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• 2005 (7) TMI 742
  
  ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

  The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:

  • Whether the application for recovery of possession filed by the respondent constitutes "legal proceedings" under Section 446 of the Companies Act.
  • Whether the Delhi Rent Control Act prevails over the Companies Act in matters of eviction of tenants from premises leased to a company in liquidation.
  • Whether the Company Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for eviction of a tenant, or if such matters must be exclusively handled by the Rent Controller under the Delhi Rent Control Act.
  • Whether the respondent landlord is entitled to recover possession of the premises under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

  ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

  1. Application as "Legal Proceedings" under Section 446 of the Companies Act

  - Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 446 of the Companies Act stipulates that no suit or legal proceeding shall be commenced or continued against a company in liquidation without the leave of the Tribunal. The objective is to centralize the handling of claims against the company to ensure equitable distribution of its assets.

  - Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court affirmed that the application for recovery of possession constitutes "legal proceedings" under Section 446. The Court referenced the judgment in Sudarsan Chlits (P) Ltd. to support a broader interpretation of "legal proceedings" to include applications for possession.

  - Key Evidence and Findings: The premises were not utilized for the intended purpose for several years, and the company had defaulted on rent payments since 1997. The premises were under the tenancy of the appellant company for use as a personal office and guest house for the Managing Director, who had passed away.

  - Application of Law to Facts: The Court found that since the premises were not required for liquidation proceedings, the Company Court had jurisdiction to entertain the landlord's application for possession.

  - Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant argued that the application should be filed before the Rent Controller. However, the Court held that the Company Court could determine the necessity of the premises for liquidation and order possession accordingly.

  - Conclusions: The application for possession was a valid legal proceeding under Section 446, and the Company Court had jurisdiction to decide on it.

  2. Prevalence of the Delhi Rent Control Act over the Companies Act

  - Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The appellant contended that the Delhi Rent Control Act, being a special and subsequent Act, should prevail over the Companies Act in matters of tenant eviction.

  - Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court referred to the Full Bench decision in the context of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, which also considered the Delhi Rent Control Act. It concluded that the Company Court could apply the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act when dealing with possession applications.

  - Key Evidence and Findings: The Court noted that the premises were not used for their intended purpose and that the landlord had grounds for eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act.

  - Application of Law to Facts: The Court determined that the Company Court could consider whether grounds for eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act were made out.

  - Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant's reliance on precedents was dismissed as the Court found them inapplicable to the current case.

  - Conclusions: The Delhi Rent Control Act did not preclude the Company Court's jurisdiction in this matter, and the landlord's application for possession was valid.

  SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

  - The Court held that the application for recovery of possession was a "legal proceeding" under Section 446 of the Companies Act, requiring the Company Court's jurisdiction.

  - The judgment established that the Company Court could apply the Delhi Rent Control Act's provisions when determining possession applications, ensuring that the landlord's rights were considered in the context of the company's liquidation.

  - The Court concluded that the Company Court was not without power to decide on applications for possession and could make orders that were just and proper in the circumstances.

  - The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Company Court's decision to allow the landlord's application for possession of the premises.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 741
  
  The appeals raised a common question of law regarding Service Tax on Goods Transport Operators. Show Cause Notices were issued after the relevant period, making the demands unsustainable. The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and allowed the appeals.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 740
  
  Issues:
  Violation of provision of section 8(3) read with section 8(4) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 regarding failure to submit proof of import of goods against remittance of foreign exchange; Delay in filing the appeal beyond the limitation period.
  
  Analysis:
  The judgment deals with an appeal against an Adjudication Order imposing a penalty for violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The appellant argued that the remittance of foreign exchange was utilized for importing goods, supported by letters from the authorized banker confirming the submission of necessary documents. The appellant contended that it fulfilled its legal obligations under the Act. Reference was made to a Delhi High Court judgment stating that failure to file proof against import of goods in exchange for foreign exchange should not attract penalties.
  
  On the other hand, the respondent argued that the appeal was filed after the expiration of the 45-day limitation period, making it liable for dismissal. The appellant sought condonation of delay, citing the potential injustice if the appeal was not heard. The Tribunal acknowledged the importance of the limitation period but emphasized that justice should not be denied due to procedural delays. The delay was explained to some extent, leading to the condonation of the delay despite opposition.
  
  Ultimately, the Tribunal found that the appellant had indeed imported goods against the remittance of foreign exchange and had submitted proof to the authorized banker. As a result, the contravention of the Act was deemed unfounded, leading to the quashing of the Adjudication Order and allowing the appeal. The judgment highlights the importance of fulfilling legal obligations under the Act and the need for timely filing of appeals within the prescribed limitation period.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 739
  
  Issues:
  Challenge to adjudication order for contravention of FERA, 1973 and penalty imposition under section 18(2) - Efforts made by the appellant to realize export proceeds - Consideration of submissions and documents by the adjudication authority.
  
  Analysis:
  The appellant challenged the adjudication order passed by the Additional Director, Enforcement Directorate for contravention of section 18(2) of FERA, 1973 and imposition of a penalty of Rs. 2,00,000 on the appellant-firm. The appellant approached the Tribunal seeking dispensation of the penalty amount pre-deposit, which was partly allowed by the FERA Board. The appellant deposited Rs. 40,000 as directed but with a delay in the last installment. The Tribunal condoned the delay and proceeded with the appeal for final disposal on merits.
  
  The appellant was proceeded against for not taking all reasonable steps to realize export proceeds as declared in the GRIs. The appellant explained that the firm, started by inexperienced individuals, faced difficulties when the buyer encountered financial troubles. Despite efforts through correspondence, phone calls, and personal visits to Canada, the appellant could only realize partial payments. The appellant also pursued alternate buyers but faced challenges due to changes in fashion trends affecting the goods shipped. The appellant provided evidence of efforts made, including correspondence and telephone bills.
  
  The adjudicating authority found the appellant guilty of contravening section 18(2) of the Act for lack of sincere efforts in realizing export proceeds and imposed a penalty. The appellant challenged this order, arguing that they had made serious efforts and provided relevant documents, including approval for a partial payment by the Official Liquidator in Canada. The Tribunal examined the documents and concluded that the appellant had indeed made substantial efforts to recover the dues. The Tribunal noted that the adjudicating authority erred in not considering the appellant's efforts and set aside the impugned order, quashing the penalty imposed.
  
  In conclusion, the Tribunal found the impugned order unsustainable in law and allowed the appeal. The penalty imposed was quashed, and the pre-deposited amount of Rs. 40,000 was ordered to be refunded to the appellant within 15 days. The judgment emphasized the importance of considering the efforts made by the appellant in cases of alleged contravention of FERA provisions.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 738
  
  Issues:
  - Appeal against Adjudication Order imposing penalty for contravention of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973
  - Violation of principles of natural justice in adjudication proceedings
  - Effect of acquittal by Criminal Court on departmental proceedings
  - Acceptance of retracted confession as evidence
  - Quantification of penalty amount
  
  Analysis:
  
  1. The appeal was filed against an Adjudication Order imposing a penalty for contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The appellant was alleged to have taken delivery of gold biscuits, converted them into Indian Rupees, and paid the money to individuals in India as directed by a Non-Resident, in exchange for a commission.
  
  2. The appellant raised an argument regarding the violation of principles of natural justice in the adjudication proceedings. It was contended that the time provided for preparation and adjournments was insufficient, leading to an ex parte order. However, the Tribunal held that the time granted was reasonable, and repeated adjournments were not entitled under the rules.
  
  3. The appellant also argued that since the Criminal Court had acquitted him of the same charges, the departmental proceedings should not result in conviction. Citing judgments, the appellant claimed that the Tribunal should follow the Criminal Court's findings. However, the Tribunal held that the acquittal in the Criminal Court did not bind the Tribunal, and the confession statement could be relied upon.
  
  4. The issue of accepting a retracted confession as evidence was raised. The respondent argued that the confession could be accepted if true and correct. Citing legal precedents, the Tribunal emphasized the voluntary nature of the statement and the burden on the appellant to prove any vitiating factors, which was not discharged.
  
  5. Regarding the quantification of the penalty amount, the Tribunal noted the difficulty in verifying the exact amount involved. Despite reducing the penalty amount due to lack of concrete evidence, the Tribunal upheld the conviction under the relevant provisions of the Act and reduced the penalty to Rs. 5,00,000 from the initial Rs. 10,00,000.
  
  6. The appeal was partly allowed, and the appellant was given 30 days to deposit the reduced penalty amount, failing which the respondent could recover the same in accordance with the law.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 737
  
  The Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange in New Delhi overturned a penalty of Rs. 20 lakhs on an Appellant-company and Rs. 5 lakhs on another Appellant for contravention of FER Act, 1973 due to failure to provide proof of import of goods after receiving foreign exchange remittances. The Tribunal found that all remittances were explained and the legal obligation was satisfied, therefore setting aside the Adjudication Order. The appeals were allowed.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 736
  
  The Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange, New Delhi set aside and quashed the Adjudication Order imposing a penalty on the appellant company for alleged violation of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The appellant provided proof of import of goods for the remittances, leading to the order being overturned. The appeal was allowed.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 735
  
  The Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange in New Delhi dismissed the appeal for non-compliance with the order dated 3-12-2004, which required the appellant to submit an unconditional bank guarantee of 20% of the penalty amount. The appellant failed to show efforts to comply with the orders, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 734
  
  The Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to the Appellant in a case where the remaining accused were already granted bail. The Appellant is directed to be released on bail upon arrest or surrender. Bail conditions are to be in accordance with Section 438 of the CrPC. (Case Citation: 2005 (7) TMI 734 - Supreme Court)

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• 2005 (7) TMI 733
  
  The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal as there was no substantial question of law raised regarding the interest under Sec. 214/244(1A) in the case.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 732
  
  The Supreme Court of India in 2005 stated that the decision in Meltex (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commr. of Central Excise was distinguishable. The appellant argued that the Department was not given the opportunity to prove that the product in question was being "manufactured" within the definition of the Central Excise Act. The Court condoned the delay and issued notice limited to the question of remanding the matter back to the Tribunal for disposal.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 731
  
  Issues:
  1. Writ of habeas corpus for illegal detention of petitioner's brother.
  2. Maintainability of the habeas corpus petition without sufficient evidence of illegal detention.
  3. Court's role in habeas corpus petitions and monitoring investigations.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking the production of his brother allegedly under illegal detention by respondent Nos. 5 to 14. The court issued a show cause notice and granted an opportunity to trace the missing person. The status report revealed that some respondents had been granted bail, while one respondent was not traceable. The investigating agency stated that they lacked evidence to submit a charge sheet against the missing respondent. The court acknowledged the efforts to locate the petitioner's brother and gather evidence against the respondents.
  
  2. The court emphasized that a habeas corpus petition can only be maintained if there is clear and unimpeachable evidence of illegal detention. Without such evidence, the petition cannot be entertained. The court clarified that it cannot act as a monitoring agency for a police case unless there is sufficient material indicating illegal detention. In this case, as there was no material against the respondents proving illegal detention of the petitioner's brother, the court found the habeas corpus petition not maintainable. The petitioner was given the liberty to monitor the case and file a fresh petition if evidence of illegal detention surfaces during the investigation.
  
  3. Considering the legal principles governing habeas corpus petitions, the court concluded that without evidence of illegal detention, the petition could not be entertained. The court highlighted the importance of having substantial material to infer illegal detention before converting a habeas corpus petition into a monitoring agency for police investigations. The petitioner was granted the freedom to file a new petition if evidence of illegal detention emerges during the investigation, thereby disposing of the current writ petition with this liberty in the interest of justice.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 730
  
  Issues involved:
  Challenge to order dated 27.3.1995 passed by Judicial Magistrate Nagina, District Bijnor; Revision No. 156 of 1995 vide order dated 16.8.1997 by Additional Session Judge, Bijnor; Dispute regarding dishonored cheque under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act; Premature dismissal of complaint; Invocation of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
  
  Analysis:
  
  1. Challenge to the Order:
  The application challenges the order dated 27.3.1995 passed by the Judicial Magistrate Nagina, District Bijnor, which was confirmed in Revision No. 156 of 1995 by the Additional Session Judge, Bijnor. The dispute arises from a dishonored cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  
  2. Dishonored Cheque Dispute:
  The applicant's firm, registered as M/s Singh Brothers, Dhampur, District Bijnor, dealt with Khandsari sugar business. The complainant, managing partner Ganga Ram, alleged that after settling accounts, a sum of Rs. 53,000 was due from the opposite parties. An account payee cheque dated 25.9.1991 for Rs. 54,000 drawn in Canara Bank Dhampur Branch was dishonored for insufficient funds. Notices were sent to the opposite parties, and a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed on 20.5.1992.
  
  3. Premature Dismissal of Complaint:
  The counsel for the applicant argued that the dismissal of the complaint by the lower courts was premature. Citing legal precedents, it was contended that the court should have waited for the complainant to establish the case or taken cognizance after the stipulated period. Emphasis was placed on distinguishing between "taking cognizance of an offence" and the filing of a complaint. The dismissal of the complaint without allowing the complainant to prove the allegations was deemed hasty.
  
  4. Legal Precedents and Arguments:
  Legal arguments were based on decisions such as Narsingh Das Tapadia v. Goverdhan Das Partani and Anr., Samrat Shipping Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Dolly George, and Adalat Prasad v. Roop Lal Jindal and Ors. These cases highlighted the importance of not summarily dismissing complaints and allowing complainants to prove their case before dismissal.
  
  5. Court's Decision:
  After considering the arguments and legal precedents, the court found that the trial court should have allowed the complainant to establish the case or taken cognizance after the stipulated period. The dismissal of the complaint was deemed premature. Consequently, the impugned orders dated 27.3.1995 and 16.8.1997 were set aside, directing the trial court to proceed afresh and decide the matter on its merits.
  
  This detailed analysis covers the legal issues involved in the judgment, focusing on the challenge to the order, the dispute over the dishonored cheque, the premature dismissal of the complaint, legal precedents cited, and the court's final decision.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 729
  
  Issues:
  Petition for leave to file an appeal against judgment in C.C. No. 259/2004; Dishonour of cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Legally enforceable debt or liability for cheque issuance.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The petitioner filed a complaint alleging that the 2nd respondent committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act by issuing a cheque that was dishonoured for insufficient funds. The trial court acquitted the 2nd respondent due to failure in proving the service of statutory notice and the cheque being in discharge of a legally enforceable debt.
  
  2. The petitioner contended that the trial court erred in finding the notice not issued within the statutory time limit and the cheque not representing a legally enforceable debt. The legal counsel argued against these findings.
  
  3. Section 138 of the Act deals with dishonour of cheques due to insufficient funds, requiring a legally enforceable debt or liability for an offence. The provision outlines conditions for cheque dishonour and the necessity of a valid debt or liability.
  
  4. The trial court examined the background of the cheque issuance, linking it to an agreement related to a non-compoundable offence. The court concluded that the debt arising from such an agreement was not legally enforceable, citing relevant case law and legal principles.
  
  5. The court emphasized that debts or liabilities arising from agreements against the law or public policy are not enforceable, making cheques related to such agreements not punishable under Section 138 of the Act. The judgment highlighted the importance of lawful consideration in agreements.
  
  6. Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act was referenced to emphasize the unlawfulness of agreements opposed to law or public policy. The judgment clarified that cheques based on such agreements are unenforceable, using examples to illustrate the point.
  
  7. The term "enforceable" was defined, emphasizing the need for debts or liabilities to be legally enforceable for cheque dishonour to constitute an offence under Section 138. The explanation to the section reiterated the requirement of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
  
  8. The court concluded that the judgment of the trial court did not warrant interference, leading to the rejection of the petition for leave to file an appeal. The decision was based on the lack of a legally enforceable debt or liability in the case, aligning with the provisions of Section 138 of the Act.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 728
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the petitioners were liable for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
  2. Whether the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to summon the petitioners.
  3. Interpretation of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act regarding the liability of directors.
  4. The necessity for specific allegations against directors in the complaint.
  5. The court's power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to adjudicate facts during the trial.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  Issue 1: Liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
  The petitioners were summoned by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM) along with the principal accused, M/s. Mahakali Processors Ltd., for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The complaint alleged that a cheque for Rs. 2,75,000/- issued by the accused company was dishonoured due to account closure, and despite notice under Section 138, payment was not made.
  
  Issue 2: Sufficiency of Allegations in the Complaint
  The petitioners challenged the order on the grounds that they had resigned as directors before the date of the cheque and that the complaint did not contain sufficient allegations to prosecute them. The court held that the question of resignation was a factual matter to be addressed during the trial and could not be adjudicated under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  
  Issue 3: Interpretation of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
  The court examined whether the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to summon the petitioners under Section 141 of the Act, which deals with offences by companies. Section 141(1) states that every person in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the time of the offence shall be deemed guilty. However, the Supreme Court in various judgments, including Katta Sujatha vs. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd., clarified that not all directors are responsible for the conduct of the business unless specific allegations are made against them.
  
  Issue 4: Necessity for Specific Allegations Against Directors
  The court emphasized that the complaint must specify how a particular director is responsible for the offence. Simply being a director does not automatically make one liable under Section 141. The complainant must allege specific acts or omissions connecting the director to the offence. The Supreme Court in Katta Sujatha and other cases held that directors could only be summoned if they were in charge of the business or if the offence was committed with their consent or connivance.
  
  Issue 5: Court's Power Under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  The court noted that it could not adjudicate on factual matters such as whether the petitioners had resigned as directors at the relevant time. Such issues must be addressed during the trial.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court concluded that the allegations against the petitioners were insufficient to summon them for the offence committed by M/s. Mahakali Processors Ltd. The complaint merely contained bald allegations without specifying the petitioners' roles in the offence. Consequently, the court set aside the CMM's order summoning the petitioners but clarified that this would not restrict the CMM or any magistrate from summoning the petitioners at a later stage if sufficient evidence was produced.
  
  Advisory:
  The court advised Metropolitan Magistrates to exercise caution before summoning directors under Section 141 of the Act. Magistrates should personally examine the complainant to ascertain the specific roles and responsibilities of the accused in the conduct of the company's business. This would prevent harassment of innocent persons and reduce delays in case disposal. The registry was directed to circulate the judgment to Metropolitan Magistrates for compliance.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 727
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the Electricity Board can demand arrears of electricity dues, including penalties incurred by a previous consumer, from a new owner/occupier/allottee as a precondition for electricity connection under Regulation 15(e) of the Conditions of Supply of Electrical Energy.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Demand of Arrears from New Owner/Occupier/Allottee:
  The primary question addressed was whether the Electricity Board can demand arrears of electricity dues, including penalties incurred by a previous consumer, from a new owner/occupier/allottee as a precondition for electricity connection under Regulation 15(e) of the Conditions of Supply of Electrical Energy. The court noted that three Division Benches had upheld the Board's right to demand such arrears, but the correctness of these decisions was doubted, leading to a referral to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement.
  
  2. Auction Purchase and Electricity Dues:
  The petitioner purchased land in a public auction under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act and sought a fresh electricity connection. The Board insisted on clearing the arrears of the previous consumer before providing the connection. The petitioner argued that as an auction purchaser, he was not obliged to pay the previous consumer's arrears.
  
  3. Applicability of Regulations 15(d) and 15(e):
  The court examined Regulations 15(d) and 15(e) of the Conditions of Supply of Electrical Energy. Regulation 15(d) states that all dues to the Board from a consumer shall be the first charge on the consumer's assets. Regulation 15(e) stipulates that reconnection or new connection shall not be given to any premises with pending arrears unless cleared in advance. The court emphasized that these regulations apply to both reconnection and new connections, and the new owner/occupier/allottee must clear the previous arrears to get a connection.
  
  4. Definition of "Consumer":
  The court analyzed the definition of "consumer" under Section 2(c) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. The petitioner was deemed a prospective consumer until supplied with electrical energy by the Board. The petitioner would become a consumer only after executing the service connection agreement and agreeing to be bound by the Conditions of Supply of Electrical Energy.
  
  5. Public Auction and Encumbrances:
  The petitioner argued that the property was purchased free from all encumbrances under Section 60 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. However, the court clarified that the Board was not proceeding against the premises or the petitioner but was enforcing the regulations that mandate clearing arrears before providing a new connection.
  
  6. Statutory Nature of Regulations:
  The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in M/s. Hyderabad Vanaspati Ltd. v. A.P. State Electricity Board, which held that the terms and conditions of supply notified by the Board are statutory in character and binding on the consumer. The court reiterated that the regulations are statutory and not purely contractual.
  
  7. Previous Judgments and Legal Precedents:
  The court reviewed previous judgments, including Ramachandran v. K.S.E. Board, K.J. Dennis v. Liquidator, and Seena B. Kumar v. Asst. Executive Engineer, which upheld the Board's right to demand arrears from new applicants. The court also distinguished the present case from Souriyar Luka v. K.S.E. Board and Isha Marbles v. Bihar State Electricity Board, noting that those cases did not involve regulations like Regulation 15(e).
  
  8. Supreme Court Decision in Ahmedabad Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Gujarat Inns Pvt. Ltd.:
  The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Ahmedabad Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Gujarat Inns Pvt. Ltd., which held that auction purchasers cannot be held liable for previous owners' arrears in the absence of a specific statutory provision. However, the court noted that Regulation 15(e) provides such a statutory provision in this case.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court concluded that the Board is entitled to insist on the payment of arrears of electricity charges as a precondition for supplying electricity to the same premises to a prospective consumer. The appeal was dismissed, and the earlier decisions upholding the Board's right were affirmed.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 726
  
  Issues:
  1. Revision of judgment by High Court regarding dropping of proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  2. Examination of defense on merits at the summoning stage.
  3. Payment made by Respondents in relation to the cheques issued.
  4. Error in the approach of the High Court in allowing the revision petition.
  
  Issue 1: Revision of judgment by High Court regarding dropping of proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
  The Appellant filed complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the Metropolitan Magistrate issued summons to the Respondents. The Magistrate dismissed an application to drop the proceedings, stating that the determination of whether the cheques were issued for discharge of debt/liability should be made after recording evidence. The High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, examined the defense on merits and allowed the criminal revision petition filed by the Respondents, reversing the Magistrate's decision. The Supreme Court found the High Court's approach erroneous and set aside the judgment, directing the Complaint Cases to be tried on merits in accordance with the law.
  
  Issue 2: Examination of defense on merits at the summoning stage
  The Supreme Court noted that the High Court erred in examining the defense on merits at the stage of summoning the Respondents. The Court emphasized that questions regarding payment made by the Respondents in relation to the cheques issued should be decided during the trial of the complaint cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and not at the summoning stage. The Court held that it was premature for the High Court to consider the defense of the Respondents at that point.
  
  Issue 3: Payment made by Respondents in relation to the cheques issued
  The subject matter of the complaints involved four cheques totaling a significant amount. The Respondents claimed to have made a payment of a substantial sum by bank drafts after the issuance of some of the cheques. The Supreme Court highlighted that the determination of whether the payment was made and whether it covered the amounts specified in the cheques should be made during the trial proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Court emphasized that such matters should not form the basis for allowing a revision petition at an earlier stage.
  
  Issue 4: Error in the approach of the High Court in allowing the revision petition
  The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's decision to allow the revision petition by examining the defense on merits and determining the payment made by the Respondents was erroneous. By setting aside the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court restored the Complaint Cases to be tried on merits in accordance with the law. The parties were directed to appear before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for further proceedings. The appeals were allowed accordingly, emphasizing the importance of following the legal procedures and conducting a trial to decide the issues raised in the complaints under the Negotiable Instruments Act.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 725
  
  The Bombay High Court allowed the amendment of prayer clause and granted interim relief while maintaining the order of attachment till final hearing. The court directed the expedited hearing of the Writ Petition along with other related cases. Both parties were given liberty to request a fixed date for the hearing.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 724
  
  The Supreme Court of India dismissed the Civil Appeal due to an inordinate delay of 394 days in filing the Appeal. Application for condonation of delay was also dismissed.

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• 2005 (7) TMI 723
  
  The Supreme Court allowed the compounding of the offence under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as the amount due was paid in full. The conviction and sentence of the appellant were set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

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