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2006 (5) TMI 569
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED The core legal questions considered in this judgment were: (i) Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was justified in accepting the plea that Form No. 26A must be submitted only after Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) is made according to section 194A of the Income-tax Act. (ii) Whether the Tribunal was justified in concluding that one default by the assessee could reasonably cause another default. (iii) Whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that there was no delay in filing Form No. 26A as per section 206 of the Income-tax Act, even when the assessee did not deduct the tax at source in a timely manner. 2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS (i) Justification of ITAT in Entertaining the Plea Regarding Form No. 26A - Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The key provision here is section 194A, which mandates the deduction of tax at source. The submission of Form No. 26A, which certifies that TDS has been made, is contingent upon this deduction. - Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court referred to its previous decisions in CIT v. Sahara Airlines Ltd. and CIT v. Sri Ram Memorial Education Promotion Society, which established that if no TDS was made, the requirement to submit Form No. 26A does not arise. - Key Evidence and Findings: The Court found that the previous judgments had not been challenged and thus had attained finality, reinforcing the Tribunal's decision. - Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal's acceptance of the plea was consistent with the legal framework, as the requirement to file Form No. 26A is predicated on the prior deduction of tax. - Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant's argument that penalties should be imposed irrespective of the TDS status was dismissed based on established precedents. - Conclusions: The Tribunal was justified in its decision, as the requirement to file Form No. 26A is inapplicable without prior TDS. (ii) Reasonableness of One Default Leading to Another - Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The legal basis for penalties is found in sections 272A(2)(g) and 272A(2)(c), which penalize failures to comply with procedural requirements. - Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court reiterated its stance from prior cases that a penalty under section 271C for non-deduction of TDS precludes additional penalties under sections 272A(2)(g) and 272A(2)(c). - Key Evidence and Findings: The Court noted that the imposition of a penalty under section 271C was already pending appeal, and thus additional penalties for related procedural failures were unwarranted. - Application of Law to Facts: The Court applied the principle that procedural penalties are moot if the primary obligation (TDS) was not fulfilled. - Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant's claim for additional penalties was countered by the precedent that procedural penalties do not apply if the primary obligation is unmet. - Conclusions: The Tribunal's decision that one default could reasonably cause another was upheld, negating the need for additional penalties. (iii) Timeliness of Filing Form No. 26A - Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 206 requires the filing of returns, including Form No. 26A, following TDS. - Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found that without TDS, the obligation to file Form No. 26A does not arise, as per its prior judgments. - Key Evidence and Findings: The Court established that the absence of TDS nullifies the requirement to file Form No. 26A, aligning with previous rulings. - Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal's decision that there was no delay was consistent with the legal framework, as the filing requirement is contingent on TDS. - Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant's argument for penalties due to delayed filing was dismissed, as the filing obligation was not triggered without TDS. - Conclusions: The Tribunal correctly held that there was no delay in filing Form No. 26A, given the absence of TDS. 3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS - Core Principles Established: The Court reaffirmed that penalties under sections 272A(2)(g) and 272A(2)(c) are inapplicable if the primary obligation of TDS under section 194A is unmet. The requirement to file Form No. 26A is contingent upon the deduction of tax at source. - Final Determinations on Each Issue: The Court concluded that the Tribunal's decisions on all issues were justified and consistent with established legal precedents. The appeals were dismissed as they lacked merit, and no substantial questions of law remained unresolved.
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2006 (5) TMI 568
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the cancellation of the provisional allotment of Plot No. 39.
2. Legality of the award passed in favor of the Appellant.
3. Application of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908.
4. Entitlement of the Appellant to an alternative plot.
5. Conduct of the Society regarding misrepresentation and its consequences.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Cancellation of the Provisional Allotment of Plot No. 39:
The Court examined whether the provisional allotment of Plot No. 39 to the Appellant's mother was validly canceled. It was noted that the provisional allotment was contingent upon the payment of development charges, which were not paid. Consequently, the allotment was deemed canceled by operation of law, even if no formal cancellation notice was issued. The Court emphasized that a provisional allotment does not confer an indefeasible right and becomes permanent only upon fulfillment of stipulated conditions.
2. Legality of the Award Passed in Favor of the Appellant:
The Court scrutinized the award granted to the Appellant by the Registrar, which directed the allotment of Plot No. 39. It found the award to be a nullity due to the violation of natural justice principles, as the necessary party, Mr. Srinivas, was not impleaded. The award was also considered illegal as it directed an injunction beyond the scope of the Appellant's prayer. Consequently, the principle of res judicata did not apply, and the award was not enforceable.
3. Application of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908:
The Court addressed the applicability of Section 47, which stipulates that a registered document operates from the date of its execution, not registration. The sale deed executed in favor of Mr. Srinivas, although registered later, was deemed effective from the date of execution. This interpretation aligned with established precedents, confirming that the title passed to Mr. Srinivas prior to the award, rendering the award inexecutable.
4. Entitlement of the Appellant to an Alternative Plot:
The Court considered the Appellant's request for an alternative plot, given the cancellation of Plot No. 39's allotment. The Society's conduct in offering Plot No. 400 was scrutinized, revealing misrepresentation as the plot was not available for allotment. The Court directed the Society to consider the Appellant's entitlement to a plot in accordance with its bye-laws and seniority rules, ensuring no discrimination among members.
5. Conduct of the Society Regarding Misrepresentation and Its Consequences:
The Society's conduct was criticized for misrepresenting the availability of Plot No. 400 and failing to disclose pertinent facts to the Registrar, leading to confusion and litigation. The Court ordered an inquiry into the responsible individuals and directed the Society to refund the Appellant's deposits with penal interest and compensate both the Appellant and the Second Respondent for the inconvenience caused. The Society was also granted liberty to recover these amounts from those found responsible for the misrepresentation.
In conclusion, the appeals were dismissed, with directions for the Society to rectify its missteps and ensure fair consideration of plot allotments among its members, while also compensating the affected parties for the Society's misrepresentations and procedural lapses.
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2006 (5) TMI 567
Issues Involved:
1. Whether Respondent No. 2 is entitled under the leave and license agreement to continue to use and occupy the licensed premises till the security deposit and interest thereon is refunded by Respondent No. 1.
2. Whether the leave and license agreement creates a mortgage or a charge or security in respect of the licensed premises to secure the repayment of the security deposit and the interest thereon.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Entitlement to Continue Use and Occupation of Licensed Premises:
The court examined whether Respondent No. 2 could continue to occupy the premises under the leave and license agreement until the security deposit and interest were refunded. The court referred to Sections 59, 60, and 64 of the Indian Easements Act and relevant case law, including the Supreme Court's judgment in Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College. The court concluded that:
- Parties can make a license irrevocable by agreement: The court affirmed that parties can agree to make a license irrevocable or revocable only under specific conditions, as established in M.F. De Souza v. Children's Education Uplift Society and Dominion of India v. Sohan Lal.
- Transferee Bound by Agreement: The court held that a transferee of the property is bound by such an agreement, citing Ram Sarup Gupta, which established that a transferee from the licensor could not acquire a better right than the licensor.
- Security Deposit Includes Interest: The court interpreted Clause 28 of the agreement to include interest on the security deposit, allowing Respondent No. 2 to continue occupying the premises until both the principal and interest were refunded.
2. Creation of Mortgage or Charge:
The court analyzed whether the leave and license agreement created a mortgage or charge on the licensed premises to secure repayment of the security deposit and interest. The court considered the terms of the agreement and relevant legal principles:
- No Intention to Create Mortgage or Charge: The court found no evidence of an intention to create a mortgage or charge. The agreement was consistently referred to as a leave and license agreement, and there was no indication that the parties intended to constitute the property as security for the debt.
- Agreement's Clauses: Clauses 7, 8, and 10 of the agreement explicitly stated that it was a leave and license agreement, creating no other rights, title, or interest in the licensed premises.
- Surrounding Circumstances: The court noted that Respondent No. 2 had never claimed the existence of a mortgage or charge until the hearing, indicating that this was an afterthought rather than a matter of contractual commitment.
- No Legal Basis for Lien: The court rejected the argument that the agreement created a lien, as there was no indication that the licensed premises constituted security for repayment of the security deposit.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeal and made the Chamber Summons absolute in terms of recognizing Respondent No. 2's right to remain in possession of the flat until the security deposit and interest were refunded. The court clarified that the agreement was a leave and license agreement under Section 24 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, and did not create a mortgage, charge, or any other interest in the premises. The document was ordered to be returned to Respondent No. 2 as duly stamped.
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2006 (5) TMI 566
Issues Involved:
1. Preservation of heritage structures within textile mills in Mumbai.
2. Applicability of Development Control Regulation (D.C. Regulation) 67.
3. Permissions for demolition and development under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (MRTP) Act.
4. Validity of prior permissions and approvals under D.C. Regulation 58 and BIFR schemes.
5. Interim orders and injunctions concerning demolition activities.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Preservation of Heritage Structures within Textile Mills in Mumbai:
The petitioners, a charitable trust and two individuals, sought to protect and preserve heritage structures within textile mills in Mumbai. They invoked Regulation 67 of the Development Control Regulations (D.C. Regulation) framed for the city of Mumbai. The petitioners emphasized the historical, aesthetic, architectural, and cultural values of these structures, arguing that they should not be demolished.
2. Applicability of Development Control Regulation (D.C. Regulation) 67:
D.C. Regulation 67 provides for the conservation of listed buildings and heritage precincts. It mandates that no development, redevelopment, or demolition of such structures can occur without the prior written permission of the Commissioner, who must act on the advice of the Heritage Conservation Committee (MHCC). The regulation also specifies the grading of heritage buildings into Grade I, II, and III, with varying levels of restrictions on alterations.
3. Permissions for Demolition and Development under the MRTP Act:
Section 46 of the MRTP Act requires the Planning Authority to consider any draft or final development plans or proposals before granting development permissions. The petitioners argued that the published heritage list should be considered under Section 46, preventing demolition until a final decision is made. The respondents, particularly NTC, contended that permissions granted under D.C. Regulation 58 for redevelopment should not be hindered by the heritage listing process.
4. Validity of Prior Permissions and Approvals under D.C. Regulation 58 and BIFR Schemes:
NTC had received permissions for redevelopment under D.C. Regulation 58, which were upheld by the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) and the Supreme Court. The approvals included conditions for demolishing structures to facilitate redevelopment and compensating retrenched workers. The court noted that these prior permissions, granted in 2004, could not be invalidated by the heritage listing process initiated in 2006.
5. Interim Orders and Injunctions Concerning Demolition Activities:
The court had previously issued interim orders restraining the demolition of certain heritage structures. NTC and other respondents sought to vacate these orders, arguing that the demolition was essential for implementing the approved redevelopment schemes. The court allowed NTC to proceed with demolitions permitted under the 2004 layout approval but maintained an interim injunction on demolishing other structures until the heritage listing process was completed.
Conclusion:
The court directed that the objections to the heritage listing be considered promptly, with a final decision to be made by the State Government within a specified timeframe. It allowed NTC to continue with demolitions approved under prior permissions but restrained other mills from demolishing listed structures without following due process. The court emphasized the need for a balance between heritage preservation and redevelopment, ensuring that all legal procedures were followed.
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2006 (5) TMI 565
Issues Involved:
1. Claims of secured creditors and workmen under Sections 529 and 529A of the Companies Act, 1956.
2. Interpretation of "pari passu" charge in favor of workmen.
3. Priority of payment between secured creditors with first and second charges.
4. Application of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Claims of Secured Creditors and Workmen under Sections 529 and 529A of the Companies Act, 1956:
- Background: M/s. Bokiyu Tanneries Ltd. was ordered to be wound up on 17th August 1999. A Committee was appointed to scrutinize the claims of secured creditors and workers, which recommended full payment to workmen and partial payment to secured creditors.
- Committee's Recommendations: The Committee accepted claims of Rs. 1,07,01,546/- for workmen and Rs. 22,83,000/- for IFCI. The Indian Bank had already received Rs. 2,92,50,000/- against a total claim of Rs. 8,96,21,880/-.
- Controversy: The Committee opined that the matter of whether only the first charge or both first and second charges should be considered for workmen's payment should be placed before the Court.
2. Interpretation of "Pari Passu" Charge in Favor of Workmen:
- Legal Provisions: Sections 529 and 529A were examined to understand the rights of workmen and secured creditors. Section 529A provides for overriding preferential payments to workmen and secured creditors.
- Court's Interpretation: The Court emphasized that the "pari passu" charge means that the rights of workmen and secured creditors run equally. The liquidator represents the workmen to enforce this charge, and any realized amount is applied rateably for the discharge of workmen's dues.
3. Priority of Payment between Secured Creditors with First and Second Charges:
- Court's Analysis: The Court held that Sections 529 and 529A create two classes of priority preferential creditors: workmen and secured creditors. No distinction is made between first and second charge holders.
- Legal Precedents: The Court referred to judgments like ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Sidco Leathers Ltd. and Andhra Bank v. Official Liquidator to assert that all secured creditors, irrespective of their charge priority, should be treated equally under Sections 529 and 529A.
4. Application of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:
- Court's Ruling: The Court clarified that Section 529A does not specify payment distribution between first and second charge holders. Therefore, Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, which determines priority among secured creditors, applies.
- Implication: The dues of secured creditors with first charge are to be paid before those with second charge, but all secured creditors are considered as one group for calculating the workmen's portion.
Conclusion:
- Final Decision: The Court held that the Committee incorrectly excluded Indian Bank's second charge from consideration. The Committee must recalculate the proportion and ratio of payments to be made to workmen and secured creditors, including those with second charges.
- Outcome: The report and objections were disposed of, directing the Committee to follow the Court's observations for recalculating the dues.
This detailed analysis ensures that all relevant legal terminologies and significant phrases are preserved while providing a comprehensive understanding of the judgment.
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2006 (5) TMI 564
Issues:
- Modvat credit on Capital Goods used in production of exempted goods
- Removal of used Capital Goods to sister unit
- Demand of duty and penalty
Modvat Credit on Capital Goods:
The appellants received inputs and did job work under Notification No. 214/86-CE. The Revenue contended that Capital Goods were used exclusively for exempted goods production, denying Modvat credit. The appellants challenged this, citing precedents like Bajaj Electricals Ltd. v. CCE and Sterlite Industries (I) Ltd. v. CCE. The Tribunal found that until 30.09.2002, goods were cleared under job work procedure, making Modvat credit denial unjustified. Post that date, goods were cleared on duty payment, indicating non-exclusive use for exempted goods production. The Tribunal referenced Madura Coats Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE to support clearance of used Capital Goods and Sterlite Industries case to establish goods cleared by job workers under Notification 214/86 as non-exempted. Consequently, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the appellants, allowing the appeals and rejecting the demand for Modvat credit and penalty.
Removal of Used Capital Goods:
The Revenue alleged removal of used Capital Goods to a sister unit, leading to duty demand and penalty imposition. The appellants argued against this, emphasizing legal precedents like Madura Coats Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE. The Tribunal, considering the arguments and precedents, concluded that the clearance of used Capital Goods was permissible, aligning with the decision in Madura Coats Pvt. Ltd. case. Therefore, the Tribunal dismissed the demand related to the removal of used Capital Goods and the penalty imposed under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules.
Demand of Duty and Penalty:
The Revenue demanded duty and imposed penalties on the appellants for alleged violations related to Modvat credit and removal of used Capital Goods. The appellants contested these demands, presenting legal arguments and citing relevant case laws. After careful consideration, the Tribunal found in favor of the appellants, ruling that the demands lacked merit. The Tribunal allowed the appeals, providing consequential relief and absolving the appellants from the duty and penalties imposed.
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2006 (5) TMI 563
Issues:
1. Timeliness of filing the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
2. Liability of the drawer under Section 138 in case of a filled-up cheque.
3. Interpretation of the period of limitation for filing a complaint under Section 138 with reference to the service of notice.
Analysis:
1. The appellant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act against the respondent, alleging dishonor of a cheque. The Court found that the complaint was filed beyond 30 days of the date when the cause of action arose based on the first notice sent after the second presentation of the cheque. Additionally, discrepancies in ink and handwriting on the cheque were noted.
2. The Court clarified that even if a cheque is filled up by someone other than the drawer, the drawer cannot evade liability under Section 138 unless they provide evidence to rebut the presumption against them. In this case, such evidence was lacking, making the acquittal on this ground unsustainable.
3. The crux of the issue revolved around the timeliness of the complaint filing based on the service of notices. The first notice, which did not reach the addressee, did not trigger the cause of action. The Court emphasized that a written notice, as per statutory requirements, is necessary to initiate the cause of action under Section 138. The second notice, which was received by the accused, led to the filing of the complaint within the prescribed period of limitation.
4. Referring to legal precedents, the Court highlighted that the cause of action under Section 138 arises only once, typically upon the failure to make payment within fifteen days of receiving a valid notice. In this case, since the first notice did not reach the drawer, the cause of action was deemed to have arisen only upon the receipt of the second notice, leading to the conviction of the respondent under Section 138.
5. Consequently, the respondent was convicted under Section 138 and sentenced to undergo imprisonment until the rising of the Court, along with a compensation amount. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the acquittal and finding the respondent guilty based on the evidence of dishonor of the cheque and failure to pay the amount despite the demand in the second notice.
This detailed analysis of the judgment from the Kerala High Court provides insights into the interpretation and application of provisions under the Negotiable Instruments Act, specifically focusing on the timeliness of filing complaints and the liability of drawers in cases of dishonored cheques.
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2006 (5) TMI 562
Issues Involved:
1. Quashing of criminal proceeding G.R. Case No. 1275 of 1994 under Section 420 IPC.
2. Quashing of complaint case C.R. No. 317 of 1994 under Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act.
3. Applicability of Section 141 of the NI Act.
4. Validity of simultaneous proceedings under NI Act and IPC for the same transaction.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Quashing of Criminal Proceeding G.R. Case No. 1275 of 1994 under Section 420 IPC:
The petitioners sought to quash the criminal proceeding G.R. Case No. 1275 of 1994 arising from Kotwali P.S. Case No. 370/94 under Section 420 IPC, arguing that the facts and allegations were identical to those in the complaint case under Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act. The court noted that the filing of a second complaint under Section 420 IPC for the same facts, same allegations, and concerning the same dishonoured cheque amounted to an abuse of the process of law. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., which held that invoking the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court for offences under Sections 406/420 IPC when a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act was already pending constituted an abuse of process. Consequently, the court quashed the criminal proceeding being G.R. Case No. 1275 of 1994.
2. Quashing of Complaint Case C.R. No. 317 of 1994 under Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act:
The petitioners argued that the complaint case under Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act should be quashed as there was no firm under the name and style of M/s. Debendra Bejoy Ghosh and Ors., and the cheque was issued on a personal account. The court held that whether the firm existed or the cheque was issued from a personal account were matters to be decided based on evidence during the trial. The court found no ground to quash the complaint case at this stage and directed the trial to proceed, keeping all points open for consideration based on evidence.
3. Applicability of Section 141 of the NI Act:
The petitioners contended that Section 141 of the NI Act was not applicable as the cheque was not issued in the name of the firm. The court clarified that the applicability of Section 141, which deals with offences by companies, would depend on whether the firm existed and whether the cheque was issued on behalf of the firm. These were factual issues to be determined during the trial. The court kept the question of the applicability of Section 141 open for the trial court to decide based on evidence.
4. Validity of Simultaneous Proceedings under NI Act and IPC for the Same Transaction:
The court addressed the issue of simultaneous proceedings under the NI Act and IPC for the same transaction. It referred to the Supreme Court's observation in Nagpur Steel & Alloys Pvt. Ltd. v. P. Radhakrishna @ Rajan, which held that merely because an alleged offence under Section 420 IPC was committed during a commercial transaction, the High Court was not justified in quashing the complaint. However, the court distinguished this case, noting that in the present matter, the filing of a second complaint under Section 420 IPC for the same facts as the NI Act complaint was an abuse of the process of law. The court emphasized that the complainant's intention to file a separate complaint under Section 420 IPC after filing the NI Act complaint indicated malice and an attempt to harass the accused. Therefore, the court quashed the criminal proceeding under Section 420 IPC while allowing the NI Act complaint to proceed.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the revisional application CRR No. 1142/96, quashing the criminal proceeding G.R. Case No. 1275 of 1994 under Section 420 IPC. The revisional application CRR No. 2753/96 was dismissed, allowing the complaint case C.R. No. 317 of 1994 under Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act to continue. The court directed the trial court to expedite the disposal of the complaint case and to decide on the applicability of Section 141 based on evidence. The court also vacated all interim orders and directed the lower courts to take necessary actions for early disposal of the complaint case.
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2006 (5) TMI 561
Issues: Acquittal under Section 138 of the N.I. Act
Analysis:
1. The appellant challenged the respondent's acquittal under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The respondent, a dealer in household articles, issued a post-dated cheque to the complainant, which bounced upon presentation. The complainant alleged non-payment and initiated prosecution. The respondent claimed the cheque was for mixies ordered but not supplied by the complainant, thus no liability existed. The lower court found the cheque was not issued to discharge any existing liability towards the complainant.
2. The appellant argued that the respondent had admitted liability towards the complainant in communications, indicating a subsisting liability at the time of cheque presentation. Despite the cheque being for mixies ordered, the appellant contended it was towards the existing liability. The order for mixies, cheque issuance, and subsequent stop memo by the respondent were analyzed to establish the absence of liability towards the complainant for the cheque amount.
3. The order placed by the respondent for mixies and the post-dated cheque were scrutinized. The stop memo issued by the respondent to the bank before the cheque date, indicating non-supply of ordered items, was considered. Communications between the parties suggested a general settlement of accounts, but the specific amount due was not proven by the complainant. The crucial aspect was determining if the cheque amount corresponded to the liability, as required by Section 138. The court concluded that the cheque was not issued to discharge the liability covered by it, as it was for unsupplied mixies, leading to the respondent's acquittal being upheld.
Conclusion:
The appeal challenging the respondent's acquittal under Section 138 of the N.I. Act was dismissed, as the evidence did not establish the cheque was issued to discharge the existing liability towards the complainant.
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2006 (5) TMI 560
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988.
2. Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988:
The plaintiff, initially filing the suit with his wife (now deceased), sought a decree declaring him the owner of the property, a permanent injunction against the defendant from leasing or alienating the property, and cancellation of specific sale deeds. The defendant counterclaimed ownership and sought the plaintiff's removal from the property.
The core contention was whether the transactions were benami, i.e., if the property was purchased by the plaintiff but held in the name of Defendant No. 1. The court examined the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988, especially Section 4, which prohibits claims by real owners against benamidars unless the benamidar is a trustee or stands in a fiduciary capacity.
The court noted that the entire sale consideration flowed from the plaintiff, and the sale deeds were executed in the name of Defendant No. 1. The plaintiff argued that Defendant No. 1 was his nominee and held the property in a fiduciary capacity. The court scrutinized whether a fiduciary relationship existed, which would exempt the transaction from being considered benami under Section 4(3)(b) of the Act.
The court referred to precedents, emphasizing that a fiduciary relationship involves trust and confidence, where one party is bound to protect the interests of the other. The plaintiff's averments and documents suggested that Defendant No. 1 was more than a mere nominee; she was entrusted with the property and acted in a fiduciary capacity.
The court concluded that the plaintiff had made a prima facie case that Defendant No. 1 held the property in a fiduciary capacity, thus not barred by the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act. Therefore, Issue No. 1 was answered in the negative.
2. Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC:
The defendant argued for the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, claiming it lacked a real cause of action and was barred by the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act. The court, however, emphasized that for the purposes of deciding the preliminary issue, the averments in the plaint must be deemed correct.
The court examined the plaintiff's detailed averments and supporting documents, which indicated that Defendant No. 1 was acting as a nominee and in a fiduciary capacity. The court noted that the plaintiff had consistently treated Defendant No. 1 as his nominee and had provided substantial financial contributions for the purchase and maintenance of the property.
The court highlighted that the Benami Transactions Act must be strictly construed, especially when it seeks to take away substantive rights. Given the plaintiff's averments and the fiduciary relationship established, the court found that the plaint disclosed a real cause of action and could not be summarily rejected.
Therefore, the court concluded that the plaint was not liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
Conclusion:
The court determined that the suit was not barred by the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988, as the plaintiff had established a prima facie fiduciary relationship with Defendant No. 1. Consequently, the plaint was not liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The observations made were solely for deciding the preliminary issue, and the evidence would be recorded in due course without prejudice to any party.
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2006 (5) TMI 559
Issues:
Violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by the appellant leading to illegal termination of respondent's service. Challenge to the Labour Court's award by the appellant. Dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court on grounds of delay and lack of merit. Lack of discussion on merits by the Division Bench of the High Court. Stay order by the Supreme Court on the operation of the Labour Court's award.
Analysis:
The respondent, initially appointed as a Pump Driver on a temporary basis, alleged termination without notice. The Conciliation Officer rejected the claim based on muster roll evidence showing 197 days of work. High Court dismissed the respondent's writ petition seeking reinstatement. Subsequent reference to the Labour Court led to an award in favor of the respondent, citing violation of Section 25F and ordering reinstatement with back-wages. The appellant challenged this award in a writ petition, contending the respondent's failure to prove working for 240 days. The High Court upheld the Labour Court's decision, leading to the appellant's appeal before the Division Bench.
The Division Bench dismissed the appeal citing a 321-day delay and lack of merit, without discussing the contentions adequately. The Supreme Court found the Division Bench's order lacking justification and remitted the case for fresh consideration. A stay order was issued on the recovery of back-wages pending the High Court's decision. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for a speaking order and directed the High Court to reevaluate the case on merit and in accordance with the law, disregarding any observations made in the current judgment.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Division Bench's order and instructing a fresh review by the High Court. The interim order for reinstatement and stay on back-wages recovery remains in effect until the High Court's decision. The case is to be handled without cost, and the original record is to be returned to the High Court for further proceedings.
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2006 (5) TMI 558
Issues Involved:
1. Legitimacy of the second marriage between Vuggina Suryanarayana and Pydamma.
2. Relationship of landlord and tenant between Pydamma and the appellants.
3. Entitlement of Pydamma and her daughters to evict the appellants from the property.
4. Applicability of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legitimacy of the Second Marriage:
The court examined the validity of the marriage between Vuggina Suryanarayana and Pydamma. It was established that the marriage took place during the subsistence of Suryanarayana's first marriage with Chilakamma, making it void under Section 5 and Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The court noted that despite the void nature of the marriage, the daughters born out of this union were legitimate under Section 16 of the Act and thus entitled to inherit the properties.
2. Relationship of Landlord and Tenant:
The appellants contested the eviction petition on the grounds that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between them and Pydamma. However, the District Munsif-cum-Special Officer found that such a relationship existed and ordered eviction based on default and sub-letting under the A.P. Tenancy Act. The High Court upheld this finding, noting that the appellants had been inducted by Pydamma and had paid rent for some time before ceasing payments.
3. Entitlement to Evict:
The primary issue was whether Pydamma and her daughters could evict the appellants. The District Judge-cum-appellate authority initially ruled that Pydamma had no right to the property due to her marriage being void. However, the High Court, while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution, allowed the daughters' impleadment and concluded that they inherited the property along with Chilakamma. The Supreme Court upheld this, stating that the daughters were entitled to inherit and thus could seek eviction.
4. Applicability of Estoppel:
The court applied Section 116 of the Evidence Act, which precludes a tenant from denying the landlord's title while in possession. The High Court and the Supreme Court both held that the appellants could not deny Pydamma's title as they had been inducted by her and had not restored possession by surrender. This principle was supported by precedents such as Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh and Atyam Veerraju v. Pechetti Venkanna.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that the eviction petition was maintainable. It clarified that the right of inheritance was not conclusively decided in this proceeding and could be addressed in a separate suit for title. The court allowed the appellants six months to vacate the property, contingent on filing an undertaking to deliver peaceful possession.
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2006 (5) TMI 557
Issues:
1. Appeal against judgment convicting for offence under Section 409 IPC.
2. Proof of misappropriation by the respondent.
3. Interpretation of Section 405 IPC and application to the case.
4. Evaluation of entrustment and misappropriation in the case.
5. Burden of proof on the accused regarding property entrusted.
6. Revision jurisdiction of the High Court and concurrent findings of fact.
7. Compliance with Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
8. Admission of prosecution case by the respondent.
9. Consideration of punishment in light of circumstances.
Analysis:
1. The State of Himachal Pradesh appealed against a judgment convicting the respondent for an offence under Section 409 of the IPC. The respondent, a Post Master, was convicted for not providing National Savings Certificates after receiving money from a teacher. The High Court allowed the revision application, stating misappropriation was not proven.
2. The central issue was whether the prosecution proved the respondent's misappropriation of entrusted funds. The court referred to Section 405 IPC, emphasizing the public trust aspect due to the respondent's role. The High Court's view that misappropriation was not proved was criticized, highlighting the failure to utilize the funds for the intended purpose.
3. Section 405 IPC was interpreted concerning criminal breach of trust. The court emphasized the public nature of the funds entrusted to the respondent and the obligation to use them as intended. The High Court's decision was deemed erroneous in not recognizing the misappropriation based on the circumstances.
4. The court evaluated the entrustment and misappropriation aspects of the case. The respondent's actions of depositing the funds after an inquiry indicated his awareness of the obligation. The court rejected the defense that the funds were not fully received, emphasizing the offense committed by not using the funds as intended.
5. The burden of proof regarding the property entrusted was discussed. The court held that once entrustment is proven, the accused must explain how the entrusted property was managed. The lack of evidence from the respondent to justify fund usage supported the prosecution's case.
6. The High Court's revision jurisdiction and the trial court's findings were compared. The court criticized the High Court's judgment, citing misdirection in the revision process. The importance of concurrent findings of fact by lower courts was highlighted.
7. Compliance with Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was addressed. The court rejected the contention that the respondent was not questioned adequately during examination. The respondent's admission of receiving and depositing the funds was crucial to the case.
8. The respondent's admission of the prosecution case was emphasized. The court noted that the respondent failed to prove his defense regarding fund receipt, leading to the rejection of his claims. The High Court's error in finding a violation of Section 313 was highlighted.
9. Considering the circumstances, the court decided on the punishment. Due to the respondent's age and the time elapsed since the offense, a substantial punishment was not imposed. A fine was imposed, and failure to pay would result in a three-month imprisonment term.
This detailed analysis covers the legal aspects and findings of the judgment comprehensively.
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2006 (5) TMI 556
Issues Involved:
1. Appointment of Administrator pendente lite (APL)
2. Validity and genuineness of the Will and Codicil
3. Allegations of undue influence and suspicious circumstances
4. Necessity and grounds for appointing an APL
5. Conduct and credibility of the executor
6. Legal principles and precedents for appointing an APL
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Appointment of Administrator pendente lite (APL):
The applications for appointing an APL were filed by the defendants, challenging the executor's control over the estate. The court considered the vastness of the estate and the serious challenge to the Will and the executor's appointment. The court concluded that the estate was in "medio," meaning there was no legal representation of the estate, necessitating the appointment of an APL to manage and control the estate during the pendency of the probate proceedings.
2. Validity and genuineness of the Will and Codicil:
The defendants challenged the Will and Codicil, alleging they were manufactured and procured documents. They argued that the disposition was unnatural, excluding family members and giving all properties to the executor, a paid employee. The court noted that the challenge to the Will's genuineness and the executor's appointment was serious and bona fide, warranting careful consideration.
3. Allegations of undue influence and suspicious circumstances:
The defendants alleged that the executor exercised undue influence over the deceased, who was in poor health and dependent on him. They cited suspicious circumstances, such as the unnatural disposition of the estate, the executor's substantial benefit, and the change of lawyer for preparing the Will. The court found these allegations to be serious and supported by prima facie evidence, making it unsafe to leave the estate in the executor's hands.
4. Necessity and grounds for appointing an APL:
The court emphasized the necessity of appointing an APL due to the vast and valuable estate, the serious challenge to the Will, and the executor's conduct. The court referred to legal principles and precedents, highlighting that the appointment of an APL is discretionary and should be based on the necessity to protect and preserve the estate. The court found that the executor's actions and the ongoing litigations created a strong case for appointing an APL.
5. Conduct and credibility of the executor:
The executor's conduct was scrutinized, including his hasty actions to gain control of the companies and his failure to disclose and collect all assets of the deceased. The court noted that the executor was facing criminal prosecution and had acted in a manner that raised doubts about his trustworthiness and competence. The court concluded that the executor's conduct and the allegations against him justified his displacement and the appointment of an APL.
6. Legal principles and precedents for appointing an APL:
The court referred to various legal principles and precedents, including English and Indian case law, to support its decision. The court highlighted that the appointment of an APL is guided by the principles of necessity, the seriousness of the challenge to the Will, and the need to protect and preserve the estate. The court emphasized that the executor's appointment should be questioned if there are serious allegations and the estate is vast and valuable.
Conclusion:
The court appointed a Joint Administrator pendente lite consisting of four individuals to take charge and control of the deceased's shareholding in all companies, make necessary inquiries, and manage the estate during the probate proceedings. The executor was directed to hand over all charges to the appointed administrators. The court also granted a conditional stay of the judgment for three weeks, allowing the executor to act as a director or chairman with his own qualifying shareholding, if appointed.
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2006 (5) TMI 555
Murder - Challenged the reversal of acquittal and thereby convicting - gun shot injury - High Court referred to the Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence - HELD THAT:- The Trial Court disbelieved the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3, But P.W.3 had changed his statement regarding place of occurrence where Chatarvati had sustained injuries. The ante-mortem injuries found on the dead body of the Ram Gopal clearly belied the statements of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3. The High Court, however, held that P.Ws.1 and 2 were not related to the complainant.
We may notice that admittedly the accused No. 6 was not carrying any weapon. He admittedly had a dispute with Veer Singh. Veer Singh accompanied the complainant to the police station. No role had been attributed to the said accused. It is not clear as to why he was implicated. He did not have any dispute with the deceased, namely. Ram Gopal and Chatarvati. The prosecution did not lead any evidence as to why he would join the appellant Nos. 1 and 2 in commission of the crime. Similarly, appellant Nos. 3 and 4 were cousins. Except making a statement that they had been carrying some country made pistols and fired from their respective weapons, no evidence has been brought on record to that effect. We also fail to understand as to why the Investigating Officer, who took over the investigation from P.W.7 and who had investigated only for 8 days, had not been examined. No explanation whatsoever has been offered by the prosecution in this regard.
The version of the prosecution is that the lands belonging to P.Ws.2 and 3 were half a kilometer away and they do not have any field near the field of the deceased. There was no standing crops in the field. The view of the Trial Court having regard to the aforementioned facts and circumstances of the case, was, therefore, a possible view and as such we need not go into the other contentions as regard the motive or time of death, vis-a-vis, the medical opinion etc.
Thus, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not correct in arriving at the conclusion that the view of the Trial Court was wholly perverse and could not be sustained on me materials brought on record by the prosecution. This appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appellants are on bail. They are discharged from their bail bonds.
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2006 (5) TMI 554
Issues Involved:
1. Limitation for completion of assessment.
2. Addition of Rs. 1,37,00,502 as alleged gross receipts.
3. Addition of Rs. 12,63,400 as unexplained investment in shares.
4. Addition of Rs. 1,95,000 as advance given to Mr. and Mrs. Nagaraj Urs.
5. Addition of Rs. 3,00,000 as advance to Shri A. Ashok Anand.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Limitation for Completion of Assessment:
The assessee argued that the assessment order was barred by limitation, asserting that the search concluded on 19th Feb., 1996, and the assessment should have been completed by 28th Feb., 1997. The Revenue contended that the search continued until 25th April, 1996. The Tribunal examined the validity of the Panchnama dated 25th April, 1996, and concluded that it was not valid as no search or seizure occurred on that date, and the prohibitory order was not extended. Consequently, the last valid Panchnama was dated 19th Feb., 1996, making the assessment order barred by limitation.
2. Addition of Rs. 1,37,00,502 as Alleged Gross Receipts:
The AO added Rs. 1,37,00,502 as gross receipts, alleging that the assessee diverted funds from M.H.B.C.S. for personal use. The Tribunal scrutinized the evidence, including statements from contractors and seized documents. It was held that amounts utilized by the assessee for personal purposes should be taxable. Specific entries were examined, and certain amounts were excluded based on explanations provided. The Tribunal restored some issues to the AO for further verification, particularly regarding expenses incurred for society work.
3. Addition of Rs. 12,63,400 as Unexplained Investment in Shares:
The AO added Rs. 12,63,400 as unexplained investment in shares of M/s Chaitanyya Food Products Ltd., based on cash receipts found during the search. The assessee argued that no actual investment was made, and the receipts were issued to project a positive image of the company. The Tribunal found that the onus to prove the investment was on the Revenue, which failed to provide sufficient evidence. Consequently, the addition was deleted.
4. Addition of Rs. 1,95,000 as Advance Given to Mr. and Mrs. Nagaraj Urs:
The AO added Rs. 1,95,000 as an advance given by the assessee, which was denied by the assessee during the search. The assessee later claimed the advance was from HUF funds. The Tribunal found no evidence supporting the use of HUF funds and upheld the AO's addition.
5. Addition of Rs. 3,00,000 as Advance to Shri A. Ashok Anand:
The AO added Rs. 3,00,000 as an advance given to Shri A. Ashok Anand, based on a seized document. The assessee denied the advance, and the Tribunal found no material evidence to support the addition. The Tribunal deleted the addition, noting that the funds were advanced through M/s M.H.B.C.S. and not directly by the assessee.
Conclusion:
The appeal was partly allowed, with the Tribunal holding that the assessment order was barred by limitation and deleting certain additions while upholding others. Specific issues were remanded to the AO for further verification.
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2006 (5) TMI 553
Issues: Alleged recovery linking co-accused with the petitioner under NDPS Act, admissibility of secret information, bail application.
Issue 1: Alleged recovery linking co-accused with the petitioner under NDPS Act
The petitioner, in custody since 13.07.2005, challenged the alleged recovery of two polythene bags from the co-accused containing diacetylmorphine and other substances. The petitioner's counsel argued that the recovery from the co-accused cannot be linked to the petitioner solely based on secret information without additional evidence. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Amarsingh Ramjibhai Barot v. State of Gujarat, the counsel emphasized the need for evidence connecting individuals for the application of Section 29 of the NDPS Act. Referring to a previous court decision, it was highlighted that mere secret information without the informant being named or produced as a witness is insufficient to establish a case under Section 29. The court concluded that without concrete evidence linking the petitioner to the recovery, even if Section 37 of the NDPS Act applies, there are reasonable grounds to believe the petitioner's innocence.
Issue 2: Admissibility of secret information
The petitioner's counsel relied on the decision in N. Ayyappan v. State to argue that secret information is inadmissible unless the provider of such information is examined in court. The State, while acknowledging the lack of recovery from the petitioner, prosecuted the petitioner under Section 21 read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act based on the recovery from the co-accused. However, the State failed to present any evidence beyond the secret information to establish a direct link between the petitioner and the recovery from the co-accused. Considering the absence of substantial evidence and the precedents discussed, the court found the petitioner entitled to bail after being in custody for a significant period.
Issue 3: Bail application
After a thorough analysis of the arguments presented by both parties, the court granted bail to the petitioner. The court directed the petitioner's release on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of &8377;25,000 with two sureties of the same amount to the satisfaction of the concerned court. The bail application was disposed of accordingly, taking into account the lack of substantial evidence linking the petitioner directly to the alleged recovery from the co-accused.
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2006 (5) TMI 552
Issues:
- Appellant challenging acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
- Accused claiming no liability due to a blank cheque
- Interpretation of liability under Section 138 based on evidence and legal precedents
Analysis:
1. The appellant filed a case against the accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, alleging non-payment of a sum of Rs. 50,000 represented by a bounced cheque. The appellant contested the lower court's decision to acquit the accused, citing the admission of liability in the reply notice (Ext.P5) and the return of the cheque due to insufficient funds. The appellant relied on the decision in I.C.D.S.Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer to support their claim.
2. The accused, in response, argued that the cheque in question was a blank one issued as security for a gold transaction, and no actual liability existed as claimed by the appellant. The accused contended that the lower court's acquittal was justified based on these grounds.
3. Referring to the precedent set by I.C.D.S.Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer, the court emphasized that under Section 138 of the Act, liability cannot be avoided if a cheque is returned unpaid by the bank. The court noted that even if a blank cheque is issued as security, the holder can fill it with the necessary details later, making the issuer liable for any resulting debt.
4. The evidence presented confirmed that the accused issued the cheque, which bounced due to insufficient funds, and acknowledged some form of transaction and liability towards the appellant. As such, the court concluded that unless the accused provides strong evidence to rebut the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, they cannot escape criminal liability under Section 138, especially when some liability is admitted as in Ext.P5.
5. Based on the above analysis, the court convicted the accused, ordering a day's imprisonment until the rising of the court, a compensation payment of Rs. 50,000 to the appellant, and a three-month simple imprisonment in case of payment failure. The court clarified that the deposited compensation would be awarded to the appellant. The appeal was allowed, and the judgment was reversed in favor of the appellant/complainant.
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2006 (5) TMI 551
Issues involved:
Appeal against the judgment of the High Court dismissing a petition to quash the order of the Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance of offenses under Sections 406, 419, 420, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Background of the Case:
The appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court dismissing a petition seeking to quash the order of the Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance of offenses under the Indian Penal Code. The complaint alleged a dispute regarding the sale and purchase of land between the parties.
2. Contentions of the Appellants:
The appellants argued that the complaint was false and frivolous, stating that the dispute was of a civil nature and did not give rise to any criminal liability. They contended that the allegations were baseless, and the complaint was mala fide.
3. Contentions of the Respondent-Complainant:
The respondent-complainant argued that the complaint disclosed cognizable offenses, and the court should not inquire into the reliability of the allegations at a preliminary stage. They cited a precedent to support their position.
4. Court's Analysis and Decision:
Upon examining the contents of the complaint, the Court found contradictions in the complainant's version, leading to the conclusion that no prima facie case was made out against the appellants. The Court held that even if the allegations were true, no criminal liability could be attributed to the appellants.
5. Legal Precedent and Application:
The Court referred to a legal precedent to emphasize that quashing a complaint should be limited to extreme exceptions. It highlighted that the dispute in question was of a civil nature and did not amount to criminal liability. The Court concluded that the cognizance taken by the Magistrate was an abuse of the court process.
6. Final Judgment:
Based on the above analysis, the Court quashed the order of the High Court and the complaint filed by the complainant. It also set aside the order of the Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance of offenses under Sections 406, 419, 420, and 120B of the IPC. The appeal was allowed accordingly.
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2006 (5) TMI 550
Contempt petition - Application for grant of licenses - Disobedience of this Court's order - closure of all un- licensed saw mills, veneer and plywood industries - intention of manipulation or interpolation of the official records - Whether the note had missed the attention of members of CEC - HELD THAT:- The inevitable conclusion is that both the contemnors 1 and 2 deliberately flouted the orders of this Court in a brazen manner. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that there was no mens rea involved. The fact situation clearly shows to the contrary. Learned counsel appearing for contemnor No. 1 and 2 stated that they have tendered unconditional apology which should be accepted. Apology is an act of contrition. Unless apology is offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace, the apology is shorn of penitence and hence it is liable to be rejected. If the apology is offered at the time when the contemnor finds that the court is going to impose punishment it ceases to be an apology and becomes an act of a cringing coward. Apology is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence, nor is it intended to operate as universal panacea, but it is intended to be evidence of real contriteness.
As was noted in L.D. Jaikwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1984 (5) TMI 271 - SUPREME COURT] "We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the 'slap-say sorry-and forget' school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence. Saying 'sorry' does not make the slipper taken the slap smart less upon the said hypocritical word being uttered. Apology shall not be paper apology and expression of sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen. For it is one thing to 'say' sorry-it is another to 'feel' sorry.
Proceedings for contempt are essentially personal and punitive. This does not mean that it is not open to the Court, as a matter of law to make a finding of contempt against any official of the Government say Home Secretary or a Minister. While contempt proceedings usually have these characteristics and contempt proceedings against a Government department or a minister in an official capacity would not be either personal or punitive (it would clearly not be appropriate to fine or request the assets of the Crown or a Government department or an officer of the Crown acting in his official capacity), this does not mean that a finding of contempt against a Government department or minister would be pointless. The very fact of making such a finding would vindicate the requirements of justice. In addition an order for costs could be made to underline the significance of a contempt.
A purpose of the court's powers to make findings of contempt is to ensure the orders of the court are obeyed. This jurisdiction is required to be co-extensive with the courts' jurisdiction to make the orders which need the protection which the jurisdiction to make findings of contempt provides. In civil proceedings the court can now make orders (other than injunctions or for specific performance) against authorized Government departments or the Attorney General. On applications for judicial review orders can be made against ministers. In consequence such orders must be taken not to offend the theory that the Crown can supposedly do no wrong. Equally, if such orders are made and not obeyed, the body against whom the orders were made can be found guilty of contempt without offending that theory, which could be the only justifiable impediment against making a finding of contempt.
This is a case where not only right from the beginning attempt has been made to overreach the orders of this Court but also to draw red-herrings. Still worse is the accepted position of inserting a note in the official file with oblique motives. That makes the situation worse. In this case the contemnors deserve severe punishment. This will set an example for those who have propensity of disregarding the court's orders because of their money power, social status or posts held. Exemplary sentences are called for in respect of both the contemnors. Custodial sentence of one month simple imprisonment in each case would meet the ends of justice.
Considering the high positions held by the contemnors more stringent punishment is called for, and, therefore, we are compressing custodial sentence.
The contempt petition with WP (C) are disposed of.
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