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1997 (7) TMI 705
Issues:
Challenge to detention order under COFEPOSA Act based on failure to inform detenu of right to make representation.
Analysis:
The writ petition challenged the detention order issued under the COFEPOSA Act, contending that the detenu was not informed of his right to make a representation to the detaining authority. The detenu, Rahim Haroon Manoria, was arrested at Sahar International Airport with foreign currency concealed in his baggage. The detention order was served on the detenu on 4th March 1997, and the grounds of detention were provided. The detenu was not informed of his right to make a representation, as required under Article 22(5) of the Constitution.
The Deputy Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra admitted in an affidavit that the detenu was not apprised of his right to make a representation due to the prevailing law at the time of detention order issuance. However, the petitioner argued citing the Supreme Court's decision in Smt. Pushpa v. Union of India that the detaining authority must be informed to enable the detenu to make a representation. Additionally, the petitioner referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India, emphasizing the detenu's right to make a representation to the detaining authority, which includes being informed of this right at the time of service of the grounds of detention.
The Court found the Government's stand unsustainable as the interpretation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution was in existence from the commencement of the Constitution. The Court highlighted that the detention order execution in this case was after the interpretation of the law by the Supreme Court, indicating a failure to inform the detenu of his right to make a representation. The Court noted that the detaining authority had issued addenda in other cases to inform detenus of their representation rights, further underscoring the failure in the present case. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, set aside the detention order, and ordered the detenu's release unless required in another case.
In conclusion, the Court held that the detention order was invalid due to the detenu not being informed of his right to make a representation, as mandated by Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The Court's decision was based on established legal principles and precedents emphasizing the detenu's constitutional rights in detention matters.
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1997 (7) TMI 704
Issues Involved:
1. Waiver of pre-deposit requirement.
2. Contravention of section 29(1)(a) and 29(4)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.
3. Contravention of section 9(1)(d) and 9(1)(e) of the Act.
4. Contravention of section 16(1)(a) of the Act.
5. Contravention of section 8(1) of the Act.
6. Contravention of section 73(3) of the Act.
7. Contravention of section 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(c) of the Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Waiver of Pre-Deposit Requirement:
The Tribunal waived the requirement of pre-deposit for penalties, citing that the impugned order was made ex parte without giving due opportunity to the appellants to defend themselves. The adjudicating authority treated the replies to the show-cause notices as written arguments and passed the impugned order without a personal hearing, violating rule 3(3) of the Adjudication Proceedings and Appeals Rules, 1974. Additionally, penalties were imposed on H.S. Duggal without serving show-cause notices on him, violating rule 3(1).
2. Contravention of Section 29(1)(a) and 29(4)(a) of the Act (Show-Cause Notices II & III):
The charge against the appellants was holding shares without RBI permission, violating section 29(1)(a), which actually pertains to carrying on business. The correct provision was section 29(4)(a). The Tribunal found that the adjudicating authority wrongly assumed the appellants' non-resident status without evidence. The appellants, who were initially resident Indians, went abroad for specific purposes and returned, thus not qualifying as non-residents under section 2(q). Consequently, the penalties imposed were set aside.
3. Contravention of Section 9(1)(d) and 9(1)(e) of the Act (Show-Cause Notice IV):
The appellant company was accused of making payments on behalf of certain individuals without RBI permission. The Tribunal found that the individuals were not non-residents at the relevant time, nullifying the contravention of sections 9(1)(d) and 9(1)(e). The penalties imposed were set aside.
4. Contravention of Section 16(1)(a) of the Act (Show-Cause Notices V, VII, XI, XIII):
- Show-Cause Notice V: The Tribunal found that the company did not have a right to receive the claimed amount of JD 1.5 million, as it was a disputed claim, not an admitted debt. The penalty was set aside.
- Show-Cause Notice VII: The claim of ID 4.8 million was also a disputed amount, and the company made efforts to pursue it. The penalty was set aside.
- Show-Cause Notice XI: The claim of US $1.3 million was for compensation, which was paid directly to the staff by TROCON. The penalty was set aside.
- Show-Cause Notice XIII: The amount of Rs. 2,53,366.11 was not realisable due to a ban by the Republic of Yemen. The penalty was set aside.
5. Contravention of Section 8(1) of the Act (Show-Cause Notice VI):
The appellant company was accused of borrowing JD 2,29,120 without RBI permission. The Tribunal found that the company had the necessary permission from the Working Group and subsequently from the RBI. The penalty was set aside.
6. Contravention of Section 73(3) of the Act (Show-Cause Notice X):
The company was accused of shifting equipment without RBI permission. The Tribunal found no evidence of sale or hiring out of equipment, thus no contravention of para 11E.6 of the Exchange Control Manual. The penalty was set aside.
7. Contravention of Section 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(c) of the Act (Show-Cause Notices XII & XIV):
- Show-Cause Notice XII: The company was accused of making payments to Wafa Dajani & Sons without RBI permission. The Tribunal found that the payments were within the approved limit, and the company had complied with the necessary approvals. The penalty was set aside.
- Show-Cause Notice XIV: The company was accused of making payments to R.S. Duggal without RBI permission. The Tribunal found that the payments were part of the approved expenses for the London office. The penalty was set aside.
Conclusion:
All the appeals were allowed, and the impugned order was set aside. The appellants were exonerated of all charges.
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1997 (7) TMI 703
Issues involved: Interpretation of lease deed, unauthorized constructions, authority to grant permission for constructions.
Interpretation of lease deed: The lease deed granted by the Military Estate Officer specified the construction of "four temples, a well, Pujari's hut and a store room" on military land in Kanpur. The petitioners made unauthorized constructions beyond the specified limits, leading to conflicts with the military authority and Cantonment Board.
Unauthorized constructions: The petitioners acknowledged in the writ petition that the constructions were unauthorized. They received warnings for the removal of these constructions. The respondents contended that the lease only allowed constructions for the seven named individuals and for the specific purposes mentioned in the indenture.
Authority to grant permission for constructions: The Court emphasized that the grant in the lease deed was specific and limited to the constructions mentioned. The petitioners sought to justify their additional constructions by claiming lack of permission within a certain period. However, the Court held that the military authority had the discretion to authorize constructions beyond the specified limits.
Decision: The Court dismissed the petition, stating that the unauthorized constructions should be removed. The petitioners were advised to abide by the terms of the lease deed and not seek more than what was originally granted. The Court emphasized that the military administration should not be intimidated into granting ex-post facto permissions for unauthorized acts. The petition was denied admission, and the interim order was discharged, with costs imposed on the petitioners.
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1997 (7) TMI 702
Issues Involved:
1. Ownership of the Property
2. Validity and Execution of the Will dated 15-12-1949
3. Validity and Execution of the Will dated 13-11-1956
4. Creation of a Public Trust
5. Procedural and Technical Arguments
Detailed Analysis:
1. Ownership of the Property
The court established that Pyare Lal had two sons, Panna Lal and Ajudhya Prasad. Panna Lal died issueless in 1929, and according to the order of succession under the old Hindu law, Ajudhya Prasad inherited the property. The claim that Panna Lal had adopted Mool Chand was not substantiated with evidence. Consequently, Ajudhya Prasad was deemed the rightful owner of the property.
2. Validity and Execution of the Will dated 15-12-1949
The plaintiffs contended that Ajudhya Prasad executed a will on 15-12-1949, creating a trust. The court noted that the document, Ex.P/22, was registered and the scribe, Dayashankar Shukla, confirmed its authenticity. Despite one attesting witness, Nemi Chandra Jain, denying knowledge of the will, the court relied on Section 71 of the Indian Evidence Act, which allows the use of other evidence when an attesting witness denies execution. The court concluded that the will dated 15-12-1949 was validly executed and proved.
3. Validity and Execution of the Will dated 13-11-1956
The defendant claimed that a subsequent will dated 13-11-1956 revoked the earlier will. However, the court found several suspicious circumstances surrounding this will. The attesting witness, Onkar Nath Choubey, provided inconsistent testimony, and the involvement of Laturi Lal, who had a vested interest, further cast doubt on the document's authenticity. The court concluded that the will dated 13-11-1956 was not proved in accordance with law and was surrounded by suspicious circumstances.
4. Creation of a Public Trust
The court examined whether the document dated 15-12-1949 created a trust. It was determined that while the document expressed Ajudhya Prasad's intention to construct a dharamshala, it did not divest him of ownership or transfer the property to trustees during his lifetime. Therefore, the document was deemed a will rather than a trust deed. Upon Ajudhya Prasad's death, the will created a public trust named "Dharmshala Panna Lal Ajudhya Prasad."
5. Procedural and Technical Arguments
The defendant argued that the suit should be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties and lack of notice under Section 80 of the CPC. The court rejected these arguments, noting that the State and the Registrar did not contest the suit, and the objection was not raised at earlier stages. The court also addressed the applicability of the Indian Succession Act, concluding that the will dated 15-12-1949 must be in writing and attested by at least two witnesses as required by Section 63 of the Act.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the judgment and decree of the lower court, as well as the order of the Registrar, were set aside. The court declared that the disputed property is a public trust named "Dharmshala Panna Lal Ajudhya Prasad." The parties were left to bear their own costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 701
Issues Involved:
1. Permissibility of prosecuting all directors under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
2. Specific allegations required for prosecuting directors.
3. Responsibility and liability of directors in the issuance and dishonor of a cheque.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Permissibility of prosecuting all directors under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act:
The core issue in this case was whether it is permissible to launch a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against all directors of a company, despite a nomination made by the company. The court analyzed various precedents, including those under similar provisions in different statutes such as the Essential Commodities Act and the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. It was emphasized that prosecution must be based on clear allegations that the directors were responsible for the conduct of the business at the time the offence was committed.
2. Specific allegations required for prosecuting directors:
The court highlighted the necessity of specific allegations in the complaint regarding the role played by each director in the transaction. It was stated that there must be clear and unambiguous allegations detailing how each director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business. The court referred to various judgments to support this view, including:
- Sham Sunder and Others v State of Haryana: It was held that no clear allegation against directors or managers meant proceedings could be quashed against directors.
- Kishore Lal and Others v State of Karnataka: Prosecution must show that the partner or director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business.
- Bakridan Bibi and Others v State of Bihar: Mere naming of persons in the complaint does not warrant criminal proceedings without specific allegations of their involvement in the conduct of business.
3. Responsibility and liability of directors in the issuance and dishonor of a cheque:
The court examined whether the directors could be held liable for the dishonor of a cheque issued by the company. It was noted that:
- Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act: This section states that every person who was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the time the offence was committed shall be deemed guilty.
- R. Banerjee and Others v H.D. Dubey and Others: The Supreme Court held that if the complaint does not constitute any offence, no process can be issued against co-accused other than the company and the nominated person.
- Smt. Sharada Agarwal and Others v Additional C.M.M. II, Kanpur and Others: The Allahabad High Court held that directors cannot be held responsible for the dishonor of cheques if there are no allegations that they were in charge of and responsible for the business.
The court concluded that the complaint must specifically allege that directors were responsible for the conduct of the business and had knowledge or connivance in the commission of the offence. In this case, the complaint lacked such specific allegations against petitioners 4 to 8, and thus, the prosecution against them was not sustainable. However, the Managing Director and Joint Managing Director (petitioners 1 to 3) were found to be necessary parties due to their direct involvement in the transaction and issuance of the cheque.
Conclusion:
The petition was partly allowed, dismissing the complaint against petitioners 4 to 8 due to the absence of specific allegations regarding their involvement in the conduct of the business. The complaint against petitioners 1 to 3 was upheld, and the Magistrate was directed to proceed against them according to law. The court also made observations for the proper guidance of trial courts to scrutinize the necessity of arraigning all accused persons to avoid unnecessary delay and harassment.
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1997 (7) TMI 700
Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and its amendments.
2. Obligations and powers of the Registrar regarding the conduct of elections.
3. Validity and continuity of the Managing Committee and Board of Directors of the Apex Bank.
4. Impact of legislative amendments on the tenure of office bearers.
5. Role and duties of the Apex Bank in ensuring elections of member societies.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Interpretation of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and its amendments:
The judgment extensively discusses the definitions and provisions under the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. Sections 2(a-i), 2(c-i), 2(c-ii), 2(d), and others define various types of societies and their governance structures. Section 4 mandates the registration of societies, while Section 9 and Section 10 classify societies into categories. Section 19 outlines the right to membership, and Section 22 gives the right to vote. Section 23 prescribes the manner of exercising votes, and Section 47-A prescribes the functions of the Apex society. The judgment elaborates on these provisions to clarify the legislative intent and operational framework of co-operative societies in Madhya Pradesh.
2. Obligations and powers of the Registrar regarding the conduct of elections:
The judgment highlights the Registrar's role in conducting elections as per Section 49(8) of the Act. It states, "It shall be obligatory on the outgoing committee of the Society to hold elections prior to the expiration of the term." If the Registrar fails to conduct elections within the stipulated period, the committee can appoint a returning officer to conduct elections within 180 days. The Registrar's failure to act within this framework can result in the committee continuing in office, as per the legislative injunction.
3. Validity and continuity of the Managing Committee and Board of Directors of the Apex Bank:
The judgment examines the continuity of the Managing Committee and Board of Directors of the Apex Bank. It states, "The term of the representatives of the Central Bank (Board of Directors) and of their office bearers was co-terminus with the term of the Managing Committee of the Central Bank." The term was later extended to five years. The judgment also notes that the Managing Committee and Board of Directors of the Apex Bank should continue to function until their successors assume office, as per the bye-laws.
4. Impact of legislative amendments on the tenure of office bearers:
The judgment discusses the amendments brought by Act No. 14 of 1990 and Act No. 12 of 1994, which impacted the tenure of office bearers. The amendments extended the term of societies and mandated the Registrar to take over management if elections were not conducted. The High Court had earlier declared these amendments as ultra vires, stating, "the officers of the earlier Managing Committee of the petitioners Societies will continue to function, till elections are held, in accordance with law."
5. Role and duties of the Apex Bank in ensuring elections of member societies:
The Apex Bank's role in ensuring timely elections of member societies is emphasized. The judgment states, "The Apex society for servicing its constituents and in accordance with its byelaws, can perform various functions mentioned therein and one of such functions is to ensure timely conduct of elections in member societies." However, the Apex Bank is not responsible for conducting elections of primary societies, which are not its members. The judgment clarifies that the duty to conduct elections lies with the Registrar, not the Apex Bank.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the Registrar was unjustified in assuming charge of the Apex Bank's Board of Directors and Managing Committee. The judgment clarifies that the Managing Committee and Board of Directors should continue in office until their successors assume charge, as mandated by the Act and bye-laws. The judgment also emphasizes the Registrar's duty to conduct timely elections and the Apex Bank's role in ensuring elections of member societies. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 699
Issues:
1. Whether the respondent is entitled to permanent status in the service of the Corporation based on past service and relevant awards.
2. Whether the finding of the tribunal regarding the respondent being a workman entitled to permanent status is based on relevant evidence.
3. Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the petition challenging the tribunal's award.
4. Whether the High Court has the power to review findings of fact based on no evidence.
5. Whether sympathy and equity can override statutory recruitment rules in the appointment process.
Analysis:
1. The appellant, a Corporation under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, has the duty to provide medical services, including dental care. The respondent, a dental surgeon, had been providing services to the Corporation on a daily fee basis. When the Corporation advertised for permanent dental surgeon positions, the respondent applied but was not selected. The Industrial Tribunal, relying on past awards and circulars, held in favor of the respondent's permanent status claim. The High Court upheld the tribunal's decision, leading to the Corporation's appeal to the Supreme Court.
2. The Supreme Court examined the tribunal's reliance on past awards and circulars. The tribunal referred to an award related to daily rated workmen in the Engineering Department, which prescribed criteria for permanency. However, the circulars issued by the Corporation implementing the award specifically applied to the Engineering Department, not the dental clinic where the respondent worked. The Court questioned whether the tribunal's finding was based on relevant evidence applicable to the respondent's case.
3. The Court clarified the High Court's role in reviewing tribunal decisions. While the High Court cannot reevaluate the sufficiency of evidence, it can assess whether there is any evidence supporting the tribunal's findings. In this case, since the past awards and circulars were not relevant to the respondent's situation, the tribunal's finding lacked evidentiary support. The High Court's dismissal of the petition without considering this aspect was deemed erroneous.
4. Additionally, the tribunal's reasoning for granting permanent status to the respondent based on sympathy was challenged. The Court emphasized that statutory recruitment rules must prevail over considerations of sympathy or equity. Deviating from established rules could lead to nepotism and arbitrariness in appointments. The tribunal's reliance on sympathy was deemed a legal error, as it could undermine the integrity of the recruitment process.
5. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the tribunal's award and the High Court's judgment, allowing the Corporation's appeal. The Court highlighted the importance of upholding statutory rules in recruitment to ensure fairness and prevent favoritism. The Corporation was directed not to recover the salary paid to the respondent in compliance with the tribunal's award. The appeal was allowed without costs, dismissing related proceedings.
This detailed analysis outlines the key legal issues, evidentiary considerations, and the Court's reasoning in overturning the tribunal's decision regarding the respondent's permanent status claim against the Corporation.
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1997 (7) TMI 698
Issues Involved:
1. Liability of the vehicle owner.
2. Vicarious liability of the insurer.
3. Quantum of compensation.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Liability of the Vehicle Owner:
The claimants argued that the car, driven rashly and negligently, caused the death of Vaikulam. The vehicle's owner, Respondent No. 1, countered that the car was stolen from his premises and was not driven by an authorized driver. The Tribunal found that the vehicle was indeed stolen and the owner had no control over it at the time of the accident. The evidence, including the police complaint and the theft report, supported this conclusion. The Tribunal concluded that the owner was not vicariously liable since there was no employer-employee relationship with the driver at the time of the accident.
2. Vicarious Liability of the Insurer:
The insurance company, Respondent No. 2, adopted the owner's defense, arguing that they were not liable as the vehicle was driven by an unauthorized third party. The Tribunal agreed, stating that the liability of the insurer is contingent on the owner's liability. Since the owner was not liable due to the theft, the insurer was also not liable. The court cited various judgments, including Bishan Devi v. Sirbaksh Singh and Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co., to emphasize that vicarious liability arises only when the driver is acting within the scope of employment or with the owner's authorization.
3. Quantum of Compensation:
The Tribunal determined that the claimants were entitled to Rs. 1,21,000 for the death of Vaikulam due to rash and negligent driving. However, since neither the owner nor the insurer was liable, the compensation could not be recovered from them. The court, acknowledging the statutory requirement under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, awarded Rs. 25,000 as compensation, which the insurer agreed to pay.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed in part. The court confirmed the Tribunal's findings that the owner and insurer were not liable for the accident due to the theft of the vehicle. However, the claimants were awarded Rs. 25,000 as compensation under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Each party was directed to bear their own costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 697
Issues Involved:
1. Rejection of applications for allotment of plots by the DDA.
2. Requirement of municipal licenses under Section 416 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act.
3. Application of Rule 6(v) of the Delhi Development Authority (Disposal of Developed Nazul Land) Rules, 1981.
4. Validity and retrospective effect of municipal licenses.
5. Discrepancies in the criteria for allotment by DDA.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Rejection of Applications for Allotment of Plots by the DDA:
The appellants were aggrieved by the DDA's rejection of their applications for allotment of plots, despite having deposited earnest money and 30% of the premium as required by the public notices issued in February and September 1976. The rejection was primarily based on the absence of municipal licenses and compliance with the Nazul Rules.
2. Requirement of Municipal Licenses under Section 416 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act:
The DDA argued that applicants needed valid municipal licenses under Section 416 of the DMC Act to be eligible for plot allotment. Section 416 stipulates that no factory, workshop, or trade premises can be established without the Commissioner's prior written permission. The contravention of this provision entails penal consequences under Section 461, including fines and imprisonment.
3. Application of Rule 6(v) of the Delhi Development Authority (Disposal of Developed Nazul Land) Rules, 1981:
Rule 6(v) of the Nazul Rules requires industrialists or owners of warehouses to shift from non-conforming to conforming areas under the Master Plan. The Division Bench noted that Rule 6(v) did not mandate holding a municipal license as a precondition for allotment. The rule aimed to facilitate the shifting of industries from non-conforming to conforming areas.
4. Validity and Retrospective Effect of Municipal Licenses:
The Division Bench observed that the phrase "if any" in the application form indicated that holding a municipal license was not mandatory for plot allotment. It was also noted that the petitioners had applied for and were granted municipal licenses with retrospective effect, covering the dates of their applications for plot allotment. Thus, the DDA's contention based on the possession of municipal licenses was not upheld.
5. Discrepancies in the Criteria for Allotment by DDA:
The DDA had imposed the requirement of a municipal license to manage the large number of applications. However, the learned single Judge and the Division Bench found this condition to be arbitrary and unreasonable. The DDA's policy was inconsistent, as some applicants without valid licenses were allotted plots, while others were not. The Court directed the DDA to re-examine the cases based on consistent criteria.
Separate Judgments:
M/s. Vijay Steel Products:
The DDA's appeal was dismissed. The Court noted that the DDA had contradictory stands-prosecuting the party for operating in a non-conforming area while rejecting its application for not being in a non-conforming area.
Kimat Baldev Chhiber:
The DDA's appeal was dismissed. The Court found that the party had a valid municipal license from June 18, 1975, as evidenced by a letter from the MCD.
M/s. Chawla Sons (Regd.):
The DDA's appeal was dismissed. The Court found that the first municipal license issued to the party had not been duly considered by the Committee.
Other Cases:
The appeals of the DDA in the cases of M/s. Ambitious Enterprises, M/s. Chopra Dying Industries, M/s. Basant Parkash Electric & Co., Raj Brothers, R. K. Chandrabhan Multani, Joytosma Export, M/s. Dolly Toys International, and Satish Chander were allowed. The orders of the High Court were set aside, and the writ petitions filed by the respondents were dismissed.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court's judgment addressed multiple issues related to the DDA's rejection of plot allotment applications, the requirement of municipal licenses, the application of Nazul Rules, and the inconsistencies in the DDA's allotment criteria. The Court upheld the High Court's decisions in some cases while dismissing the appeals in others, emphasizing the need for consistent and reasonable criteria for plot allotment.
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1997 (7) TMI 696
Issues:
1. Validity of assessment for the year 1972-73
2. Impact of service of assessment form on the assessee
Analysis:
Issue 1: Validity of assessment for the year 1972-73
The case involved a reference from the Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax regarding the validity of an assessment order for the year 1972-73. The assessment was made by the Agricultural Income Tax Officer and communicated to the assessee on 5th April, 1976. The primary question was whether the assessment was barred under section 35(2) of the Kerala Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950, which stated that no assessment shall be made after three years from the end of the year in which the income was first assessable. The Revenue contended that an amendment extending the period to five years saved the assessment from being time-barred. However, the court disagreed, citing a Supreme Court decision that emphasized the limited retrospective operation of such amendments. The court held that the assessment, completed after the three-year period, was indeed time-barred under the unamended section. Therefore, the first question was answered in the negative against the Revenue and in favor of the assessee.
Issue 2: Impact of service of assessment form on the assessee
The second question raised in the case pertained to the service of the assessment form on the assessee. However, the court deemed this question irrelevant in the context of the facts presented and declined to provide an answer. This decision was based on the primary issue of the assessment's validity being resolved in favor of the assessee. Consequently, the court did not delve into the implications of the service of the assessment form on the assessee, as it was deemed unnecessary given the outcome of the main issue.
In conclusion, the High Court of Kerala, in the judgment delivered by Justice K.K. Usha, ruled against the Revenue, holding the assessment for the year 1972-73 as invalid due to being time-barred under the unamended provision of the Kerala Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950. The court declined to address the secondary question regarding the impact of the service of the assessment form on the assessee, considering it irrelevant in light of the primary issue's resolution.
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1997 (7) TMI 695
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeals after reviewing the impugned judgment of the Customs, Excise & Gold Control Tribunal. No costs were awarded. (Citation: 1997 (7) TMI 695 - SC)
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1997 (7) TMI 694
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, stating that Section 109, I.P.C. is a distinct offence and cannot be used to convict an accused without a specific charge. The appellant was acquitted due to a legal flaw and prejudice to his defense. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant's convictions and sentences were set aside, leading to his release.
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1997 (7) TMI 693
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and increased the compensation awarded to the appellant to Rs. six lakhs due to permanent disability from a motor accident. The balance amount is to be deposited in the Tribunal within four weeks, with any excess to be kept in a fixed deposit. No costs were awarded.
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1997 (7) TMI 692
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the mutation and gift deeds.
2. Possession and title of Durga Devi under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
3. Application of res judicata from prior proceedings.
4. Abatement of appeal due to the death of one appellant.
5. Legal implications of mutation entries on title and possession.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Mutation and Gift Deeds:
The original owner, Khushal Singh, died issueless, and the land was mutated in favor of his widow, Durga Devi, who then purportedly adopted two minors and mutated the land in their favor under Mutation No. 1311. The trial court found that the adoption was not proved, and the mutation did not bind the reversionary rights of the plaintiff after Durga Devi's death. Durga Devi later executed gift deeds in favor of the appellants, which were contested. The trial court held that the alienation by way of mutation and gift by Durga Devi would not bind the reversionary rights of the plaintiffs after her death. The appellate court and the High Court upheld this view, stating that Durga Devi was divested of her title and possession by Mutation No. 1311.
2. Possession and Title of Durga Devi under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956:
The High Court considered whether Durga Devi was in possession of the land when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force and found that she was not. The Supreme Court, however, held that mutation entries do not create or extinguish title nor have any presumptive value on title. Therefore, Durga Devi was not divested of her title by Mutation No. 1311 and continued to possess the land. Consequently, she became the absolute owner under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and had the right to execute the gift deeds.
3. Application of Res Judicata from Prior Proceedings:
The earlier suit sought a declaration that the mutation of the gift deed would not affect the reversionary rights after Durga Devi's death. The Supreme Court held that since mutation entries do not convey or extinguish title, the earlier proceedings did not affect Durga Devi's title. Thus, the principle of res judicata did not apply to bar the current suit.
4. Abatement of Appeal Due to the Death of One Appellant:
The appellants filed applications to condone the delay in bringing the legal representatives of the deceased appellant on record. The Supreme Court found that the appeal stands abated only concerning the properties given to the deceased-Makan Singh under the gift deed dated 9.9.70, as the decree is divisible among several reversioners against several independent donees.
5. Legal Implications of Mutation Entries on Title and Possession:
The Supreme Court reiterated that mutation entries in revenue records do not create or extinguish title and are relevant only for land revenue purposes. Therefore, Mutation No. 1311 did not divest Durga Devi of her title or possession. The trial court erred in treating the mutation as a gift that conveyed title. Consequently, Durga Devi's possession and title remained intact, and she became the absolute owner under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals except for the properties gifted to Makan Singh. The erroneous conclusions of the lower courts regarding mutation and possession were set aside. The alienations made by Durga Devi were upheld as valid, given her absolute ownership under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. There was no order as to costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 691
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Order XXI Rule 1(2) CPC to claims under Section 110(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
2. Justification of awarding interest from the date of deposit to the date of decree holder's knowledge of the deposit.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of Order XXI Rule 1(2) CPC:
The primary issue for determination was whether Order XXI Rule 1(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) applies to claims under Section 110(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The appellant argued that this provision was not applicable in Haryana as the amendment to include Order XXI in Rule 20 of the Punjab Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 was not adopted by Haryana. However, it was contended that Haryana adopted the Punjab Rules in 1972, which included the amendments made in 1968, thereby making Order XXI applicable in Haryana.
The Court held that when Haryana adopted the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules in 1972, it adopted them as they stood on the date of adoption, including the amendments. Therefore, Order XXI of the CPC was applicable in Haryana.
2. Justification of Awarding Interest:
The second issue was whether it was justified to award interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit (June 26, 1986) to the date the decree holder became aware of the deposit (April 19, 1989). The appellant contended that there was no obligation to inform the decree holders about the deposit and that the failure of the court to inform the decree holders should not prejudice the judgment debtor.
The Court, however, emphasized the principles of fairness and justice, stating that the judgment debtor has an obligation to notify the decree holder about the deposit of the decretal amount. This obligation is rooted in Order XXI Rule 1(2) CPC, which mandates that the judgment debtor must give notice of the deposit to the decree holder. The Court held that the failure to provide such notice means the judgment debtor remains liable to pay interest until the decree holder is informed of the deposit.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that Order XXI Rule 1(2) CPC applies to the Motor Vehicles Act claims in Haryana, and the judgment debtor must notify the decree holder of the deposit. The failure to do so justifies the award of interest for the period between the deposit and the decree holder's knowledge of the deposit. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower court's decision to award interest for the specified period. The Court also appreciated the assistance provided by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, who appeared as amicus curiae.
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1997 (7) TMI 690
... ...
... ... ..... irpal, JJ. Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (7) TMI 689
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals by special leave arising from the orders of the Punjab & Haryana High Court related to retrenchment of employees by the Haryana Seeds Development Corporation Ltd. The Court held that the closure of the industry exempts it from Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, and set aside the Labour Court's order. The respondents may make representations for reappointment if other junior persons were appointed subsequently.
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1997 (7) TMI 688
Issues:
1. Whether the suit filed by the State Bank of India against the company can proceed without obtaining leave of the company court as per Sections 444 and 446(1) of the Companies Act.
2. Whether the secured creditor in a winding-up process needs to obtain leave from the court to enforce their rights.
3. Whether a composite suit involving the company and guarantors can proceed against the guarantors without determining the company's liability.
Analysis:
1. The petition involved a dispute regarding the maintainability of a suit filed by the State Bank of India against a company without obtaining leave from the company court as required by Sections 444 and 446(1) of the Companies Act. The trial court had allowed the suit to proceed despite the objection raised. The petitioner relied on legal precedents emphasizing the necessity of obtaining leave from the court for such proceedings involving a company under winding-up.
2. The judgment discussed the position of a secured creditor in a winding-up scenario, citing relevant legal interpretations from previous cases. It highlighted that a secured creditor, such as a mortgagee, can enforce their rights outside the winding-up process without requiring leave from the court. However, if the creditor chooses to act as an unsecured creditor, they must obtain leave before initiating legal proceedings, ensuring protection of the company's assets during winding-up.
3. The judgment addressed the argument raised by the respondent's counsel regarding a composite suit involving both the company and guarantors. It emphasized that determining the company's liability is crucial before holding guarantors accountable. Therefore, in a situation where a composite suit is filed and leave of the Company Court is necessary to proceed against the company, the judgment concluded that the suit cannot continue against the guarantors without obtaining the required leave.
In conclusion, the petition was allowed, granting the State Bank of India the opportunity to seek leave to proceed with the suit. The judgment suggested that the bank should also request direction from the Company Court for the continuation of the litigation at the relevant court in Gwalior once leave is granted. No costs were awarded in this decision.
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1997 (7) TMI 687
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Telephone Nigam Limited, Bombay is an 'industry' under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. Whether the employees working in the canteen are 'workmen' within the definition of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
3. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute.
4. Remedies available to the dismissed employees.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the Telephone Nigam Limited, Bombay is an 'industry' under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
The Tribunal held that the Telephone Nigam Limited, Bombay is not an 'industry' based on the judgment in Sub-Divisional Inspector of Posts, Vaikkam v. Theyyam Joseph, which stated that a departmental canteen is not an 'industry'. However, the petitioner contended that this decision was contrary to the judgment in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. R. Rajappa, which provided a broader interpretation of 'industry'. The Court in Bangalore Water Supply case laid down that the term 'industry' includes any systematic activity organized by cooperation between employer and employee for the production or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes, irrespective of profit motive.
2. Whether the employees working in the canteen are 'workmen' within the definition of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act:
The respondents argued that the canteen employees were not 'workmen' under Section 2(s) of the Act and were holding civil posts in the Central Government. The Tribunal concluded that the employees working in the canteen were not 'workmen' as they were paid monthly salaries devised by the Canteen Committee and were treated as holding civil posts.
3. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute:
The Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute as the Telephone Nigam Limited was not an 'industry'. The Court noted that the determination of whether an establishment is an 'industry' involves considering the nature of the activity, the employer-employee relationship, and the systematic organization of the activity. The Court recognized the need to balance the competing rights of individuals and the State, and the importance of providing just, fair, and reasonable procedures for terminating employees.
4. Remedies available to the dismissed employees:
The Court held that since the canteen employees were holding civil posts and paid monthly salaries, the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act. Instead, the appropriate remedy for the dismissed employees was to approach the constitutional Court under Article 226 or the Administrative Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. The Court emphasized that the employees could seek redressal through judicial review or common law review if no statutory rules or certified Standing Orders were applicable.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition, holding that the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute as the canteen employees were holding civil posts. The Court directed the dismissed employees to seek remedies through the constitutional Court or the Administrative Tribunal. The Court upheld the Tribunal's finding that the Telephone Nigam Limited was not an 'industry' and that the canteen employees were not 'workmen' under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court emphasized the importance of providing just and fair procedures for terminating employees and ensuring their right to seek redressal through appropriate legal channels.
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1997 (7) TMI 686
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978.
2. Validity of alienation of land by the petitioners.
3. Claim of adverse possession by the petitioners.
Summary:
Constitutionality of the Act:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, which prohibits the alienation of certain lands allotted to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Validity of Alienation:
The petitioners had purchased the property in 1962-63 and 1963-64 from the original allottees. The Government had allotted these lands with a prohibition on alienation. The Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, further prohibited such alienations. The authorities held that the alienation in favor of the petitioners was in violation of the rules and the Act, making the sales voidable. The Supreme Court affirmed that the title to the lands continued to remain with the State, and the grantees only had the right to possess and enjoy the lands subject to the conditions of the grant.
Claim of Adverse Possession:
The petitioners claimed that they had perfected their title by adverse possession. The Supreme Court noted that the petitioners failed to plead and prove the necessary elements of adverse possession, such as asserting a hostile title to the knowledge of the true owner and remaining in possession without any let or hindrance. The Court emphasized that mere uninterrupted and continuous possession without the animus to continue in possession hostile to the rights of the real owner does not constitute adverse possession in law. The Court cited several precedents, including the cases of Lakshmi Reddy, State of West Bengal v. Dalhousie Institute Society, and Chandevarappa, to support its decision.
The Court concluded that the petitioners did not establish their claim of adverse possession as they failed to plead the necessary facts and provide evidence of continuous and uninterrupted possession hostile to the true owner's rights. The plea of adverse possession was not proved, and the petitioners' claim was dismissed.
Conclusion:
The Civil Appeal was dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings of the authorities and the High Court that the petitioners' claim of adverse possession was not substantiated, and the alienation of the lands was voidable under the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978.
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