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1968 (8) TMI 206
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the suit could be founded on the basis of the document Ex. 1.
2. Whether Ex. 1 contained an express promise to pay by the defendants.
3. Whether an unconditional acknowledgment implies a promise to pay and can form the basis of a suit.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the suit could be founded on the basis of the document Ex. 1:
The primary issue was whether the suit could be based on the document Ex. 1, which was an entry in the plaintiff's account books. The trial court decreed the suit for Rs. 6215/- with costs and future interest, but the District Judge dismissed the suit, holding that Ex. 1 was merely an acknowledgment and not a basis for the suit. The District Judge relied on previous decisions, including Hastimal v. Shankerdan and Ramdayal v. Maji Deodiji of Riyan.
The High Court examined whether Ex. 1 could be considered an "account stated," which would create a new debt and a new cause of action. The court found that Ex. 1 did not meet the criteria for an "account stated" as laid down by the Privy Council in Bishunchand v. Girdharilal, because it lacked cross-items and mutual agreement on the balance payable. Therefore, Ex. 1 could not be the basis of the suit.
2. Whether Ex. 1 contained an express promise to pay by the defendants:
The appellants argued that the words "Dena Chhe" in Ex. 1 indicated an express promise to pay Rs. 6022/-. However, the court held that these words only meant that Rs. 6022/- were payable and did not constitute an express promise to pay. The court referred to Phoolchand v. Mangilal, which held that expressions like "Lena Dena, Baki Lena, Baki Dena or Baki rahe" do not import a distinct promise to pay and merely amount to an acknowledgment.
3. Whether an unconditional acknowledgment implies a promise to pay and can form the basis of a suit:
The court discussed the divergent views on whether an unconditional acknowledgment implies a promise to pay and can form the basis of a suit. The court noted that the Rajasthan High Court had consistently held that an acknowledgment only extends the period of limitation but does not create a new cause of action. This view was supported by previous decisions, including Kanraj v. Vijaisingh and the Full Bench decision in Hastimal v. Shankerdan.
However, the Supreme Court in Hiralal v. Badkulal had observed that an unconditional acknowledgment implies a promise to pay, which could form the basis of a suit. The High Court acknowledged this, but also noted that the Supreme Court's observations were obiter dicta and not a binding precedent. The court also referred to Shapoor Freedom Mazda v. Durga Prosad Chamaria, where the Supreme Court stated that an acknowledgment merely renews the debt and does not create a new right of action.
Ultimately, the majority view in the High Court was that an acknowledgment, whether conditional or unconditional, cannot form the basis of a suit and can only serve to extend the period of limitation. The court emphasized the potential dangers of allowing suits to be based on unconditional acknowledgments, particularly for illiterate and unwary debtors.
Conclusion:
The High Court, by majority, allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the District Judge, and remanded the case to the trial court with permission for the plaintiffs to amend their suit to base it on the original cause of action. The court also reduced the decree amount to Rs. 6022/- and adjusted the interest rate accordingly.
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1968 (8) TMI 205
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of Section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. Jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petitions under Section 99B of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
3. Validity of the order of forfeiture passed by the Delhi Administration.
4. Whether the book "Gandhi-hatya Ani Mee" promotes feelings of enmity and hatred between Hindus and Muslims in India.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Constitutionality of Section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
The petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 99A on the grounds that it violates Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(f), and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, arguing that it imposes unreasonable restrictions on free speech, property rights, and the right to carry on business. The Court held that Section 99A is an 'existing law' and the restrictions it imposes are reasonable and in the interests of public order and the general public. The Court cited precedents and tests for reasonableness, concluding that the restrictions are not excessive or arbitrary. The Court also noted that Section 99A provides for a full judicial review under Sections 99B and 99D, which acts as a safeguard against arbitrary exercise of power.
2. Jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petitions under Section 99B of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
The Court addressed the preliminary objection raised by the Advocate General regarding the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court to entertain the petitions under Section 99B. The Court concluded that the High Court of Delhi, and no other High Court, would have jurisdiction to entertain petitions filed under Section 99B to challenge the order of forfeiture passed by the Delhi Administration. The Court reasoned that allowing challenges in multiple High Courts would lead to conflicts of jurisdiction and that Section 99B must be read in conjunction with Section 99A, implying that the High Court with jurisdiction over the area of the State Government issuing the order has the authority to hear the petition.
3. Validity of the order of forfeiture passed by the Delhi Administration:
The Court examined whether the order of forfeiture dated 26th September 1968 was justified on merits. The Court analyzed the book in detail, considering its theme, language, and context. The Court concluded that the book does not contain matter that promotes feelings of enmity and hatred between Hindus and Muslims in India. The Court emphasized that the book must be read as a whole and in context, and isolated passages should not be taken out of context to infer objectionable content. The Court found that the book's theme revolves around historical events and the author's views on Gandhiji's policies, rather than promoting communal enmity.
4. Whether the book "Gandhi-hatya Ani Mee" promotes feelings of enmity and hatred between Hindus and Muslims in India:
The Court analyzed specific passages from the book, considering whether they promote enmity and hatred. The Court found that the book's primary theme is the political context of Gandhiji's assassination and the author's perspective on historical events. The Court noted that while the book contains strong expressions of the author's views, it does not promote enmity or hatred between communities. The Court also considered the broader context of the book, including the author's personal experiences and the historical setting, concluding that the book does not fall within the mischief of Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code.
Conclusion:
The Court allowed the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, setting aside the order of forfeiture dated 26th September 1968 and directing the respondents not to take any steps in furtherance of the said order. The Court also ordered the return of copies of the book seized by the police. The Court awarded costs to the petitioner, with the 2nd Respondent (Delhi Administration) ordered to pay a total of Rs. 4,000 in costs to the author and publisher.
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1968 (8) TMI 204
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the act of the accused constituted an attempt to commit an offence under Section 420 read with Section 511 IPC and Section 23(c) of the Petroleum Act, 1934.
2. The distinction between 'preparation' and 'attempt' in the context of committing an offence.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the act of the accused constituted an attempt to commit an offence under Section 420 read with Section 511 IPC and Section 23(c) of the Petroleum Act, 1934:
The State filed a revision application against the order of the Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, which upheld the Munsiff Magistrate's decision to discharge the accused under the aforementioned sections. The facts revealed that the accused mixed kerosene with diesel and invited Prahlad Ram to purchase diesel the next day. The prosecution argued that the attempt to commit the offence was complete once the kerosene was mixed with the diesel, as the accused had already invited Prahlad Ram to purchase the adulterated diesel. The defense contended that the invitation alone could not constitute an attempt as the preparation was not complete until the kerosene was mixed with the diesel.
The court held that the act of inviting Prahlad Ram to purchase diesel, which did not exist in the required quantity, coupled with the subsequent act of mixing kerosene, constituted a series of acts amounting to an attempt to commit the offence. The court emphasized that the term 'attempt' under Section 511 IPC should be interpreted broadly to include any act within the series of acts leading to the commission of the offence.
2. The distinction between 'preparation' and 'attempt' in the context of committing an offence:
The court elaborated on the three stages of committing a crime: intention, preparation, and attempt. It cited the Supreme Court's decision in Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar, which clarified that an attempt begins when preparations are complete, and the offender starts doing something towards the commission of the offence. The court noted that the invitation to Prahlad Ram was part of the series of acts towards committing the offence and not merely preparation.
The court further referenced the case of R. Maccrea, stating that Section 511 IPC covers acts done in the course of attempting to commit an offence, even if they are not the final act towards its completion. The court concluded that the accused's actions, including inviting Prahlad Ram and mixing kerosene with diesel, constituted an attempt to commit the offence as they were part of the series of acts leading to the offence.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the State's revision application, holding that the accused's actions amounted to an attempt to commit the offence under Section 420 read with Section 511 IPC and Section 23(c) of the Petroleum Act, 1934. The case was sent back to the trial court for further proceedings.
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1968 (8) TMI 203
Issues:
1. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts under the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 and its subsequent amendments.
2. Applicability of Sections 16, 16A, and 16B of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases (Amendment) Act, 1953 to pending proceedings.
3. Authority of the Revenue Officer to determine the status of a tenant under the Acts.
4. Interpretation of the word "whenever" in Section 16 of the 1953 Act.
5. Validity of the reference made by a Single Judge to the Revenue Officer under Section 16 of the 1951 Act.
6. Jurisdiction of the Letters Patent Bench to decide on the applicability of the 1953 Act to pending proceedings.
Analysis:
The case involved an appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay Nagpur Bench, where the plaintiff sought possession, damages, and mesne profits from the defendant, who claimed protection as a tenant under the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951. The Trial Court and the District Court initially held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction over the matter, despite the defendant's claim of being a protected tenant under the 1951 Act. The subsequent appeal raised questions regarding the jurisdiction of Civil Courts under the 1953 Act amendments and the authority of Revenue Officers to determine tenancy status.
The High Court initially referred the matter to the Revenue Officer under Section 16 of the 1951 Act to decide the tenant status for the year in question. The Revenue Courts confirmed that the defendant was indeed paying rent to the plaintiff for the relevant period. The subsequent appeal to the High Court led to a detailed analysis of the applicability of Sections 16, 16A, and 16B of the 1953 Act to pending proceedings. The Letters Patent Bench ultimately held that the 1953 Act was not intended to affect pending proceedings, and Civil Courts retained jurisdiction over such matters.
The Bench also addressed the issue of the Single Judge's reference to the Revenue Officer, concluding that it was within the Bench's authority to review the decision. The argument regarding the validity of raising new points in the appeal was dismissed, as the points had been previously raised before the Single Judges. The Bench affirmed the findings of the Trial Court and the District Court, holding that the appellant was not a tenant for the relevant year, thereby dismissing the appeal with costs.
Overall, the judgment clarified the jurisdictional boundaries of Civil Courts under the agricultural lease Acts, emphasizing the importance of legislative intent in determining the applicability of amendments to pending proceedings and the authority of Revenue Officers in deciding tenancy disputes.
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1968 (8) TMI 202
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the lease created on August 24, 1956, was vitiated by fraud.
2. Whether the defendants had become statutory owners of the suit lands under Section 32, Section 32-F, or Section 88(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act.
3. Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the question of tenancy and statutory ownership.
4. Whether the High Court was correct in referring the issue of tenancy to the Mamlatdar under Section 85-A of the Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Fraud in Lease Creation:
The first issue was whether the lease created on August 24, 1956, was vitiated by fraud. The plaintiff contended that the defendants conspired with the Collectorate staff to fraudulently obtain the lease. The High Court found that the plaintiff failed to establish fraud or misrepresentation. The High Court noted that the Collector was aware that no Co-operative Society existed and that the defendants were not members of any such society. The plaintiff and his personal guardian did not appear as witnesses to support the fraud allegation. Therefore, the High Court's view that the lease was not vitiated by fraud was upheld.
2. Statutory Ownership:
The second issue was whether the defendants had become statutory owners of the suit lands under Section 32, Section 32-F, or Section 88(1) of the Act. The Amending Act No. 13 of 1956, which came into force on August 1, 1956, excluded lands under the management of the Court of Wards from the application of Sections 1 to 87-A. The High Court found that the Court of Wards' management ceased on May 11, 1958, not on May 11, 1957, when the plaintiff attained majority. The defendants argued that they were tenants on April 1, 1957, and thus became statutory owners. However, the High Court found no valid lease was created on July 28, 1956, and the lease created on August 24, 1956, expired on May 31, 1957. Therefore, there was no subsisting tenancy on May 11, 1958, and the defendants failed to establish statutory ownership.
3. Jurisdiction of Civil Court:
The third issue was whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the question of tenancy and statutory ownership. The defendants argued that under Section 70 of the Act, the question of tenancy was exclusively triable by a Revenue Court. The Court held that Section 70(b) imposes a duty on the Mamlatdar to decide whether a person is a tenant but does not extend to deciding past tenancy. The main issue was the claim of statutory ownership, which included determining past tenancy. The Court concluded that the Civil Court's jurisdiction was not barred by Section 70 or Section 85 of the Act.
4. Reference to Mamlatdar:
The fourth issue was whether the High Court was correct in referring the issue of tenancy to the Mamlatdar under Section 85-A of the Act. The High Court had rejected the defendants' claim of tenancy starting on July 28, 1956, and found no subsisting tenancy on May 11, 1958. The plaintiff argued that there was no plea of tenancy subsequent to May 11, 1958. The Court agreed, finding no independent plea of tenancy set up by the defendants for the date of the suit. Therefore, the High Court erred in referring the issue to the Mamlatdar and should have granted a decree to the plaintiff for recovery of possession, damages, and mesne profits as decreed by the trial court.
Conclusion:
Civil Appeal No. 312 of 1966 was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the trial court's decree. Civil Appeal No. 313 of 1966 was dismissed. The plaintiff was entitled to the costs of the Supreme Court, but no order was made regarding costs in the High Court. The defendants' application to produce additional evidence was rejected.
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1968 (8) TMI 201
Issues Involved:
1. Competence of the liquidator's application.
2. Bank's entitlement to sell properties without court intervention.
3. Bank's right to retain possession of the properties.
4. Validity of the mortgages and hypothecations in light of Section 293 of the Companies Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Competence of the Liquidator's Application:
The bank argued that the liquidator should have filed a regular suit instead of an application and that the court fee should be paid as for a suit. The court distinguished this case from the cited ruling in *Official Liquidator v. Muniswamy Achary*, noting that the liquidator was not suing to recover any debt or property but was acting to take possession of the company's properties, which were already deemed to be in the custody of the court by virtue of the winding-up order. The court held that the liquidator is not obliged to file a suit and that the proper proceeding is an application to the winding-up court, with the court fee payable as for an application under Article 11(u) of Schedule II of the Mysore Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1957. This objection was overruled.
2. Bank's Entitlement to Sell Properties Without Court Intervention:
The court examined the terms of the mortgage and hypothecation deeds, particularly focusing on Exhibit R-8 and Exhibit R-15. It was established that the deeds created a hypothecation of movables with the power to convert it into a pledge by taking possession of the hypothecated movables under certain conditions. The court found that the bank, as a secured creditor, had the right to take possession and sell the goods without court intervention, provided the sale was conducted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Contract Act. For immovable properties, the court confirmed that the mortgage deeds were English mortgages, which allowed the bank to sell the properties without court intervention. The bank's right to possession was also upheld as it was an English mortgage, which included the right to immediate possession.
3. Bank's Right to Retain Possession of the Properties:
The court held that the bank was entitled to retain possession of both immovable and movable properties for the purpose of exercising its right of private sale. The bank's right to possession of immovable properties was confirmed as part of the English mortgage, which allowed for immediate possession. For movable properties, the bank's right to retain possession and sell the goods was upheld based on the terms of the hypothecation deeds. However, the bank was directed to deliver all articles of furniture, which were not part of the hypothecated properties, to the official liquidator.
4. Validity of the Mortgages and Hypothecations in Light of Section 293 of the Companies Act:
The court examined whether the transactions violated Section 293(1)(a) or (d) of the Companies Act, which restricts the board of directors from disposing of the whole or substantially the whole of the company's undertaking or borrowing beyond certain limits without the consent of the company in a general meeting. The court found that the transactions did not amount to a disposal of the company's undertaking but were security arrangements for raising funds. However, Clause 5(i) of Exhibit R-15, which allowed the bank to take over the management of the company's business, was found to be invalid as it could be regarded as a disposal of the company's undertaking. This clause was struck down, but the rest of the transaction was upheld as valid and enforceable.
Final Order:
1. The Bank of Maharashtra is entitled to take and retain possession of the properties described in the mortgage and hypothecation deeds for the purpose of recovering the moneys due by enforcing its security against the said properties. The bank has the power to sell the properties without court intervention, subject to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Contract Act.
2. The court expressed no opinion on the exact amount due to the bank.
3. The bank was directed to deliver all articles of furniture belonging to the company to the official liquidator.
4. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.
The judgment provides a detailed analysis of the rights and powers of secured creditors in the context of company winding-up proceedings, emphasizing the legal principles governing mortgages, hypothecations, and the role of the liquidator.
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1968 (8) TMI 200
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Cricket Club of India Ltd. qualifies as an "industry" under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
2. The relevance of the Club's activities and their classification in determining if it constitutes an industry.
3. The impact of the Club's incorporation as a Limited Company on its status as an industry.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the Cricket Club of India Ltd. qualifies as an "industry" under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act:
The primary issue in this case was whether the Cricket Club of India Ltd. (the "Club") qualifies as an "industry" under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Tribunal had previously ruled that the Club is an industry, making the reference under the Act competent. The Club appealed this decision, arguing that it is not an industry and thus not subject to the Act.
2. The relevance of the Club's activities and their classification in determining if it constitutes an industry:
The Club argued that it is a Members' Club, not a proprietary Club, and its primary objectives are to encourage and promote various sports, particularly cricket, and to provide recreational facilities for its members. The Club's activities include maintaining sports facilities, providing residential accommodations for members, and running a Catering Department. The Club contended that these activities do not amount to an "industry" as defined by the Act.
The Supreme Court referenced its previous decision in the Madras Gymkhana Club case, which laid down principles for determining when a Club can be considered an industry. The Court reiterated that not every human activity involving employers and employees qualifies as an industry. Activities that are primarily self-serving for members and do not involve systematic production or distribution of material goods or services do not qualify as an industry.
The Court examined the specific activities of the Club:
- Sports and Recreational Activities: The primary purpose of the Club is to promote sports and provide recreational facilities for its members. The Court noted that these activities are self-serving and do not involve the systematic production or distribution of material goods or services.
- Residential Accommodations: The Club provides residential accommodations exclusively for its members. The Court held that this is a self-serving activity and not comparable to running a hotel, as it is not open to the general public.
- Catering Services: The Club's Catering Department serves only its members and their guests, with transactions confined to members. The Court found this to be a self-serving activity, not an industrial activity.
- Stadium and Cricket Matches: The Club earns income from selling tickets to spectators for cricket matches and from agreements with organizations for reserved seats in the stadium. The Court held that these activities are incidental to the Club's primary objective of promoting cricket and do not transform the Club into an industry.
3. The impact of the Club's incorporation as a Limited Company on its status as an industry:
The Club is incorporated as a Limited Company under the Indian Companies Act. The Union argued that this incorporation makes the Club a separate legal entity, distinct from its members, and thus qualifies it as an industry. The Court, however, held that the incorporation is a legal technicality and does not change the nature of the Club's activities. The Club remains a Members' Club, with no shareholders, no distribution of profits, and membership being fluid and non-transferable. Therefore, the incorporation does not make the Club an industry.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the Club's activities are primarily self-serving for its members and do not involve the systematic production or distribution of material goods or services. Therefore, the Club does not qualify as an "industry" under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Tribunal's order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed, with each party bearing its own costs.
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1968 (8) TMI 199
Issues:
1. Whether the Nasik Math is liable to be registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950?
Analysis:
The judgment in question revolves around the issue of whether the Nasik Math is liable to be registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950. The High Court set aside the order made by the Assistant Charity Commissioner, confirming that the Nasik Math is not liable to be registered under the Act. The High Court found that the Nasik Math did not qualify as a place of public religious worship and did not meet the criteria for registration under the Act. The High Court examined the nature of the Nasik Math, noting that while it had some religious elements such as idols and occasional festivals, it did not impart religious instructions or render spiritual services to a body of disciples. The High Court also considered the definition of "math" and "temple" under the Act, emphasizing that the Act only applies to trusts within the State of Bombay.
Furthermore, the judgment delves into the relevant provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, particularly highlighting the definitions of "math," "public trust," and "temple" under the Act. It discusses the duty of trustees to apply for registration under the Act and the process of enquiry and appeals under the Act. The judgment also references previous legal precedents to support the interpretation of the Act in the context of the Nasik Math case. It cites cases where the situs of the trust or institution was crucial in determining the applicability of similar Acts, emphasizing the importance of the location of the principal math in deciding registration under the Act.
Ultimately, the judgment concludes that the Nasik Math is not liable to be registered under the Act. It affirms the High Court's decision that the Nasik Math does not qualify as a real math or temple within the definitions set out in the Act. The judgment dismisses the appeal against the High Court's decision, upholding that the Nasik Math does not meet the criteria for registration under the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950.
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1968 (8) TMI 198
Issues Involved:
1. Allegations of corrupt practices in the election.
2. Non-impleading of a necessary party (V.K. Reddi) in the election petition.
3. Applicability of the Indian Limitation Act to election petitions.
4. Interpretation of relevant sections of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Allegations of Corrupt Practices in the Election:
The appellants filed an Election Petition challenging the election of the first respondent to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, alleging corrupt practices, including illegal gratification. Specifically, it was alleged that V.K. Reddi was made to withdraw his candidature by the first respondent on payment of Rs. 10,000, which constituted an illegal gratification. The court noted that the taint of illegal gratification attaches to both the payer and the payee, thereby implicating V.K. Reddi in the corrupt practice.
2. Non-impleading of a Necessary Party (V.K. Reddi) in the Election Petition:
The first respondent filed an application for dismissal of the petition on the ground that V.K. Reddi, who was charged with corrupt practices, had not been impleaded as a party, making the petition liable for dismissal under Section 82(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The trial judge held that the allegations amounted to an imputation of corrupt practice to V.K. Reddi and dismissed the amendment application to implead him. The court emphasized that failure to join a necessary party within the prescribed period of 45 days necessitates dismissal of the petition under Section 86(1).
3. Applicability of the Indian Limitation Act to Election Petitions:
The appellants argued that an election petition is an application to the High Court and thus the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, should apply, allowing for condonation of delay. However, the court held that the Representation of the People Act is a complete and self-contained code, which does not admit the introduction of the principles or provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. The court clarified that the Act's specific provisions, such as Sections 81, 82, and 117, must be strictly followed, and failure to comply results in mandatory dismissal of the petition.
4. Interpretation of Relevant Sections of the Representation of the People Act, 1951:
The court examined various sections of the Act, including:
- Section 82: Mandates joining as respondents any candidate against whom allegations of corrupt practice are made.
- Section 83: Requires full particulars of any corrupt practice alleged.
- Section 86(1): Directs the High Court to dismiss an election petition not complying with Sections 81, 82, or 117.
- Section 99: Requires the High Court to record findings on corrupt practices and name guilty persons, providing them an opportunity to show cause if they are not parties to the petition.
The court concluded that the failure to implead V.K. Reddi, a necessary party, within the statutory period rendered the petition liable to dismissal. It was noted that the Act does not equate an election petition with a civil suit, and the procedural aspects are governed strictly by the Act's provisions, not by the general principles of civil procedure or limitation laws.
Judgment:
The appeal was dismissed with costs, affirming the necessity of strict compliance with the Representation of the People Act's provisions regarding the impleading of necessary parties and the inapplicability of the Indian Limitation Act to election petitions. The court emphasized that any changes to address the procedural rigidity must come from legislative amendments.
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1968 (8) TMI 197
Issues Involved:
1. Winding-up of the Company
2. Petitioner's Rights as a Secured Creditor
3. Opposition by Creditors and Shareholders
4. Commercial Insolvency of the Company
5. Validity of the Petition and Affidavit Verification
6. Ultra Vires Borrowing by the Company
7. Sanction by the Central Government under Section 18E(1)(c)
8. Disputed Debts and Stay of Proceedings
Detailed Analysis:
1. Winding-up of the Company:
The petitioner, State Bank of India, filed an application under Section 439 of the Companies Act, 1956, for the winding-up of India Electric Works Ltd. The petition is supported by two other creditors, Anwar Ali and Bros, and Steel Distributors, and opposed by several creditors and a shareholder. The petitioner claims the company is hopelessly insolvent and it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up.
2. Petitioner's Rights as a Secured Creditor:
The petitioner argued that a secured creditor is not debarred from presenting a petition for winding-up without giving up its security or valuing the security and proving for the balance, citing cases like Moor v. Anglo-Italian Bank and K. V. O. Refineries Ltd. v. Madras Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd. The court accepted this contention, stating that the rules in bankruptcy do not apply to a winding-up petition presented by a secured creditor.
3. Opposition by Creditors and Shareholders:
Opposing creditors and the shareholder Rohatgi contested the petition on grounds that the petitioner is a secured creditor who has not given up its security and that the Central Government's negligence created the debt burden. They also questioned the validity of the Central Government's sanction under Section 18E(1)(c) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. The court found no merit in these contentions, noting that the company is hopelessly insolvent and the assets are insufficient to satisfy even the secured creditor's claim.
4. Commercial Insolvency of the Company:
The court applied the test of commercial insolvency, as laid down in cases like Davies and Co. Ltd. v. Brunswick (Australia) Ltd. and Re Cine Industries and Recording Co. Ltd., and found that the company was commercially insolvent at the date of the petition for winding-up. There was no reasonable hope that the object of trading at a profit could be attained. Thus, an order for winding-up should be made ex debito justitiae.
5. Validity of the Petition and Affidavit Verification:
The petition was verified by an affidavit affirmed by Samindra Kumar Gupta, Superintendent, Advances Department of the State Bank of India. The court held that the rule requiring verification by a principal officer is not mandatory and that Mr. Gupta, being conversant with the facts, was a suitable person to affirm the petition. The court found no defect in the petition's verification.
6. Ultra Vires Borrowing by the Company:
Mr. Sen argued that the loans given by the petitioner exceeded the limits prescribed by Section 293(1)(d) of the Companies Act and were thus ultra vires. The court rejected this argument, noting that the company had authorized the Board of Directors to borrow sums exceeding the aggregate of the paid-up capital and reserves in an extraordinary general meeting held in 1956. Moreover, the advances made by the State Bank were temporary loans obtained in the ordinary course of business, to which Section 293(1)(d) did not apply.
7. Sanction by the Central Government under Section 18E(1)(c):
The court found that the sanction by the Central Government under Section 18E(1)(c) was valid and that the respondents had not established that it was granted improperly. The court held that the provision for sanction is for the benefit of the Central Government and does not give any right to the shareholders or creditors to challenge the validity of the liquidation proceedings.
8. Disputed Debts and Stay of Proceedings:
The court noted that the company was hopelessly insolvent and that allowing it to continue would only add to its liabilities. The court rejected the respondents' request to stay the proceedings until the determination of the writ petition challenging the validity of the Central Government's sanction, stating that no useful purpose would be served by allowing the company to continue in its present state.
Conclusion:
The court ordered the winding-up of India Electric Works Ltd., but stayed the operation of the order until October 15, 1968, to allow for negotiations with the Central Government. The petitioner and supporting creditors were entitled to add the costs of the application to their claim, while other parties would bear their own costs. Liberty to apply was granted.
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1968 (8) TMI 196
Issues:
Validity of equitable assignment based on power of attorney and bill endorsement.
Analysis:
The case involved a dispute regarding an equitable assignment of funds due under a bill. The appellant Bank had a financing arrangement with Malhotra, a contractor, and held an irrevocable power of attorney dated July 13, 1946. The power of attorney authorized the Bank to receive payments under contracts and appropriate them towards loan repayment. Malhotra endorsed a bill to the Bank on July 19, 1948, directing payment to the Bank. The central issue was whether the power of attorney and bill endorsement constituted an equitable assignment of funds in favor of the Bank.
The Supreme Court analyzed the legal principles governing equitable assignments. Referring to precedents, the Court highlighted that an agreement between a debtor and creditor to pay from a specific fund creates a valid equitable charge on that fund. The Court emphasized that the power of attorney and bill endorsement indicated an agreement between the parties for payment out of a specific fund, constituting an equitable assignment for security.
The Court noted the distinction between a pay order and an assignment. While a pay order is revocable and confers no interest in the fund, an assignment creates an irrevocable interest. In this case, the bill endorsement, read in conjunction with the power of attorney, created an interest in a specific fund and was deemed irrevocable, establishing a valid equitable assignment in favor of the Bank.
Ultimately, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's decision and restoring the decree in favor of the Bank. The legal representatives of the party contesting the assignment were directed to bear the costs of the appeal and previous court proceedings. The judgment clarified the validity of equitable assignments based on power of attorney and bill endorsements, emphasizing the irrevocable nature of such arrangements for securing loan repayments in commercial transactions.
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1968 (8) TMI 195
Issues:
1. Interpretation of guarantee bond terms and conditions.
2. Liability of the surety in case of non-payment by the principal debtor.
3. Validity of the Trial Court's direction regarding enforcement of dues against the surety.
Interpretation of guarantee bond terms and conditions:
The plaintiff bank lent money to the principal debtor on the guarantee of the surety. The guarantee bond specified that the surety agreed to pay the principal debtor's liabilities upon demand. The bond allowed the plaintiff to enforce the guarantee without exhausting other remedies. The Court held that the surety's liability was immediate upon non-payment by the principal debtor, as per sec. 128 of the Indian Contract Act. The surety could not delay payment by requesting the creditor to pursue remedies against the principal debtor first.
Liability of the surety in case of non-payment by the principal debtor:
The Court referenced legal precedents to establish that the surety's liability is coextensive with that of the principal debtor. The surety cannot restrain the creditor from enforcing the guarantee based on the principal debtor's solvency or potential relief from the principal. The surety's obligation to pay arises upon the principal debtor's default, and the surety cannot dictate terms to delay payment.
Validity of the Trial Court's direction regarding enforcement of dues against the surety:
The Trial Court directed that the plaintiff bank could only enforce its dues against the surety after exhausting remedies against the principal debtor. The High Court upheld this direction, leading to the plaintiff's appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found the direction vague and unjustified, as it lacked clarity on how the creditor should exhaust remedies against the principal debtor. The Court emphasized that the solvency of the principal debtor does not justify delaying enforcement against the surety. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Trial Court's direction and ordering the surety to pay costs to the appellant.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court clarified the immediate liability of the surety, emphasizing that the creditor can enforce the guarantee without first exhausting remedies against the principal debtor. The judgment highlighted the surety's obligation to pay upon default by the principal debtor and rejected the Trial Court's direction to delay enforcement against the surety.
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1968 (8) TMI 194
Issues:
- Interpretation of whether a tank can be considered a charitable institution under the Andhra Inams Act.
- Determination of the grant of the Inam in question and its purpose.
- Analysis of the legal definition of "charitable institution" in the absence of a statutory definition.
- Examination of Hindu law principles regarding tanks as objects of charity.
- Decision on the registration of the Inam property in the name of the tank.
Detailed Analysis:
The primary issue in this appeal is whether a tank can be classified as a charitable institution under the Andhra Inams Act. The appellant claimed ownership of the Inam property, arguing that he was the Inamdar and responsible for the tank's maintenance. However, authorities concluded that the Inam was granted for the tank's benefit and that the appellant was merely the tank's manager, upholding this decision. The historical evidence, including the Inam register, supported the view that the Inam was specifically granted for the tank's upkeep, establishing it as a charitable institution.
The appellant's counsel contended that even if the Inam was granted for charitable purposes, a tank does not qualify as an institution. The argument revolved around the definition of "institution," citing various sources to support the interpretation. However, since the Act did not define "charitable institution," the court had to determine the term's meaning in the context of the statute. Hindu law traditions were examined, highlighting the longstanding recognition of tanks as objects of charity, further reinforcing the tank's status as a charitable institution.
The judgment delved into historical Hindu law principles regarding charitable works, emphasizing the significance of tanks in charitable endeavors. References to legal precedents and scholarly interpretations underscored the acceptance of tanks as charitable institutions under Hindu law. The court concluded that the Inam, granted for the tank's benefit, automatically converted the property into Ryotwari property belonging to the tank, managed by its appointed Manager, the appellant in this case.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the Inam property should be registered in the tank's name, recognizing it as a charitable institution. The appellant would continue managing the property as long as he served as the tank's Manager. The judgment highlighted the historical and legal basis for considering tanks as charitable institutions under Hindu law, providing a comprehensive analysis of the issue at hand.
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1968 (8) TMI 193
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
2. Validity of the findings of the Enquiry Officer.
3. Application of principles of natural justice.
4. Adequacy of evidence supporting the charges.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act:
The appellant, Central Bank of India Ltd., challenged the Industrial Tribunal's refusal to approve the dismissal of the respondent under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Tribunal found the enquiry fair but held the findings perverse and unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court reiterated that the Tribunal's role under Section 33(2)(b) is limited to ensuring that the enquiry was fair and the findings were not perverse. The Tribunal should not reassess the evidence as an appellate court.
2. Validity of the findings of the Enquiry Officer:
The Enquiry Officer found both charges against the respondent proved, leading to his dismissal. The Tribunal, however, deemed these findings as based on conjecture and hearsay rather than solid evidence. The Supreme Court examined whether the Tribunal was correct in its assessment. It was found that the Tribunal rightly identified several findings as unsupported by legal evidence, thus perverse. However, the Tribunal erred in dismissing the finding that the respondent left for Muzaffarnagar on 14-1-1960, which was supported by adequate evidence.
3. Application of principles of natural justice:
The Supreme Court emphasized that domestic tribunals must adhere to principles of natural justice, ensuring evidence is presented in the presence of the accused. The Enquiry Officer's reliance on hearsay evidence, such as statements made by Nand Kishore to Vazifdar, which were not affirmed in the respondent's presence, violated these principles. The Tribunal correctly identified these procedural lapses, rendering the findings perverse.
4. Adequacy of evidence supporting the charges:
The Supreme Court scrutinized the evidence supporting each element of the charges:
- First Charge: The Tribunal correctly found no legal evidence for the payment of Rs. 30,400 to the respondent and his departure to Muzaffarnagar with others to retire bills. The evidence was based on hearsay and conjecture.
- Second Charge: The Enquiry Officer's findings on the timing of cash presentation and clearing were unsupported by legal evidence. The only evidence, the endorsement on the cheque, was misinterpreted without corroborative testimony from the United Bank of India.
The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, noting that the limited proof of the respondent's presence in Muzaffarnagar on 14-1-1960 was insufficient to justify the dismissal. The Tribunal's refusal to approve the dismissal was thus justified.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction and correctly identified the perverse findings of the Enquiry Officer, which were unsupported by legal evidence. The principles of natural justice were not adhered to, and the evidence presented was inadequate to substantiate the charges against the respondent. The Tribunal's refusal to grant approval for the dismissal was upheld.
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1968 (8) TMI 192
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the dispute between the petitioners and the bank can be referred by the Registrar for arbitration under Section 91(1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960.
2. Whether the petitioners should have been heard before the Assistant Registrar made the order referring the dispute to his nominee.
3. Whether the dispute touches the business of the society as per Section 91 of the Act.
4. Whether the petitioners are claiming through a member of the bank.
5. Whether the Rent Act gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Small Causes, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the Registrar.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Referral of Dispute under Section 91(1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960:
The main point in this appeal is whether the dispute between the petitioners and the bank can be referred by the Registrar for arbitration under Sub-section (1) of Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The High Court held that the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar is bound to hear the petitioners before making the orders referring the dispute to his nominee. The court also decided that the petitioners were not heard by the Assistant Registrar before the order of reference was made. However, it was not necessary to remand the matter to the Assistant Registrar for deciding the question about the existence of a dispute within the meaning of Section 91 after hearing the parties.
2. Hearing of Petitioners Before Referral:
The High Court held that the petitioners were not heard by the Assistant Registrar before the order of reference was made, but it was not necessary to remand the matter to the Assistant Registrar for deciding the question about the existence of a dispute within the meaning of Section 91 after hearing the parties as the questions raised were general questions which arose in many cases and the parties desired that the position in law might be clarified.
3. Dispute Touching the Business of the Society:
The High Court held that the words "touching the business of the society" in Section 91 were very wide and would include any matter which relates to or concerns or affects the business of the society. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the word "business" in this context does not mean affairs of a society but the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the society which the society is authorized to enter into under the Act and the Rules and its bye-laws. The dispute between a tenant of a member of the bank in a building, which has subsequently been acquired by the bank, cannot be said to be a dispute touching the business of the bank.
4. Claiming Through a Member:
The High Court held that the petitioners cannot be said to be claiming through a member of the bank as a member; consequently, Clause (b) will not apply, and the dispute between them and the bank cannot be the subject matter of a reference under Sub-section (1) of Section 91. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that before a person can be said to claim through a member, the claim should arise through a transaction or dealing which the member entered into with the society as a member. If a member entered into a transaction with the society not as a member but as a stranger, then he must be covered, if at all, by the provisions of Section 91(1)(a) or (c).
5. Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes under the Rent Act:
The High Court held that in view of Section 28 of the Rent Act, the dispute which had been referred by the Assistant Registrar to his nominee could only be determined by the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, and that the Assistant Registrar had no jurisdiction to refer the said dispute to his nominee for determination. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the policy of the Rent Act is to give protection to the tenants, and various powers have been conferred on the authorities under the Rent Act to grant protection to the tenants against ejectment and other reliefs claimed by the landlords. The jurisdiction of the Registrar is ousted on broader considerations, and the provisions of Section 91 of the Act do not affect the provisions of Section 28 of the Rent Act.
Conclusion:
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs to respondents Nos. 1-2. The dispute concerning the property purchased by the society from one of its members is not a dispute touching the business of the society. The Court of Small Causes has exclusive jurisdiction under Section 28 of the Rent Act to entertain a proceeding by a landlord for the ejectment of a tenant. A dispute concerning the ejectment of a tenant by a landlord is outside the purview of Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act.
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1968 (8) TMI 191
Issues:
Validity of notice issued under s. 6 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 as amended by Act 32 of 1959.
Detailed Analysis:
The judgment in question revolves around the validity of a notice issued by the appellant under s. 6 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, as amended by Act 32 of 1959. The primary issue at hand is whether the notice, dated June 23, 1961, is valid. The High Court had previously ruled that the notice was not valid, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court. The notice pertained to the exercise of the option vested in the Gujarat Electricity Board to purchase the respondent's undertaking, as per the provisions of the Act.
The background of the case involves the grant of a license in 1923 to the father of respondent No. 1 to supply electric energy within a specific area. The license contained a clause regarding the option of purchase by the government after certain periods. Following the merger of Baroda State with the Province of Bombay, the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 became applicable to the territories, and the Baroda Act was repealed with a saving clause for existing licenses.
The Supreme Court analyzed the requirements of s. 6(1)(a) of the Act, which outlines the procedure for the State Electricity Board to exercise the option to purchase the licensee's undertaking. The Court emphasized that such a power must be strictly construed as it involves interfering with the property rights of the licensee. The notice issued must comply with the statutory requirements to be considered valid.
The Court rejected the argument that substantial compliance with legal provisions should suffice, emphasizing the mandatory nature of the requirements under s. 6(1). It highlighted that the power to purchase the licensee's property must be exercised strictly in accordance with the law, as prescribed by the legislature. The Court noted discrepancies in the notice issued, indicating confusion and lack of clarity regarding the legal basis for the notice.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concurred with the High Court's decision that the notice was invalid. It held that the notice did not meet the mandatory requirements of s. 6(1) of the Act, and therefore, the appellant could not compel the respondent to sell the undertaking in question. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's ruling on the matter.
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1968 (8) TMI 190
Issues:
1. Validity of the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority (R.T.A.) on renewal and grant of permits.
2. Challenge to the constitution of the R.T.A.
3. Interim order for maintaining status quo.
4. Application for compromise to settle the matter between the State Road Transport Corporation and private operators.
Validity of the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority (R.T.A.) on renewal and grant of permits:
The case involved the State Road Transport Corporation of Maharashtra seeking renewal and grant of stage carriage permits, which were also applied for by private operators. The Provincial Transport Services, the predecessor of the appellant, had published a scheme to take over several routes, which was initially approved but later challenged and quashed by the High Court. The R.T.A. considered the applications for renewal and substantive permits, rejecting private operators' applications and granting permits to the appellant. This decision was challenged in multiple Civil Applications, leading to a series of reconsiderations and orders by the R.T.A. The High Court intervened, quashing the initial order due to improper constitution of the R.T.A. and later directing a compromise between the parties to settle the matter.
Challenge to the constitution of the R.T.A.:
The constitution of the R.T.A. was challenged by the private operators on the grounds of improper constitution on the date when the initial order was passed. The High Court upheld this challenge, leading to a reevaluation of the applications for renewal and grant of permits by the R.T.A. on a later date to rectify the procedural irregularity.
Interim order for maintaining status quo:
During the proceedings, an interim order was issued by Paranipe, J., directing the R.T.A. to maintain status quo on certain routes until a final decision was reached. This interim order was confirmed by the High Court, ensuring that the operations on specific routes remained unchanged until the resolution of the legal disputes.
Application for compromise to settle the matter between the State Road Transport Corporation and private operators:
A joint application was made to the R.T.A. by the appellant and private operators, proposing a compromise to settle the ongoing litigation. The terms of the compromise included withdrawal of the Special Civil Applications and an agreement on the commencement of operations on specific routes. The R.T.A. considered this application, and upon assurance from the private operators, a decision was made to allow the appellant to commence operations on certain routes from specific dates, while granting temporary permits to private operators on other routes until a specified period.
This detailed analysis outlines the key issues and the legal proceedings involved in the judgment, highlighting the complexities of the case and the steps taken by the courts to address the challenges raised by the parties.
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1968 (8) TMI 189
Issues:
1. Validity of assessment orders for the circumstances and property tax.
2. Jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
3. Allegations of ultra vires taxing provisions and violation of natural justice.
Analysis:
1. Validity of Assessment Orders:
The appellant, a partnership firm engaged in manufacturing Khandsari sugar, challenged the assessment orders issued by the Antarim Zila Parishad for the circumstances and property tax for the years 1959-60 and 1961-62. The appellant contended that the Taxing Officer lacked authority to impose the tax and that the Parishad was not validly constituted after December 31, 1959. Additionally, the appellant alleged violations of constitutional provisions, including Art. 14 and Art. 276, and procedural irregularities. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in summarily dismissing the writ petition based on the availability of an alternative statutory appeal. The Court found merit in the appellant's contentions regarding ultra vires taxing provisions and violation of natural justice, leading to the allowance of the appeal and setting aside of the previous judgments.
2. Jurisdiction of the High Court:
The primary argument presented on behalf of the appellant was that the High Court was mistaken in deeming the statutory appeal under the U.P. District Boards Act as a sufficient remedy, thereby requiring the appellant to exhaust it before seeking relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The Court acknowledged the general principle that litigants should pursue available remedies before invoking the High Court's special jurisdiction. However, exceptions exist where statutory remedies are inadequate or where there are violations of natural justice. In this case, the Court found that the High Court's discretion was not exercised in accordance with the law, as the appellant's allegations of ultra vires provisions and procedural irregularities warranted consideration beyond the statutory appeal process.
3. Allegations of Ultra Vires Provisions and Violation of Natural Justice:
The appellant raised substantial legal arguments challenging the validity of the taxing provisions under the U.P. District Boards Act, alleging violations of constitutional rights and procedural improprieties. Specifically, the appellant contended that the tax imposition exceeded the prescribed limits under Art. 276 of the Constitution and that the assessment procedure did not adhere to principles of natural justice. The Court recognized the seriousness of these allegations and concluded that the High Court's summary dismissal of the writ petition was erroneous. The Court emphasized that the discretion of the High Court should align with legal principles, especially in cases involving potential ultra vires actions and violations of natural justice.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the previous judgments, and directed the restoration of the writ petition for further consideration in accordance with the law. The Court highlighted the importance of addressing substantial legal issues raised by the appellant, including challenges to the validity of taxing provisions and procedural fairness, which warranted a more thorough examination beyond the statutory appeal process.
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1968 (8) TMI 188
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the notice issued under Section 7 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910.
2. Compliance with the requirements of Section 7 to compel the sale of the undertaking.
3. Authority of the Bombay State Electricity Board and the appellant to exercise the right to purchase.
4. Impact of amendments and repeals on the rights acquired under the previous law.
5. Conditionality of the appellant's right to purchase on the payment of the price.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Notice Issued Under Section 7 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910:
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the notice issued by the Bombay State Electricity Board on January 8, 1959, under Section 7 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, was valid. The High Court had determined that the notice was valid under Section 7(4) of the Act but concluded that it was insufficient to compel the respondent to sell the undertaking. The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's interpretation, stating that the notice complied with the requirements of Section 7(4) and that the option to purchase and the election to purchase are part of a single integral process, not two independent steps.
2. Compliance with the Requirements of Section 7 to Compel the Sale of the Undertaking:
The High Court had held that the appellant needed to take two independent steps: (1) an election to purchase the undertaking followed by a notice to the respondent within the period mentioned in Section 7(4), and (2) exercise its option to purchase upon the expiration of the license period. The Supreme Court found this interpretation incorrect, stating that the exercise of the option to purchase and the election to purchase are one integral process. The notice given by the Bombay State Electricity Board on January 8, 1959, fulfilled the requirements of Section 7.
3. Authority of the Bombay State Electricity Board and the Appellant to Exercise the Right to Purchase:
The respondent contested the appellant's right to purchase the undertaking, arguing that neither the Bombay State Electricity Board nor the appellant had the authority to exercise this right. The Supreme Court examined Section 71 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, which transfers the right or option to purchase the undertaking from the State Government or local authority to the Board. The Court concluded that the appellant had acquired the right to purchase the undertaking by the combined operation of Section 7 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and Section 71 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948.
4. Impact of Amendments and Repeals on the Rights Acquired Under the Previous Law:
The respondent argued that the amendments to Section 7 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and the repeal of Section 71 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, nullified the appellant's right to purchase. The Supreme Court held that unless expressly or by necessary implication, the new law had taken away the rights acquired earlier, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would preserve those rights. The right to purchase the respondent's undertaking, which vested in the Bombay State Electricity Board and subsequently in the appellant, remained valid.
5. Conditionality of the Appellant's Right to Purchase on the Payment of the Price:
A new contention was raised in the Supreme Court that the appellant's right to purchase was conditional on the payment of the price as provided in Section 7. This issue was not addressed by the High Court and was left open for it to decide upon remand. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and remitted the case back to the High Court to decide the remaining issues, including the conditionality of the appellant's right to purchase on the payment of the price.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and remitted the case back to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues. The costs of the appeal were to be costs in the cause.
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1968 (8) TMI 187
Detention under the Preventive Detention Act (4 of 1950)challenged - Held that:- As regards mala fides and collateral purpose alleged to be the real reason, the averment is that the detention was ordered to prevent the detenus from actively campaigning for the Panchayat elections that were to take place on the 19th and 20th February, 1968. This has been denied and looking to the circumstances of this area which are notorious there is no doubt in our minds that the affidavit of the District Magistrate is reliable.
What we have to satisfy ourselves about is the satisfaction of the authority and the absence of mala fides and whether all the opportunities of making representation were given. There were enough instances cited of the conduct on which detention was ordered for the petitioner to make an effective representation. The situation in this area was already bad and the later activities would not make it any better. We do not think that the detention suffers from any defect. The petition will be dismissed.
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