.
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1978 (5) TMI 114
The High Court judgment involved a sales tax case where the court ruled that the dealer was considered an importer and the turnover was liable to tax in his hands. The court answered the question in the negative in favor of the department and against the assessee. The reference was answered in the negative. (Case citation: 1978 (5) TMI 114 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT)
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1978 (5) TMI 113
The High Court of Allahabad ruled that tin trays are considered "wares" under Notification No. ST-2104/X-902(16)-52, while tin calendars and tin signboards are not. Tin trays are deemed to fall within the definition of "bartan," unlike tin calendars and signboards.
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1978 (5) TMI 112
Issues:
Assessment of sales tax under item 26 of the First Schedule vs. multi-point scheme of taxation under section 5 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act.
Detailed Analysis:
The High Court of Kerala deliberated on the issue of whether the assessment of sales tax should be at 7% under item 26 of the First Schedule to the Kerala General Sales Tax Act or under the more favorable rate of taxation to the assessee under the multi-point scheme of taxation sanctioned by section 5 of the Act. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, overturning the decisions of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Sales Tax Officer, ruled in favor of the assessee that the assessment should be under section 5 of the Act, leading to the department filing tax revision cases.
The Tribunal considered the commodity under scrutiny to be stay-wire manufactured by the assessee, used for supporting electric posts. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's contention that the stay-wires could not be categorized as accessories under entry 26 of the First Schedule, thereby concluding that the assessment should be under section 5 of the Act. However, the Court analyzed the entry and opined that the primary question was whether electric posts could be classified as "electrical goods" within the ambit of the entry, emphasizing that the stay-wires' relation to electrical goods was pivotal. The Court referenced judicial decisions to support its interpretation, highlighting that the goods must be intrinsically electrical and incapable of use without electrical energy to qualify as electrical goods.
The Court further scrutinized the term "accessory" in light of a Supreme Court decision, concluding that while stay-wires could potentially be viewed as accessories, they could not be considered accessories to electrical goods due to the inability to classify electric posts as such. Ultimately, the Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, finding no legal errors or omissions, and dismissed the tax revision cases without costs.
In conclusion, the High Court of Kerala examined the conflicting assessments of sales tax under item 26 of the First Schedule and the multi-point scheme of taxation under section 5 of the Act. The Court analyzed the nature of the commodity in question, the interpretation of relevant legal provisions, and judicial precedents to determine the appropriate tax assessment. The Court ultimately upheld the Tribunal's decision, emphasizing the crucial distinction between stay-wires and electrical goods in the context of the tax assessment framework.
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