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• 1971 (8) TMI 234
  
  ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

  The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:

  • Whether the convictions of the appellants under Sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), read with Section 34 IPC, were justified based on the evidence presented.
  • Whether the High Court was correct in overturning the acquittal by the Sessions Judge and convicting the appellants.
  • The credibility of the eyewitness testimonies and the dying declaration of the deceased.
  • The adequacy of the motive established by the prosecution for the crime.
  • The appropriateness of the High Court's assessment of the evidence and its decision to reverse the acquittal.

  ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

  1. Convictions under Sections 302 and 307 IPC, read with Section 34 IPC

  The relevant legal framework involves Sections 302 (murder) and 307 (attempt to murder) of the IPC, both read with Section 34, which deals with acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. The Court analyzed whether the appellants acted with common intention to commit murder and attempt to murder.

  The Court's interpretation focused on the testimonies of the eyewitnesses, including Rishipal Singh and others, who provided consistent accounts of the incident. The evidence showed that the appellants, armed with weapons, attacked Gajraj Singh, resulting in his death, and injured others who tried to intervene.

  Key evidence included the medical reports corroborating the injuries described by the witnesses and the recovery of fired cartridges from the scene. The Court found the prosecution's narrative credible, supported by physical evidence and consistent witness testimonies.

  Competing arguments from the defense suggested alternative motives and questioned the delay in filing the first information report (FIR). However, the Court found these arguments speculative and unsupported by evidence.

  2. High Court's Reversal of Acquittal

  The High Court's power to review evidence in appeals against acquittal was central to this issue. The Court referenced precedents affirming the High Court's authority to reassess evidence and reach a different conclusion if the trial court's judgment was unreasonable.

  The High Court found the Sessions Judge's acquittal based on an unreasonable appreciation of evidence, particularly regarding the alleged lack of motive and the credibility of witnesses. The High Court emphasized that the evidence supported the prosecution's case, and the acquittal resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

  The Court concluded that the High Court correctly exercised its power to reverse the acquittal, as the Sessions Judge's findings were not supported by the evidence.

  3. Credibility of Eyewitness Testimonies and Dying Declaration

  The Court evaluated the consistency and reliability of the eyewitness accounts, which were pivotal in establishing the sequence of events and identifying the assailants. The testimonies of Rishipal Singh and others were found credible, as they were consistent with the medical evidence and the circumstances described.

  The dying declaration made by Gajraj Singh was also considered, with the Court noting that its absence in the FIR did not undermine its credibility. The High Court found the declaration consistent with the overall prosecution narrative.

  4. Adequacy of Motive

  The prosecution's motive centered on the familial and social tensions arising from Rishipal Singh's relationship with Bitana, which was resented by the appellants. The Court found this motive plausible and supported by the context of the incident.

  The Sessions Judge's alternative motive theory, suggesting Rishipal's interest in Jadunath Singh's property, was dismissed as speculative and unsupported by evidence.

  SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

  The Court upheld the High Court's decision to convict the appellants, emphasizing the credibility of the eyewitnesses and the consistency of their testimonies with the medical evidence. The judgment reinforced the principle that appellate courts have the authority to overturn acquittals when the trial court's findings are unreasonable.

  Core principles established include the importance of a thorough and reasonable assessment of evidence by trial courts and the appellate court's role in correcting miscarriages of justice.

  The final determination was to dismiss the appeals, affirming the convictions and sentences imposed by the High Court.

  ---

• 1971 (8) TMI 233
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to uphold the conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
  2. Whether the appellant's statement to the Doctor was admissible under Section 26 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence:
  
  The appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was primarily based on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution presented multiple pieces of evidence:
  
  - The appellant had a motive to murder the deceased due to an illicit relationship with the deceased's wife.
  - The appellant was aware that the deceased would be alone at home on the night of the murder.
  - A towel belonging to the appellant was found near the deceased's body, identified by the washerman.
  - The appellant's clothes were found with human bloodstains upon his surrender to the police.
  - The discovery of the murder weapon, an aruval, by the appellant.
  - Injuries on the appellant, including an abrasion on his toe, allegedly caused by the deceased biting him.
  
  Both the Sessions Court and the High Court found the above evidence collectively pointed to the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. The defense's attempt to challenge the construction of evidence and the capability of the aruval to cause the injuries was unsuccessful. The courts concluded that the evidence was clear and unambiguous, establishing a chain of events leading to the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
  
  2. Admissibility of the Appellant's Statement to the Doctor:
  
  The appellant's statement to the Doctor, claiming that the deceased caused an injury on his toe, was challenged as inadmissible under Section 26 of the Evidence Act, 1872. This section provides that a confession made by an accused in police custody is inadmissible unless made in the presence of a magistrate. However, the court examined whether the statement constituted a "confession."
  
  The court referred to precedents, including the Privy Council's decision in Pakala Narayana Swami v. The King Emperor and subsequent rulings, which clarified that a confession must be a direct acknowledgment of guilt. An admission of an incriminating fact, which does not by itself establish guilt, does not qualify as a confession. The appellant's statement was deemed an admission of a fact (his presence at the crime scene) rather than a confession. Therefore, it was admissible under Section 21 of the Evidence Act as an admission, not barred by Section 26.
  
  The court upheld the High Court's decision that the statement was properly admitted and could be relied upon as evidence. Consequently, the appellant's second contention regarding the inadmissibility of his statement also failed.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence of death under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, as the circumstantial evidence was deemed sufficient, and the appellant's statement to the Doctor was admissible under the Evidence Act.

  ---

• 1971 (8) TMI 232
  
  Issues:
  Challenge to the validity of the Mysore Land Revenue (Surcharge) Act, 1961 and its amendments under Article 226 of the Constitution. Competence of the Mysore legislature to enact the Acts. Constitutionality of the Acts under Articles 14, 19, and 31 of the Constitution. Discriminatory nature of the levy under Article 14.
  
  Analysis:
  The judgment involved seven writ petitions challenging the Mysore Land Revenue (Surcharge) Act, 1961, and its amendments as ultra vires the Constitution. The High Court upheld the validity of the Acts, stating they were within the competence of the Mysore legislature and did not violate Articles 14, 19, or 31 of the Constitution. The petitions originated from different districts, but the decision on one petition would impact all appeals.
  
  In the specific case of writ petition No. 1137 of 1963 concerning lands in South Kanara district, the petitioner mutt owned properties and paid assessments based on a settlement from 1902 to 1904. The Madras Legislature levied surcharges on these lands, but integration with Mysore led to the enactment of the Mysore Land Revenue (Surcharge) Act, 1961. Subsequent amendments raised surcharges significantly.
  
  The Acts were challenged on grounds of legislative competence, additional land revenue levy, violation of Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31, and discrimination under Article 14. The High Court held that the surcharge was within Entry 45 or 49 of the State List, and the Mysore Legislature was competent to enact the Acts.
  
  The Court analyzed the nature of the surcharge, concluding it constituted an additional imposition of land revenue falling under Entry 45. Referring to precedents, the Court found no breach of Article 14, considering the temporary nature of the Acts and the ongoing resettlement and survey processes.
  
  The judgment referenced the importance of State reorganization in Article 14 considerations and highlighted the State's discretion in levying additional revenue. The Court emphasized the temporary nature of the Acts and the State's urgency for funds, concluding that the Legislature did not act contrary to Article 14.
  
  In conclusion, the appeals challenging the Acts were dismissed, with no order as to costs. The judgment upheld the validity of the Mysore Land Revenue (Surcharge) Act, 1961, and its amendments, emphasizing the temporary nature of the surcharge and the State's authority in revenue matters.

  ---

• 1971 (8) TMI 231
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of notice under Section 80, Civil Procedure Code.
  2. Discrepancy between the name of the sender of the notice and the plaintiff.
  3. The State's approach to litigation and its responsibilities.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of Notice under Section 80, Civil Procedure Code:
  
  The defendant, the Union of India represented by the General Manager, Southern Railway, contended that the suit was invalid due to the lack of a valid notice under Section 80, Civil Procedure Code. However, the court found this contention to be untenable and unjust. The plaintiff had indeed sent a notice under Section 80 before instituting the action. The advocate for the plaintiff described his client as "Kozhikode Lime Centre, Lime Fruits, Vegetable Merchants and Commission Agents, M. V. Market, Calicut-2" in the notice. In the plaint, the plaintiff was described as "Kozhikode Lime Centre by proprietor, P. P. Abubacker." The court observed that the defendant, in their written statement, did not challenge the validity of the notice but merely required formal proof of service. The court concluded that there was no legal plea of denial of the notice under Section 80 or its validity, and thus, no question of the sustainability of the action on account of non-compliance with Section 80 arose.
  
  2. Discrepancy Between the Name of the Sender of the Notice and the Plaintiff:
  
  The court addressed the issue of whether a discrepancy between the name of the sender of the notice and the plaintiff was fatal to the suit. The notice was sent by "Kozhikode Lime Centre," and the suit was filed by "Kozhikode Lime Centre, by proprietor P. P. Abubacker." The court found that the defendant had no doubts about the identity of the party and only demanded proof of service of the notice. The court distinguished the present case from the ruling in S. N. Dutt v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 1449, where the notice was sent by "M/s. S. N. Dutt & Co." and the plaintiff was described as "Surrendra Nath Dutta, sole proprietor of a business carried on under the name and style of S. N. Dutt & Co." The court noted that the name "Kozhikode Lime Centre" did not necessarily indicate a firm and was consistent with an assumed name in which an individual was doing business. The court emphasized that the notice must be construed with regard to commonsense and the object of Section 80, which is to give the Government an opportunity to reconsider its legal position and settle the claim out of court. The court concluded that no confusion of identity had been caused to the defendant, and the present plea served only to lengthen the litigation.
  
  3. The State's Approach to Litigation and Its Responsibilities:
  
  The court highlighted the responsibilities of the State in litigation. The State, under the Constitution, undertakes economic activities in a vast and widening public sector and inevitably gets involved in disputes with private individuals. The court emphasized that the State is no ordinary party trying to win a case against its own citizens by hook or by crook. The State's interest is to meet honest claims, vindicate a substantial defense, and never to score a technical point or overreach a weaker party to avoid a just liability or secure an unfair advantage. The court noted that the State should behave in a straightforward way and settle disputes where litigation could be avoided. The court criticized the present case as an instance of disregard for the national policy on State litigation, which aims to cut back on the volume of lawsuits by not being tempted into forensic showdowns where a reasonable adjustment is feasible.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court allowed the second appeal and directed the trial court to proceed with the suit on the real controversy in the case. The court-fee paid in the appeal was ordered to be refunded, and the court expressed hope that the Railway, through its legal advisers, would have a second look at the merits of the matter and put an end to the litigation by a fair settlement. A copy of the judgment was directed to be sent to the Central Government and the General Manager, Southern Railway.

  ---

• 1971 (8) TMI 230
  
  Issues:
  Admissibility of unstamped documents in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act.
  
  Analysis:
  The revision pertains to the admission of two unregistered documents, an unregistered sale deed, and an unregistered adoption deed, subject to payment of stamp duty and penalty under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act. The petitioner sought to use these documents to prove the signature of the plaintiff for a different purpose, i.e., to establish the plaintiff's signature in a will. The subordinate Judge held that the documents could not be admitted as evidence without proper stamping and directed payment of stamp duty and penalty for their admission. The petitioner relied on a Rangoon High Court decision, contending that only the signatures in the documents were being relied upon for a collateral matter. However, the amicus curiae argued that unstamped documents cannot be admitted for any purpose. The court examined the provisions of Section 35, emphasizing the requirement of stamping to prevent loss of revenue and the admissibility of documents under the proviso (a) of the section upon payment of deficit duty and penalty.
  
  The court referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand, which clarified the scope of Section 35, stating that unstamped instruments are inadmissible for any purpose. It highlighted that the prohibition applies regardless of the purpose for which the document is sought to be used, including collateral purposes. The court distinguished the effect of non-registration under the Indian Registration Act from the stamping requirement under Section 35, emphasizing the absolute bar on admitting unstamped instruments. The court rejected the petitioner's argument that only signatures were being relied upon, emphasizing that any part of a document chargeable with duty cannot be admitted in evidence under Section 35.
  
  The court dismissed the revision petition, finding no merit in the petitioner's arguments regarding the admissibility of the unstamped documents. The court expressed gratitude to the amicus curiae for their assistance and granted a month's time for the petitioner to pay the stamp duty and penalty. The judgment underscores the strict application of Section 35 to ensure proper stamping of chargeable instruments for their admissibility in evidence, irrespective of the purpose for which they are sought to be used.

  ---

• 1971 (8) TMI 229
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether there was a severance of the joint family and a partition of lands in 1956 and 1960.
  2. Determination of the ceiling area under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961.
  3. Consideration of additional family members born after the appointed day.
  4. Treatment of land purchased separately by a family member before the appointed day.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Severance of the Joint Family and Partition of Lands in 1956 and 1960:
  The appellants claimed that the joint family had undergone a partial partition in 1956 and a complete partition in 1960. They relied on mutation vardhis, sales of lands, market receipts, affidavits, and a consent deed to support their claim. The Deputy Collector and the Revenue Tribunal rejected this claim, noting the absence of a partition deed, unequal distribution of shares, and lack of evidence for the division of other properties like houses. Additionally, the authorities found no proof that the sale proceeds were appropriated by the members to whom the lands were allegedly allotted. The concurrent finding of fact by both authorities was that the appellants' case of partition was not acceptable. The court held that it would not interfere with such a concurrent finding of fact under Article 136.
  
  2. Determination of Ceiling Area:
  The Act imposes a ceiling on agricultural land holdings from the appointed day, January 26, 1962. Section 4 prohibits holding land in excess of the ceiling area, and any excess is deemed surplus. Section 5 specifies the ceiling area for different local areas and classes of land. For families with more than five members, Section 6 allows holding additional land to the extent of 1/6th of the ceiling area for each member exceeding five. The proviso to Section 6 states that if any member holds land separately, they shall not be regarded as a member for the purpose of increasing the family's ceiling area. The court concluded that the ceiling area is determined with reference to the appointed day and is not subject to fluctuations due to changes in family size.
  
  3. Consideration of Additional Family Members Born After the Appointed Day:
  The appellants argued that the ceiling area should be redetermined to account for three children born after the appointed day. The court rejected this argument, stating that the Act does not provide for redetermination of the ceiling area based on subsequent changes in family size. The ceiling area is fixed as of the appointed day, and any subsequent births do not alter it. The court cited previous judgments from the Bombay High Court supporting this interpretation.
  
  4. Treatment of Land Purchased Separately by a Family Member Before the Appointed Day:
  Madhav had purchased 11.20 acres of land in March 1960. The proviso to Section 6 stipulates that if a family member holds land separately, they cannot be considered a member for the purpose of increasing the family's ceiling area. The court held that either the land is treated as Madhav's separate property, in which case he is not considered a family member for ceiling purposes, or it is treated as family property, in which case it is added to the family's total holding, and Madhav is considered a family member. The Tribunal found no evidence that the land was treated as Madhav's separate property and included it in the family's holding, allowing for an additional 1/6th of the ceiling area.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeal was dismissed with costs, upholding the findings of the Deputy Collector and the Revenue Tribunal. The court affirmed that the family held 354.27 acres of land, and the ceiling area for the family was 192 acres, making 162.27 acres surplus. The court also clarified that the ceiling area is determined as of the appointed day and does not change with subsequent family size variations.

  ---

• 1971 (8) TMI 228
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Conviction under Section 395 IPC
  2. Conviction under Section 307 IPC
  3. Identification of the accused
  4. Use of First Information Report (FIR) as evidence
  5. Conduct and reliability of Test Identification Parades (TIPs)
  6. Legal sufficiency of evidence
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Conviction under Section 395 IPC
  The trial court convicted all five accused under Section 395 IPC, sentencing four to ten years of rigorous imprisonment. The High Court, however, acquitted three of the accused while maintaining the convictions of Sheikh Habib alias Tabarak (the appellant) and Sheikh Quddua alias Khudwa. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence against the appellant, particularly focusing on the identification process and the reliability of the witness testimonies.
  
  2. Conviction under Section 307 IPC
  Akal Yadav, one of the accused, was additionally convicted under Section 307 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. The High Court acquitted him along with two others, leaving only the appellant and Sheikh Quddua with sustained convictions. The Supreme Court did not find sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction under Section 307 IPC for the appellant.
  
  3. Identification of the Accused
  The prosecution's case heavily relied on the identification of the accused by witnesses. The Supreme Court scrutinized the identification process, noting that the appellant was identified by Inspector Jadunandan Singh (P.W. 10) during a Test Identification Parade (TIP). The Court emphasized that the substantive evidence is the witness's statement in court, and TIPs serve to corroborate this testimony. The Court found inconsistencies and procedural lapses in the identification process, weakening the evidence against the appellant.
  
  4. Use of First Information Report (FIR) as Evidence
  The High Court used the FIR (Ex. 1) to corroborate P.W. 10's testimony. The Supreme Court clarified that the FIR's principal object is to set the criminal law in motion and provide information for investigation. It cannot be used as substantive evidence to corroborate or contradict other witnesses, except its maker. The High Court's reliance on the FIR to support P.W. 10's identification was legally erroneous.
  
  5. Conduct and Reliability of Test Identification Parades (TIPs)
  The Supreme Court found several issues with the TIPs conducted. The appellant was identified in a TIP held on February 14, 1963, despite being arrested on January 29, 1963. The delay and multiple TIPs raised doubts about the fairness and reliability of the process. The Court noted that effective precautions were not taken to prevent witnesses from seeing the accused before the TIPs, further undermining their reliability.
  
  6. Legal Sufficiency of Evidence
  The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence against the appellant was insufficient to sustain a conviction. The identification by P.W. 10 lacked corroborative value due to procedural flaws in the TIPs and the improper use of the FIR. The Court emphasized that without substantive evidence of the appellant's involvement in the dacoity, the conviction could not be upheld.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, finding no legal evidence connecting him to the alleged offense. The judgment highlighted the importance of adhering to legal principles in the use of FIRs and the conduct of TIPs to ensure fair and reliable identification of accused persons.

  ---

• 1971 (8) TMI 227
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Entitlement to notice under Section 32-D of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955.
  2. Validity of transfers under Section 32-FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955.
  3. Principles of natural justice in the context of surplus area proceedings.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Entitlement to Notice under Section 32-D of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955:
  
  The appellants argued that they were entitled to notice before the surplus area was declared under Section 32-D of the Pepsu Act. The court noted that no notice was given to the appellants, who had purchased the land in 1958. The appellants contended that the lack of notice vitiated the proceedings, making them null and void. The State, however, relied on the Full Bench judgment in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, which held that transferees were not interested parties entitled to notice. The court observed that the Full Bench judgment in Pritam Singh's case related to the Pepsu Act and not the Punjab Act, and the distinction between the two Acts was significant. The court concluded that the principles of natural justice required that notice be given to transferees, as their interests could be prejudicially affected by the declaration of the surplus area.
  
  2. Validity of Transfers under Section 32-FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955:
  
  The appellants argued that as landless persons, their transfer should be valid under Section 32-FF of the Pepsu Act. They contended that even if they were relations within the prescribed degree, the transfer should be valid, and they should be entitled to receive the consideration paid to the vendor. The court noted that Section 32-FF provided that transfers after August 21, 1956, would not affect the State's right to the surplus area. The court further observed that the Supreme Court in S. Pritam Singh Chahil v. State of Punjab held that such transfers were good between the transferor and transferee but ineffective against the State. The court concluded that even if the transfers were ignored for determining the surplus area, the transferees were entitled to a hearing to claim the consideration paid.
  
  3. Principles of Natural Justice in the Context of Surplus Area Proceedings:
  
  The court emphasized the importance of the principles of natural justice, particularly the rule of audi alteram partem (hear the other side). The court cited various judgments, including Union of India v. Col. J. N. Sinha and State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, to highlight that even administrative orders affecting civil consequences must conform to the principles of natural justice. The court held that the proceedings under the Pepsu Act were quasi-judicial and required adherence to natural justice principles. The court concluded that the transferees were entitled to notice and a hearing before the surplus area was declared, as their interests could be adversely affected.
  
  Judgment of the Full Bench:
  
  The Full Bench, comprising R.S. Narula, C.J., Harbans Singh, Gurdev Singh, Balraj Tuli, and Prem Chand Jain, J.J., unanimously agreed with the analysis provided by Narula, J. They concluded that where a transfer is made by a landowner after August 21, 1956, the transferee is an interested person entitled to notice before declaring the surplus area under the Pepsu Act. The court emphasized that the principles of natural justice required that the transferee be given an opportunity to safeguard their interests in such proceedings. The costs of the hearing before the Full Bench were to abide by the decision of the appeal, which was to be decided by the Division Bench in accordance with the law, keeping in view the answer provided by the Full Bench.

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• 1971 (8) TMI 226
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality of the strike by the workmen.
  2. Justification of the termination of workmen's services without a domestic enquiry.
  3. Entitlement of workmen to back wages.
  4. Validity of the termination of services of a specific workman, Shri Surat Singh.
  
  Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legality of the Strike by the Workmen:
  The judgment begins by detailing the events leading to the strike. The workmen went on strike on 25-1-59 after the suspension of a fellow worker, despite ongoing conciliation efforts. The Labour Court initially found the strike to be illegal due to pending proceedings before the Labour Court in Reference No. 150 of 1958. This finding was upheld by the Supreme Court, which noted that the strike was indeed illegal under Chapter V of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
  
  2. Justification of the Termination of Workmen's Services Without a Domestic Enquiry:
  The primary issue was whether the termination of the workmen's services without holding a domestic enquiry was justified. The Supreme Court emphasized that even in cases of illegal strikes, the management must conduct a domestic enquiry to substantiate allegations of misconduct. The Court referred to previous judgments, including *Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Michael Mark* and *India General Navigation & Railway Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen*, which established that termination without an enquiry is generally invalid. However, the Court also noted that the management can justify the termination before the Tribunal by producing satisfactory evidence of misconduct. In this case, the management had issued multiple notices to the workmen, urging them to return to work, which they ignored. The Court concluded that the persistent refusal to join duty constituted misconduct, justifying the termination.
  
  3. Entitlement of Workmen to Back Wages:
  The Labour Court had initially awarded half back wages from 18-3-59 to the date the Award would become enforceable and full back wages from that date until reinstatement. However, the Supreme Court overturned this decision, finding that the termination was justified due to the workmen's misconduct. Therefore, the workmen were not entitled to back wages.
  
  4. Validity of the Termination of Services of Shri Surat Singh:
  The Court noted that there were no standing orders applicable to the appellant, making the termination of Shri Surat Singh invalid. The Labour Court's Award for his reinstatement was upheld, as the management conceded this point.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, except for the Award concerning Shri Surat Singh, which was maintained. The Court held that the termination of the other workmen's services was justified due to their misconduct in persistently refusing to join duty. The Tribunal's direction for reinstatement and payment of wages was overturned, and no costs were ordered.

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• 1971 (8) TMI 225
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality of the search and seizure conducted by the Excise Department.
  2. Compliance with the Gold Control Act, 1968, and associated rules by the petitioner.
  3. Jurisdiction and authority of the Excise Department to seize the petitioner's entire stock.
  4. Availability and adequacy of alternative remedies for the petitioner.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legality of the Search and Seizure:
  The petitioner, a licensed dealer under the Gold Control Act, 1968, had his business premises searched by the Excise Department on 27th April 1971. The search led to the seizure of 2583 pieces of gold ornaments weighing 22151.370 grams, as well as the discovery of a piece of foreign gold. The search was conducted under a search authorization issued under Section 105 of the Customs Act, 1962. The petitioner challenged the search and seizure, arguing that it was unjustified and illegal.
  
  2. Compliance with the Gold Control Act, 1968:
  The petitioner admitted that accounts were not written from 18th April 1971 and that the prescribed forms (GS-10, GS-11, GS-12) were not maintained. The petitioner argued that although entries were not made in the forms, relevant vouchers were available for inspection, and the posting of transactions was to be done within a few days. The court noted that under Section 55 of the Gold Control Act, every licensed dealer is required to maintain complete accounts of gold owned, possessed, or otherwise acquired. The petitioner failed to do so, thereby contravening Section 55 of the Act.
  
  3. Jurisdiction and Authority to Seize Entire Stock:
  Section 66 of the Gold Control Act empowers a Gold Control Officer to seize gold in respect of which any provision of the Act has been contravened. The court found that the seizure of the petitioner's entire stock was beyond the scope of Section 66. The officers should have seized only those ornaments that were not accounted for in the account books. The court held that the seizure of the entire stock was illegal and without jurisdiction, as no contravention of the Act was alleged in respect of the accounted-for ornaments.
  
  4. Availability and Adequacy of Alternative Remedies:
  The respondents argued that the petitioner had an adequate remedy available under the Act by way of filing an appeal and revision. The court, however, held that the existence of an alternative remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The court noted that the power of seizure is a serious inroad on the fundamental right of property and must be exercised strictly according to law. Since the seizure was found to be without jurisdiction, the petitioner was entitled to relief under Article 226.
  
  Conclusion:
  The writ petition was allowed, and the court directed the opposite parties to return the seized ornaments to the petitioner forthwith. The petitioner was also awarded costs. The court emphasized that while the petitioner had contravened Section 55 of the Act by failing to maintain accounts, the seizure of the entire stock was illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of the Excise Department. The Department was free to take any other action or proceedings against the petitioner for the said contravention of the Act.

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• 1971 (8) TMI 224
  
  Issues:
  1. Habeas corpus petition challenging the legality of confinement in sub-jail.
  2. Transfer petition seeking transfer of criminal cases.
  3. Bail application during the pendency of criminal cases.
  
  Habeas Corpus Petition Analysis:
  The petitioner, a self-described individual confined in a sub-jail, alleged his transfer without legal authority and lack of production before a magistrate. He made serious allegations against various officials and presented annexures to support his claims. The State countered with details of criminal charges, convictions, and legal proceedings against the petitioner, highlighting the delay in trial due to illness and multiple petitions filed. The Court noted the absence of specific orders but concluded that the current confinement did not appear illegal, refusing to grant habeas corpus based on unsubstantiated allegations.
  
  Transfer Petition Analysis:
  The transfer petition sought to move criminal cases from Bhubaneshwar to another state for expediency. The Court found no grounds justifying the transfer under Section 527 of the Cr.P.C., leading to the dismissal of the petition without further consideration.
  
  Bail Application Analysis:
  The petitioner's plea for bail during the ongoing criminal cases faced obstacles, including uncertainty regarding the status of a previous sentence and prior refusals of bail applications in Orissa. The Court highlighted the petitioner's option to challenge previous bail refusals in the High Court and emphasized the need for a fair trial. While dismissing the bail plea in the current proceedings, the Court directed the trial Court to expedite the cases and encouraged both parties to cooperate to avoid unnecessary delays.
  
  In the final judgment, both the habeas corpus and transfer petitions were dismissed. The Court acknowledged the assistance of amicus curiae and emphasized the importance of fair trial proceedings and timely case disposal.

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• 1971 (8) TMI 223
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Implementation of the Town Planning Scheme by the Municipal Corporation.
  2. Responsibility for the removal of unauthorized structures.
  3. Legal obligations under the Town Planning Act and Scheme.
  4. Issuance of a writ of mandamus.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Implementation of the Town Planning Scheme by the Municipal Corporation:
  The primary issue was whether the Municipal Corporation was responsible for implementing the Town Planning Scheme, which included constructing roads and drains and removing unauthorized structures. The High Court held that it was the Corporation's primary responsibility to implement the Scheme. The Supreme Court confirmed this, noting that the Corporation, as the local authority under the Town Planning Act, was wholly responsible for the preparation and implementation of every development plan.
  
  2. Responsibility for the Removal of Unauthorized Structures:
  The controversy centered on whether the Municipal Corporation owed a duty to remove unauthorized structures on private plots. The Attorney-General contended that the Corporation was not responsible for removing unauthorized structures on private plots and that the owners were solely responsible. However, the Supreme Court found that the Corporation was bound under the law to remove structures that contravened the Town Planning Scheme, even if they were on private plots. The Court referred to sections 53, 54, and 55 of the Town Planning Act, which empower the local authority to remove or alter any building or work that contravenes the Scheme.
  
  3. Legal Obligations under the Town Planning Act and Scheme:
  The Court emphasized that the Town Planning Act, 1954, and the Scheme framed under it placed stringent restrictions on property owners and vested considerable powers in the local authority to ensure proper town planning. Section 53 provided that all lands required by the local authority would vest absolutely in the local authority free from all encumbrances. Section 54 allowed the local authority to summarily evict any person occupying land contrary to the Scheme. Section 55 granted the local authority the power to remove, pull down, or alter any building or work that contravened the Scheme.
  
  4. Issuance of a Writ of Mandamus:
  The respondents sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Corporation to implement the Scheme by constructing roads and drains and removing unauthorized structures. The High Court granted the writ, and the Supreme Court upheld this decision. The Court noted that where a statute imposes a duty, a mandamus may be granted ordering that to be done which the statute requires. The Court found no adequate reason to refuse the writ, especially since the Corporation had stalled effective action for several years despite being served notices by the respondents.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with a modification to the High Court's order, specifying that the Corporation must remove within one year all such huts, sheds, stables, and other temporary structures that contravene the Scheme or in the erection or carrying out of which any provision of the Scheme has not been complied with. The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the periods for compliance were to be counted from the date of the Supreme Court's judgment.

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• 1971 (8) TMI 222
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of Section 3 of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District (Transfer of Land) Act, 1953.
  2. Competence of the District Council to legislate on the transfer of land.
  3. Alleged violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of Section 3 of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District (Transfer of Land) Act, 1953:
  The core issue revolves around the constitutional validity of Section 3 of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District (Transfer of Land) Act, 1953. The High Court of Assam and Nagaland had struck down this section, deeming it beyond the competence of the District Council and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court needed to determine this validity based solely on the interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions without delving into the factual background.
  
  2. Competence of the District Council to Legislate on the Transfer of Land:
  The primary question was whether Paragraph 3(1)(a) of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution confers the power on the District Council to make laws regarding the transfer of land. The High Court had held that Paragraph 3(1)(a) does not empower the District Council to legislate on the transfer of land, as the expression "allotment, occupation or use, or the setting apart of land" does not encompass "transfer of land."
  
  The Attorney-General argued for a broader interpretation, suggesting that the legislative history and the directive principles of state policy (Article 46) should guide the understanding of Paragraph 3(1)(a). He cited historical reports and previous court decisions to support a wider interpretation that includes the transfer of land. However, the Supreme Court found that the plain language of Paragraph 3(1)(a) did not support this broader interpretation. The Court emphasized that the words "allotment, occupation or use, or setting apart of land" do not imply the transfer of title and that the framers of the Constitution intended to restrict the District Council's legislative power to the actual use or occupation of land.
  
  The Court also noted the deliberate addition of the word "transfer" in the preamble and Section 3 of the impugned Act, which indicated an intent to extend beyond the constitutional limits. This departure from the constitutional language suggested an overreach of legislative power by the District Council.
  
  3. Alleged Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution:
  Given the Court's conclusion that the District Council lacked the legislative competence to enact Section 3 of the impugned Act, it found it unnecessary to address the issue of whether the section violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court typically refrains from deciding points that are not essential for the resolution of the appeal.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that Section 3 of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District (Transfer of Land) Act, 1953, was beyond the legislative competence of the District Council as conferred by Paragraph 3(1)(a) of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs, and the impugned Act was declared void to the extent of Section 3.

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• 1971 (8) TMI 221
  

  Should the employers be required to pay bonus to their workmen for the year 1960-61 ? If so, at what rate and with what details?

  Held that:- The amount found by the Tribunal in this regard is Rs. 1,29,248/- and if Rs. 55,233/- is to be provided there will be an available surplus of Rs. 74,015/-. The Tribunal as we / said awarded three months bonus amounting to Rs. 73,000/- which works out to Rs. 24,333/per month. We think having regard to the financial capacity of this Undertaking one month’s bonus which will leave a surplus for the working of the Undertaking, will meet the ends of justice. We accordingly order the payment of one month’s wages as bonus. Each party will bear their own costs in this Appeal.

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• 1971 (8) TMI 220
  
  Issues:
  1. Interpretation of exemption conditions under Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950.
  2. Compliance requirements for claiming exemption under the Act.
  3. Admissibility of additional evidence in revision proceedings.
  
  Analysis:
  
  Issue 1: Interpretation of exemption conditions under Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950
  The judgment addresses the interpretation of exemption conditions under the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950. The court emphasizes that the exemption was granted subject to specific conditions, such as the sale being made to a registered dealer against a written declaration for export outside the State. The court clarifies that strict compliance with the prescribed forms and returns is not an additional condition for claiming exemption. Citing relevant case law, the court highlights that once the conditions for exemption are fulfilled, the dealer is entitled to the benefit of exemption, even if certain forms were not submitted at the time of assessment.
  
  Issue 2: Compliance requirements for claiming exemption under the Act
  The judgment delves into the compliance requirements for claiming exemption under the Act. It discusses a case where a manufacturing dealer claimed exemption but did not furnish monthly returns or produce declarations at the time of assessment. The court concludes that strict compliance with the requirements of the exemption notification is necessary, but such compliance does not mandate the submission of specific forms at the assessment stage. The court opines that the dealer can establish fulfillment of the exemption conditions through alternative evidence, thereby emphasizing that the strict compliance does not include certain procedural formalities at the assessment stage.
  
  Issue 3: Admissibility of additional evidence in revision proceedings
  The judgment also addresses the admissibility of additional evidence in revision proceedings. It examines whether the Commissioner of Sales Tax was justified in refusing to consider declarations produced during revision proceedings. The court opines that the revising authority has the power to admit and consider additional material if necessary for effectively exercising its revisional jurisdiction. Citing relevant authorities, the court asserts that the revising authority can accept additional evidence to ensure a fair and just decision. Consequently, the court finds the refusal to consider the certificates produced during revision proceedings as inappropriate and rules in favor of admitting additional evidence during such proceedings.
  
  In conclusion, the court answers the questions posed in the negative, affirming the entitlement to exemption upon fulfilling the conditions, allowing alternative evidence for compliance, and permitting the admission of additional evidence in revision proceedings. The parties are left to bear their own costs in this reference.

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• 1971 (8) TMI 219
  
  Issues:
  1. Whether the petitioner, an incorporated company under the Companies Act, is liable to pay sales tax on alleged sales made to another party as directed by the Import Controller.
  2. Whether the transactions between the petitioner and the other party can be characterized as sales attracting the Sales Tax Act.
  3. Whether the petitioner can be considered a dealer for the purpose of sales tax liability based on the transactions in question.
  
  Analysis:
  The petitioner, an incorporated company, imported raw stock of films under the Export Promotion Scheme and obtained licenses for the same. The Import Controller imposed restrictions, including that the release of imported stock to a third party required authorization. Subsequently, a part of the imported stock was re-allotted to another party on a no-profit-no-loss basis. The respondent issued a notice to the petitioner regarding alleged sales made to the other party, subjecting them to sales tax assessment. The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to quash the order, contending that the transactions were not sales attracting sales tax liability.
  
  In a similar precedent, the Supreme Court held that transactions made under specific directives, not resulting from a contract of sale, do not constitute sales liable to sales tax. The High Court also previously ruled in a comparable case that such transactions do not make the party a dealer for sales tax purposes. In the present case, the imports were subject to restrictions and surplus stock was released at the Import Controller's direction, indicating a lack of essential elements of a sale. The court opined that the petitioner cannot be deemed a dealer as specific incidents and aspects defining a dealer were not met in this scenario.
  
  The court acknowledged the petitioner's proactive approach in seeking legal remedy due to apprehensions but ruled in favor of the petitioner. It held that since the petitioner was not a dealer and the transactions did not constitute sales, the notice demanding sales tax assessment was unwarranted. Consequently, the court allowed the writ petition, making the rule nisi absolute and granting no costs. The judgment concluded that the relief sought by the petitioner was justified, and no further proceedings based on the challenged notice were legally justified.

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• 1971 (8) TMI 218
  
  Issues:
  1. Interpretation of section 45(2)(d) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act.
  2. Legality of initiating action for non-compliance with storage rules.
  3. Presumption of tax evasion based on location of stock-in-trade.
  4. Validity of compounding option offered by revenue authorities.
  
  Interpretation of section 45(2)(d) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act:
  The petitioner challenged the legality of the action taken under section 45(2)(d) of the Act, arguing that storing goods in an unauthorized location does not necessarily constitute an offense. The court disagreed, emphasizing that the legislative intent behind such provisions is to prevent tax evasion and hold offenders accountable. The court cited precedents to support the legislative competence in creating such offenses and dismissed the petitioner's contention.
  
  Legality of initiating action for non-compliance with storage rules:
  The court noted that the petitioner failed to comply with the statutory obligation to store goods at the designated places mentioned in the registration certificate. The rule requiring stock-in-trade to be kept at specified locations is crucial to prevent tax evasion. The court upheld the validity of this rule as it is ancillary to the power to levy sales tax and essential for effective tax administration.
  
  Presumption of tax evasion based on location of stock-in-trade:
  While acknowledging that the mere presence of stock-in-trade in a partner's residence does not automatically imply tax evasion, the court stressed that in this case, the petitioner's failure to store goods at authorized locations raised a reasonable presumption of evasion. The petitioner's contradictory statements further cast doubt on the bona fides of his actions, leading the court to conclude that an offense was committed under section 45(2)(d) of the Act.
  
  Validity of compounding option offered by revenue authorities:
  The petitioner contested the compounding fee imposed by the revenue authorities, arguing against the option given to compound the offense instead of facing prosecution. The court upheld the decision of the revenue authorities, stating that the levy of the compounding fee was appropriate in the circumstances. The court found no legal error or jurisdictional issue in the actions of the revenue authorities, ultimately dismissing the petitioner's writ petition.
  
  In conclusion, the court dismissed the petitioner's challenge, upheld the actions of the revenue authorities, and found no grounds to interfere with the imposition of the compounding fee.

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• 1971 (8) TMI 217
  
  Issues:
  1. Challenge to the reopening of assessments under the Madras General Sales Tax Act for the years 1962-63 and 1963-64.
  2. Determination of whether transactions should be deemed as intra-State or inter-State sales.
  3. Examination of the role of the Controller of Stores, Madras, in the context of the contract.
  4. Jurisdiction of the respondent under section 16 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  1. The petitioners challenged the reopening of assessments under the Madras General Sales Tax Act for the years 1962-63 and 1963-64. The respondent sought to reopen the assessments made under the Central Sales Tax Act, claiming that the transactions were wrongly assessed as inter-State sales. The petitioners argued that the transactions involved a movement of goods between states, making them inter-State sales properly assessed under the Central Sales Tax Act. They contested the jurisdiction of the officer to reopen the assessments under section 16 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act.
  
  2. The court analyzed the transactions in question to determine whether they should be classified as intra-State or inter-State sales. The contract between the parties outlined the obligations of the petitioners in supplying goods to various locations. The court noted that goods were dispatched from Tamil Nadu to states outside it, indicating inter-State sales subject to the Central Sales Tax Act. The respondent, however, contended that the involvement of the Controller of Stores, Madras, made the transactions intra-State sales. The court found that the movement of goods was pursuant to the contract between the parties, establishing them as inter-State sales taxable under the Central Sales Tax Act.
  
  3. The court examined the role of the Controller of Stores, Madras, in the context of the contract. The Controller's involvement in testing, accepting, and sealing goods before dispatch raised questions regarding the tax liability of the transactions. The court clarified that the Controller's role was limited to quality supervision and did not impact the contractual terms between the parties. Specific despatch instructions issued by the Chief Controller of Telegraph Stores, Calcutta, further supported the inter-State nature of the transactions.
  
  4. The court evaluated the jurisdiction of the respondent under section 16 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. It concluded that the respondent's decision to reopen the assessments was unwarranted as the transactions were clearly inter-State sales. The court upheld the original authority's assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act for the years in question. Consequently, the court allowed the writ petitions, making the rules nisi absolute and ruling in favor of the petitioners.

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• 1971 (8) TMI 216
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of Rule 14-A(8) of the Central Sales Tax (Andhra Pradesh) Rules.
  2. Application of the time-limit for making best judgment assessments under the Central Sales Tax Act.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of Rule 14-A(8) of the Central Sales Tax (Andhra Pradesh) Rules:
  
  The petitioners contended that Rule 14-A(8) fixing the time-limit for making best judgment assessments in respect of escaped turnover is ultra vires and void as it exceeds the rule-making power of the State Government. They argued that the provision fixing the period of limitation was a substantive law and not a mere rule of procedure. The court examined whether the time-limits fixed under Rule 14-A(8) are periods of limitation forming part of substantive law or mere rules of procedure. The court noted that the substantive law defines the right and remedy, while the law of procedure defines the mode and conditions of application of one to the other. The court referenced the Supreme Court's observation in S.S. Gadgil v. Lal & Co. that the period prescribed for assessment is not a period of limitation but a fetter on the power of the assessing authority. The court concluded that Rule 14-A(8) is a procedural rule and not a substantive law, falling within the domain of adjective law. The court further examined whether Rule 14-A(8) is within the rule-making power conferred upon the State Government by section 13(3) or 13(4) of the Central Sales Tax Act. The court held that the power to make assessments includes the power to provide procedures for making assessments, including fixing a time-limit. Therefore, Rule 14-A(8) is within the rule-making power of the State Government.
  
  2. Application of the time-limit for making best judgment assessments under the Central Sales Tax Act:
  
  The petitioners argued that the Central Sales Tax Act incorporates the provisions of the General Sales Tax Act in force in Andhra Pradesh in 1956, which fixed a three-year period for assessing escaped turnover. Since the assessments in question were made beyond three years but within four years from the end of the assessment year 1963-64, they contended that the assessments were time-barred and illegal. The court examined whether the general sales tax law prevailing in Andhra Pradesh at the time when the Central Sales Tax Act came into force was incorporated into the latter Act or merely referred to in that Act. The court noted that the law draws a distinction between a mere reference to or citation of one statute in another and incorporation of one statute into another. The court held that section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act merely refers to the provisions of the General Sales Tax Act and does not incorporate them. Therefore, the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, which fixed a four-year period for making best judgment assessments, apply to the case. The court concluded that the assessments made within four years from the end of the relevant assessment year were valid.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court dismissed the writ petitions, holding that Rule 14-A(8) of the Central Sales Tax (Andhra Pradesh) Rules is valid and within the rule-making power of the State Government. The court also held that the assessments made within the four-year period from the end of the relevant assessment year were valid. The petitioners' contentions were rejected, and the petitions were dismissed with costs.

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• 1971 (8) TMI 215
  
  Issues:
  1. Validity of notices issued by assessing authority under section 16 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act.
  2. Jurisdiction of assessing authority to reassess tax liability based on alleged escapement.
  3. Interpretation of the powers of the assessing authority under section 16 in relation to revisional powers under sections 32 and 34 of the Act.
  4. Adequacy of particulars provided in the notices issued under section 16 for reassessment.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The judgment concerns writ petitions challenging the validity of notices issued by the assessing authority under section 16 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. The initial notices were deemed vague and lacking in specific details, prompting the petitioner to seek a writ of mandamus to prohibit further action. Subsequently, revised notices were issued with additional particulars, addressing the deficiencies of the original notices. The court found that the revised notices provided the necessary details and granted the assessing authority the jurisdiction to proceed with the reassessment, dismissing the writ petitions that challenged the initial notices for being vague.
  
  2. The core issue addressed in the judgment pertains to the jurisdiction of the assessing authority to reassess tax liability based on alleged escapement of turnover. The court clarified that under section 16 of the Act, the assessing authority possesses the original jurisdiction to reopen assessments if any part of the assessable turnover has escaped taxation. This power is distinct from the revisional powers granted to other specified authorities under sections 32 and 34 of the Act. The court emphasized that the assessing authority's actions under section 16 aim to bring escaped assessable turnover within the purview of taxation, and such jurisdiction is exercised independently of the revisional powers outlined in the Act.
  
  3. The judgment delves into the interpretation of the powers vested in the assessing authority under section 16 vis-`a-vis the revisional powers under sections 32 and 34 of the Act. While acknowledging that the assessing authority's actions may result in revising assessments, the court underscored that the primary objective of section 16 is to tax escaped assessable turnover discovered within the prescribed period. The court rejected the argument that only statutory authorities designated under sections 32 and 34 should exercise revisional powers, affirming the unique original jurisdiction conferred upon the assessing authority under section 16 for addressing escapement of tax liability.
  
  4. In evaluating the adequacy of particulars provided in the notices issued under section 16 for reassessment, the court found that all essential details required for the assessing authority to proceed with the reassessment were included in the revised notices. The petitioner was afforded the opportunity to submit objections as mandated by section 16, ensuring a fair hearing and compliance with procedural requirements. Consequently, the court dismissed the writ petitions challenging the notices on grounds of vagueness or lack of specificity, emphasizing the sufficiency of particulars provided for the reassessment process.
  
  In conclusion, the judgment upholds the validity of the reassessment notices issued by the assessing authority under section 16 of the Act, affirming the jurisdiction of the authority to address escapement of tax liability and emphasizing the distinct nature of the original jurisdiction under section 16 in contrast to the revisional powers under sections 32 and 34. The court's analysis underscores the importance of providing adequate particulars in reassessment notices and upholding procedural fairness in the reassessment process.

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