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1998 (5) TMI 422
Issues:
Validity of judgment and order of High Court of Rajasthan in a criminal case barred by limitation under Section 468 Cr. P.C.
Analysis:
The Supreme Court granted special leave to hear the case where the State of Rajasthan challenged the High Court's judgment quashing a criminal case based on the limitation period. The case involved collecting drug samples in 1988, finding them substandard, and filing a complaint in 1991. The High Court quashed the case citing limitation under Section 468 Cr. P.C. The main argument was whether the limitation period should start from the date of collecting samples or the date of the analyst's report. The Court discussed the provisions of Sections 467-473 of the CrPC, focusing on Sections 468 and 469 regarding limitation for different offenses. Section 468 prohibits taking cognizance after the limitation period expires, with different periods based on the offense's punishment. Section 469 deals with the commencement of the limitation period based on the date of the offense or when the offense is known to the aggrieved party or the police.
The Court analyzed the facts of the case, determining that the offense was known only after the analyst's report in July 1988, not when the samples were collected. Referring to similar cases in other states, the Court agreed with the interpretation that the limitation period starts from the date of the analyst's report, not the sample collection date. The Court emphasized that the High Court erred in calculating the limitation period from the sample collection date, leading to a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the Court set aside the High Court's order, allowed the appeal, and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with the law.
This judgment clarifies the computation of the limitation period for offenses under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, emphasizing that the limitation starts from when the offense is known, not when the samples are collected. It upholds the importance of following procedural fairness and ensuring justice by correctly interpreting the law's provisions related to limitation periods for criminal cases.
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1998 (5) TMI 421
Issues:
1. Delay in re-filing the application for leave to defend.
2. Application for leave to defend not placed on record due to objections by the Registry.
3. Interpretation of relevant rules governing the re-filing of documents.
4. Consideration of negligence or casual approach in re-filing applications.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Delay in re-filing the application for leave to defend
The appellant filed an appeal against the dismissal of the application for leave to defend due to a delay in re-filing. The initial delay of 7 days was condoned, but subsequent delays occurred in correcting errors and objections raised by the Registry. The court emphasized that the term 'sufficient cause' must be liberally construed for substantial justice. Despite the casual approach of the counsel in addressing objections promptly, the court decided to condone the delay on payment of costs by the appellant.
Issue 2: Application for leave to defend not placed on record due to objections by the Registry
The Registry raised objections regarding discrepancies in the application for leave to defend, leading to delays in re-filing. Despite orders to rectify these issues, the application was not placed on record promptly. The court noted the negligent approach of the counsel in addressing objections in a timely manner.
Issue 3: Interpretation of relevant rules governing the re-filing of documents
The appellant argued that specific rules governing appellate matters did not apply to matters on the Original Side of the Court. Reference was made to Rule 2 of Chapter-4 of the Delhi High Court Original Side Rules concerning the endorsement and scrutiny of documents. The court did not delve into the applicability of these rules but focused on the merits of the case.
Issue 4: Consideration of negligence or casual approach in re-filing applications
The court highlighted the casual approach of the counsel in handling objections and delays in re-filing the application for leave to defend. While negligence was evident, no mala fide intention to delay proceedings was found. The court decided to condone the delay on payment of costs by the appellant, emphasizing the need to balance justice with accountability for delays.
In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal, condoned the delay in re-filing the application for leave to defend, and directed the parties to appear before the learned Single Judge for further proceedings. The decision aimed to uphold justice while addressing the delays caused by the negligent approach of the counsel.
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1998 (5) TMI 420
Issues Involved:
1. Whether there was a concluded contract between the parties on 25.1.1984 at Delhi.
2. Whether the plaintiff could contend that there was an agreement of sale dated 28.4.1984 at Bangalore.
3. Legal principles applicable to suits for specific performance under section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and the extent of relief under 'general relief' in suits for specific performance under Order 7 Rule 7 CPC.
4. Whether the plaintiff can get a decree for specific performance of an agreement dated 28.4.1984 said to have been concluded at Bangalore.
Detailed Analysis:
Point 1: Concluded Contract on 25.1.1984 at Delhi
The court found that there was no concluded agreement on 25.1.1984 at Delhi. The suit-notice Ex.P12 dated 2.7.84 clearly stated that the 1st defendant mentioned he still needed to consult his two brothers. Correspondence after 25.1.84 confirmed that the sale consideration was not finalized at Delhi. The High Court's finding that there was no concluded agreement on 25.1.1984 at Delhi was deemed correct.
Point 2: Agreement of Sale on 28.4.1984 at Bangalore
The plaintiff did not amend the plaint to plead an agreement dated 28.4.1984 at Bangalore when given the opportunity by the High Court. Therefore, the plaintiff could not seek relief for specific performance of an agreement allegedly concluded at Bangalore on 28.4.1984. This point was held against the appellant.
Points 3 and 4: Legal Principles and Relief under General Relief
The court discussed the discretion under section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, emphasizing that the relief for specific performance is discretionary and governed by sound judicial principles. The evidence and proof of the agreement must be absolutely clear and certain. The court cited various precedents, including Madamsetty Satyanarayana vs. G. Yellogi Rao and Sardar Singh vs. Smt. Krishna Devi, affirming that specific performance requires a higher degree of certainty in the terms of the agreement.
Point 3:
The court emphasized that the plaintiff cannot abandon the case made in the plaint and seek relief based on evidence not pleaded. Specific performance suits require strict adherence to the pleaded case. The court referred to Gonesh Ram vs. Ganpat Rai and Md. Ziaul Haque vs. Calcutta Vyapar Prat1sthan, highlighting that variance between pleading and proof is not permissible in specific performance suits.
Point 4:
Even if an agreement dated 28.4.1984 at Bangalore was proved, the plaintiff's refusal to amend the plaint to seek relief based on such an agreement was detrimental. The evidence did not support the existence of a fresh agreement on 28.4.1984 at Bangalore. The court concluded that there was no fresh agreement at Bangalore on 28.4.1984 and that the plaintiff's case was based on a concluded agreement on 25.1.1984 at Delhi, which was not proved.
Conclusion:
The High Court's exercise of discretion in refusing specific performance was consistent with established principles. The appeal was dismissed without costs.
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1998 (5) TMI 419
Issues:
1. Best judgment assessment based on lack of documentation
2. Imposition of penalty and interest under the Central Sales Tax Act
3. Judicial review of assessment orders
Analysis:
1. The petitioner, engaged in building bus bodies, faced a best judgment assessment for the 1983-84 period due to the non-production of cash books and purchase vouchers during assessment. The Assessing Officer rejected the reported sales figure and determined the total turnover at &8377; 1,25,00,000 based on the 1982-83 turnover of &8377; 98,52,500. A penalty of &8377; 5,000 and interest of &8377; 44,639 were imposed, leading to demands under the Delhi and Central Acts. Revision petitions and a review application were dismissed, prompting the petitioner to approach the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
2. The petitioner contested the best judgment assessment, arguing against arbitrary assessments and the charging of interest under the Central Sales Tax Act. The Court noted discrepancies in the assessment process, highlighting the lack of progress in proceedings until shortly before the time-barring date. Citing legal precedents, the Court emphasized that best judgment assessments must be based on rationality and relevant material, not arbitrary guesswork. The assessment was deemed arbitrary and set aside.
3. Regarding the interest charged under the Central Sales Tax Act, the petitioner relied on a Supreme Court decision to argue against its imposition. The Court, in line with the petitioner's argument, ruled that interest could not be charged in the absence of a substantive provision for it in the Central Sales Tax Act. Consequently, the impugned assessment orders under both the Delhi Sales Tax Act and the Central Sales Tax Act were set aside, along with the orders in revision and review. The Assessment Officer was directed to conduct a fresh assessment adhering to legal principles and providing the petitioner an opportunity to be heard.
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1998 (5) TMI 418
Issues:
Determining whether Gravure Printing Cylinders used for printing laminated plastic film are intermediate products in the manufacturing process and whether the inputs used in their production are eligible for Modvat credit.
Analysis:
The main issue in this case revolves around the classification of Gravure Printing Cylinders (GPC) as intermediate products in the manufacturing process of printed laminated plastic film and the admissibility of Modvat credit for the inputs used in their production. The appellant argues that GPCs are captively used in the manufacture of printed laminated plastic film and are exempt under Notification No. 67/91, thus disallowing Modvat credit for inputs used in their production. Reference is made to previous Tribunal decisions regarding the treatment of sand moulds as non-intermediate products to support this argument.
On the other hand, the respondents contend that previous Tribunal decisions regarding the classification of sand moulds as intermediate goods are no longer applicable, citing the Rama Krishna Ind. case where sand moulds were considered intermediate products. They also refer to a judgment by the Madras High Court to support their argument. The respondents argue that GPCs can be considered intermediate products based on various legal interpretations and precedents, making the duty paid on inputs used in their manufacture eligible for Modvat credit.
The Tribunal, after considering the arguments presented by both sides, notes that GPCs are manufactured by the appellants and are primarily consumed captively. Drawing parallels with the treatment of sand moulds as intermediate products in a previous case, the Tribunal concludes that GPCs, when captively used in the manufacturing process, should be considered intermediate products. Therefore, the duty paid on inputs used in the manufacture of GPCs is deemed admissible for Modvat credit under Rule 57D(2). The Tribunal upholds the impugned order and rejects the appeals based on this analysis.
In conclusion, the judgment clarifies the classification of Gravure Printing Cylinders as intermediate products in the manufacturing process, making the duty paid on inputs used in their production eligible for Modvat credit. The decision is based on legal interpretations, precedents, and the specific circumstances of the case, ultimately favoring the respondents' position.
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1998 (5) TMI 417
The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, Kolkata ruled that there can be a separate assessable value under Part-II Price List even when there is a Part-I Price List. The Commissioner (Appeals) set aside the Assistant Commissioner's Order, stating that different prices for different classes of buyers are allowed unless it is shown that low prices were charged due to extraneous circumstances. The appeal filed by the Department was rejected.
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1998 (5) TMI 416
Issues:
Applicability of proviso to Notification 35/95 regarding exemption for double yarn clearance from a factory having facilities for producing single yarn.
Analysis:
The appeal was filed by the Commissioner of Central Excise Vadodara challenging the order passed by the Commissioner dropping the demand for duty on clearance of double yarn. The Respondents, manufacturers of Cellulose Spun Yarn, were availing exemption under Notification No. 35/95 for manufacturing double yarn after paying duty on single yarn. The issue revolved around whether the exemption applied to a factory having facilities for producing both single and double yarn. The Department contended that the exemption was meant for yarn made in small units and sought to deny it to integrated units. The Ld. JDR highlighted that the Respondents operated as an integrated unit, manufacturing single yarn in one section and using it to produce double yarn in another section. The Ld. Counsel for the Respondents argued that if the factory premises for single and double yarn were distinct, the proviso to the Notification would not apply. The Tribunal analyzed the proviso, emphasizing that it referred to a factory's facilities for producing single yarn, not the manufacturer. The Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner had found the Respondents' two units to be separate factories based on relevant material and factual findings. The Tribunal cited precedents where the place of manufacture determined exemption eligibility, not the manufacturer.
The Tribunal found that the two units of the Respondents were separate factories as per the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner's findings. The activities in the units were not so integrated that one could not function without the other. The Tribunal referenced previous cases to support its decision, highlighting that the proviso referred to a factory, not a manufacturer. The case law emphasized that the place of manufacture was crucial for exemption eligibility. As the two units were treated as separate factories and the activities were distinct, the Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's order as legal and proper. The appeal by the Commissioner was rejected, affirming the decision regarding the exemption for double yarn clearance from the factory having facilities for producing single yarn.
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1998 (5) TMI 415
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the amount of royalty/compensation should exceed the amount of rent payable by the tenant to the landlord.
2. Determination of the appropriate amount of royalty for Shop No. 6.
3. Compliance with the Court Receiver's orders and execution of the Agency Agreement by the defendant.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the amount of royalty/compensation should exceed the amount of rent payable by the tenant to the landlord:
The primary issue raised by Defendant No. 1 was whether the royalty/compensation amount fixed by the Court Receiver could exceed the actual rent payable to the landlord, which was Rs. 169 per month. Defendant No. 1 argued that charging Rs. 5,000 per month as royalty was excessive and lacked a real basis, asserting that it violated the provisions of the Rent Act. The defendant relied on a precedent from a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, which stated that the amount of royalty could not exceed the rent payable to the landlord. The court upheld this view, emphasizing that the royalty should be a compensation for the use of the property and should not exceed the rent payable to the landlord.
2. Determination of the appropriate amount of royalty for Shop No. 6:
The Court Receiver initially fixed an ad-hoc royalty of Rs. 5,000 per month based on a Valuation Report suggesting Rs. 7,000 per month. The plaintiff argued that the shop's prime location and the business profits justified a higher royalty, suggesting Rs. 12,000 to Rs. 14,000 per month. However, the court found that the Court Receiver's reduction to Rs. 5,000 lacked a cogent and legal basis. The court concluded that the royalty should not exceed the rent payable to the landlord, which was Rs. 169 per month. However, considering the defendant's admission, the court fixed the royalty at Rs. 750 per month, allowing the Court Receiver to cover other expenses.
3. Compliance with the Court Receiver's orders and execution of the Agency Agreement by the defendant:
The court directed Defendant No. 1 to comply with the Court Receiver's orders, including the deposit of three months' rent as a security deposit and the execution of the Agency Agreement. The court emphasized that the defendant must abide by these orders to preserve the tenancy rights of Shop No. 6. The court also allowed the Court Receiver to take forcible possession of the premises if the defendant failed to execute the Agency Agreement within four weeks.
Conclusion:
The court made the Chamber Summons absolute in terms of prayer Clauses (b) and (c), directing Defendant No. 1 to pay Rs. 750 per month as royalty to the Court Receiver and comply with the other orders. The court concluded that the royalty amount could not exceed the rent payable to the landlord and emphasized the need to preserve the property during the litigation. The Chamber Summons was disposed of with no order as to costs, and the Court Receiver was directed to act on an ordinary copy of the order.
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1998 (5) TMI 414
Issues Involved:
1. Rectification of the register of members of the respondent-company.
2. Alleged wrongful transfer of shares.
3. Applicability of Section 111A(3) of the Companies Act, 1956.
4. Violation of SEBI guidelines regarding promoters' shares and lock-in period.
5. Validity of the transfer deeds and authority of signatories.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Rectification of the Register of Members:
The petitioners sought rectification of the register of members of the respondent-company, alleging wrongful transfer of their shares. The Company Law Board (CLB) decided to consider the petitions under Section 111A(3) of the Companies Act, 1956, despite a technical error in the filing under Section 111.
2. Alleged Wrongful Transfer of Shares:
The petitioners claimed that their shares, part of the promoters' quota subject to a lock-in period of five years, were wrongfully transferred without their consent and without consideration. They argued that these transfers violated SEBI guidelines.
3. Applicability of Section 111A(3):
The CLB noted that with the enactment of the Depositories Act, 1996, the scope for rectification of the register of members in public companies had become limited. Section 111A(3) allows rectification only if the transfer of shares is in contravention of certain laws, including the SEBI Act and its regulations.
4. Violation of SEBI Guidelines:
The petitioners argued that the transfers violated SEBI guidelines, which mandate that shares in the promoters' quota are to be locked in for five years and cannot be transferred. The CLB examined whether SEBI guidelines constituted "regulations" under the SEBI Act. Despite some ambiguity, the CLB accepted the SEBI guidelines as regulations, referencing a broader interpretation from a Supreme Court decision.
The CLB found that the SEBI guidelines clearly restricted the transfer of promoters' shares during the lock-in period, except for transfers among promoters specifically named in the prospectus. The prospectus of the respondent-company named specific promoters, and the impugned transfers did not involve these named promoters. Therefore, the transfers were in violation of SEBI guidelines.
5. Validity of Transfer Deeds and Authority of Signatories:
The petitioners raised objections regarding the authority of the signatories on the transfer deeds and the absence of an original board resolution authorizing the transfers. However, the CLB deemed these issues irrelevant under Section 111A(3), which focuses solely on violations of specified laws, not procedural or authority-related issues.
Conclusion:
The CLB concluded that the transfers of shares were in clear violation of SEBI guidelines. Consequently, the CLB directed the respondent-company to rectify its register of members by removing the names of the transferees and restoring the names of the petitioners within ten days. The relevant share certificates were also to be delivered to the petitioners. This order was made without prejudice to the rights of the transferees to recover any consideration paid, for which they could pursue appropriate legal proceedings.
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1998 (5) TMI 413
Issues Involved:
1. Application for recalling and/or review of orders dated 10.4.1997 and 2.12.1997.
2. Application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay.
3. Application for stay of the aforesaid orders.
4. Maintainability of the winding-up petition u/s 433 and 434 of the Companies Act.
5. Admission of liability by the respondent.
6. Whether the claim is barred by limitation.
7. Impact of dismissal of the application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC on the winding-up petition.
Summary:
1. Application for recalling and/or review of orders dated 10.4.1997 and 2.12.1997:
The respondent filed applications for recalling and/or review of the orders dated 10.4.1997 and 2.12.1997. The court noted that the respondent's counsel was absent on crucial dates, and despite the publication of citations in newspapers, the respondent did not take timely action. The court found negligence and/or wilful inaction on the part of the respondent and dismissed the applications.
2. Application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay:
The respondent sought condonation of delay in filing the application for recalling and reviewing the orders. The court observed that the respondent had knowledge of the proceedings through citations published in newspapers and failed to act promptly. The delay was not satisfactorily explained, and the application for condonation of delay was dismissed.
3. Application for stay of the aforesaid orders:
The respondent also filed an application for staying the operation of the orders dated 10.4.1997 and 2.12.1997. Given the dismissal of the applications for recalling and review, the court found no grounds to stay the orders and dismissed this application as well.
4. Maintainability of the winding-up petition u/s 433 and 434 of the Companies Act:
The petitioner filed a winding-up petition u/s 433 read with Section 434 of the Companies Act, claiming the respondent's inability to pay dues amounting to Rs. 6,89,870.76. The Division Bench had earlier remitted the matter back to the Company Judge, noting an admission of liability by the respondent. The court found that the requirements of Sections 433, 434, and 439 were satisfied, and the winding-up petition was maintainable.
5. Admission of liability by the respondent:
The respondent admitted its liability in a reply dated 22.11.1991, signed by one of its directors, and in its balance sheet for the year ending 31.3.1990. The court relied on this admission to conclude that the respondent was indebted to the petitioner and unable to pay its debt.
6. Whether the claim is barred by limitation:
The respondent argued that the claim was barred by limitation. However, the court held that the acknowledgment of debt in the balance sheet and the reply dated 22.11.1991 constituted an acknowledgment in writing within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the petition filed on 14.5.1992 was within the limitation period.
7. Impact of dismissal of the application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC on the winding-up petition:
The respondent contended that the dismissal of the petitioner's application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC in a civil suit barred the winding-up petition. The court clarified that the remedies of recovery of money through a civil suit and winding-up proceedings are distinct and separate. The dismissal of the application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC did not debar the petitioner from seeking winding-up of the respondent company.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the applications for recalling and/or review of the orders dated 10.4.1997 and 2.12.1997, the application for condonation of delay, and the application for stay of the orders. The winding-up petition was found to be maintainable, and the respondent's liability was acknowledged. The claim was within the limitation period, and the dismissal of the application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC did not affect the winding-up proceedings. The case was listed before the Hon'ble Company Judge for further orders.
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1998 (5) TMI 412
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the application for permission to sell the plot.
2. Calculation of the period for eligibility to sell the plot.
3. Determination of the date of building completion.
4. Calculation of unearned increase.
5. Liability for sub-lease charges.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Application for Permission to Sell the Plot:
The petitioner made an application to the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) on 20.12.84 seeking permission to sell the plot and building. The DDA delayed the decision, finally granting permission on 23.6.91. The petitioner argued that the delay was not their fault and that the application was complete in all material particulars when submitted. The court agreed, stating that the application did not suffer from any substantial defect and was valid as of 22.12.84.
2. Calculation of the Period for Eligibility to Sell the Plot:
The lease deed, effective from 1.11.74, stipulated that the lessee could not sell or transfer the plot without the lessor's consent for ten years. The court clarified that the ten-year period should be calculated from 1.11.74, the date the lease became effective, not from the date of the formal execution of the lease deed on 28.2.77. Thus, the petitioner was eligible to apply for permission to sell the plot on 1.11.84.
3. Determination of the Date of Building Completion:
The petitioner completed the building and applied for a completion certificate on 19.5.78. The DDA issued the certificate on 22.6.88. The court referred to the Delhi Building Bye-Laws, which state that if the authority does not communicate approval or refusal within 60 days of the notice of completion, the building is deemed approved. Therefore, the court deemed the building completion date as 19.7.78, making the petitioner eligible to sell the plot on 22.12.84, as three years had elapsed since the building's completion.
4. Calculation of Unearned Increase:
The lease deed required the calculation of unearned increase based on the market value at the time of sale. The petitioner argued that the unearned increase should be calculated using the rates from 1984-85, the year they applied for permission to sell, not the rates from 1991-92 when permission was granted. The court agreed, citing legal principles that prevent a party from benefiting from its own delay. The DDA was directed to calculate the unearned increase based on the 1984-85 rates.
5. Liability for Sub-Lease Charges:
The petitioner sought permission to sub-let part of the plot on 12.8.84, which was granted for the period from 1.11.84 to 31.10.85. The court noted that the petitioner would remain liable for sub-lease charges until the permission to sell was granted on 20.6.91. The petitioner indicated readiness to pay any outstanding sub-lease charges.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the petition, quashing the DDA's demand for unearned increase calculated using 1991-92 rates. The DDA was directed to recalculate the unearned increase using 1984-85 rates and to execute the conveyance deed upon payment. The petitioner was required to clear any outstanding sub-lease charges before selling the property. No order as to costs was made.
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1998 (5) TMI 411
Issues involved: Interpretation of Section 10 of the CPC in relation to summary suits filed under Order 37.
Summary:
The Supreme Court considered the applicability of Section 10 of the CPC to a summary suit filed under Order 37. The case involved a dispute between a Federation and a Bank regarding payments under an Irrevocable Letter of Credit. The Bank filed a summary suit against the Federation, who had also initiated a suit against the Bank prior to the summary suit. The Single Judge held that Section 10 applies only to regular suits, not summary suits, and allowed the Federation to defend conditionally. The Division Bench, however, held that Section 10 applies to summary suits and stayed the proceedings. The Court analyzed the meaning of "trial" in Section 10, emphasizing that it aims to prevent concurrent trials and inconsistent findings. It clarified that the word "trial" should be interpreted in the context of summary suits under Order 37, where the trial begins after the defendant is granted leave to defend. The Court disagreed with the Division Bench's interpretation and set aside their judgment, restoring the Single Judge's order.
The Court highlighted that Section 10 is a procedural provision to avoid simultaneous trials and conflicting decisions. It noted that the word "trial" should be understood in the context of summary suits under Order 37, where the trial commences post the defendant obtaining leave to defend. The Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 10 is not to bar the institution of suits but to regulate the proceedings to prevent conflicting judgments. The judgment clarified that the Division Bench erred in applying a different interpretation and reinstated the Single Judge's decision, emphasizing the specific nature of summary suits under Order 37.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, overturned the Division Bench's judgment, and reinstated the Single Judge's order. The Court emphasized that the word "trial" in Section 10 should be construed in the context of summary suits under Order 37, where the trial begins after the defendant is granted leave to defend. The decision aimed to harmonize the provisions of Section 10 and Order 37 to achieve their respective objectives without conflicting interpretations.
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1998 (5) TMI 410
Issues Involved:
1. Appointment on compassionate grounds for dependents of teaching/non-teaching staff in non-government recognized aided schools and intermediate colleges in Uttar Pradesh.
2. Applicability of the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974.
3. Interpretation and application of Circular dated September 23, 1981, and subsequent amendments.
4. Creation of supernumerary posts for dependents' appointments.
5. High Court's directions on appointments to Class III posts.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Appointment on Compassionate Grounds:
The appeals concern the appointment of dependents of deceased teaching/non-teaching staff in non-government recognized aided schools and intermediate colleges in Uttar Pradesh. These appointments are made on compassionate grounds to support the families of employees who died in harness.
2. Applicability of 1974 Rules:
The Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974, applies to government employees but not to staff in government-recognized aided institutions. The 1974 Rules allow for the relaxation of normal recruitment rules to facilitate the employment of dependents of deceased government servants.
3. Circular and Amendments:
Initially, a Circular dated September 23, 1981, directed that dependents of deceased teaching/non-teaching staff in non-government aided secondary schools be given employment, provided they meet the qualifications for non-teaching posts. This Circular was followed by a notification on July 30, 1992, which inserted Regulations 101 to 107 in Chapter III of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. These regulations provided detailed procedures for such appointments, including the creation of supernumerary posts if no vacancies were available.
4. Creation of Supernumerary Posts:
The High Court directed that if no Class III post was available, a supernumerary post should be created for the appointment of dependents. The appellants argued that this directive caused practical problems, as it would monopolize all Class III vacancies, excluding other eligible candidates from direct recruitment.
5. High Court's Directions:
The High Court quashed orders appointing dependents to Class IV posts and directed their appointment to Class III posts if they had the necessary qualifications. The High Court also mandated the creation of supernumerary posts if no Class III vacancies were available.
Supreme Court's Judgment:
The Supreme Court emphasized that compassionate appointments are an exception to the general recruitment rules, intended to provide immediate relief to the deceased employee's family. The Court noted that such appointments should not override the rights of other eligible candidates for direct recruitment.
The Court held that the High Court's interpretation, which required creating supernumerary Class III posts, was incorrect. Instead, if no Class III post was available, dependents should be appointed to Class IV posts, and supernumerary posts should be created only in Class IV.
The appeals were allowed, and the High Court's judgments were set aside. The respondents were directed to be appointed to Class IV posts if no Class III vacancies were available. The Court restored the orders of the District Inspectors of Schools for Class IV appointments and directed the concerned authorities to consider the applications accordingly.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court clarified that compassionate appointments should balance the need for immediate relief to the deceased employee's family with the rights of other eligible candidates. The creation of supernumerary posts should be limited to Class IV positions if no Class III vacancies are available.
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1998 (5) TMI 409
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in the case presided by Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar and Mr. G.P. Pattanaik, JJ., as per the citation 1998 (5) TMI 409 - SC.
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1998 (5) TMI 408
Issues Involved:
1. Non-deduction of tax at source u/s 201(1) and 221(1).
2. Charging of interest u/s 201(1A).
3. Imposition of penalties u/s 201(1) read with section 221(1).
4. Limitation for recovery of tax u/s 231.
Summary:
1. Non-deduction of tax at source u/s 201(1) and 221(1):
The assessee, a limited company, failed to deduct tax at source from interest payments to GESCO. The Assessing Officer, after issuing a show-cause notice, passed orders for the assessment years 1979-80 to 1983-84, directing the assessee to pay tax deductible at source amounting to Rs. 32,73,927 by 31-7-1984 and levied penalties at 10% for each year.
2. Charging of interest u/s 201(1A):
The Assessing Officer also levied interest u/s 201(1A) for the default period up to 31-7-1984. The CIT(A) directed the Assessing Officer to charge interest from the dates on which tax was deductible to the dates on which tax was actually paid by GESCO. If GESCO's assessment resulted in nil or negative income, the terminal date for the period of default would be the date of the assessment order.
3. Imposition of penalties u/s 201(1) read with section 221(1):
CIT(A) cancelled the penalties imposed by the Assessing Officer, holding that the failure to deduct tax was not without good and sufficient reasons. However, the Tribunal found that the assessee could not plead ignorance of the legal obligations regarding tax deduction at source and upheld the imposition of penalties in principle but remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer to verify if GESCO was assessed at nil or negative income.
4. Limitation for recovery of tax u/s 231:
CIT(A) held that the order of the Assessing Officer directing the assessee to pay tax was barred by limitation u/s 231, except for payments made on 28-6-1982 and 17-6-1982. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, noting that assessments of GESCO had been completed and no tax could now be realized from the assessee.
Conclusion:
- The appeals by the assessee regarding interest u/s 201(1A) were dismissed.
- The appeal by the assessee for the assessment year 1983-84 was allowed.
- The revenue's appeals regarding the CIT(A)'s decision on limitation were dismissed as infructuous.
- The revenue's appeals against the cancellation of penalties were partly allowed, with the matter remanded to the Assessing Officer for verification.
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1998 (5) TMI 407
Issues Involved:
1. Eligibility for benefits under Section 10(5B) of the Income-tax Act.
2. Definition and scope of "technician" under Section 10(5B).
3. Classification of activities related to oil and gas fields as "mining".
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Eligibility for benefits under Section 10(5B) of the Income-tax Act:
The petitioner claimed eligibility for benefits under Section 10(5B) of the Income-tax Act, asserting compliance with all requirements. The Commissioner contended that the petitioner did not qualify because he was not employed by any of the authorities specified in the first part of Section 10(5B). However, the ruling clarified that the benefit could also apply to technicians employed in any business carried on in India, provided they were not residents in India in the four financial years preceding their arrival. Thus, the petitioner's argument on this point succeeded.
2. Definition and scope of "technician" under Section 10(5B):
The term "technician" is defined in the Explanation to Section 10(5B) as a person with specialized knowledge and experience in specific fields, including constructional or manufacturing operations, mining, and other fields specified by the Central Government. The petitioner claimed to fall under the category of a technician with specialized knowledge in mining, as he was responsible for production operations in oil and gas fields. However, the ruling emphasized that "mining" under Section 10(5B) does not include the extraction or exploration of oil, as evidenced by various provisions in the Income-tax Act, such as Section 293A, which specifically addresses the taxation of income from mineral oil activities.
3. Classification of activities related to oil and gas fields as "mining":
The ruling examined whether activities related to oil and gas fields could be classified as "mining" under Section 10(5B). It was noted that the Income-tax Act does not define "mine" or "mining" to include oil exploration or extraction. Various sections of the Act, such as Sections 42, 44BB, and 80HHC, treat mineral oil as distinct from minerals and ores. Additionally, the legislative practice in India, as seen in the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act and the Constitution, distinguishes between mines, minerals, and mineral oil. Consequently, the ruling concluded that "mining" in Section 10(5B) does not encompass oil extraction or exploration activities.
Conclusion:
The petitioner's claim to be treated as a technician under Section 10(5B) was rejected. The ruling determined that the petitioner did not have specialized knowledge in constructional operations and that his activities related to oil and gas fields did not fall under the definition of "mining" as intended by the Income-tax Act. Therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to the benefits of Section 10(5B). The application was disposed of accordingly.
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1998 (5) TMI 406
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals in the case of Collector of Central Excise, Meerut v. M/s. Modi Rubber Limited. The impugned orders were set aside, and the appellant is entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the law. [1998 (5) TMI 406 - SC Order]
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1998 (5) TMI 405
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the forfeiture order under Section 7 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA).
2. Burden of proof under Section 8 of SAFEMA.
3. Nexus between the illegal activities of the detenu and the property acquired by the petitioner.
4. Interpretation of the term "illegally acquired property" under SAFEMA.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Forfeiture Order:
The petitioner challenged the order dated 28.4.80 passed by the Competent Authority under Section 7 of SAFEMA, which was maintained in appeal by the order dated 1.8.94 passed by the Appellate Tribunal For Forfeited Property, New Delhi. The property in question included a half share in House No. 1135, Chatta Madan Gopal, Maliwara, Delhi, and various amounts due from different parties.
2. Burden of Proof Under Section 8 of SAFEMA:
The Competent Authority formed an opinion that the properties were illegally acquired by the petitioner and that she failed to discharge her burden of proof under Section 8 of SAFEMA. The petitioner argued that the provisions of SAFEMA entail penal consequences and should be strictly construed. The applicability of the burden of proof rule would not be attracted unless there was a foundation laid by material available on record establishing some link between the illegal activity and the acquisition of the property.
3. Nexus Between Illegal Activities and Property Acquisition:
The Appellate Tribunal found that the petitioner failed to satisfactorily explain the availability of means for acquiring the property. However, the Tribunal noted that the illegal activities of the detenu, Basant Lal, were only traceable to the year 1967, while the house property was acquired in 1961. The court emphasized that there must be a connecting link or nexus between the holding of the property by the petitioner and the illegal activities of the detenu.
4. Interpretation of "Illegally Acquired Property":
The court referred to the definition of "illegally acquired property" under Clause (c) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of SAFEMA, which includes every acquisition by illegal means not satisfactorily explained. The court also referenced the judgment in Attorney General for India v. Amrit Lal Prajivandas, where the Supreme Court held that the purpose of SAFEMA is to reach the properties of the detenu or convict, not to forfeit the independent properties of relatives and associates.
Conclusion:
The court held that the rule of evidence enacted by Section 8 of SAFEMA applies only when there is some material available to establish a nexus between the property and the illegal activities of the detenu. Since the house property was acquired by the petitioner in 1961 and the illegal activities of the detenu began in 1967, there was no connecting link. Therefore, the notice of forfeiture and the subsequent orders were quashed to the extent of the petitioner's half share in the house property.
Petition allowed.
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1998 (5) TMI 404
Issues:
1. Writ of mandamus directing the absorption of union members as bank employees.
2. Dispute regarding the status of canteen employees and their relationship with the bank.
3. Jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining the Writ Petition when the issue was pending before the Industrial Tribunal.
4. Application of recent judgments in similar cases to the present situation.
5. Directions to expedite the hearing and render an Award by the Industrial Tribunal.
Analysis:
1. The respondents sought a writ of mandamus from the Calcutta High Court to direct the appellants to absorb the union members as employees of the bank. The Single Judge initially ordered a stay on the matter for three months, allowing the parties to proceed before the Tribunal. However, the Division Bench later heard the main case and the appeal against the interim order together, ruling in favor of the union and directing the bank to treat canteen employees as bank employees.
2. The Division Bench made findings on disputed facts, assuming similarity between the canteen employees in question and those run by the bank. The bank argued that the canteens in dispute were not similar to those run by the bank, highlighting differences in staff strength and operational necessity. The Court noted that the High Court should have awaited the Industrial Tribunal's decision on the matter, as the issue was already pending there.
3. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court should not have entertained the Writ Petition while an identical issue was before the Industrial Tribunal. The Court directed the Industrial Tribunal to expedite the hearing and render an Award within six months to avoid delays and ensure a clear resolution based on facts and materials.
4. The Court referred to recent judgments in similar cases to guide the decision-making process, emphasizing the need for clear and elaborate findings on facts. The judgments cited were used to support the direction for the Industrial Tribunal to expedite the proceedings and render a timely decision.
5. In light of the pending issue before the Industrial Tribunal, the Supreme Court directed the parties to await the Tribunal's Award and listed the appeals for hearing after the Tribunal's decision. This approach aimed to streamline the process, avoid duplication of efforts, and ensure a comprehensive resolution based on the Tribunal's findings.
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1998 (5) TMI 403
Issues Involved:
1. Competence of the Special Judge (P.C. Act) Sikkim to try cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and 1988.
2. Applicability of Section 30(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
3. Interpretation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act in the context of the repealing Act.
Summary:
Competence of the Special Judge (P.C. Act) Sikkim:
The primary issue in these petitions was whether the Special Judge (P.C. Act) Sikkim had the jurisdiction to try cases registered against the petitioners u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, corresponding to Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioners argued that no special court was constituted in Sikkim under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, and thus, the Special Judge appointed under Section 3 of the Act of 1988 could not try offenses under the Act of 1947.
Applicability of Section 30(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988:
The court examined Section 30(2) of the Act of 1988, which states: "Notwithstanding such repeal, but without prejudice to the application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 (10 of 1897), anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the Acts so repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the Corresponding provision of this Act." The court held that this provision creates a legal fiction whereby actions taken under the Act of 1947 are deemed to have been taken under the Act of 1988.
Interpretation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act:
The court noted that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would normally allow the continuation of proceedings as if the repealing Act had not been passed. However, the court emphasized that Section 30(2) of the Act of 1988 expresses a different intention, ensuring that actions taken under the Act of 1947 are deemed to have been taken under the Act of 1988. The court referred to the Constitution Bench decision in B.N. Kohli's case, which elucidated that actions taken under a repealed statute are deemed to be taken under the repealing statute.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the Special Judge (P.C. Act) Sikkim is competent to try the offenses for which the appellants stand charged. The court dismissed the appeals, affirming the jurisdiction of the Special Judge appointed under Section 3 of the Act of 1988 to try offenses under the Act of 1947. The court also referenced its previous judgment in C.B.I. Versus Subodh Kumar Dutta, which supported this interpretation.
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