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1987 (5) TMI 384
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED The core legal issues considered in this judgment include: - Whether the State Government and the Orissa State Electricity Board (the Board) had the authority under Section 22B of the Indian Electricity Act to deny the benefit of clubbing power allocations to the four units of the petitioner company.
- The validity of the retrospective application of orders issued under Section 22B of the Act.
- Whether the classification of the petitioner's 132 KV IMFAL unit as a 100% export-oriented unit justified the denial of clubbing benefits.
- Whether the denial of clubbing amounted to arbitrary discrimination, violating Article 14 of the Constitution.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Authority under Section 22B of the Indian Electricity Act: - Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 22B of the Act allows the State Government to regulate the supply, distribution, consumption, or use of energy to ensure equitable distribution.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court interpreted Section 22B as permitting the State Government to lay down policy guidelines for equitable energy distribution, but the implementation should be carried out by the Board. The State Government's direct involvement in allocating power to individual units was seen as overstepping its role.
- Conclusions: The Court concluded that while the State Government could decide on policy matters such as clubbing, the execution of these policies should be left to the Board.
Retrospective Application of Orders: - Legal Framework and Precedents: The retrospective application of orders under Section 22B was challenged.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court acknowledged the difficulty in predicting power availability accurately at the start of a water year and accepted the need for mid-year adjustments. However, it held that benefits already granted, like clubbing, could not be retrospectively revoked, imposing financial burdens on the consumer.
- Conclusions: The Court held that retrospective revocation of clubbing benefits was invalid.
Classification of the 132 KV IMFAL Unit: - Legal Framework and Precedents: The classification of the 132 KV IMFAL unit as a 100% export-oriented unit was central to the denial of clubbing benefits.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found no legal basis for treating export-oriented units differently regarding clubbing, especially when no additional power allocation was granted based on export performance.
- Conclusions: The Court ruled that the classification did not justify denying clubbing benefits.
Arbitrary Discrimination and Article 14: - Legal Framework and Precedents: Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits arbitrary discrimination.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found that denying clubbing to export-oriented units, while allowing it for other power-intensive units, constituted arbitrary discrimination.
- Conclusions: The Court held that such differential treatment violated Article 14 and was impermissible.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS Verbatim Quotes and Core Principles: - "The denial of clubbing to such industrial units has very serious implications and repercussions, both economic and otherwise, on the viable functioning of the industry."
- The Court emphasized that the benefit of clubbing, once granted, could not be revoked retrospectively.
- The classification of export-oriented units did not justify differential treatment in the absence of additional power allocation based on export performance.
Final Determinations: - The Court quashed the State Government's order denying clubbing benefits to the petitioner company and directed the Board to allow clubbing for the petitioner's units.
- The Court upheld the High Court's decision to quash the revised bills demanding additional tariffs based on the retrospective revocation of clubbing benefits.
- The Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions filed by the State Government and the Board, affirming the High Court's judgment.
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1987 (5) TMI 383
Issues Involved:
1. Determination of seniority between temporary Assistant Engineers and probationary Assistant Engineers.
2. Validity of the seniority list and its preparation.
3. Interpretation and application of the United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch) Class II Rules, 1936.
4. Impact of delay and laches on the maintainability of the writ petition.
5. Effect of confirmation and substantive appointment on seniority determination.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Determination of seniority between temporary Assistant Engineers and probationary Assistant Engineers:
The core issue was the determination of seniority between respondents (temporary Assistant Engineers) and appellants (probationary Assistant Engineers). The respondents were appointed as temporary Assistant Engineers in 1947-1948 and confirmed in 1950, while the appellants, who were toppers from Thomson College of Civil Engineering, were appointed on probation in 1951-1952 and confirmed in 1955. The court held that the seniority should be determined from the date of substantive appointment, not necessarily linked to permanent positions. Rule 23 of the United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch) Class II Rules, 1936, was pivotal in this determination.
2. Validity of the seniority list and its preparation:
The validity of the seniority list prepared by the government was challenged. The High Court had quashed the seniority list and directed the preparation of a fresh list in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court upheld that the seniority list prepared in 1956 was arbitrary and in contravention of Rule 23, which mandates that seniority be determined based on the date of substantive appointment.
3. Interpretation and application of the United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch) Class II Rules, 1936:
The court extensively analyzed the rules, particularly Rule 3(b), Rule 5, Rule 16, Rule 17, Rule 19, and Rule 23. It clarified that a member of the service is one appointed in a substantive capacity, which includes both permanent and temporary posts. The court emphasized that the appointment in a substantive capacity does not necessitate a permanent post but can include a temporary post of long duration.
4. Impact of delay and laches on the maintainability of the writ petition:
The court addressed the preliminary objection regarding the delay in filing the writ petition. It noted that representations were made as early as 1959, and the writ petition was filed in 1973. Despite the delay, the court decided to consider the merits of the case due to the pending representations and the government's failure to address them timely. However, the court ultimately denied relief based on laches and delay, citing that the challenge to the seniority list after 17 years would cause administrative difficulties and injustice to the appellants who had already been promoted.
5. Effect of confirmation and substantive appointment on seniority determination:
The court clarified that confirmation is not the sole criterion for determining seniority. It held that substantive appointment, whether to a permanent or temporary post, is the key factor. The court cited previous rulings, including Baleshwar Dass v. State of U.P., to support that an appointment in a substantive capacity, even to a temporary post, qualifies one as a member of the service for seniority purposes.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside due to the inordinate delay and laches. The court directed that henceforth, seniority should be determined from the date of substantive appointment, irrespective of whether the post is permanent or temporary. No costs were awarded.
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1987 (5) TMI 382
The Supreme Court clarified the appointment process for the Central and State Administrative Tribunals, favoring a High Powered Selection Committee headed by a sitting Judge for recruitment. The Court upheld the eligibility of Advocates qualified to be High Court Judges for the post of Vice-Chairman. The deadline for setting up additional Tribunal Benches was extended to December 31, 1987, and the deadline for legislation implementation was extended to July 31, 1987.
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1987 (5) TMI 381
Issues:
Dismissal from service based on unfair means in examination, legality of removal order despite stay order.
Analysis:
The Writ Petition under Article 32 challenged the dismissal from service based on unfair means in an examination. The petitioner, a member of the U.P. State Judicial Service, was found using unfair means during an L.L.M. examination at Aligarh Muslim University. The High Court initiated disciplinary proceedings, leading to the petitioner's suspension and a subsequent inquiry conducted by an Inquiry Officer appointed by the High Court.
The Inquiry Officer framed a charge-sheet accusing the petitioner of using unfair means during the examination, which was corroborated by witness testimonies. The Full Court of the High Court accepted the Inquiry Officer's report, recommending the petitioner's removal from service to the State Government.
The petitioner, however, filed a suit denying the allegations without referencing the ongoing disciplinary proceedings. When the petitioner sought a transfer of the suit outside the state, the Supreme Court issued a stay order on further proceedings related to the examination malpractice inquiry.
The petitioner contended that the removal order was illegal due to the stay order issued by the Supreme Court. However, the court found that the removal was not in disobedience of the stay order as the inquiry had concluded before the stay order was issued.
The petitioner also argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove the use of unfair means during the examination. Despite the petitioner's defense, including an allegation of tampering with evidence by an invigilator, the court upheld the Inquiry Officer's conclusion based on the evidence presented, emphasizing the importance of integrity for judicial officers.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the Writ Petition and the Transfer Petition, upholding the validity of the removal order. The judgment highlighted the necessity for judicial officers to maintain integrity and upheld the decision based on the evidence presented during the inquiry.
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1987 (5) TMI 380
Issues Involved:
1. Substitution of deceased defendants and setting aside abatement.
2. Dismissal of the suit against the remaining guarantors after the principal debtor's dissolution.
3. Application of Section 134 of the Contract Act regarding discharge of sureties.
4. Application of Section 137 of the Contract Act regarding forbearance to sue.
5. Application of Section 138 of the Contract Act regarding release of co-sureties.
6. Sufficiency of reasons for setting aside abatement.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Substitution of Deceased Defendants and Setting Aside Abatement:
The plaintiff sought to record the deaths of several defendants and substitute their legal representatives, specifically Prabuddha Chatterjee for defendant No. 6. The application for substitution was delayed by 4 days due to inadvertence. The trial judge rejected the application, citing no sufficient explanation for the delay. The appellate court found that the plaintiff had affirmed the affidavit within the prescribed time, and the delay was due to the advocate's inadvertence. The court held that clients should not suffer for their advocate's laches, referencing the case of Rafiq v. Munshilal. Consequently, the appellate court found sufficient cause for the delay and set aside the abatement.
2. Dismissal of the Suit Against Remaining Guarantors:
The trial judge dismissed the suit against the remaining guarantors, holding that the plaintiff could not proceed against them after allowing the suit against the principal debtor and some guarantors to be dismissed. The appellate court disagreed, noting that the principal debtor was discharged by operation of law (dissolution), not by any act or omission of the plaintiff. The court emphasized that the discharge of a principal debtor by operation of law does not discharge the sureties.
3. Application of Section 134 of the Contract Act:
Section 134 states that a surety is discharged by any contract between the creditor and the principal debtor releasing the latter, or by any act or omission of the creditor leading to the discharge of the principal debtor. The appellate court found that there was no contract releasing the principal debtor and no act or omission by the plaintiff resulting in the debtor's discharge. The principal debtor's dissolution was by operation of law, which does not discharge the sureties.
4. Application of Section 137 of the Contract Act:
Section 137 states that mere forbearance to sue the principal debtor does not discharge the surety. The appellate court held that the plaintiff's omission to sue the principal debtor did not discharge the sureties. The court referenced previous decisions indicating that forbearance to sue within the limitation period does not discharge the surety.
5. Application of Section 138 of the Contract Act:
Section 138 provides that releasing one co-surety does not discharge the others nor free the released surety from responsibility to the other sureties. The appellate court held that the plaintiff's decision not to proceed against some sureties did not discharge the remaining sureties. The court criticized the trial judge's reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Sri Chand v. Jagdish Prasad, clarifying that the case did not support the dismissal of the suit against remaining co-guarantors based on res judicata principles.
6. Sufficiency of Reasons for Setting Aside Abatement:
The appellate court found sufficient cause for not making the application for setting aside the abatement within the prescribed time. The plaintiff had affirmed the petition within the time limit, and the delay in taking out the summons was due to the advocate's inadvertence. The court emphasized that clients should not suffer for their advocate's mistakes.
Conclusion:
The appellate court allowed both appeals, set aside the trial judge's judgment and order, and granted the plaintiff's prayers for substitution and setting aside the abatement. The court found that the suit could proceed against the remaining guarantors despite the principal debtor's dissolution and the dismissal of the suit against some guarantors. The court emphasized the principles under Sections 134, 137, and 138 of the Contract Act, ensuring the sureties' liability remained intact.
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1987 (5) TMI 379
Issues:
1. Appointment and curtailment of tenure of Chairman of the Haryana Board of School Education.
2. Validity of the curtailment of tenure.
3. Compliance with statutory provisions in the removal process.
4. Interpretation of "terms and conditions of service" in relation to tenure.
Analysis:
1. Appointment and Curtailment of Tenure:
The appellant was appointed as Chairman of the Haryana Board of School Education for a period of two years. However, his tenure was curtailed by the Government, leading to his immediate removal from the position. The appellant contested that the curtailment was unfair and mala fide, affecting his position detrimentally.
2. Validity of Curtailment:
The State justified the curtailment of the appellant's tenure under Section 4-A of the Haryana Board of School Education Act, enabling the Government to terminate the services of the Chairman at its pleasure. The Government made a general decision to dispense with the services of non-official Chairmen, including the appellant, citing public interest. The Court found that the termination was not punitive or mala fide but a result of a policy decision.
3. Compliance with Statutory Provisions:
The appellant argued that his removal did not comply with Section 9 of the Act, which mandates communication of reasons and an opportunity for explanation before removal. The Court clarified that Section 9 pertains to specific cases of removal not applicable to the general power of termination under Section 4-A, which governs cases like the appellant's.
4. Interpretation of "Terms and Conditions of Service":
A contention was raised regarding the interpretation of "terms and conditions of service" in relation to the curtailment of tenure. The appellant claimed that the word "term" did not encompass the period of service, thus challenging the Government's authority to curtail his tenure. However, the Court held that "terms of service" included the tenure of service, rejecting the appellant's plea.
In conclusion, despite acknowledging the appellant's grievances and the unfortunate circumstances, the Court upheld the curtailment of tenure based on the provisions of the Act. The appeal was dismissed, emphasizing the legal validity of the Government's decision, and no costs were awarded.
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1987 (5) TMI 378
Issues Involved:
1. Delay in the release of convict Ahmed Ali.
2. Alleged contempt of court by jail authorities.
3. Responsibility and accountability of jail officials.
4. Determination of wilful disobedience.
5. Compensation for undue detention.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Delay in the release of convict Ahmed Ali:
Ahmed Ali was convicted under Section 302/34, IPC, and sentenced to life imprisonment. His sentence was later reduced to three years under Section 324, IPC. Despite the High Court's judgment, there was a delay in his release due to a series of administrative lapses. The judgment was forwarded to the relevant jail authorities, but no immediate action was taken, leading to Ahmed Ali's undue detention.
2. Alleged contempt of court by jail authorities:
The contempt petition was initiated due to the delay in releasing Ahmed Ali, which was perceived as disobedience to the High Court's order. The court scrutinized the actions of the Superintendent, Jailor, and Assistant Jailor to determine if there was wilful disobedience.
3. Responsibility and accountability of jail officials:
The court examined the roles and responsibilities of the jail officials under the Assam Jail Manual. The Superintendent and Jailor are responsible for the correct release of prisoners, ensuring that all necessary documents and records are in order. The Assistant Jailor was also required to take necessary actions upon receiving the judgment.
4. Determination of wilful disobedience:
The court analyzed whether the delay constituted wilful disobedience. It was found that the delay was not intentional but resulted from administrative lapses and miscommunication. The court noted that unintentional disobedience does not amount to contempt unless there is a degree of fault or misconduct.
5. Compensation for undue detention:
The court acknowledged the undue detention of Ahmed Ali and ordered the State to pay Rs. 2,000 as a measure of consolation. The court emphasized that such instances should not recur and warned of severe consequences if they do.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that there was no deliberate or wilful disobedience by the jail officials. The apologies tendered by the Superintendent and the Jailor, and the frank statement by the Assistant Jailor, were taken into consideration. The petition was disposed of with an order for compensation to Ahmed Ali and a caution to prevent future occurrences.
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1987 (5) TMI 377
Issues Involved:
1. Whether a brother of a deceased person can claim compensation u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
2. The applicability of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 in motor vehicle accident claims.
3. The interpretation of "legal representatives" in the context of motor vehicle accident claims.
Summary:
1. Whether a brother of a deceased person can claim compensation u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939:
The Supreme Court examined whether the brother of a deceased person, killed in a motor vehicle accident, is entitled to claim compensation before a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The Tribunal and the High Court of Gujarat had awarded compensation to the brothers of the deceased. The petitioner contested this, arguing that brothers are not entitled to compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the brothers, as legal representatives, could maintain the claim u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
2. The applicability of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 in motor vehicle accident claims:
The Court discussed the historical context and the evolution of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, comparing it with the English Fatal Accidents Act. The Court noted that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, particularly Chapter VIII, had introduced substantive changes that expanded the scope of claimants beyond those specified in the 1855 Act. The Court observed that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, particularly sections 110-A and 110-B, supersede the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, in the context of motor vehicle accidents, thereby allowing a broader range of legal representatives to claim compensation.
3. The interpretation of "legal representatives" in the context of motor vehicle accident claims:
The term "legal representatives" was crucial in this case. The Court noted that the Motor Vehicles Act does not define "legal representatives," but it should be interpreted broadly to include all individuals who represent the estate of the deceased. The Court referred to section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and concluded that the term encompasses more than just the immediate family (spouse, parent, and child) as specified in the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent, as evidenced by the lack of amendment to section 110-A following the Law Commission's recommendations, was to provide a wider interpretation of "legal representatives."
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, affirming that the brothers of the deceased, as legal representatives, are entitled to claim compensation under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Court highlighted that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, have substantively modified the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, in relation to motor vehicle accidents, thereby allowing a broader range of claimants.
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1987 (5) TMI 376
Issues Involved:
1. Whether Section 8 of the Bihar Non-Government Elementary Schools (Taking Over of Control) Act, 1976 can be used as a substitute for the rule-making power under Section 7.
2. Validity of the suspension order of the petitioner.
3. The necessity of framing statutory rules under Section 7.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether Section 8 of the Bihar Non-Government Elementary Schools (Taking Over of Control) Act, 1976 can be used as a substitute for the rule-making power under Section 7:
The primary issue addressed in this judgment is whether Section 8 of the Bihar Non-Government Elementary Schools (Taking Over of Control) Act, 1976, which empowers the State Government to remove difficulties in giving effect to its provisions, can be utilized for subordinate legislation as a substitute for the rule-making power under Section 7. The court held that Section 8 cannot be used as a cloak for subordinate legislation and cannot substitute the express rule-making power under Section 7. The court emphasized that Section 8 is meant to remove difficulties encountered in the enforcement of the Act and not to create statutory rules. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Madeva Upendra Sinai v. Union of India, which elaborated on the limited scope of "removal of difficulty" clauses, underscoring that such provisions should not be used for making substantive rules. Consequently, all notifications issued under Section 8 (Annexures 2, 7, 10, and 11) were struck down as they were devoid of any valid statutory source.
2. Validity of the suspension order of the petitioner:
The petitioner challenged his suspension order on the grounds that it was not approved by the District Education Officer as required by the relevant Clause 7 of Annexure 2. The respondents countered that the earlier notification had been superseded by a subsequent circular which mandated that the District Superintendent of Education would take disciplinary action after obtaining orders from the Chairman of the District Establishment Committee. The court noted that in the absence of statutory rules under Section 7, the power of suspension remains a procedural aid to holding disciplinary proceedings. The court found that the suspension order issued at the behest of the District Magistrate was in substantial compliance with the provisions of Annexure 6, which designated the District Magistrate as the Chairman of the Committee. Thus, the suspension order was upheld as valid.
3. The necessity of framing statutory rules under Section 7:
The court highlighted the failure of the State Government to frame any statutory rules under Section 7 despite the passage of eleven years since the enforcement of the Act. The court underscored that the framing of rules under a statute is a legislative function and an integral part of the statute. The absence of such rules led to a plethora of confusing and contradictory notifications under Section 8, which created further difficulties rather than removing them. The court urged the State Government to proceed with utmost expedition to frame rules under Section 7 for the proper governance, management, and development of elementary education in the State of Bihar.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that Section 8 cannot be used as a substitute for the rule-making power under Section 7. All notifications issued under Section 8 were struck down. The suspension order of the petitioner was upheld as it complied with the provisions of Annexure 6. The court emphasized the necessity for the State Government to frame statutory rules under Section 7 to ensure the proper governance of elementary education in Bihar.
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1987 (5) TMI 375
Issues Involved:
1. Seniority dispute between erstwhile Officers Grade-II and Probationary/Trainee Officers in Grade-I of the State Bank of India.
2. Applicability and interpretation of the State Bank of India Officers (Determination of Terms and Conditions of Service) Order, 1979.
3. Retrospective effect of the 1979 Order.
4. Alleged violation of vested rights of seniority.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Seniority Dispute:
The primary issue in these appeals and the Special Leave Petition is the seniority dispute between erstwhile Officers Grade-II and Probationary/Trainee Officers in Grade-I of the State Bank of India. The 1975 Rules governed the conditions of service for both categories, but with the expansion of banking activities, Officers Grade-II began performing managerial duties similar to those of Officers Grade-I. The Officers' Federation demanded the abolition of the distinction between these grades, which the Bank resisted. Following the recommendations of the Pillai Committee, which proposed a single scale at the junior management level, the Bank agreed to merge Officers Grade-I and Grade-II into a new Junior Management Grade, with Officers Grade-I being senior to Officers Grade-II.
2. Applicability and Interpretation of the 1979 Order:
The State Bank of India Officers (Determination of Terms and Conditions of Service) Order, 1979, was passed to implement the merger of Officers Grade-I and Grade-II into the Junior Management Grade. Paragraph 3(h) of the Order defines "existing officers" as officers in the service of the Bank immediately prior to October 1, 1979. The Order was to apply to these existing officers and not to Probationary/Trainee Officers appointed on October 30 and October 31, 1979. The Allahabad High Court held that the expression "existing officers" should include Probationary/Trainee Officers to avoid repugnancy with paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Order. In contrast, the Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petitions, maintaining that Probationary/Trainee Officers were not "existing officers" under paragraph 3(h).
3. Retrospective Effect of the 1979 Order:
The contention was raised that the Bank had no authority to give retrospective effect to the Order from October 1, 1979, as section 43 of the State Bank of India Act does not authorize retrospective rule-making. The Supreme Court held that the Order was not retrospective but merely implemented the merger of Officers Grade-I and Grade-II into the Junior Management Grade from October 1, 1979, following negotiations and agreements between the Bank and the Officers' Federation. The Court cited previous decisions, such as V.T. Khanzode v. Reserve Bank of India, to support the legitimacy of retrospective effect in service matters to rectify imbalances and anomalies.
4. Alleged Violation of Vested Rights of Seniority:
The Probationary/Trainee Officers argued that their vested right to seniority was taken away by the retrospective operation of the Order. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating that seniority is relevant only for promotion and that the right to be considered for promotion is a vested right, not the mere chance of promotion. The Court emphasized that the Probationary/Trainee Officers were not "existing officers" and thus could not claim seniority over Officers Grade-II. The Court also noted that the Probationary/Trainee Officers had not been prejudiced by the Order, as they would be included in the Junior Management Grade and considered for promotion along with others.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Allahabad High Court and affirmed the judgment of the Delhi High Court. The Civil Appeals were allowed, and the Special Leave Petition was dismissed. The Court directed the State Bank of India to take immediate steps to apply the Order to the Probationary/Trainee Officers, ensuring they were not prejudiced. No costs were awarded in any of the appeals or the Special Leave Petition.
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1987 (5) TMI 374
Issues involved: Freezing of bank account without valid reason, legality of prohibitory order, applicability of Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Summary:
1. The petitioner's bank account was frozen based on an erroneous prohibitory order issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, which incorrectly linked her to criminal activities. The court found the order to be illegal and lacking valid reasons, leading to its quashing.
2. The respondents argued that the freezing of the account was justified under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, citing precedents where property seizure was allowed. However, the court disagreed, stating that the circumstances did not create suspicion of an offense related to the bank account.
3. Even if Section 102 applied, the respondents failed to follow its requirements, such as informing the magistrate and the petitioner, and providing an opportunity to operate the account. The court emphasized that the funds in the account were not established as "case property," further invalidating the seizure.
4. Due to the above reasons, the court ordered the quashing of the prohibitory order and directed the respondents to pay the petitioner interest on the frozen amount. The petitioner's request for costs was denied, considering the interest awarded during the petition's pendency.
Separate Judgment: No separate judgment was delivered by the judges in this case.
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1987 (5) TMI 373
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain preliminary objections and reject the election petition.
2. Whether the allegations in the election petition disclosed a cause of action.
3. Opportunity to amend the election petition.
4. Validity of respondent's election in light of subsequent elections.
Summary:
1. Jurisdiction of the High Court:
The appellant contended that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain preliminary objections under Order VI Rule 16 or to reject the election petition under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the respondent had filed his written statement. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in striking out pleadings and rejecting the election petition at the preliminary stage. The Court emphasized that Order VI Rule 16 and Order VII Rule 11 are applicable to election petitions and that the High Court has the power to strike out pleadings at any stage if they are unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious.
2. Allegations in the Election Petition:
The appellant alleged several corrupt practices, including undue influence, hiring and procuring vehicles, and obtaining assistance from government servants. The Supreme Court found that the allegations were vague, general, and did not disclose any cause of action as required by Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Court noted that the allegations lacked material facts and particulars necessary to constitute corrupt practices under Section 123 of the Act. For instance, allegations of incurring expenses beyond the permissible limit and using government servants for election purposes were not substantiated with specific details.
3. Opportunity to Amend the Petition:
The appellant argued that the High Court deprived him of the opportunity to amend the petition by rejecting it under Order VII Rule 11. The Supreme Court held that the appellant did not file any amendment application before the High Court. The Court further noted that any amendment application made after the expiry of the period of limitation could not be permitted, as it would amount to raising a new ground of challenge. The amendments sought by the appellant were not in the nature of supplying particulars but rather sought to raise new grounds, which is impermissible after the limitation period.
4. Validity of Respondent's Election:
The Supreme Court observed that the election under challenge related to 1981, and its term expired in 1984. Since the respondent was re-elected in the subsequent general election in 1984, the Court held that the relief for setting aside the election had been rendered infructuous by lapse of time. The Court emphasized that it should not decide an issue unless it is a living issue between the parties. The main controversy regarding the setting aside of the respondent's election had become academic, and the Court should not waste public time on such matters.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to reject the election petition under Order VII Rule 11, as the petition did not disclose any cause of action. The appeal was dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 2,000. The Court also expressed concern over the increasing number of independent candidates contesting elections without serious intent, causing confusion among voters and wasting judicial time.
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1987 (5) TMI 372
Issues:
Revival of a contempt petition withdrawn by the petitioner, Requirement of obtaining consent of the Attorney General or Solicitor General for maintaining a contempt petition, Denial of consent by the Solicitor General, Grounds for refusal of consent by the Solicitor General, Legal implications of refusal of consent by the Solicitor General.
Analysis:
Revival of Contempt Petition:
The petitioner sought to revive a contempt petition that was withdrawn by him previously. The original petition alleged criminal contempt against the first respondent for making adverse comments about judges. The petitioner withdrew the petition due to the absence of consent from the Attorney General. The court allowed withdrawal with liberty to refile after obtaining the Attorney General's consent post the National Anthem case. Subsequently, the petitioner tried to recall the withdrawal order, citing lack of awareness about the provision allowing consent from the Solicitor General. The court clarified that the petition could be revived with the Solicitor General's consent under Rule 3(c), granting the petitioner the opportunity to approach the Solicitor General for consent.
Requirement of Obtaining Consent:
The bench emphasized the necessity of obtaining written consent from the Attorney General or Solicitor General for maintaining a contempt petition. The petitioner's failure to secure consent from the Attorney General led to the withdrawal of the original petition. The court highlighted that the petitioner could revive the petition only after fulfilling the condition of obtaining consent from the Solicitor General, as specified in the court's order. The Solicitor General's subsequent refusal to grant consent was deemed valid, and the court found no legal basis to challenge the refusal.
Denial of Consent by Solicitor General:
The Solicitor General declined to grant consent for initiating the contempt proceedings, stating that it was not in the public interest. The court reviewed the reasons provided by the Solicitor General and concluded that the refusal was not arbitrary, illegal, or unreasonable. The court held that the grounds for refusal were relevant in law, thereby upholding the Solicitor General's decision to deny consent.
Legal Implications of Refusal of Consent:
Considering the events and prior court orders, the court determined that the petitioner failed to meet the conditions necessary for reviving the contempt petition. As the Solicitor General's refusal was found to be valid and in the public interest, the court dismissed the petitioner's applications for revival. The decision underscored the importance of obtaining consent from the Solicitor General for maintaining contempt proceedings and upheld the Solicitor General's discretion in granting or denying consent based on public interest considerations.
In conclusion, the judgment elucidated the procedural requirements for maintaining contempt petitions, the significance of obtaining consent from the Attorney General or Solicitor General, and the legal implications of the Solicitor General's refusal to grant consent in the context of public interest.
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1987 (5) TMI 371
Issues Involved:
The issue involves the interpretation of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, regarding eviction based on bona fide requirement of the landlord and the availability of alternative accommodation.
Judgment Summary:
Issue 1:
The appeal challenged the High Court's reversal of the Rent Controller's order directing eviction under Section 14(1)(e). The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering without valid grounds, emphasizing the landlord's bona fide need and lack of alternative accommodation. The Court highlighted that the High Court's revisional power should not override the Rent Controller's decision based on legal principles and objective assessment.
Issue 2:
The appellant, a widow, sought eviction for personal use, as she was staying with a family friend without legal right to the premises. The Court rejected the High Court's reasoning based on the appellant's age and need for care, asserting the landlord's freedom to decide residential requirements. It emphasized the landlord's right to beneficial property enjoyment and reversed the High Court's finding, reinstating the Rent Controller's decision on the appellant's bona fide requirement.
Issue 3:
The appellant relied on a Single Judge's observations misinterpreting the legal test for alternative accommodation under Section 14(1)(e). The Supreme Court clarified that the availability of alternative accommodation should consider the landlord's legal right, not just mere availability. It overruled the High Court's decision for not aligning with legal principles established in previous cases.
Issue 4:
The Court emphasized that the landlord's bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) should not be denied solely based on temporary stay arrangements, reiterating the importance of legal right to alternative accommodation. The appellant's claim was upheld as genuine, and the High Court's decision disallowing the claim was deemed unsupported.
Issue 5:
The appeal was allowed, costs were awarded, and the High Court's decision was set aside. The Rent Controller's order for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) was restored, granting the respondent four months to vacate the premises upon filing the necessary undertaking within four weeks.
This judgment clarifies the legal principles governing eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, emphasizing the landlord's bona fide requirement and legal right to alternative accommodation in determining eviction proceedings.
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1987 (5) TMI 370
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of declarations u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
2. Applicability and interpretation of the 1984 amendment to the Land Acquisition Act.
3. Impact of court stay orders on the computation of the limitation period for declarations u/s 6.
4. Other contentions raised by petitioners regarding the acquisition process.
Summary:
Validity of Declarations u/s 6:
A large number of writ petitions challenged the validity of certain declarations u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act on the ground that they were made after the expiry of the prescribed period. The petitions were heard by a Full Bench due to differing views among judges on the issue.
Applicability and Interpretation of the 1984 Amendment:
The court examined the amendments made by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, which reduced the interval between a Section 4 notification and a Section 6 declaration from three years to one year and introduced provisions for excluding periods during which court orders stayed proceedings. The court rejected the petitioners' argument that the amendments could not apply retrospectively to notifications issued before the amendment came into force.
Impact of Court Stay Orders:
The court held that the period during which any action or proceeding in pursuance of a Section 4 notification is stayed by a court order should be excluded in computing the limitation period for a Section 6 declaration. The court interpreted the stay orders broadly, considering the practical implications and the nature of land acquisition proceedings, which often involve large tracts of land and integrated schemes.
Other Contentions:
The court noted that other contentions raised by the petitioners, such as the applicability of the Master Plan and allegations of mala fide exercise of power, would need to be addressed individually. These contentions would be heard by a Division Bench for final disposal.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the declarations u/s 6 were within the extended limitation period when the stay orders' duration was excluded. The petitions were directed to be listed before a Division Bench for further arguments on other contentions.
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1987 (5) TMI 369
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of the Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 to forest produce grown in Government forests.
2. Interpretation of Section 5(1) of the Act.
3. Validity of contracts under Explanation II to Section 5(1).
Summary:
1. Applicability of the Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 to forest produce grown in Government forests:
The appellants argued that the Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 was intended to create a monopoly in forest produce for the Government and should only apply to forest produce grown on private lands, not Government forests. The Court examined the Statement of Objects and Reasons, which highlighted the need to prevent smuggling of forest produce grown on private lands, and noted that sal seeds were explicitly mentioned as being grown only in Government forests. The Court concluded that the Act was not intended to apply to forest produce grown in Government forests.
2. Interpretation of Section 5(1) of the Act:
Section 5(1)(a) states that all contracts for the purchase, sale, gathering, or collection of specified forest produce in the specified area shall stand rescinded. Section 5(1)(b) restricts the purchase and transport of specified forest produce to the State Government, its officers, or agents. The Court held that these provisions, when read with the rest of the Act, were intended to apply to forest produce grown on private lands. The Court emphasized the need to interpret the statute in light of its context and purpose, which was to create a monopoly in forest produce for the Government by controlling produce grown on private lands.
3. Validity of contracts under Explanation II to Section 5(1):
Explanation II to Section 5(1) states that the purchase of specified forest produce from the State Government or its officers or agents shall not be deemed to be a purchase in contravention of the Act. The Court found that this explanation did not save the contracts in question because the Act did not apply to forest produce grown in Government forests. Therefore, the contracts between the appellants and the State Government were not rescinded by the notification issued under the Act.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court declared that the Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 and the notification issued under it did not apply to forest produce grown in Government forests. Consequently, the contracts between the appellants and the State Government were not rescinded. The appeals were allowed, and the parties were directed to work out their rights in light of this declaration, considering the interim orders issued during the litigation.
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1987 (5) TMI 368
Whether on a true construction of Section 5 of the Madhya Pradesh Sahayata Upkram (Vishesh Upbandh) Adhiniyam, 1978 Act, execution of the exparte decree obtained by the respondent against the petitioner at Bombay can be instituted, commenced or proceeded with by the respondent against the petitioner, even though the petitioner's textile undertaking is admittedly a State Relief Undertaking under the Act?
Whether Section 5 of the aforesaid Act is substantive law or procedural law?
Held that:- High Court completely overlooked the purpose of the Act and the limited period of operation of Section 5 to held that there was no bar against execution of the decree after considering the effect of Section 5 quoted above on the general law governing decrees and their execution as provided in the Civil Procedure Code.
A contention was raised that Section 5 cannot apply to post notification liabilities but the reading of the Sections does not permit such an interpretation. The object of Section 5 is to protect the relief undertakings from all suits and legal proceedings. This protection is to end on 18-11-1987. We hold that the High Court was in error in allowing execution to proceed. Set aside the order of the High court and allow this appeal.
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1987 (5) TMI 367
Issues:
Jurisdiction of Appellate Assistant Commissioner to accept forms F and C at the appellate stage and grant reliefs based on the documents.
Analysis:
The case involved the respondent-assessee, an inter-State dealer, challenging the assessment of tax on consignment sale. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted forms F and C produced at the appellate stage and directed the deletion of the tax amount. The Appellate Tribunal upheld this decision, emphasizing that the appeal is a continuation of assessment proceedings, allowing additional evidence if the assessee was prevented from producing it earlier. The questions raised pertained to the jurisdiction of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in accepting these forms at the appellate stage.
The Revenue contended that rule 6(1B) of the Central Sales Tax (Kerala) Rules required documents like forms F and C to be produced before the assessing authority, disentitling the assessee if not done so. Citing a previous judgment, the Revenue argued that the appellate authority lacks the power to receive such documents as evidence at the appellate stage. However, the Court disagreed, highlighting that the appellate authority's jurisdiction is coterminous with the assessing authority, allowing for a re-do of assessment. The Court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Kanpur Coal Syndicate case to support this view.
Another argument raised was regarding section 6A(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, which mandates the production of certain documents within a prescribed time. The Court reasoned that the assessing authority could extend the time for production of forms based on sufficient cause, even after assessment. The Court agreed with the view that the assessing authority could rectify or reopen cases to implement corrective actions.
The Court further explained that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's power under section 34 of the KGST Act allows for the revision of every process leading to the assessment. The Court emphasized that the appellate authority can correct errors and grant reliefs to the assessee based on documents produced at the appellate stage. Referring to a Supreme Court decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. McMillan & Co., the Court affirmed that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has the power to correct errors within the framework of the Act.
In conclusion, the Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, stating that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction in accepting forms F and C at the appellate stage and granting reliefs to the assessee. The questions raised in the tax revision case were answered against the State, leading to the dismissal of the case without costs.
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1987 (5) TMI 366
Issues:
- Entitlement to deduction of sales tax liability for assessment year 1971-72.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a reference made under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding the entitlement of the assessee to a deduction of Rs. 2,22,161 towards sales tax liability for the assessment year 1971-72. The assessee, a limited company engaged in the manufacture and sale of steel tubes, was required to pay sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1947 for the year 1962-63. The Sales Tax Officer initially demanded Rs. 11,02,698, which was contested by the assessee and subsequently reduced to Rs. 2,22,161 by the Sales Tax Tribunal. The assessee claimed this amount as a business expenditure for the assessment year 1971-72, which was initially disallowed by the Income-tax Officer but allowed on appeal. However, the Tribunal reversed the decision, leading to the reference before the High Court.
The crux of the issue revolves around the method of accounting employed by the assessee, which is the mercantile method. Under this method, liabilities are recognized when they accrue, irrespective of the actual payment date. The Appellate Tribunal held that the assessee was not entitled to the deduction in the assessment year 1971-72 as claimed. The assessee argued that the obligation to pay tax arose at the time of the sale transaction in 1962-63, and the liability continued until realization, even if quantified later. Citing relevant case law, the assessee contended that the liability for payment of tax is independent of the assessment and can be deducted from the profits and gains of the business under the mercantile system of accounting.
Additionally, the judgment discusses the issuance of a fresh demand notice when the liability is reduced, as per the decision in Income-tax Officer v. Seghu Buchiah Setty. The High Court opined that since the Sales Tax Tribunal reduced the demand, a fresh demand notice should be issued, thereby allowing the assessee to claim the deduction under section 37 during the assessment year 1971-72. The judgment also references conflicting decisions from other High Courts, which were deemed not necessary to discuss in detail.
In conclusion, the High Court held that the assessee, maintaining the mercantile system of accounts, could claim the deduction in the year when the sales tax liability was finally determined by the Sales Tax Tribunal in the second appeal. The question was answered in favor of the assessee, and no costs were awarded.
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1987 (5) TMI 365
Issues:
Challenge to assessment orders for the years 1977-78 and 1978-79 regarding sales tax on food sold in a restaurant.
Analysis:
The petitioners challenged the assessment orders, contending that no sales tax was payable on food sold and consumed in the restaurant. They relied on a Supreme Court decision and a Division Bench judgment of the High Court. The Supreme Court judgment clarified that sales tax is not applicable to food served in restaurants unless the dominant purpose is the sale of food, with services being secondary. The petitioners also highlighted the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1982, which introduced Article 366(29A)(f) regarding taxes on the supply of goods as part of a service. This amendment validated the imposition of taxes on certain supplies. The Bihar Finance Act, 1984, incorporated these changes, providing statutory sanction for previously disputed taxes.
The Court acknowledged the legal arguments presented and allowed the writ petitions, quashing the assessment orders in question. The respondent was directed to reconsider the case in line with the law and the Court's observations. No costs were awarded in this matter. The judgment emphasized the impact of the constitutional amendment and subsequent legislative changes on the taxation of food supplies, ultimately leading to the annulment of the challenged assessment orders.
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