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1984 (7) TMI 412
Issues:
1. Allegations of contravention of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.
2. Imposition of penalties and confiscation of foreign exchange.
3. Appeal against the order of the Adjudication Officer.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The judgment involves allegations against the appellant for contravening the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, by maintaining foreign currency accounts abroad without repatriating the same to India or obtaining necessary exemptions. The Enforcement Directorate issued multiple show-cause notices (SCNs) to the appellant, leading to penalties and confiscation of foreign exchange. The Adjudication Officer found the charges established and imposed penalties totaling Rs. 5,500, along with directing confiscation. The appellant challenged this order by filing an appeal.
2. The appellant explained that his failure to comply was unintentional due to oversight, as he had been abroad for work and was in the process of immigrating to another country. The respondent argued that while there was no malicious intent, the appellant still contravened the Act and relevant notifications. The Chairman acknowledged the absence of willful conduct but confirmed the contravention, leading to the imposition of penalties. However, considering the appellant's explanation, the penalties were consolidated to Rs. 5,000 for all charges instead of separate amounts for each SCN.
3. The appellant further contested the confiscation of foreign exchange, claiming it was lawfully acquired savings and not obtained through unlawful means. Citing a previous decision, the Chairman emphasized the need for the adjudicating officer to justify confiscation based on evidence of unlawful acquisition. In this case, as no evidence indicated illicit sourcing of the foreign exchange, the order for confiscation was set aside, ruling in favor of the appellant.
4. Ultimately, the appeal was partly allowed, reducing the penalties and overturning the decision on confiscation of foreign exchange. The judgment highlighted the importance of justifying confiscation based on evidence of unlawful acquisition, ensuring fairness in enforcement actions under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.
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1984 (7) TMI 411
Issues Involved:
1. Right to Convene Meeting and Amend Rules
2. Legality of Office Bearers' Continuation
3. Injunction Against Office Bearers
4. Appointment of Administrator/Receiver
5. Validity of Consent Order
6. Jurisdiction of Appellate Court
Detailed Analysis:
1. Right to Convene Meeting and Amend Rules:
The respondents, members and office-bearers of Mohan Bagan Athletic Club, convened a Special General Meeting to amend the Club Rules for increasing the subscription. The appellants filed a suit challenging the respondents' right to amend the rules and their continuation as office bearers, claiming their term expired in 1980.
2. Legality of Office Bearers' Continuation:
The appellants sought a declaration that the respondents' occupation as office-bearers and members of the Executive Committee was illegal post-1980. They argued that the respondents had no right under the Club Rules to function in these capacities.
3. Injunction Against Office Bearers:
The appellants sought a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from acting as office bearers and from holding any meeting to amend the Club Rules until a fresh Executive Committee was elected according to law. An interim injunction was granted on 29th March 1982, preventing the respondents from giving effect to any amendments.
4. Appointment of Administrator/Receiver:
The appellants requested the appointment of an Administrator or Receiver to manage the Club's affairs. The court appointed Mr. Abhijit Deb as Receiver without security and remuneration, directing him to handle the difference in subscription rates and deposit the amount in a nationalized bank.
5. Validity of Consent Order:
The respondents obtained an order on 6th May 1983, by consent, allowing them not to deposit further amounts with the Receiver, arguing financial difficulties. The appellants later challenged this order, claiming their Advocate on record, Mr. P. N. Mukherjee, consented without proper authority and was misled by the respondents. The court examined whether the consent was given in good faith and for the benefit of the appellants, finding no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence.
6. Jurisdiction of Appellate Court:
The appellants contended that the Appellate Bench presided over by Pyne J. had no jurisdiction to pass the order on 6th May 1983, after the appeal was disposed of. The court held that since the Receiver was not discharged, the Appellate Bench retained jurisdiction to give directions, including the order of discharging the Receiver. The court found that the order was within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Bench.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appellants' application, finding no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence in obtaining the consent order. The court also held that the Appellate Bench had jurisdiction to pass the order on 6th May 1983. The Receiver, Mr. Abhijit Deb, was discharged, and Mr. Sovendra Kumar Mitra was appointed as the new Receiver. The court emphasized that the order did not determine the merits of the case.
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1984 (7) TMI 410
The Supreme Court allowed Writ Petition No. 1687 of 1981, confirming the petitioner's right to continue in service and be paid salary as per relevant laws. Arrears of salary to be paid within one month by college management or state government. The court accepted the apology of the Committee of Management and ordered them to pay the petitioner's costs.
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1984 (7) TMI 409
Issues Involved:
1. Addition of Rs. 58,46,535.
2. Validity and legality of the assessment.
3. Disallowance of surtax liability and expenses under section 40A(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Addition of Rs. 58,46,535:
The assessee-company, engaged in the manufacture of tungsten carbide products, adopted the Last In First Out (LIFO) method for valuing closing stock, resulting in a reduction of Rs. 58,46,535 in the closing stock valuation compared to the previous method. The IAC (assessing officer) rejected the LIFO method, considering it not bona fide, and added Rs. 58,46,535 to the income. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld this addition, noting that the change was not justified by the period of production or inflation in raw material costs. The Tribunal, after visiting the factory and examining the manufacturing process, found the LIFO method more realistic due to the long production cycle and rising raw material costs. The Tribunal held that the change in method was bona fide and necessary to reflect true profits, thus deleting the addition.
2. Validity and Legality of the Assessment:
The assessee challenged the jurisdiction of the IAC to make the assessment, arguing that the IAC should have followed the draft assessment procedure under section 144B. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the IAC had jurisdiction under sections 125, 125(2)(a)(i), 144B, and 153. The Tribunal agreed with the Commissioner (Appeals), noting that the IAC had concurrent jurisdiction and the assessment was validly made. The Tribunal emphasized that section 144B has overriding power, and the IAC was justified in making the assessment.
3. Disallowance of Surtax Liability and Expenses under Section 40A(5):
The Commissioner (Appeals) disallowed the surtax liability, relying on the Special Bench decision in Amar Dye-Chem. Ltd. v. ITO, which held that surtax liability is not a business expenditure allowable under section 37 or as a loss under section 28. The Tribunal upheld this disallowance, agreeing with the Commissioner (Appeals). Regarding the superannuation fund contribution, the Tribunal allowed the entire contribution of Rs. 89,507, following the Bombay Bench decision in Mahendra & Mahendra Ltd., which held the CBDT circular ultra vires. The Tribunal also allowed a reduction of Rs. 28,750 in respect of remuneration to Mahavir Prasad, considering it a business expenditure.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal partly allowed the assessee's appeal, deleting the addition of Rs. 58,46,535 and allowing the entire superannuation fund contribution. However, it upheld the disallowance of surtax liability and confirmed the validity of the assessment made by the IAC.
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1984 (7) TMI 408
Issues:
1. Delay in pension payment to a retiree.
2. Interpretation of pension as socio-economic justice.
3. Contempt of court by government officials.
4. Calculation and payment of pension arrears.
5. Resolution of pension dispute through court intervention.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The judgment highlights the struggle of a retiree in obtaining his pension dues after 38 years of service. The court emphasizes the importance of pension as a measure of socio-economic justice, providing economic security in old age. The delay in pension payment led the retiree to approach the court twice under Article 32 of the Constitution, reflecting the unequal fight between the individual and the state.
2. The court refers to previous decisions emphasizing the significance of pension as a statutory right that must be promptly fulfilled upon retirement. The petitioner faced agony and harassment in claiming his rightful dues, showcasing the failure of the administration to adhere to court directives. The court stresses that pension provisions are a legislative response to constitutional expectations, ensuring financial stability for retirees.
3. The judgment addresses the contempt of court by government officials who failed to comply with the court's directions regarding pension payment. The petitioner raised concerns about false and misleading information provided by the officials, leading to a show-cause notice for potential contempt. The court intervened to ensure expeditious compliance and detailed calculations to resolve the dispute.
4. The court outlines the detailed process of calculating and paying the pension arrears to the retiree. After multiple disputes and submissions from both parties, the Finance Commissioner was tasked with computing the amount due and depositing it into the petitioner's account. The court commends the Finance Commissioner for his diligent efforts in resolving the case promptly.
5. The judgment concludes with the retiree receiving the pension arrears, including exemplary costs, totaling the amount due. The court expresses hope that such costly and unending litigations for pension rights will be avoided in the future, emphasizing the importance of timely and just payment to government employees upon retirement. Ultimately, the court discharges the notice issued to the respondents, closing the case with the resolution of the pension dispute through court intervention.
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1984 (7) TMI 407
Issues:
1. Interpretation of the ban on the sale of lottery tickets authorized by other States in Maharashtra.
2. Analysis of the Bombay Lotteries (Control and Tax) and Prize Competition (Tax) Act, 1958.
3. Examination of the exemption granted to lotteries authorized by the State Government.
4. Application of Article 14 of the Constitution regarding discriminatory practices.
5. Consideration of regulatory control over lotteries authorized by different States.
Issue 1:
The judgment addresses the ban on the sale of lottery tickets authorized by other States in Maharashtra. It distinguishes between lotteries organized by the Governments of other States and those authorized but not organized by them. The court emphasizes the legislative field and the power of the Government of a State to carry on trade or business subject to parliamentary legislation. It clarifies that the ban imposed by Maharashtra on lotteries authorized by other States is not permissible.
Issue 2:
The Bombay Lotteries (Control and Tax) and Prize Competition (Tax) Act, 1958 is analyzed in the judgment. Section 3 of the Act declares all lotteries unlawful except as provided by the Act. The Act contains provisions for licensing, regulation, and control of lotteries within Maharashtra. The exemption granted to lotteries specially authorized by the State Government is discussed under Section 32 (c) of the Act.
Issue 3:
The judgment examines the exemption granted to lotteries authorized by the State Government and the argument of discriminatory practices. Article 14 of the Constitution is invoked to challenge the exemption granted only to lotteries authorized by the Government of Maharashtra. The court justifies the differential treatment based on the ability of the Maharashtra government to regulate and prevent misuse in the case of its own authorized lotteries.
Issue 4:
The application of Article 14 of the Constitution is crucial in determining whether the exemption from the Act for lotteries authorized by the Government of Maharashtra is discriminatory. The court concludes that no hostile discrimination exists in not extending the exemption to lotteries authorized by other States due to practical difficulties in regulatory control and prevention of abuse.
Issue 5:
The judgment delves into the regulatory control over lotteries authorized by different States. It highlights the challenges faced in regulating lotteries authorized by other States within Maharashtra and vice versa. The court dismisses the writ petitions challenging the ban on lotteries authorized by other States and upholds the decision based on the practical difficulties in regulatory oversight.
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1984 (7) TMI 406
The High Court dismissed the petition as the principal amount was paid, and there was no agreement for interest payment, despite the claim based on bills submitted. No winding-up order was passed.
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1984 (7) TMI 405
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Article 39 of the Articles of Association.
2. Compliance with Article 41 of the Articles of Association and Section 108 of the Companies Act.
3. Exercise of discretion by the directors under Article 40 of the Articles of Association.
4. Bona fides of the directors' decision to reject the transfer of shares.
5. Jurisdiction of the court under Section 155(2) of the Companies Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of Article 39 of the Articles of Association:
The petitioner argued that Article 39 applied to the case, asserting that the directors failed to find a purchaser for the shares within three months after receiving notice, thus obligating the company to register the shares in the petitioner's name. However, the court found that the notice (Ext. A-4/B-3) was received by the company only on September 24, 1982, not February 14, 1982, as claimed by the petitioner. Consequently, the three-month period had not expired by the time the petitioner applied for the transfer on November 19, 1982. The court held that Article 39 did not apply as the conditions stipulated therein were not met.
2. Compliance with Article 41 of the Articles of Association and Section 108 of the Companies Act:
The court emphasized that compliance with Article 41 and Section 108 is mandatory. The petitioner failed to submit the share certificates and the required fee of Rs. 2 along with the transfer application. The court ruled that this non-compliance was fatal to the petitioner's case, making the transfer application invalid. The belated attempt to rectify this by filing the share certificates and fee in court was deemed unacceptable and outside the court's jurisdiction.
3. Exercise of discretion by the directors under Article 40 of the Articles of Association:
Article 40 grants the directors absolute and uncontrolled discretion to reject any transfer of shares. The court noted that this discretion is presumed to be exercised bona fide unless proven otherwise. The petitioner did not provide evidence to show that the directors acted oppressively, capriciously, or mala fide. Therefore, the court upheld the directors' decision to reject the transfer application.
4. Bona fides of the directors' decision to reject the transfer of shares:
The court reiterated that the burden of proving mala fides lies with the petitioner. The petitioner failed to demonstrate that the directors acted in bad faith or for any collateral purpose. The court found no evidence of oppressive, capricious, or corrupt behavior by the directors, thus upholding the presumption of bona fide exercise of discretion.
5. Jurisdiction of the court under Section 155(2) of the Companies Act:
The court clarified that its jurisdiction under Section 155(2) is not summary but comprehensive. However, it cannot override the directors' discretion unless mala fides are proven. Given the petitioner's failure to comply with mandatory requirements and the lack of evidence of bad faith, the court held that the petition was not maintainable and dismissed it.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the petition with costs, holding that the petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Article 41 and Section 108, did not prove mala fides on the part of the directors, and misinterpreted the applicability of Article 39. The directors' decision to reject the transfer was upheld as valid, legal, and proper.
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1984 (7) TMI 404
Issues Involved:
1. Possession and Status under U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.
2. Jurisdiction of the Additional Commissioner under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.
3. Application under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restitution of possession.
4. Bar of suit under Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.
5. Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
Summary:
Issue 1: Possession and Status under U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950
The appellants, claiming to be Khudkasht holders of the Zamindars, filed a suit for possession u/s 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, which resulted in a decree in their favor. They claimed to have acquired the status of Bhumidars under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The respondents argued that they acquired the status of adhivasis u/s 20 of the 1950 Act and sought to regain possession, which the Additional Commissioner granted.
Issue 2: Jurisdiction of the Additional Commissioner under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953
The appellants contended that the Additional Commissioner had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits once the village was under consolidation under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The Board of Revenue held that the appeal should have been stayed, not decided on merits, and remitted the matter back to the Additional Commissioner.
Issue 3: Application under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restitution of possession
The appellants sought restitution of possession u/s 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure after the reversal of the Additional Commissioner's decision. The Sub Divisional Officer and subsequent authorities rejected their application, stating that the decision under the 1953 Act had become final and could not be reopened.
Issue 4: Bar of suit under Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953
The appellants filed a suit u/s 209 and 229(b) of the 1950 Act, which was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue on grounds of res judicata and limitation. The High Court upheld that the suit was barred u/s 49 of the 1953 Act, as the plots were finally allotted to the respondents in consolidation proceedings.
Issue 5: Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act
The appellants argued for the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to exclude the time spent in earlier proceedings. The High Court and statutory authorities held that Section 14 was not applicable as the earlier proceeding under Section 144 of the CPC did not relate to the same matter in issue and failed on merits, not on jurisdictional grounds.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondents had a stronger legal and equitable claim to possession as adhivasis under the 1950 Act. The appellants' suit was barred by limitation and Section 49 of the 1953 Act, and they were not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The decision of the High Court and statutory authorities was upheld.
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1984 (7) TMI 403
Issues Involved:
1. Entitlement to interest on delayed payment of arrears of salary.
2. Consideration for confirmation as a clerk from the date juniors were confirmed.
3. Consideration for promotion to the post of Assistant when juniors were considered.
4. Payment of pending T.A. Bills.
Detailed Analysis:
Entitlement to Interest on Delayed Payment of Arrears of Salary:
The petitioner was entitled to be reinstated and paid arrears of salary following the decision in Civil Writ Petition No. 61 of 1971. Despite presenting himself for duty on May 16, 1974, the petitioner was not permitted to join nor paid the arrears of salary. The Letters Patent Appeal filed on April 25, 1974, did not stay the decision until October 11, 1974. The stay order only applied prospectively, and no arrears of salary were paid until June/July 1981. The court found no valid justification for this delay and awarded interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the delayed payment of arrears of salary, specifying different periods for calculation:
1. From the date the salary became due until October 10, 1974.
2. From May 17, 1980, until the actual payment in June/July 1981.
Consideration for Confirmation as a Clerk:
The Departmental Promotion Committee confirmed the petitioner as a clerk on September 22, 1981. The petitioner claimed he should have been confirmed from the date his juniors were confirmed. However, the court reviewed the records and found no legal ground to challenge the Committee's decision. Thus, the petitioner was not entitled to any relief regarding confirmation.
Consideration for Promotion to the Post of Assistant:
The Departmental Promotion Committee, in its meeting on May 14, 1984, deemed the petitioner unfit for promotion based on the available records. The court, after reviewing the Committee's reports and relevant records, upheld the decision, denying any relief for promotion to the petitioner.
Payment of Pending T.A. Bills:
The petitioner claimed certain T.A. Bills were still unpaid. The Advocate General stated these were under process and assured that necessary payments would be made within one month from the judgment date.
Additional Observations:
The court emphasized the duty of the State and its subordinates to implement court decisions promptly, regardless of pending appeals unless a stay is granted. The court referenced the Supreme Court decision in *Baradakanta Mishra v. Bhimsen Dixit*, highlighting that non-compliance with court decisions could amount to contempt of court. The court directed the State Government to ensure all subordinates are aware of the necessity to implement court decisions expeditiously.
Conclusion:
The writ petition was disposed of with the above directions, and the court appreciated the assistance provided by the amicus curiae. A copy of the judgment was ordered to be forwarded to the Chief Secretary of the State Government for appropriate action.
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1984 (7) TMI 402
Issues Involved:
1. Refusal to release imported goods.
2. Validity and interpretation of import licenses.
3. Canalisation of goods.
4. Revalidation and restrictions of import licenses.
5. Jurisdiction and authority of customs officials.
6. Compliance with import policies and amendments.
7. Appeal and review procedures within customs authorities.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Refusal to Release Imported Goods:
The petitioner challenged the refusal of the respondents to release imported goods (1,500 kgs. of Amoxycillin Trihydrate) for home consumption under a valid licence. Despite submitting the Bill of Entry and paying the proportionate customs duty for part of the goods, the customs authorities withheld the remaining goods without assigning reasons.
2. Validity and Interpretation of Import Licenses:
The import licence in question was issued on 14th March 1980 and revalidated on 15th June 1982. The licence allowed the import of items listed in Appendices 5 & 7, excluding items in Appendix 26, under the Import Policy of 1979-80. The licence was valid for the import of raw materials and components placed on Open General Licence for Actual Users (Industrial).
3. Canalisation of Goods:
The customs authorities argued that the goods were canalised items, which could only be imported by the State Trading Corporation of India. However, the court found that Amoxycillin Trihydrate was not a canalised item under the 1979-80 policy and was only canalised on 16th October 1981. Thus, the import of Amoxycillin Trihydrate was permissible under the Open General Licence.
4. Revalidation and Restrictions of Import Licenses:
The revalidation of the licence was subject to the provisions of the Import Policy of 1982-83, specifically paras 231(1), 231(2), and 231(4). However, para 231(3), which restricts the import of items no longer under Open General Licence, was not applicable. Therefore, the import of Amoxycillin Trihydrate, which was not a canalised item during the original licence period, remained valid.
5. Jurisdiction and Authority of Customs Officials:
The court emphasized that the decision taken by the then Collector of Customs on 27th December 1982 to accept the licence and release the goods could not be reviewed by the present Collector. The present Collector's attempt to withhold the goods and seek an appeal was beyond his authority, as the original order had not been set aside by an appellate tribunal.
6. Compliance with Import Policies and Amendments:
The court held that a licence issued during a policy period is governed by that policy and any amendments made after the issuance of the licence do not affect its validity. The customs authorities were bound to release the goods as they were imported within the validity period of the licence and in compliance with the relevant import policies.
7. Appeal and Review Procedures within Customs Authorities:
The court noted that the customs authorities' refusal to release the goods was based on a change of opinion rather than any new legal basis. The Collector's decision to seek an appeal was time-barred, and the goods should not be withheld pending such an appeal. The court directed the respondents to release the goods forthwith upon payment of the already assessed duty.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the respondents had no jurisdiction to withhold the delivery of the goods. The customs authorities were directed to release the goods to the petitioner immediately upon payment of the assessed duty. The court emphasized that the import policies and the original licence conditions must be adhered to, and any subsequent amendments or changes in opinion by customs officials could not retroactively affect the validity of the licence.
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1984 (7) TMI 401
Issues Involved:
1. Ill-treatment of Manju by the Appellant
2. Intimacy of the Appellant with Ujwala (P.W.37)
3. Admissibility of Manju's Letters and Oral Evidence under s.32(1) of the Evidence Act
4. Conduct of Dr. Banerji (P.W.33) who conducted the autopsy on Manju
Summary:
1. Ill-treatment of Manju by the Appellant:
The defense admitted a strong possibility of Manju being ill-treated and uncared for by her husband and in-laws, leading her to commit suicide out of sheer depression and frustration. However, no specific questions regarding ill-treatment were put to the appellant during his examination u/s 313 Cr.P.C. The court noted that the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3, 5, 6, and 20 about ill-treatment was inadmissible under s.32(1) of the Evidence Act. The High Court did not find any ill-treatment by the appellant or his parents.
2. Intimacy of the Appellant with Ujwala (P.W.37):
The prosecution alleged that the appellant had illicit intimacy with Ujwala, which embittered the relationship between him and Manju. The evidence of P.Ws. 3, 5, and 6 regarding this intimacy was rejected as untrustworthy. It was also noted that there was no mention of Ujwala in Manju's letters (Exs. 30, 32, and 33). The court concluded that there was no reliable evidence to prove the alleged intimacy.
3. Admissibility of Manju's Letters and Oral Evidence under s.32(1) of the Evidence Act:
The court examined whether the oral evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3, 5, 6, and 20, and Manju's letters (Exs. 30, 32, and 33) were admissible under s.32(1) of the Evidence Act. It was held that these statements did not relate to the cause of Manju's death or any circumstances of the transaction that resulted in her death. The statements were considered general expressions indicating fear or suspicion and were not directly related to the occasion of her death. Therefore, they were deemed inadmissible.
4. Conduct of Dr. Banerji (P.W.33) who conducted the autopsy on Manju:
Dr. Banerji's conduct was scrutinized for making interpolations in the postmortem report. The court found that Dr. Banerji had scored out the words "can be a case of suicidal death" and made other alterations after receiving the Chemical Examiner's report. This was seen as an attempt to support the prosecution's case of mechanical suffocation. The court condemned Dr. Banerji's conduct and noted that his actions cast doubt on the correctness of the postmortem reports.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant was acquitted of the charges framed against him, and the judgments of the lower courts were set aside. The appellant, Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, was directed to be released and set at liberty forthwith.
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1984 (7) TMI 400
The Supreme Court granted Special Leave in a case involving bail conditions for Keshab Narayan Banerjee in Bihar. The Court found the High Court's bail condition of furnishing security of one lakh rupees excessively onerous and modified it to a bail bond of &8377;25,000 with two sureties each for the same amount, without the requirement that the sureties be residents of Bihar.
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1984 (7) TMI 399
The High Court of Allahabad allowed the revision by the assessee for the assessment year 1977-78 against the Sales Tax Tribunal's order. The Tribunal erred in rejecting the books solely because the cash book was not shown during a survey. The court held that not showing the cash book at the time of survey is not sufficient reason to reject the books if there are valid reasons. The court also found that the difference between the books and returns was not a good ground to reject the books. The court directed the Tribunal to modify its order and allowed the revision, with each party bearing their own costs.
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1984 (7) TMI 398
Issues Involved:
1. Relationship of landowner and tenant.
2. Definition of "land" under Section 2(5) of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953.
3. Validity of transfer of tenancy rights under Section 68 of the Act.
4. Determination of compensation for acquisition of proprietary rights.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Relationship of Landowner and Tenant:
The Compensation Officer initially found no relationship of landowner and tenant between the parties, leading to the rejection of the respondent's application for proprietary rights. However, the learned Single Judge later determined that the respondent was indeed a tenant holding the suit land under the appellant. This finding was based on the evidence, including entries in the Jamabandi (Ex. PA) for the year 1964-65, which indicated that the respondent was a tenant under the Provincial Government of Himachal Pradesh.
2. Definition of "Land" under Section 2(5) of the Act:
The definition of "land" under Section 2(5) was pivotal. The learned Single Judge examined each Khasra number to determine if the suit land fell within the statutory definition. The findings were that Khasra Nos. 10 to 19 (excluding 19/1) were "lands" within the meaning of the Act. The judgment emphasized that the term "land" includes orchards, ghasnies, and sites of buildings on such land, provided they are not in a town or village and are used for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient to agriculture.
3. Validity of Transfer of Tenancy Rights under Section 68 of the Act:
The appellant argued that the transfer of tenancy rights to the respondent was void under Section 68 of the Act. However, this issue was raised for the first time at the Letters Patent Appeal stage. The court noted that the appellant had accepted the respondent as a tenant for over a decade, as evidenced by rent records and entries in the Jamabandi. The court held that raising this issue at such a late stage would unfairly prejudice the respondent.
4. Determination of Compensation for Acquisition of Proprietary Rights:
The learned Single Judge remanded the matter to the Compensation Officer to determine the compensation payable by the respondent for acquiring the right, title, and interest in the suit land (excluding Khasra No. 19/1). The court directed that upon payment of the determined compensation, the proprietary rights should be transferred to the respondent.
Additional Analysis:
Acceptance of Respondent as Tenant:
The court emphasized that the appellant had accepted the respondent as a tenant, as indicated by the entries in the Jamabandi and the payment of rent. This acceptance was crucial in dismissing the appellant's argument about the invalidity of the transfer under Section 68 of the Act.
Interpretation of "Land":
The court relied on previous decisions to interpret the definition of "land" under the Act. It concluded that the inclusive part of the definition (orchards, ghasnies, etc.) does not require satisfaction of the main clause conditions (agricultural purposes, etc.). The court found that the majority of the suit land was used for purposes covered by the definition, thereby entitling the respondent to proprietary rights.
Final Judgment:
The court upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge, affirming that the suit land (excluding Khasra No. 19/1) was "land" within the meaning of the Act. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs, and the matter was remanded to the Compensation Officer for the determination of compensation and transfer of rights.
Conclusion:
The judgment comprehensively addressed the issues of tenancy, the definition of land, the validity of the transfer of tenancy rights, and the determination of compensation. The court's interpretation of statutory provisions and reliance on previous judgments provided a clear resolution of the dispute, affirming the respondent's entitlement to acquire proprietary rights in the suit land.
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1984 (7) TMI 397
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional validity of the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Reserve Pool Teachers) Ordinances, 1978.
2. Validity of the termination of services of teachers following the Allahabad High Court judgment.
3. Reliefs entitled to the appellants and petitioners.
Summary:
Constitutional Validity of the Ordinances:
The principal question for determination was the constitutional validity of two Uttar Pradesh Ordinances: the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Reserve Pool Teachers) Ordinance, 1978 (U.P. Ordinance No. 10 of 1978) and its successor, the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Reserve Pool Teachers) (Second) Ordinance, 1978 (U.P. Ordinance No. 22 of 1978). The Allahabad High Court had struck down these ordinances on the grounds that they violated Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court held that the reserve pool teachers formed a separate and distinct class from other applicants for the posts of teachers in recognized institutions. The differentia which distinguished the reserve pool teachers from other applicants was the service rendered by them to the State and its educational system in a time of crisis. This differentia bore a reasonable and rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Ordinances, which was to keep the educational system functioning smoothly without interruption. Therefore, neither Article 14 nor Article 16(1) was violated by the provisions of either U.P. Ordinance No. 10 of 1978 or U.P. Ordinance No. 22 of 1978.
Validity of Termination of Services:
The High Court's judgment led to the termination of the services of the reserve pool teachers. The Supreme Court held that the termination of the services of these teachers following the High Court's judgment was contrary to law. The orders dated May 21, 1979, by the Government of Uttar Pradesh and May 29, 1979, by the Additional Director of Education, Uttar Pradesh, were also bad in law. The reserve pool teachers who had already been appointed and were continuing in service by reason of stay orders were entitled to continue in service and to be confirmed in their posts.
Reliefs Entitled:
The Supreme Court directed that each of the reserve pool teachers who had already been appointed and was continuing in service by reason of the stay orders was entitled to continue in service and to be confirmed in their posts. The remaining teachers in the reserve pool were directed to be appointed to substantive vacancies in recognized institutions as and when each such vacancy occurred. This direction applied to those reserve pool teachers whose services were terminated and who had not filed any writ petition or had not succeeded in obtaining a stay order, as well as to those who had not been appointed due to the interim orders passed by the High Court and the judgment in the Sangh's case.
Conclusion:
1. The High Court should not have proceeded without the reserve pool teachers being made respondents.
2. A writ of certiorari cannot be issued to declare an Act or Ordinance unconstitutional.
3. The reserve pool teachers formed a distinct class, and their preferential treatment did not violate Articles 14 and 16(1).
4. The termination of their services was contrary to law, and they were entitled to be confirmed in their posts.
5. The remaining reserve pool teachers should be appointed to substantive vacancies as they occur.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and writ petitions, reversing the High Court's judgment and setting aside the termination orders. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
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1984 (7) TMI 396
Issues involved: Jurisdiction of civil court in possession suit for agricultural lands, applicability of limitation period u/s 50 of Punjab Tenancy Act to application u/s 43 of Pepsu Tenancy Act.
In the present case, the appellant, a tenant of agricultural lands, was dispossessed by landlords and filed a suit for possession in a civil court. The civil court dismissed the suit citing lack of jurisdiction, stating that suits for possession of agricultural lands must be filed before the Collector u/s Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955. Subsequently, the appellant filed an application u/s 43 of the Pepsu Tenancy Act for possession, which was initially dismissed by the Collector on the grounds of being time-barred u/s 50 of Punjab Tenancy Act. The matter went through various appeals and revisions, ultimately reaching the Supreme Court.
Upon hearing the case, the Supreme Court directed the respondents to explain how the provisions of Section 50 of the Punjab Tenancy Act apply to proceedings u/s 43 of the Pepsu Tenancy Act. The respondents failed to provide a satisfactory explanation, leading the Court to emphasize the lack of reasoning in their response. The Commissioner of Patiala Division had earlier held that since the Pepsu Tenancy Act does not prescribe a limitation period for filing a petition u/s 43, the provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act cannot be applied to it. The Supreme Court concurred with this view, stating that without a specific provision in the Pepsu Tenancy Act incorporating the Punjab Tenancy Act, the latter cannot be imposed on proceedings under the former.
Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and remanded the matter to the Collector for a decision on the merits of the case, emphasizing the need for an expeditious resolution due to the prolonged pendency of the matter. The appeal was disposed of with the appellant being awarded costs from the respondent-landlords.
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1984 (7) TMI 395
Issues Involved:
1. Validity and legality of reservation of 25 seats for candidates from rural areas for admission to MBBS/BDS Course.
2. Whether the classification between students educated in urban schools and common rural schools is based on intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved.
3. Whether the reservation is sustainable under Articles 14, 15(4), and 29(2) of the Constitution.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity and legality of reservation of 25 seats for candidates from rural areas for admission to MBBS/BDS Course:
The petitioners challenged the reservation of 25 seats for candidates from rural areas as being violative of Articles 14, 15(4), and 29(2) of the Constitution. They argued that the classification is arbitrary, unintelligible, and unrelated to the objects sought to be achieved. The respondents contended that the classification and consequent reservation are valid under Article 14 of the Constitution, aiming to correct regional imbalances and provide opportunities to students from disadvantaged rural schools.
2. Whether the classification between students educated in urban schools and common rural schools is based on intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved:
The Court examined whether the classification based on candidates coming from rural areas against urban areas satisfies the twin tests of permissible classification under Article 14. The Court noted that all students seeking admission to the medical college must have studied up to the 12th standard, meaning that even candidates from common rural schools would have joined urban schools for the last four years. The Court found that the education from Class I to VIII is of a general nature and does not equip a student for admission to a medical college. Consequently, the classification based on education from Class I to VIII in common rural schools is arbitrary and irrational, failing to provide intelligible differentia and having no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved.
3. Whether the reservation is sustainable under Articles 14, 15(4), and 29(2) of the Constitution:
The respondents did not attempt to sustain the reservation under Article 15(4), which allows special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes or scheduled castes and tribes. Instead, they argued that the reservation is valid under Article 14. The Court referred to the decision in State of U.P. v. Pradeep Tandon, which struck down similar reservations for candidates from rural areas, holding that such reservations cannot be sustained on the ground that rural areas represent socially and educationally backward classes. The Court concluded that the classification in the present case is similarly invalid, as it is not based on intelligible differentia and has no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved.
Conclusion:
The Court held that the classification and reservation of 25 seats for candidates from rural areas for admission to the MBBS/BDS Course are constitutionally invalid. The classification is arbitrary and irrational, failing to satisfy the twin tests of permissible classification under Article 14. The reservation is not sustainable under Articles 14, 15(4), and 29(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court quashed the reservation and directed the respondents to admit students based on the general merit list for the year 1982.
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1984 (7) TMI 394
Issues Involved:
1. Limitation for Application for Fixation of Standard Rent (u/s 8 of the Act)
2. Validity of Interpolated Court Order
3. Condonation of Delay in Filing Appeal
Summary:
1. Limitation for Application for Fixation of Standard Rent (u/s 8 of the Act)
The Supreme Court addressed whether the tenant's application for the determination of standard rent was barred by limitation. The Court held that the application was within time as it was filed within six months from the date the tenant was accepted as a direct tenant by the landlord, effective from May 1, 1955. The Court rejected the lower courts' view that the limitation should be computed from the date the tenant was initially inducted as a sub-tenant by the head-tenant. The Court emphasized that the period of limitation should start from the date the premises were let to the tenant who disputes the standard rent.
2. Validity of Interpolated Court Order
The Court examined the issue of whether the tenant's failure to comply with an order, which was later found to be interpolated, should result in striking off the tenant's defense. The Supreme Court found that the trial court's order dated October 6, 1956, was indeed interpolated and therefore legally non-existent. The Court held that the tenant could not be penalized for failing to comply with an interpolated order and set aside the order striking off the tenant's defense.
3. Condonation of Delay in Filing Appeal
The Supreme Court also dealt with whether the tenant had shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing an appeal against the interpolated order. The Court found that the tenant had made a convincing case for condonation of delay, noting that the suit was dismissed for default and restored later, and the appeal was filed promptly thereafter. The Court set aside the lower courts' refusal to condone the delay, emphasizing that failure to do so resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the orders of the District Judge and the High Court, and remitted the matter back to the lower courts for further proceedings. The Court directed the trial court to first decide the application for fixing interim rent and then proceed with the suit on merits, allowing the tenant to defend the suit. The Court also condoned the delay in substituting the heirs of the deceased original landlord, thus setting aside the abatement of the appeal.
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1984 (7) TMI 393
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the rescission of the contract.
2. Entitlement to damages for loss of expected profit.
3. Compensation for loss sustained while executing the work.
4. Compensation for extra items executed by the contractor.
Summary:
1. Legality of the Rescission of the Contract:
The trial court held that the rescission of the contract by the defendant was not illegal. However, the High Court disagreed and found that the respondent-State was not justified in rescinding the contract u/s Clause (3) of the contract document. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding, agreeing that the respondent was guilty of breach of contract.
2. Entitlement to Damages for Loss of Expected Profit:
The High Court acknowledged that a contractor is entitled to claim damages for loss of profit when the party entrusting the work commits a breach of the contract. The High Court referred to Hudson's Building and Engineering Contract, noting that head-office overheads and profit typically range between 3 to 7% of the total price. However, it rejected the claim for lack of adequate proof. The Supreme Court found this inconsistent with another judgment by the same High Court, which had accepted 15% of the value of the remaining work as a reasonable measure of damages for loss of profit. The Supreme Court awarded the appellant Rs. 2 lakhs under this head.
3. Compensation for Loss Sustained While Executing the Work:
The High Court substantially rejected the claim of Rs. 1,19,686/- for compensation for loss sustained while executing the work, allowing only Rs. 12,055.90 p. under various sub-heads. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's detailed evaluation and reasoning, upholding the rejection of the majority of the claim.
4. Compensation for Extra Items Executed by the Contractor:
The High Court also rejected the claim of Rs. 1 lakh for extra items executed by the contractor, except for the amount included in the Rs. 12,055.90 p. awarded. The Supreme Court concurred with the High Court's assessment and reasoning, maintaining the rejection of the claim under this head.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, awarding the appellant Rs. 2 lakhs for loss of profit, in addition to the amount awarded by the High Court, with interest at 6% from the date of the suit and proportionate costs. The court fee was ordered to be recovered proportionately from both the appellant and the respondent.
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