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• 1980 (5) TMI 121
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Legality of excess realisations by sugar manufacturers under interim court orders.
  2. Application of the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund Act, 1976, to recover excess realisations.
  3. Jurisdiction of the court to enforce recovery of excess realisations post-withdrawal of petitions.
  4. Applicability of Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code to proceedings under Article 226.
  5. Interpretation of "set aside" in the context of interim orders ceasing to be operative.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legality of Excess Realisations:
  
  The respondents, who are sugar manufacturers, challenged the controlled sugar price fixed by the Central Government at Rs.124.59 per quintal for the year 1972-73, through Special Civil Applications. They obtained interim orders allowing them to sell levy sugar at Rs.150 per quintal, higher than the controlled price. Subsequently, they withdrew their petitions, rendering the interim orders inoperative. The court addressed the issue of how to deal with the "excess realisations" made during the period when the interim orders were effective. The Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund Act, 1976, was enacted to direct such excess realisations into a fund.
  
  2. Application of the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund Act, 1976:
  
  The Act mandates that producers credit excess realisations to the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund. Section 3(3) of the Act obligates producers to deposit the excess amounts realised before the Act's commencement, along with interest. The court found that the respondents were liable to deposit the excess realisations made during the interim order period, from 31st July 1972 to 12th March 1973, into the Fund, as per the Act's provisions.
  
  3. Jurisdiction of the Court:
  
  The petitioners argued that the court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to deprive the respondents of the undue advantage gained under the interim orders. The court agreed, emphasizing its inherent jurisdiction to undo wrongs done under interim orders, even if the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund Act, 1976, was not in place. The court cited Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, which grants inherent powers to administer justice and work out the rights of parties.
  
  4. Applicability of Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code:
  
  The respondents contended that the current proceedings were not maintainable under Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code, which does not apply to Article 226 proceedings. The court rejected this argument, stating that its power to enforce interim orders and rectify wrongs does not depend on Section 141 or 151, but on its inherent jurisdiction.
  
  5. Interpretation of "Set Aside":
  
  The respondents argued that the interim orders were not "set aside" but merely ceased to be operative upon withdrawal of the petitions, thus not constituting "excess realisations." The court disagreed, interpreting "set aside" to include situations where interim orders become inoperative due to withdrawal, thereby categorizing the amounts realized under such orders as excess realisations.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court directed the respondents to credit the excess amounts, along with interest, to the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund within three months, failing which the orders would be executed as court decrees. The petitions were allowed, with no order as to costs.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 120
  
  Issues involved:
  1. Whether an applicant must approach the Court of Session before moving the High Court for revision.
  2. Whether there is a requirement to approach the Sessions Judge before seeking anticipatory bail from the High Court.
  
  Revision:
  The High Court and the Court of Session have concurrent revisional jurisdiction as per the Cr. P. C., 1973. While the old Code allowed applicants to approach either court directly, some High Courts imposed a rule to apply to the Sessions Judge first. However, the new Code restricts moving to the High Court if the Sessions Judge has already been approached. The Sessions Judge's powers under the old Code were limited, and the new Code prohibits invoking revisional jurisdiction of more than one court. Various High Courts have held that the choice of forum lies with the party, and the rule requiring application to the Sessions Judge first is no longer valid.
  
  Anticipatory Bail:
  Section 438 of the new Code allows for anticipatory bail without the requirement to approach the Sessions Judge first. A Division Bench held that a person can directly apply to the High Court for anticipatory bail, and rejection by the Sessions Judge does not bar approaching the High Court. Another judgment suggested approaching the Court of Session first, but the Full Bench disagreed, stating that there is no legal basis for such a restriction. The Full Bench concluded that applicants can directly apply to the High Court for revision or anticipatory bail without involving the Sessions Judge first.
  
  The matters are to be decided by a single Judge based on the Full Bench's answers to the questions posed.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 119
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Jurisdiction of the civil court.
  2. Legal termination of tenancy.
  3. Condonation of delay under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act.
  4. Bona fide mistaken legal advice.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court:
  The petitioner filed a suit for possession and recovery of damages and water charges against the respondents, who are the legal representatives of a deceased statutory tenant. The respondents contested the suit on the ground that the civil court had no jurisdiction as there existed a landlord-tenant relationship, and they had inherited the tenancy rights. The trial court treated this as a preliminary issue and concluded that the respondents were tenants of the petitioner, thus the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. Consequently, the plaint was returned to be filed in the proper court.
  
  2. Legal Termination of Tenancy:
  The petitioner claimed that the tenancy of Om Prakash Kaura was terminated by notice dated 1-1-1970, making him a statutory tenant until his death. The respondents argued that the tenancy was never terminated and they inherited the tenancy rights. The trial court did not delve deeply into this issue as it primarily focused on the jurisdictional question.
  
  3. Condonation of Delay under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act:
  The petitioner filed an appeal against the trial court's order after the prescribed period, along with an application for condonation of delay supported by affidavits. The application stated that the delay was due to the mistaken advice of the counsel, who advised filing a revision petition instead of an appeal. The Additional District Judge dismissed the application, noting that the delay from 4-9-1976 to 13-10-1976 was unexplained and that the advice of the counsel did not constitute sufficient cause or good faith under Sections 5 and 14 of the Act.
  
  4. Bona Fide Mistaken Legal Advice:
  The petitioner argued that the mistaken advice of the counsel, who honestly believed a revision petition was appropriate, should be considered sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The court held that not every mistaken advice constitutes sufficient cause or good faith. The counsel's affidavit lacked details on why he believed a revision petition was appropriate, and there was no explanation for the delay in responding to the Registry's objections. The court emphasized that the advice must be given after due care and attention to constitute good faith. The court concluded that the counsel's advice did not meet these criteria and thus did not justify condonation of delay.
  
  Conclusion:
  The revision petition was dismissed as the court found no sufficient cause for condonation of delay and no bona fide mistake in the legal advice given by the counsel. The court reiterated that the provisions of Order 43, Rule 1 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure were clear, and the mistaken advice did not constitute good faith under Section 14 or sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The petition was dismissed, and parties were left to bear their own costs.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 118
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of Chapter IIB of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 under Article 31A(1) of the Constitution.
  2. Validity of the definition of 'family' in Section 14K(c).
  3. Validity of the ceiling limits on agricultural holdings under Section 14M.
  4. Clubbing of land holdings of family members under Section 14M(2).
  5. Validity of Section 14P regarding the avoidance of transfers.
  6. Validity of the ceiling limit on orchards under Section 14O(2).
  7. Vesting of surplus land in the State under Section 14S(1).
  8. Penal consequences for failure to file a return under Section 14T(4).
  9. Restriction on transfers under Section 14U.
  10. Absence of a provision for payment of compensation for acquisition of homestead under Section 14V.
  11. Validity of Section 14M(5) regarding private trusts or endowments.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of Chapter IIB under Article 31A(1):
  The main question was whether the provisions of Chapter IIB of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, which provide for a ceiling on agricultural holdings, are violative of the second proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution. The Court held that the provisions are protected under Articles 31A, 31B, and 31C, and thus cannot be challenged on the grounds that they violate fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(f), and 31(2).
  
  2. Validity of the definition of 'family' in Section 14K(c):
  The definition of 'family' in Section 14K(c) was challenged as being artificial and not aligned with the traditional concept of a family in West Bengal. The Court found that the definition is more realistic and generous compared to similar laws in other states. It includes provisions for widowed and divorced daughters, making it broader and more inclusive.
  
  3. Validity of the ceiling limits on agricultural holdings under Section 14M:
  The ceiling limits were challenged as being arbitrary and unreasonable. The Court held that the limits are reasonable and fair, considering the high population density in West Bengal. The limits vary based on whether the land is irrigated or not, and are designed to ensure equitable distribution of land.
  
  4. Clubbing of land holdings of family members under Section 14M(2):
  The provision for clubbing land holdings of family members was challenged as violating the second proviso to Article 31A(1). The Court held that this provision is necessary for the purpose of imposing a ceiling on agricultural holdings and is protected under Article 31B.
  
  5. Validity of Section 14P regarding the avoidance of transfers:
  Section 14P, which provides that transfers made after a certain date will be taken into account as if they had not occurred, was challenged. The Court held that fixing a back-date is a usual legislative device to prevent avoidance of the law and is reasonable.
  
  6. Validity of the ceiling limit on orchards under Section 14O(2):
  The ceiling limit on orchards was challenged on the grounds that orchards are not agricultural land. The Court held that the term 'agricultural land' includes orchards and that the provision for a ceiling on orchards is reasonable.
  
  7. Vesting of surplus land in the State under Section 14S(1):
  The provision for vesting surplus land in the State was upheld as being necessary for the purpose of equitable distribution of land.
  
  8. Penal consequences for failure to file a return under Section 14T(4):
  The penal consequences for failure to file a return were upheld as being necessary for the effective implementation of the ceiling provisions.
  
  9. Restriction on transfers under Section 14U:
  The restriction on transfers was upheld as being reasonable and necessary to prevent avoidance of the ceiling provisions.
  
  10. Absence of a provision for payment of compensation for acquisition of homestead under Section 14V:
  The absence of a provision for compensation for homesteads was challenged. The Court noted that the State does not intend to oust raiyats from their homesteads and that compensation will be provided in accordance with existing provisions if homesteads are acquired.
  
  11. Validity of Section 14M(5) regarding private trusts or endowments:
  The provision treating land owned by private trusts as land owned by the beneficiaries was challenged as violating Article 26. The Court held that the provision is necessary for the imposition of a ceiling on agricultural holdings and that the legislature has provided adequate safeguards to protect charitable and religious trusts.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Court dismissed the petitions, upholding the validity of Chapter IIB of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, and related provisions, with costs quantified at Rs. 5,000 in one set.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 117
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of post-service restrictive covenant under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act.
  2. Enforceability of the restrictive covenant against the respondent.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of Post-Service Restrictive Covenant:
  The primary issue in this case was whether a post-service restrictive covenant in restraint of trade, as contained in Clause 10 of the service agreement, is void under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act. The appellant company contended that the restrictive covenant was reasonable and necessary to protect its trade secrets and business interests. Counsel for the appellant argued that the interpretation of Section 27 by various High Courts, including the decision in Madhub Chunder v. Rajcoomar Doss, required reconsideration by the Supreme Court. They asserted that not all post-service restrictions are void and that reasonable restrictions, limited in time and area, should be valid.
  
  On the other hand, the respondent's counsel maintained that Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act is absolute and does not distinguish between partial and general restraints. They argued that all post-service restrictive covenants are prima facie void, and the only exceptions are those explicitly provided in the statute. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the negative covenant operating beyond the period of employment was in restraint of trade and, therefore, void under Section 27 of the Contract Act.
  
  The Supreme Court, however, chose not to express an opinion on this issue, as the appeal could be disposed of based on the second issue.
  
  2. Enforceability of the Restrictive Covenant:
  The second issue was whether the restrictive covenant, assuming it to be valid, was enforceable against the respondent. Clause 10 of the service agreement stated that the restriction would come into operation "after you leave the company." The respondent's services were terminated by the appellant company, and the question was whether the term "leave" included termination by the employer.
  
  The Division Bench of the High Court interpreted the term "leave" to mean voluntary departure by the employee and not termination by the employer. The Supreme Court agreed with this interpretation, stating that the word "leave" in its plain grammatical sense implies voluntary action by the employee. The Court emphasized that the appellant company should have used clear language to include all cases of cessation of employment, including termination by the employer.
  
  As a result, the Supreme Court held that the restrictive covenant in Clause 10 was not enforceable against the respondent, as his services were terminated by the appellant company.
  
  Separate Judgment Analysis:
  
  A.P. Sen, J.:
  Justice A.P. Sen expressed regret that his colleagues chose not to express an opinion on the first issue, which he believed was crucial for deciding the appeal. He argued that the appeal could not be decided without addressing whether a post-service restrictive covenant is in restraint of trade and void under Section 27 of the Contract Act. Justice Sen emphasized that Section 27 is exhaustive and does not permit the importation of English common law principles. He stated that agreements in restraint of trade are prima facie void unless they fall within the statutory exception.
  
  Justice Sen highlighted that the distinction between general and partial restraints, as recognized in English law, does not apply under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act. He cited various Indian decisions supporting this view and concluded that the restrictive covenant in Clause 10 was void and unenforceable. He also agreed with the interpretation that the term "leave" in Clause 10 referred to voluntary departure by the employee and not termination by the employer.
  
  In conclusion, Justice Sen dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that Section 27 of the Contract Act renders the restrictive covenant void and unenforceable. He also noted that the drafting of such covenants should be clear and precise to avoid ambiguity.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the restrictive covenant in Clause 10 of the service agreement was not enforceable against the respondent, as his services were terminated by the appellant company. The Court emphasized the importance of clear and precise language in drafting restrictive covenants and upheld the interpretation that the term "leave" referred to voluntary departure by the employee. Justice A.P. Sen, in a separate judgment, reiterated the absolute nature of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act and concluded that the restrictive covenant was void and unenforceable.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 116
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Application under Section 466 of the Companies Act, 1956.
  2. Financial difficulties and winding-up petitions.
  3. Lease agreement and breaches.
  4. Conduct and motives of the petitioners.
  5. Public interest and commercial morality.
  6. Compliance with statutory duties.
  7. Feasibility of company revival.
  8. Investigation into company affairs.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Application under Section 466 of the Companies Act, 1956:
  The application was made by four contributories alleging they held 121,920 shares in Sonajuli Tea and Industries Ltd. (now in liquidation) and represented over 80% of the total shareholding. The application was supported by other contributories holding the remaining 20%.
  
  2. Financial Difficulties and Winding-Up Petitions:
  The company was in financial difficulties, with winding-up petitions filed starting in 1976. Prem Chand Jute Mills Ltd., the lessor, filed a petition for arrears of rent under a lease agreement. The company was directed to furnish security, and a suit was filed by Prem Chand Jute Mills Ltd. for arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 6,62,720/-.
  
  3. Lease Agreement and Breaches:
  The lease agreement dated 14th July 1971, between Prem Chand Jute Mills Ltd. and Sonajuli Tea and Industries Ltd., was for 30 years with an option to renew for 20 years. The company failed to pay rent since 1975, leading to arrears of approximately Rs. 18,00,000/-. The company also declared a lock-out in April 1977, and the mill remained closed since then.
  
  4. Conduct and Motives of the Petitioners:
  The petitioners, who were also guarantors of loans granted by Punjab National Bank Ltd., were alleged to have ulterior motives. The court noted their conduct and intentions were not bona fide, aiming to obstruct the winding-up process and avoid investigation into the company's affairs.
  
  5. Public Interest and Commercial Morality:
  The court emphasized the need to consider commercial morality and public interest. It was noted that the petitioners lacked commercial morality, honesty, and probity. The court found it against public interest to stay the winding-up proceedings, as the petitioners' intentions were to deprive creditors of their legitimate dues.
  
  6. Compliance with Statutory Duties:
  The ex-directors and officers of the company failed to file the required statement of affairs under Section 454 of the Companies Act, 1956. The company had not filed its balance sheets and annual returns since 1975, indicating non-compliance with statutory duties.
  
  7. Feasibility of Company Revival:
  The court found no material evidence to support the feasibility of reviving the company. The petitioners' financial solvency and resources were not demonstrated, and the mill had been closed since 1977. The court concluded that the proposal to revive the company was unrealistic and improbable.
  
  8. Investigation into Company Affairs:
  The court stressed the importance of investigating the company's affairs, given the allegations of misconduct and violations of the Companies Act. The winding-up proceedings were seen as necessary to uncover any potential misfeasance or irregularities.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court dismissed the application under Section 466, citing lack of bona fides, non-compliance with statutory duties, and the need to uphold commercial morality and public interest. The petitioners were found unfit to manage the company's affairs, and the winding-up proceedings were deemed necessary to protect creditors and ensure proper investigation into the company's conduct. The application was dismissed with costs.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 115
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of notices issued u/s 148 of the IT Act addressed to a deceased person.
  2. Service of notice on all legal representatives.
  3. Binding nature of settlement arrived at by one legal representative.
  4. Validity of reassessment orders made against a deceased person.
  5. Imposition of penalty on legal representatives for furnishing inaccurate particulars.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Validity of Notices Issued u/s 148:
  The petitioner contended that the notices for reopening assessment were vitiated as they were addressed to a deceased person. The court held that u/s 159 of the IT Act, the ITO was competent to initiate proceedings against the legal representatives of the deceased by issuing notices to them. The notices issued clearly indicated they were meant for the legal representatives of Shanker Lal Omar, thus complying with the provisions of s. 159.
  
  2. Service of Notice on All Legal Representatives:
  The petitioner argued that the notice was served only on one legal representative, Sheo Nath, and not on her, precluding her from participating in the proceedings. The court did not find it necessary to express an opinion on this submission due to the subsequent findings.
  
  3. Binding Nature of Settlement:
  The petitioner claimed that the settlement arrived at between Sheo Nath and the Department was not binding on her. The court rejected this submission, stating that after jointly making the application for settlement, it was for the petitioner and her sons to pursue the matter. The fact that Sheo Nath attended the proceedings inferred he did so on behalf of all applicants, making the settlement binding on the petitioner.
  
  4. Validity of Reassessment Orders:
  The petitioner contended that the reassessment orders were void as they were made against a dead person. The court held that the reassessment orders described the assessee as "Late Shanker Lal Omar through L/H Sheo Nath," indicating the income of the deceased was being assessed in the hands of the legal heirs, in accordance with s. 159 of the IT Act.
  
  5. Imposition of Penalty:
  The petitioner argued that penalty for furnishing inaccurate particulars could not be imposed on legal representatives. The court noted that s. 159 of the IT Act makes legal representatives liable for all sums the deceased would have been liable to pay, including penalties. Thus, penalty proceedings for defaults committed by the deceased could be continued against the legal representatives.
  
  Conclusion:
  All submissions made by the petitioner were found to be without merit. The petition was dismissed with costs.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 114
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legislative competence of Parliament to enact the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976.
  2. Applicability of the Nationalisation Amendment Act to composite mines containing coal and fireclay.
  3. Alleged discrimination and violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, and 31 of the Constitution.
  4. Public purpose and payment of compensation under the Nationalisation Amendment Act.
  
  Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legislative Competence of Parliament:
  The petitioners challenged the legislative competence of Parliament to enact the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976, under Entry 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. They argued that the Act was not in public interest and merely terminated leases without ensuring regulation and development of mines. The Court found no substance in this argument, noting that the Act was designed to serve the purpose of Entry 54 by ensuring the rational, coordinated, and scientific development of coal resources. The Court emphasized that the Act was an extension of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973, and was necessary for conserving and developing coal resources.
  
  2. Applicability to Composite Mines:
  The petitioners contended that the Nationalisation Amendment Act did not apply to composite mines containing both coal and fireclay. The Court examined the definitions of 'coal mine' and 'coking coal mine' in the relevant Acts and concluded that composite mines were not intended to be acquired under the Nationalisation Acts. However, the Court held that the provisions of Sections 3(3)(a) and 30(2) of the Nationalisation Amendment Act would apply to composite leases, prohibiting coal mining operations by lessees of composite mines. Consequently, lessees could not mine fireclay if it involved mining coal.
  
  3. Alleged Discrimination and Violation of Fundamental Rights:
  The petitioners argued that the Nationalisation Amendment Act violated Articles 14, 19, and 31 by discriminating against lessees whose leases were terminated without compensation, unlike lessees of other mines who were compensated. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the Act merely extinguished the rights of lessees without acquiring their mining businesses. The Court found that the Act was protected under Article 31A(1)(e), which exempts laws extinguishing or modifying rights in leases from being void under Articles 14, 19, and 31.
  
  4. Public Purpose and Payment of Compensation:
  The petitioners contended that the Act lacked a public purpose and did not provide for compensation, thus violating Article 31. The Court held that the public purpose behind the Act was the same as that of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973, which aimed at the rational and scientific development of coal resources. The Court emphasized that the Act did not acquire the lessees' businesses but merely terminated their leases, which was within the legislative competence of Parliament and served a legitimate public purpose.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976, dismissing the writ petitions challenging the Act. The Court found that the Act was within the legislative competence of Parliament, served a public purpose, and did not violate the fundamental rights of the petitioners. The Act's provisions applied to composite mines, prohibiting coal mining operations by lessees of such mines. The Court also held that the Act was protected under Article 31A(1)(e) and did not require compensation for the termination of leases.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 113
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Interpretation of Section 127(3)(b) CrPC.
  2. Compliance with Section 127(3)(b) CrPC.
  3. Adequacy of mahr payment as maintenance.
  4. Judicial adherence to precedents.
  5. Social justice implications for divorced women.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Interpretation of Section 127(3)(b) CrPC:
  The core issue revolves around the interpretation of Section 127(3)(b) of the CrPC. The Supreme Court emphasized that the provision must be read in light of its social justice purpose, which is to prevent destitution of divorced women. The Court criticized the lower courts for misinterpreting this provision and circumventing the precedent set in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fidaalli Chothia, which clearly outlined the requirements for compliance with Section 127(3)(b).
  
  2. Compliance with Section 127(3)(b) CrPC:
  The Court found that the respondent-husband's payment of Rs. 500 as mahr and Rs. 750 for iddat period did not fulfill the requirements of Section 127(3)(b). The provision mandates that the sum paid at the time of divorce must be sufficient to maintain the divorced wife, and the amount paid in this case was deemed "illusory" and insufficient to meet the maintenance needs of the appellant.
  
  3. Adequacy of mahr payment as maintenance:
  The judgment highlighted that the mahr amount of Rs. 500 was inadequate to maintain the appellant. The Court reiterated that the purpose of Section 127(3)(b) is to ensure that the lump sum payment made at the time of divorce is a reasonable substitute for ongoing maintenance. The Court criticized the lower courts for accepting a nominal mahr payment as a discharge of the husband's maintenance obligation, thereby violating the spirit of the law.
  
  4. Judicial adherence to precedents:
  The Supreme Court underscored the importance of judicial discipline and adherence to precedents. The lower courts were criticized for attempting to distinguish the Bai Tahira case on untenable grounds. The judgment emphasized that no judge in India, except a larger Bench of the Supreme Court, can deviate from the binding ratio of a Supreme Court decision. The Court noted that the High Court's approach was a misapplication of the law and an embarrassment to the subordinate judiciary.
  
  5. Social justice implications for divorced women:
  The judgment stressed the broader social justice implications of the case, noting that the statutory provisions in Sections 125-127 CrPC are designed to protect destitute women and children. The Court highlighted that the law aims to prevent divorced women from being driven to destitution and to ensure they receive adequate maintenance. The judgment criticized the lower courts for undermining these social justice objectives by accepting inadequate mahr payments as a substitute for maintenance.
  
  Summary:
  The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, emphasizing the need for a humane and just application of Section 127(3)(b) CrPC. The judgment reaffirmed the precedent set in Bai Tahira, clarifying that nominal mahr payments cannot discharge a husband's maintenance obligation unless they are sufficient to prevent the wife's destitution. The Court highlighted the importance of judicial adherence to precedents and the broader social justice goals of the maintenance provisions in the CrPC. The appeal was allowed, ensuring that the appellant received the maintenance due to her.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 112
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Constitutional validity of the death penalty under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
  2. Constitutional validity of the sentencing procedure under Section 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Constitutional Validity of the Death Penalty under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  
  Background and Legislative History:
  - The Indian Penal Code (IPC), enacted in 1860, prescribes death as a punishment for certain offenses, including murder (Section 302).
  - The Law Commission's 35th Report (1967) recommended retaining the death penalty, considering India's socio-economic conditions and the necessity to maintain law and order.
  
  Arguments Against Death Penalty:
  - The death penalty is irreversible and can lead to the execution of innocent individuals.
  - It serves no proven penological purpose, as its deterrent effect remains unproven.
  - Retribution is no longer an acceptable end of punishment, and reformation and rehabilitation should be the primary purposes of punishment.
  - Execution is a cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment.
  
  Judicial Reasoning:
  - The Court acknowledged that the death penalty is irreversible but emphasized that adequate safeguards in the judicial system minimize the risk of wrongful execution.
  - The deterrent effect of the death penalty is supported by a significant segment of the population, including distinguished jurists and judges.
  - The Court cited various judgments and opinions recognizing the deterrent and retributive value of the death penalty.
  - The legislative policy now indicates that life imprisonment is the rule, and the death penalty is an exception, to be imposed only in the "rarest of rare" cases.
  
  Conclusion:
  - The Court concluded that Section 302 of the IPC does not violate Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. The provision is reasonable and in the public interest, considering the prevailing crime conditions and the legislative policy.
  
  2. Constitutional Validity of the Sentencing Procedure under Section 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
  
  Legislative Background:
  - Section 354(3) of the CrPC, 1973, marks a shift in legislative policy, making life imprisonment the rule and the death penalty an exception.
  - The provision requires the Court to state "special reasons" for awarding the death sentence.
  
  Arguments Against Section 354(3):
  - The provision delegates legislative duty to the Court to legislate "special reasons" for imposing the death penalty.
  - It allows arbitrary and whimsical imposition of the death penalty without clear guidelines.
  
  Judicial Reasoning:
  - The Court emphasized that the discretion to impose the death penalty is to be exercised judicially, considering all aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
  - The legislative policy is clear that the death penalty should be imposed only in extreme cases.
  - The Court rejected the argument that the provision allows arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, noting that judicial discretion is exercised based on well-recognized principles and subject to correction by superior courts.
  
  Guidelines for Imposing Death Penalty:
  - The Court provided broad guidelines for imposing the death penalty, emphasizing that it should be reserved for cases of extreme culpability.
  - Aggravating circumstances include pre-planned, cold-blooded murders, murders involving extreme brutality, and murders of public servants on duty.
  - Mitigating circumstances include the age of the accused, the probability of reformation, and mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense.
  
  Conclusion:
  - The Court held that Section 354(3) of the CrPC, 1973, does not violate Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. The provision provides adequate guidelines for judicial discretion in sentencing.
  
  Separate Judgment (Minority View):
  
  Bhagwati, J.:
  - Justice Bhagwati dissented, holding that Section 302 of the IPC, in so far as it provides for the death penalty, is unconstitutional and void as it violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
  - He argued that the provision lacks legislative guidelines for when life should be extinguished by death sentence.
  - Justice Bhagwati's detailed reasons were to be provided after the Court's summer vacation.
  
  Order:
  - The majority opinion rejected the challenge to the constitutionality of Sections 302 of the IPC and 354(3) of the CrPC, 1973.
  - The writ petitions and connected matters were to be heard on their individual merits in light of the principles enunciated in the majority judgment.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 111
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the Order dated 27th April 1979 by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.
  2. Allegations of arbitrariness, malafide, and public interest.
  3. Creation of monopoly and unreasonable restrictions under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
  4. Alleged violation of Article 14 of the Constitution due to arbitrary selection without competition.
  
  Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of the Order dated 27th April 1979:
  The dispute centers around an Order by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, allotting 10 to 12 lacs blazes annually to the 2nd respondents for resin extraction from inaccessible chir forests for 10 years. The Order was challenged on various grounds, necessitating a detailed examination of the circumstances under which it was passed. The State had shifted from giving contracts on royalty basis to wage contracts to ensure that resin was used within the State to promote industrialization. The inaccessible forests in Reasi, Ramban, and Poonch Divisions were not feasible for wage contracts due to high extraction costs and lack of local labor. Hence, the State allotted these blazes to the 2nd respondents, who offered to set up a resin processing factory within the State.
  
  2. Allegations of Arbitrariness, Malafide, and Public Interest:
  The petitioners argued that the Order was arbitrary, malafide, and not in public interest, conferring undue benefit on the 2nd respondents at the State's expense. However, the Court found that the State's decision was reasonable and in public interest. The Order ensured the setting up of a factory within the State, creating job opportunities and increasing State revenue. The terms of the Order required the 2nd respondents to surrender 25% of the resin to the State and retain the balance for their factory. The cost of resin extraction from inaccessible areas was high, and the State benefited by securing resin at a lower rate without financial risk.
  
  3. Creation of Monopoly and Unreasonable Restrictions under Article 19(1)(g):
  The petitioners claimed that the Order created a monopoly for the 2nd respondents, restricting their right to carry on tapping business. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the Order only allotted inaccessible blazes to the 2nd respondents, leaving a significant number of blazes available for other contractors. The petitioners had opportunities to bid for wage contracts in other accessible areas.
  
  4. Alleged Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution:
  The petitioners contended that the State acted arbitrarily by selecting the 2nd respondents without allowing others to compete, violating Article 14. The Court found that the State's decision was based on rational and relevant principles. The 2nd respondents had significant experience in resin extraction and processing, and their proposal to set up a factory aligned with the State's industrialization policy. The State's action was not arbitrary or unreasonable, and the impugned Order was in the State's interest.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Court concluded that the impugned Order was valid, reasonable, and in public interest. The State's decision to allot inaccessible blazes to the 2nd respondents to ensure the setting up of a resin processing factory was justified. The Order did not create a monopoly or impose unreasonable restrictions, nor did it violate Article 14. The writ petitions were dismissed with no order as to costs.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 110
  
  Issues:
  1. Compliance with Rule 8 Note (1) of the Revised Pension Rules, 1950 in the case of compulsory premature retirement.
  2. Allegations of mala fide issuance of the retirement notice.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  1. The appeal before the Supreme Court questioned the compliance of the impugned notice-cum-order of compulsory premature retirement with Rule 8 Note (1) of the Revised Pension Rules, 1950. The respondent, a government servant, was retired from service after completing 30 years of qualifying service. The High Court allowed the respondent's petition, stating that the retirement was not in strict compliance with Rule 8 Note (1) as the exact reasons for retirement were not recorded in writing. The State Government appealed this decision, arguing that the noting in the file of the respondent adequately recorded the reason for retirement, which was impairment of efficiency. The Supreme Court analyzed the language of Note (1) and concluded that the recorded reason of impairment of efficiency sufficed for compliance with the rule. The Court emphasized that the formation of the opinion not to level a formal charge of inefficiency was not an additional reason required to be stated. Therefore, the retirement notice was held to be in strict compliance with Rule 8 Note (1).
  
  2. The respondent also alleged mala fide issuance of the retirement notice, claiming harassment by a superior. The respondent's counsel contended that the retirement decision was influenced by mala fide intentions and pointed to past grievances against the superior. However, the Supreme Court examined the respondent's confidential reports and adverse remarks dating back several years, indicating a persistent deterioration in efficiency. The retirement decision was based on an overall consideration of the respondent's record by the Industries Commissioner and Director of Industries, not solely influenced by the superior in question. The Court rejected the mala fide allegations, stating that the retirement decision was made based on the respondent's performance record over the years. As no other grounds were upheld, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's decision, and dismissed the respondent's writ petition.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 109
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Ownership of the disputed land (plot No. 227).
  2. Authority of the Municipal Board to lease the land.
  3. Validity of the lease granted by the Municipal Board.
  4. Right of the State to evict the respondent.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Ownership of the Disputed Land:
  The primary issue was whether the land in question, plot No. 227, belonged to the State of Uttar Pradesh or the Municipal Board of Gorakhpur. The State claimed that the land was Nazrul land and thus government property. The respondent contended that the land was part of the Patri of the public road and thus vested in the Municipal Board.
  
  The Trial Court found that the land was a "street" and belonged to the Municipal Board. The High Court agreed, holding that the land vested in the Municipality under Section 116(g) of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Act. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that while the land was vested in the Municipality for the purpose of managing it as a street, the State retained ownership of the soil. The Municipality had control over the surface and necessary subsoil for maintaining the street but did not own the land outright.
  
  2. Authority of the Municipal Board to Lease the Land:
  The State argued that the Municipal Board had no authority to lease the land as it was government property. The respondent countered that the Municipal Board had the practice of obtaining Kabuliyats from lessees instead of formal leases and that the lease was approved by the District Magistrate.
  
  The Supreme Court noted that the Municipal Board's authority to manage and control streets did not extend to leasing the land for purposes other than street maintenance. The Municipal Board could not lease the land as an absolute owner since the land was vested in it only qua street.
  
  3. Validity of the Lease Granted by the Municipal Board:
  The respondent had executed a Kabuliyat in favor of the Municipal Board and constructed a house based on the sanctioned plan. The State contended that the lease was invalid as the Municipal Board was not the owner.
  
  The Supreme Court held that the lease was invalid because the Municipal Board did not have the authority to lease the land for purposes other than maintaining it as a street. The lease granted by the Municipal Board was beyond its scope of authority, making it invalid.
  
  4. Right of the State to Evict the Respondent:
  The State sought to evict the respondent, arguing that it retained ownership of the land and that the Municipal Board had acted beyond its authority.
  
  The Supreme Court concluded that the State, as the owner of the land, had the right to evict the respondent. The Court emphasized that the Municipality's rights were limited to managing the street and did not include leasing the land for other purposes. The State's ownership allowed it to maintain an action for eviction against anyone in illegal possession.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh, holding that the State retained ownership of the land and was entitled to evict the respondent. The lease granted by the Municipal Board was invalid as it exceeded the Board's authority. The appeal was allowed with costs, and a decree was issued in favor of the plaintiff as prayed for.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 108
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Noncompliance with the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and associated rules.
  2. Improper reception of votes.
  3. Commission of corrupt practices.
  4. Secrecy of ballot under Section 94 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
  5. Tampering with postal ballot papers.
  6. Interpretation of Section 94 in the context of free and fair elections.
  7. Grounds for declaring the election void under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
  
  Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Noncompliance with the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and associated rules:
  The election petitioners contended that the election of the appellant was materially affected by noncompliance with the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and the rules made thereunder. The High Court found that the tampering of four postal ballot papers was a significant noncompliance that impacted the election results.
  
  2. Improper reception of votes:
  The election petitioners alleged that four postal ballot papers were tampered with to favor the appellant, which constituted improper reception of votes. The High Court held that these four votes were improperly received in favor of the returned candidate and improperly refused to the unsuccessful Akali candidate, which materially affected the election result.
  
  3. Commission of corrupt practices:
  The petitioners alleged corrupt practices by the appellant and his agent, including obtaining assistance from persons in the service of the Punjab Government. However, the High Court found that the allegations of corrupt practices were not proved and decided this issue in favor of the returned candidate.
  
  4. Secrecy of ballot under Section 94 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951:
  The appellant argued that Section 94 of the Act, which ensures the secrecy of the ballot, was violated by allowing witnesses to disclose for whom they voted. The Court interpreted Section 94 as a privilege for the voter, which can be waived by the voter if they choose to disclose their vote voluntarily. The Court held that the privilege ends when the voter voluntarily discloses their vote, and there is no violation of Section 94.
  
  5. Tampering with postal ballot papers:
  The High Court found that four postal ballot papers were tampered with to alter the first preference votes from the Akali candidate to the appellant. This finding was based on the testimony of witnesses and expert evidence. The tampering was crude and evident, leading to the conclusion that the votes were improperly received in favor of the appellant.
  
  6. Interpretation of Section 94 in the context of free and fair elections:
  The Court emphasized that secrecy of ballot is an indispensable adjunct of free and fair elections but must yield to the larger principle of ensuring free and fair elections. The Court held that Section 94 enacts a qualified privilege in favor of the voter, which can be waived by the voter to ensure the integrity of the election process.
  
  7. Grounds for declaring the election void under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951:
  The Court held that the improper reception of votes and the tampering of postal ballot papers fell within the grounds for declaring the election void under Section 100(1)(d)(iii) of the Act. The Court found that the result of the election was materially affected by the improper reception and refusal of votes, leading to the setting aside of the appellant's election and declaring the unsuccessful Akali candidate elected.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeal was dismissed, and the election of the returned candidate was set aside based on the findings of improper reception of votes, tampering with postal ballot papers, and the interpretation of Section 94 in the context of ensuring free and fair elections. The unsuccessful Akali candidate was declared elected, and the costs were awarded to the respondents.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 107
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Morality of law versus government policy on the export of silver.
  2. Application of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947.
  3. Validity and impact of the Exports (Control) Fifteenth Amendment Order, 1979.
  4. Indemnity clause in the contract between the indigenous supplier and the State Trading Corporation (STC).
  5. Judicial review of administrative policy.
  6. Equitable relief for the indigenous supplier.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Morality of Law versus Government Policy on Export of Silver:
  The judgment emphasizes the importance of public morality over governmental policy decisions. The Court notes, "public morality is more precious than silver and gold for individual and nation and to honour the plighted word of a public body is proof of this higher policy." This observation sets the tone for the Court's approach to balancing legal principles with ethical considerations in the context of government policy on the export of silver.
  
  2. Application of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947:
  The export of silver is governed by the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. Section 3 of the Act empowers the Central Government to prohibit, restrict, or control the import and export of goods. The Court acknowledges the legal framework provided by the Act and the Exports (Control) Order, 1977, which restricts the export of certain goods, including silver.
  
  3. Validity and Impact of the Exports (Control) Fifteenth Amendment Order, 1979:
  The Exports (Control) Fifteenth Amendment Order, 1979, moved silver from Part B to Part A of Schedule I, effectively banning its export. The Court notes, "This switch came about since February 20, 1979, and meant a virtual ban on export of silver." The Court examines the reasons provided by the Union of India for this ban, which include the conservation of national resources and meeting internal demand. The Court finds no grounds to discredit this policy, stating, "Courts cannot deal cavalierly with administrative policy where the judicial process is functionally under a handicap."
  
  4. Indemnity Clause in the Contract between the Indigenous Supplier and the STC:
  The core issue revolves around Clause 9(a) of the contract between the indigenous supplier (Damani) and the STC, which includes an indemnity clause. The Court highlights the significance of this clause: "Any cess, duty, rate or tax whatsoever, payable in respect of any transaction covered by this contract shall be borne by the supplier." The Court examines whether this indemnity clause should be enforced, given the special circumstances of the case, including the frustration of the contract due to the export ban.
  
  5. Judicial Review of Administrative Policy:
  The Court asserts its authority to review administrative policies, especially when fundamental rights are at stake. The judgment states, "The sovereign power is in the Constitution, not the Administration and the Court is the sentinel." However, the Court also exercises caution, noting that constitutional questions should be considered only when absolutely necessary.
  
  6. Equitable Relief for the Indigenous Supplier:
  The Court grants equitable relief to the indigenous supplier (Damani) by releasing them from the indemnity obligation under Clause 9(a). The judgment states, "We hold, confined to the facts and circumstances of this case, that Clause 9(a) which creates the indemnity clause shall not be enforced by the STC against Damani." This decision is based on the unique facts of the case and the equitable considerations highlighted by the Court.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court's judgment balances legal principles with ethical considerations, emphasizing the importance of public morality and equitable relief. The Court upholds the government's policy decision to ban the export of silver while providing relief to the indigenous supplier from the indemnity clause in their contract with the STC. The judgment underscores the Court's role in reviewing administrative policies and ensuring justice in specific circumstances. Each party is directed to pay Rs. 2,000 to the Legal Aid Society (Supreme Court) but otherwise bear their respective costs.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 106
  
  Issues: Interpretation of Notification No. 146/74 regarding exemption on sugar production exceeding average production.
  
  Analysis:
  The judgment revolves around the interpretation of Sl. No. 2 of the Table appended to Notification No. 146/74 regarding the exemption on sugar production exceeding average production. The advocate representing the parties argued that a similar issue was raised in a previous revision application by M/s. Sankar Sahakari Sakhar Kharkhana, which was rejected by the Government. The advocate also highlighted a judgment by the High Court of Madras, where the court interpreted the notification favorably for the assessees. The Government considered these submissions and observed that the main issue in all four revision applications was the interpretation of Sl. No. 2 of the said notification.
  
  The Government, after careful consideration, noted that the key question was how to interpret the percentages specified in Sl. No. 2 of the Table. They referred to a judgment by Justice Chinnappa Reddy of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which held that the percentages were with reference to average production only. The Madras High Court, however, differed in their interpretation and held that the percentages were related to excess production only. The Government agreed with the Andhra Pradesh High Court's view, emphasizing that the exemption was for sugar produced in excess of the average production of the preceding five years.
  
  The confusion in the case stemmed from the procedure for granting rebates under the notification. The rebate on excess production was given in advance through a credit in the petitioner's ledger account, even before the sugar was cleared. However, the Government clarified that the notification should be interpreted independently of the procedure. They reiterated that the percentages specified in the notification were indeed with reference to average production, as the wording of the notification was clear on this matter. The Government rejected the four revision applications based on this interpretation.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 105
  
  The Government of India considered a revision application regarding pricing and marketing structure, finding that sales made at arms' length at the factory gate should be the basis for assessment. The order-in-appeal was set aside, and the revision application was allowed. (Case Citation: 1980 (5) TMI 105 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA)

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• 1980 (5) TMI 104
  
  Issues:
  1. Appeal against Asst. Collector's order of provisional assessment and refund claim.
  2. Pragmatic considerations in distribution of work among Customs officers.
  3. Proper handling of claims for refund and provisional assessment.
  4. Departmental flaws in thinking regarding provisional assessment revisions.
  5. Assessment of imported goods under Project Import Regulations.
  6. Reassessment of goods and interim refund granted.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The appeal was filed against the Asst. Collector's order of provisional assessment, where the Appellate Collector noted that the original order was in the form of a letter, not a formal order-in-original. The Asst. Collector dismissed the claim as premature due to provisional assessment status. The Appellate Collector observed the pragmatic distribution of work among Customs officers and the need for proper handling of claims and assessments.
  
  2. The Appellate Collector highlighted the importance of proper distribution of work among Customs officers based on pragmatic considerations. He noted that claims for refund should be handled by the appropriate officer and that the Asst. Collector of the Appraising Group concerned should handle matters related to provisional assessments.
  
  3. The Appellate Collector addressed the proper handling of claims for refund and provisional assessments, emphasizing that the Asst. Collector (Refunds) should redirect claims to the relevant Appraising Group for handling. He noted the need for clear communication and efficient handling of claims to avoid delays and financial losses for the appellants.
  
  4. The judgment highlighted flaws in the Department's thinking regarding provisional assessment revisions. The Appellate Collector criticized the Department's stance that provisional assessments can only be revised once finalization, noting that revisions can be made interimly. He emphasized the need for corrections in assessments, especially in cases of common errors that could impact duty payments significantly.
  
  5. The case involved the assessment of imported goods under Project Import Regulations. The Appellants imported capital equipment for their plant and sought assessment under specific headings to benefit from lower duty rates. The Appellate Collector reviewed the Customs file and allowed the appeal, directing the reassessment of goods under the appropriate heading for Project Imports.
  
  6. The judgment concluded with the Appellate Collector allowing the appeal, directing the provisional reassessment of goods at a lower duty rate under Project Import Regulations. An interim refund was granted pending finalization, with the reassessment impacting only specific goods in the bill of entry. The Appellate Collector clarified that the timely claim by the Appellants prevailed, regardless of the provisional nature of the original assessment.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 103
  
  Issues: Interpretation of policy provisions regarding importation against a Letter of Credit opened before a specified date.
  
  Analysis:
  The judgment involves a revision application where the petitioners contended that the Letter of Credit for importing goods was opened before the specified date, entitling them to certain benefits under the Import Policy. The key contention was that even though the price and quantity in the Letter of Credit were altered due to market conditions, the original commitment for import existed before the specified date. The Government analyzed the situation in light of the policy provisions and the facts presented.
  
  The Government considered the policy provision in Paragraph 209 of the AM-79 Policy, which allowed imports against Letters of Credit opened before a specific date, even for items listed in the banned list. The critical aspect was determining whether a firm commitment for import existed before the specified date and if a Letter of Credit was opened prior to that date. The Government noted that while the original Letter of Credit was opened before the specified date, subsequent amendments to price and quantity raised questions about the firm commitment before the cutoff date.
  
  The Government emphasized the importance of offer and acceptance in forming a contract. It was highlighted that the essential elements of a transaction are price, quantity, and shipment period. While market conditions may necessitate changes, the core terms of the transaction should remain intact for the original commitment to be valid. The Government observed that significant alterations to price and quantity post-opening of the Letter of Credit indicated a new agreement rather than a continuation of the original commitment.
  
  Ultimately, the Government held that the importation did not align with a commitment made before the specified date, leading to the rejection of the revision application. The decision was based on the understanding that the changes in the Letter of Credit were made for profit motives rather than legal or moral obligations. The confiscation order on the goods was upheld, emphasizing the importance of adherence to policy provisions and the integrity of commercial agreements.

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• 1980 (5) TMI 102
  
  Issues: Validity of notice under section 21(1) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 by the revising authority.
  
  The judgment of the Court addressed the validity of a notice issued under section 21(1) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 by the revising authority. The appellant, a company assessed to sales tax, challenged the notice on the grounds that the revising authority was attempting to reopen the assessment based on fresh information, which was beyond its competence. The appellant argued that the power to reopen assessments based on fresh information was vested in the Assessing Authority under section 11-A of the Act, not the revising authority. The appellant relied on a Full Bench judgment to support this contention.
  
  The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, in response, stated that the suspicion arose from variations in signatures on certain forms, leading to an enquiry that revealed discrepancies in the transactions. The learned single Judge, after considering the Full Bench judgment, concluded that the revising authority was competent to issue the notice as the revision was initiated based on suspicious features found in the record itself. Consequently, the writ petitions challenging the notice were dismissed.
  
  The appellant's counsel argued before the High Court that the revising authority could not consider fresh material to determine the impropriety or illegality of the order or proceedings, citing the Full Bench judgment. However, after reviewing the Full Bench judgment and the arguments presented, the High Court found no merit in the appeals. The Court agreed with the lower court's interpretation that the revising authority could conduct further inquiry based on the record before the Assessing Authority, as long as the new evidence was relevant to the existing turnover on record. The Court held that in this case, the revising authority's actions were based on findings from the existing record, not on new information not part of the original record.
  
  Ultimately, the High Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the lower court's decision, with no order as to costs.

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