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1975 (8) TMI 151
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the District Judge to entertain the petition for the grant of Letters of Administration.
2. Maintainability of the petition for Letters of Administration.
3. Due execution, attestation, and genuineness of the Will.
4. Appointment of the guardian for the minor's property.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the District Judge to entertain the petition for the grant of Letters of Administration:
The appellants challenged the jurisdiction of the District Judge based on Section 5(2) of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, arguing that the High Court alone had jurisdiction for matters exceeding Rs. 50,000. The Court held that Section 5(2) confers ordinary original civil jurisdiction on the High Court only in relation to "every suit" and does not extend to testamentary and intestate jurisdiction. The District Judge retained jurisdiction in such matters, and the High Court had concurrent jurisdiction under Section 300 of the Indian Succession Act.
2. Maintainability of the petition for Letters of Administration:
The appellants argued that the petition was not maintainable because it did not mention the testator's property in Goa. The Court found that the Indian Succession Act did not apply to Goa during the material period, and the omission to mention the Goa property did not affect the jurisdiction of the District Judge or the maintainability of the petition. The Court concluded that the petition was competent even if it did not include the Goa property, as the District Judge had jurisdiction over the property within his territorial limits.
3. Due execution, attestation, and genuineness of the Will:
The Court examined the evidence of the attesting witnesses, Public Witness 1 (Shri Chet Ram Mittal, Advocate) and Public Witness 2 (J.D. Cruz), who confirmed the testator's sound disposing mind and the proper execution of the Will. The Court addressed the alleged suspicious circumstances, including inconsistencies in the Will, deprivation of the elder son and widow, and influence of the younger son's wife. The Court found that these circumstances did not cast doubt on the genuineness of the Will. The testator's advanced age and health conditions were considered, but the evidence supported the finding that he was of sound disposing mind when he executed the Will.
4. Appointment of the guardian for the minor's property:
The District Judge appointed the younger son as the guardian of the minor's person and property, subject to executing a bond. The Court upheld this appointment, finding no grounds to interfere with the decision.
Conclusion:
The appeals were dismissed, and the judgments of the District Judge granting Letters of Administration and appointing the guardian were upheld. The Court found that the District Judge had jurisdiction, the petition was maintainable, the Will was duly executed and genuine, and the appointment of the guardian was appropriate. The objections to the jurisdiction and maintainability of the petition were overruled, and the evidence supported the findings of the District Judge.
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1975 (8) TMI 150
Issues:
1. Conviction under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code for causing death by rash or negligent driving.
2. Appeal against conviction and sentence to the Sessions Court, Delhi.
3. Revision Application in the High Court challenging the conviction and sentence.
4. Review of evidence by the High Court in the Revision Application.
5. Exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution by the Supreme Court.
Analysis:
1. The case involved an appeal by special leave against an order of the High Court of Delhi rejecting a Revision Application against an appellate order confirming the conviction under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. The incident leading to the conviction was witnessed by three eye-witnesses, and the appellant was found guilty of causing death by negligent driving.
2. The appellant appealed the conviction to the Sessions Court, Delhi, where the sentence was reduced to six months considering a possible lapse into absent-mindedness by the appellant. Dissatisfied with the decision, the appellant filed a Revision Application in the High Court, which upheld the conviction after re-examining the evidence, leading to the present appeal in the Supreme Court.
3. The High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, reviewed the evidence to ensure the correctness of the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts. Despite the limited scope of revision, the High Court confirmed the conviction based on the established evidence of negligent driving leading to the death of the deceased.
4. The Supreme Court emphasized that it does not routinely re-appreciate evidence from lower courts but intervenes only in exceptional cases of manifest illegality or serious miscarriage of justice. In this case, the Court noted that the lower courts' appreciation of evidence was correct, supported by telltale circumstances, and affirmed the conclusion of negligent driving leading to the death of the deceased.
5. The Supreme Court analyzed the speed of the bus and the circumstances of the incident, concluding that while the speed may not have been excessive, the appellant's failure to notice the deceased and apply the brakes promptly constituted gross negligence. The Court upheld the findings of the lower courts, affirming the appellant's guilt under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction and instructing the appellant to surrender to bail.
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1975 (8) TMI 149
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the land acquisition proceedings.
2. Specificity and vagueness of the public purpose mentioned in the notification.
3. Whether the execution of the Interim General Plan constitutes a public purpose.
4. Allegation of the notification being a colorable device for freezing land.
5. Discrimination in the acquisition process.
6. Adequacy of opportunity for objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Land Acquisition Proceedings
The appeals challenge the validity of the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act. The appellants contested the notification issued under Section 4 and the subsequent declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The Supreme Court upheld the Punjab High Court's dismissal of the petitions challenging these proceedings, affirming the validity of the land acquisition.
2. Specificity and Vagueness of the Public Purpose Mentioned in the Notification
The appellant argued that the public purpose, "for the execution of the Interim General Plan for the Greater Delhi," was vague and thus invalid. However, the Supreme Court noted that this issue was not raised initially in the High Court. Even so, the Court found the public purpose sufficiently specific, given the large area involved. The Court referenced the case of Munshi Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi to support its finding that the specification of the public purpose was adequate and did not suffer from vagueness.
3. Whether the Execution of the Interim General Plan Constitutes a Public Purpose
The appellant contended that the execution of the Interim General Plan was not a public purpose. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, citing the affidavit of Shri K.L. Rathee, which detailed the necessity of the Interim General Plan to prevent unplanned and haphazard development in Delhi. The Court reiterated its stance from the Aflatoon case, affirming that the planned development of Delhi, including the execution of the Interim General Plan, constituted a public purpose under Section 4 of the Act.
4. Allegation of the Notification Being a Colorable Device for Freezing Land
The appellant claimed that the notification under Section 4 was a colorable device to freeze land. The Supreme Court dismissed this claim, stating that the freezing of land is an inherent consequence of a notification under Section 4, which serves to inform the public of the proposed acquisition and protect the land from speculative dealings. The Court emphasized that the public purpose stated in the notification was genuine and not a pretext for freezing land.
5. Discrimination in the Acquisition Process
The appellant pointed out that some lands initially included in the notification were later excluded from acquisition. The Supreme Court found no inherent infirmity in this, explaining that Section 5A of the Act allows for objections to be heard and considered, leading to possible exclusions. The Court held that the acceptance of some objections and rejection of others by the appropriate Government did not affect the validity of the acquisition of the appellant's land.
6. Adequacy of Opportunity for Objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act
In Civil Appeal No. 989 of 1968, the appellant argued that they were not given an adequate opportunity to be heard under Section 5A of the Act. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no evidence that a representative of the appellant appeared before the Collector on the scheduled date. The Court noted that the High Court had accepted the respondents' claim that no one appeared on behalf of the appellant. The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant's objections were considered along with others, and the Collector's report was duly made to the appropriate Government. Therefore, the Court found no merit in the contention that the appellant was denied an opportunity to be heard.
Conclusion
Both appeals were dismissed with costs, affirming the validity of the land acquisition proceedings and rejecting all the contentions raised by the appellants. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the Punjab High Court and confirmed that the procedural and substantive requirements under the Land Acquisition Act were met.
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1975 (8) TMI 147
Issues Involved:
1. Legitimacy of the investigation conducted by Head Constable Ram Singh.
2. Credibility of the prosecution's evidence.
3. Probable defense of the appellant regarding the permit.
4. Inherent improbability of the prosecution's bribery story.
Summary:
1. Legitimacy of the investigation conducted by Head Constable Ram Singh:
The Supreme Court noted a significant procedural irregularity in the investigation. Head Constable Ram Singh, who was the complainant in the bribery case, also conducted the investigation. The Court found it difficult to understand how the complainant could also be the investigator, highlighting that this dual role undermines the credibility of the prosecution case.
2. Credibility of the prosecution's evidence:
The prosecution's case relied solely on the testimony of Head Constable Ram Singh and four other police constables, with no independent witnesses to corroborate the offer of bribe. The Court pointed out that the seizure memo for the currency notes did not include any independent respectable witnesses, which could have been easily arranged. The absence of such witnesses and the lack of detailed circumstances in the seizure memo cast doubt on the prosecution's version of events.
3. Probable defense of the appellant regarding the permit:
The appellant claimed to have a valid permit dated 28th October 1966 for transporting gram, which he allegedly showed to Head Constable Ram Singh at the time of interception. The Court found this defense plausible, noting that the permit was only one day expired and the appellant might have believed it was still valid. The prosecution's claim that the permit was produced two days later was not supported by any Panchnama or memo, making the appellant's version more credible.
4. Inherent improbability of the prosecution's bribery story:
The Court found the prosecution's story of the appellant offering a bribe of Rs. 510 inherently improbable. It questioned why the appellant would offer the entire bundle of currency notes after an initial refusal by Head Constable Ram Singh to accept a smaller bribe. The Court deemed this sequence of events unnatural and unlikely, leading to hesitation in accepting the prosecution's narrative.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial Court and the High Court failed to consider several important circumstances that cast doubt on the prosecution's case. The evidence did not exclude reasonable doubt regarding the appellant's guilt. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant of the offence u/s 165A of the Indian Penal Code.
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1975 (8) TMI 146
Issues:
1. Whether a judgment delivered orally in open court can be withdrawn, altered, or modified before it is signed and sealed.
Analysis:
The judgment in question raised the issue of the finality of a judgment delivered orally in open court before being signed and sealed. The appellant requested that the appeal be treated as a revision petition after the judgment was orally dictated but before it was signed and sealed. The respondents objected, arguing that once a judgment is dictated in open court, it becomes final and cannot be reconsidered. The court examined relevant statutory provisions, including Order 20 Rule 1 and Order 20 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which require judgments to be signed and dated in open court. The court also considered case law, such as Firm Gokal Chandjagan Nath v. Firm Nand Ram Dass Atma Ram and Iqbal Ismail Sodawala v. Registrar Hon'ble High Court, Bombay, which emphasized that the date of operation of a judgment is not postponed to the date of signing.
Furthermore, the court discussed the effect of the death of a judge before the delivery of a judgment in the case of Surendra Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P., where the Supreme Court held that a judgment is not valid if both judges are not alive at the time of delivery. The court also referred to the decision in Beni Madho Prasad Singh v. Adit and Ors., where it was held that a judgment delivered in open court is not final until signed and dated. The court highlighted the differing views in various cases, such as Faulad and Anr. v. State and Sangam Lal v. Rent Controller and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, regarding the permissibility of altering a judgment before it is signed and sealed.
Moreover, the court discussed the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Ishwarbhai Desaibhai Patel v. Vadilal Lallubhai Mehta and Ors., which held that a judgment delivered in open court becomes final and cannot be revised. However, the court ultimately relied on English case law, such as Millensted v. Crosvenor House (Park Lane), Ltd. and Moon Motors Ltd. v. Kinan Wou, to conclude that a judgment can be withdrawn, altered, or modified until it is signed and dated. The court emphasized that signing and dating a judgment is an act that perfects it, making it final and complete. Based on these principles, the court allowed the application to treat the appeal as a revision petition and listed the case for further hearing.
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1975 (8) TMI 145
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the appeal under Section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956.
2. Jurisdiction of the company court to substitute heirs and legal representatives of a deceased director in misfeasance proceedings.
3. Applicability of Section 543 of the Companies Act, 1956, to the heirs and legal representatives of a delinquent director.
4. Interpretation of Section 543 of the Companies Act, 1956, in light of previous Indian and English case law.
5. The common law doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona in the context of the Companies Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of the Appeal:
The court held that the appeal is maintainable under Section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956. The section provides a substantive right of appeal against any order made in the matter of the winding up of a company. The court clarified that the words "in the matter of the winding up of a company" should be construed broadly. The court rejected the contention that the order for substitution is not a "judgment" under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, affirming that the appeal is maintainable as it involves the winding up of a company.
2. Jurisdiction to Substitute Heirs and Legal Representatives:
The court concluded that the company court does not have the jurisdiction to substitute heirs and legal representatives of a deceased director in misfeasance proceedings under Section 543 of the Companies Act, 1956. The court emphasized that Section 543 expressly empowers the court to assess damages against the alleged delinquent director and not against their heirs. The section does not mention the liability of the estate of such delinquent director in case of misfeasance or breach of trust.
3. Applicability of Section 543 to Heirs and Legal Representatives:
The court observed that Section 543 of the Companies Act, 1956, does not extend to making compulsive orders against heirs of delinquents. The section is designed to hold directors personally liable for misfeasance or breach of trust, and there is no provision for extending this liability to their heirs or legal representatives. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Official Liquidator, Supreme Bank Ltd. v. P. A. Tendolkar, which indicated that the liability of a deceased delinquent director could be declared but not enforced against the heirs.
4. Interpretation of Section 543 in Light of Previous Case Law:
The court reviewed various Indian and English case laws, including Section 235 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and Section 333 of the English Companies Act, 1948. The consistent view in these cases was that the remedy under these sections was personal against the delinquent director or officer and did not extend to their heirs or legal representatives. The court noted that the legislature, aware of these interpretations, did not amend Section 543 to include heirs and legal representatives, indicating an intention to maintain the established interpretation.
5. Common Law Doctrine of Actio Personalis Moritur Cum Persona:
The court held that the common law doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona, which means a personal action dies with the person, does not apply to cases under the Companies Act. However, the express language of Section 543 and the observations of the Supreme Court suggest that the liability for misfeasance or breach of trust is personal to the director and does not extend to their heirs or legal representatives.
Conclusion:
The court set aside the order of the court of first instance that substituted the heirs and legal representatives of Dr. Sinha in the misfeasance proceedings, allowing the appeal. The court held that the misfeasance proceedings could not continue against the heirs and legal representatives of a deceased director, as Section 543 of the Companies Act, 1956, does not provide for such substitution. The appeal was allowed, and the costs of the official liquidator were to be paid out of the assets lying with him.
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1975 (8) TMI 144
Issues:
1. Whether the award of interest at 11 per cent per annum with half-yearly rests by the trial Court is illegal.
2. Whether the compound interest provided for in the promissory note should be presumed excessive under the Usurious Loans Act.
3. Whether the provision for 11 per cent interest with half-yearly rests is usurious under the Usurious Loans Act.
4. Whether the rate of interest contracted for by the parties is excessive or unconscionable.
5. Whether the rate of interest in the particular case is excessive considering various factors.
Analysis:
1. The defendants appealed against the trial Court's decision awarding interest at 11 per cent per annum with half-yearly rests. The appellants argued they should only pay simple interest at 11 per cent per annum. The primary issue was whether the trial Court's interest award was illegal.
2. The appellants contended that under the Usurious Loans Act, compound interest charged to agriculturists is presumed excessive. However, as the appellants did not claim to be agriculturists in their written statement, this provision did not apply. The absence of any mention of being agriculturists in the written statement led to the rejection of this argument.
3. The appellants further argued that the 11 per cent interest with half-yearly rests was usurious under the Usurious Loans Act. The court dismissed this argument as the appellants failed to prove the transaction was unfair or unconscionable, which is a requirement under the Act.
4. The appellants' counsel contended that the rate of interest was excessive and unconscionable. However, the court emphasized that each case's facts determine whether the interest rate is excessive or not. The court highlighted the importance of considering circumstances like the security provided and prevailing market rates.
5. The court emphasized that no fixed rule exists for determining excessive interest rates, and each case must be assessed based on its unique circumstances. The lack of evidence regarding the property's value given as security and prevailing market interest rates led the court to uphold the trial Court's decision on the interest rate.
6. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed as the appellants failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the interest rate awarded was excessive. The court found no merit in the appeal and ordered the appellants to bear the costs.
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1975 (8) TMI 143
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the temporary injunction granted by the First Additional Civil Judge.
2. Legitimacy of the elected members' resignation and their right to function as committee members.
3. Authority of defendant-6 to co-opt other members under Article 37 of the Articles of Association.
4. Balance of convenience in granting or refusing the interlocutory injunction.
5. Conduct of the plaintiff and its impact on the interim relief.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the temporary injunction granted by the First Additional Civil Judge:
The appeals challenge the common order of the First Additional Civil Judge, Bangalore City, which granted a temporary injunction against the Directors of the Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. The plaintiff, a member of the Bangalore Turf Club Ltd., sought a declaration that the elected members had resigned via a resolution dated 8th December 1973 and thus ceased to be committee members. He also sought a permanent injunction to restrain them from exercising their powers and a direction for the Company to call an extraordinary general body meeting to fill the vacancies.
2. Legitimacy of the elected members' resignation and their right to function as committee members:
The plaintiff contended that the elected members had tendered their resignation on 8th December 1973 and had no right to manage the Company's affairs thereafter. The defendants argued that their resignations were conditional, meant to pressure the government for better law enforcement, and were withdrawn upon receiving assurances from the Commissioner for Home Affairs. The lower court concluded that the resignations were immediate and could not be withdrawn later, leading to the injunction against defendants 2 to 5 and 7 to 10 but not against defendant-6.
3. Authority of defendant-6 to co-opt other members under Article 37 of the Articles of Association:
The lower court opined that defendant-6, who did not resign, could co-opt other members to fill the vacancies under Article 37. However, this interpretation was questioned. Article 37 states that remaining elected members can fill vacancies, but it is doubtful whether one elected member can appoint multiple members simultaneously, as it might undermine the democratic structure of the committee.
4. Balance of convenience in granting or refusing the interlocutory injunction:
The court emphasized that the balance of convenience is crucial in granting an interlocutory injunction. The plaintiff must show that irreparable damage would occur without the injunction. The lower court's decision was criticized for prematurely deciding the merits of the case and not adequately considering whether the balance of convenience favored the plaintiff. The business of the Company, which involves technical expertise in racing, might suffer if managed by nominated members alone without the elected members' experience.
5. Conduct of the plaintiff and its impact on the interim relief:
The plaintiff's conduct was scrutinized, noting that he did not object to the elected members' continuation during the extraordinary general body meeting on 18th February 1974. The delay in filing the suit on 21st March 1974 suggested acquiescence, undermining his claim for interim relief.
Conclusion:
The appeal MFA. 654 of 1974 by the Company and some defendants was allowed, setting aside the lower court's order. Consequently, the plaintiff's appeal MFA. 500 of 1974 was dismissed. The judgment highlighted the importance of balance of convenience, proper conduct of the plaintiff, and the need to avoid premature decisions on the merits during interlocutory stages. No order as to costs was made.
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1975 (8) TMI 142
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the notice issued to the Advocate.
2. Allegations of misuse of power and abuse of process by the District Magistrate.
3. Request for expunction of adverse remarks made by the High Court against the District Magistrate.
Summary:
1. Legality of the notice issued to the Advocate:
The appellant, a District Magistrate, issued a notice to an Advocate, Mr. Srinivasan, requiring his appearance in court. The Advocate filed a petition u/s 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, arguing that the notice was arbitrary and an abuse of process since there was no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code empowering the Magistrate to issue such a notice to an Advocate not connected with the proceedings. The High Court quashed the notice, holding that the action of the District Magistrate constituted a grave misuse of his power and a flagrant abuse of the process of the court.
2. Allegations of misuse of power and abuse of process by the District Magistrate:
The High Court found that the notice issued by the District Magistrate was not in good faith and was intended to humiliate the Advocate and the Bar, who had earlier passed a resolution against the Magistrate's behavior. The High Court observed that the appellant's report to the High Court was grossly inaccurate and misleading, and the action taken against the Advocate was highly arbitrary and devoid of legal sanction.
3. Request for expunction of adverse remarks made by the High Court against the District Magistrate:
The appellant sought the expunction of certain adverse remarks made by the High Court. The Supreme Court applied the tests from State of U.P. v. Muhammad Nain, considering whether the appellant had an opportunity to explain his conduct, whether there was evidence on record justifying the remarks, and whether the remarks were necessary for the decision of the case. The Supreme Court found that the appellant had adequate opportunity to explain his conduct, there was ample material justifying the adverse comments, and the remarks were integral to the High Court's reasoning. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, stating that no case for interference was made out.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the appeal and maintaining the adverse remarks against the District Magistrate, with no order as to costs.
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1975 (8) TMI 141
Issues:
- Interpretation of charges under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
- Credibility of witnesses in a criminal case
- Determination of the purpose of the food item in question
- Compliance with legal requirements for prosecution evidence
- Burden of proof in cases involving food adulteration
Interpretation of charges under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act:
The appellant was charged under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for selling Til seeds unfit for human consumption. The key issue revolved around whether the Til seeds were specifically sold for the purpose of Pooja or without informing the Food Inspector about their unsuitability for human consumption. The court analyzed the purpose for which the seeds were kept in the shop, emphasizing that the appellant's knowledge of the seeds' condition was crucial given the Act's provisions. The judgment highlighted the necessity of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the item in question was intended for human consumption as food, as per the Act's requirements.
Credibility of witnesses in a criminal case:
The case involved two main witnesses, D. P. Tambe and S. P. Gayadhani, supporting the prosecution's version. However, the court found discrepancies and vagueness in their testimonies. Tambe's testimony contradicted the Food Inspector's account, suggesting he might not have been present during the sale of the seeds. The court noted the absence of Tambe's signatures on crucial documents, raising doubts about the prosecution's evidence. Ultimately, the court deemed the evidence led by the prosecution unconvincing and unreliable for establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Determination of the purpose of the food item in question:
A critical aspect of the case was determining the purpose for which the Til seeds were sold. The appellant claimed they were meant for Pooja and not human consumption, which was supported by his cash memo. The court highlighted the lack of concrete evidence to disprove the appellant's assertion. It emphasized the importance of credible evidence to establish whether the seeds were ordinarily used as food, shifting the burden of proof onto the accused in case of ambiguity. Due to insufficient evidence on the seeds' typical usage, the court gave the appellant the benefit of the doubt.
Compliance with legal requirements for prosecution evidence:
The court scrutinized the compliance with legal procedures, particularly regarding witness signatures and adherence to statutory provisions. The absence of Tambe's signatures on essential documents cast doubt on the prosecution's case and raised concerns about the witness's actual presence during the alleged transaction. The court emphasized the significance of strict adherence to legal requirements in criminal cases to ensure the reliability and integrity of evidence presented.
Burden of proof in cases involving food adulteration:
In cases of food adulteration under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the burden of proof lies with the prosecution to establish that the item in question was intended for human consumption as food. The judgment underscored the need for clear evidence regarding the typical usage of the food item and the purpose for which it was stored or sold. In the absence of conclusive proof, the court favored giving the benefit of the doubt to the accused, emphasizing the importance of meeting the legal standards for prosecution in such cases.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the appellant's conviction and sentence based on the lack of credible evidence and compliance issues in the prosecution's case. The court emphasized the necessity of meeting legal standards and burden of proof requirements in cases involving food adulteration to ensure fair and just outcomes.
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1975 (8) TMI 140
Issues Involved:
1. Status of the land as "muafi Devasthani" and its implications.
2. Legal status of Fosuram as a lessee or an occupancy tenant.
3. Interpretation of "public, charitable or religious institution" under Section 168(2)(viii) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code.
4. Whether an idol or deity qualifies as a "disabled person" under Section 168(2)(v).
5. Conditions under which a lease ceases to be in force under Section 168(4) and the second proviso to Section 168(2).
6. Validity of the notice given to Fosuram to desist from cultivation.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Status of the Land as "Muafi Devasthani":
The land in question was identified as "muafi Devasthani," meaning it was a rent-free grant to a temple. The court presumed that the temple was a public religious institution within the meaning of entry (viii) of Section 168(2) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code unless proven otherwise. The burden of proof lay on the party alleging it to be a private institution. The petitioners failed to prove or even allege that the temple was a private institution.
2. Legal Status of Fosuram:
The Board of Revenue held that Fosuram was a lessee under an oral lease from year to year. The petitioners contended that Fosuram had become an occupancy tenant, but this was rejected. The Khasra entries showed the land as "muafi Devasthani," and Fosuram was recorded as a sub-tenant in the kistabandi Khatauni of 1963-64. The only status Fosuram could have had at the commencement of the Code was that of a lessee of a disabled Bhumiswami.
3. Interpretation of "Public, Charitable or Religious Institution":
The petitioners argued that the Bhumiswami deity did not fall under the expression "public, charitable or religious institution" within the meaning of Section 168(2)(viii). The court noted that the expression could be misleading due to a misplaced comma but did not find it necessary to express a considered opinion on this matter. It was held that the temple was a public religious institution, and the deity was a disabled Bhumiswami.
4. Deity as a "Disabled Person":
The court held that an idol or deity is a "disabled person" within the meaning of Clause (v) of Section 168(2). The term "person" in this context includes juristic or artificial persons. The idol, being unable to act on its own, had to act through human agency, thus qualifying as a person with physical disability.
5. Conditions for Lease Cessation:
The second proviso to Section 168(2) states that any lease made in pursuance of this sub-section shall cease to be in force after one year of the determination of the disability by death or otherwise. The court clarified that this proviso is not exhaustive of the conditions under which a lease ceases to be in force. The expression "on the lease ceasing to be in force" in Section 168(4) includes both statutory cessation under the second proviso and contractual determination, such as by effluxion of time or the happening of a specified event.
6. Validity of Notice to Fosuram:
The lease was determined by a notice (Ex. P-1) calling upon Fosuram to desist from cultivating the land from July 1, 1964. The court held that the lease ceased to be in force on this date within the meaning of Section 168(4). Consequently, Fosuram was liable to be ejected on the application of the Bhumiswami deity.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that:
1. The temple was presumed to be a public religious institution.
2. The deity is a disabled Bhumiswami.
3. Fosuram was a lessee from year to year.
4. The lease ceased to be in force on July 1, 1964, and Fosuram was liable to be ejected.
The petition was dismissed, and the petitioners were ordered to pay Rs. 150 as costs to the first respondent. The outstanding amount of the security deposit was to be refunded to the petitioners.
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1975 (8) TMI 139
Issues Involved:
1. Claims for overtime wages by Syphon Pumpers and Mains workers.
2. Claims for wages for weekly off days by workers from various departments.
3. Applicability of the Industrial Tribunal award and the Bombay Shops & Establishments Act.
4. Res judicata and its applicability to the claims for overtime wages.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Claims for Overtime Wages by Syphon Pumpers and Mains Workers:
The respondents, who were Syphon Pumpers and Mains workers, filed multiple applications before the Additional Authority under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, claiming overtime wages for specific periods. The company contended that these claims were barred by an award of the Industrial Tribunal in Ref. No. 54 of 1949. The Authority held that the claims of Booster Attendants for overtime work were covered by the award, while the claims of other applicants were not. The Court of Small Causes dismissed the workmen's appeals and allowed the company's appeal, holding that the claims were barred by the award. The High Court, however, held that the claims were not barred and remanded the applications for ascertaining and decreeing the amount.
2. Claims for Wages for Weekly Off Days by Workers from Various Departments:
Respondents 81 to 118, who joined the company after 1948, filed applications claiming wages for weekly off days. The Third Additional Authority allowed these applications, holding that the award was no bar and that the provisions of the Bombay Shops & Establishments Act were applicable. The Court of Small Causes, however, dismissed the applications, stating that the claims were barred by the award. The High Court restored the judgment of the Third Additional Authority, stating that the claims were not barred by the award.
3. Applicability of the Industrial Tribunal Award and the Bombay Shops & Establishments Act:
The Industrial Tribunal's award in Ref. No. 54 of 1949 dealt with demands for paid weekly off and overtime wages. The Tribunal granted the demand for a paid weekly off for workers who worked all seven days of the week until 1948. The Tribunal clarified that the award applied to all workers, including those who joined after 1948. The High Court's impression that the workers were entitled to be paid for the days off under the award or Section 18(3) of the Bombay Shops & Establishments Act was incorrect. The Supreme Court held that the award did not entitle the post-1948 workers to be paid separately for the weekly day off.
4. Res Judicata and Its Applicability to the Claims for Overtime Wages:
The demand for overtime wages was rejected by the Tribunal in general terms, with specific categories like booster attendants being dealt with separately. The Supreme Court held that the question of overtime wages under the Bombay Shops & Establishments Act should be deemed to have been dealt with and rejected by the Tribunal. The doctrine of res judicata applied, as the workers neither raised the contention that they were entitled to the benefit of the Bombay Shops & Establishments Act nor that they should be paid overtime wages under its provisions. The Supreme Court emphasized that the principle of res judicata is based on public policy considerations to avoid unnecessary litigation and ensure finality of decisions.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court. Consequently, the petitions of all the workers were dismissed. The court reiterated that the award of the Industrial Tribunal was binding on all workers, including those who joined after 1948, and that the claims for overtime wages and weekly off days were barred by the award. The doctrine of res judicata applied to the claims for overtime wages, as the issue had been dealt with by the Tribunal. The Appellant was ordered to bear its own costs and pay the costs of the Respondents.
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1975 (8) TMI 138
Issues:
Validity of orders requiring G.D.C. & A. examination for promotion and increments.
Analysis:
The case involved officers of the Co-operation Department of the Government of Gujarat challenging certain orders of the Government. The main contention was the requirement of passing the G.D.C. & A. examination for earning increments and promotion, which the petitioners argued contravened relevant Acts. The High Court of Gujarat had to determine the validity of these orders.
The petitioners alleged that the orders of May 10, 1962, and June 18, 1965, mandating the G.D.C. & A. examination for promotion were invalid. The State of Gujarat had removed certain grievances related to increments and recovery, leaving the focus on the qualification requirement for promotion. The High Court considered the rules applicable before the "appointed day" and the circular of the Central Government dated May 11, 1957, in its analysis.
The Supreme Court analyzed the applicability of Section 81(6) of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, and the conditions of service applicable to the parties before the formation of the State of Gujarat. The Court emphasized the power of the reorganised State of Bombay to make rules for promotion, including introducing the G.D.C. & A. examination requirement. The circular of May 11, 1957, was deemed to have the force of law in the State of Bombay, including the territories of Maharashtra and Gujarat.
Referring to Section 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, the Court held that the circular of the Central Government was an order with the force of law, allowing the Gujarat Government to enact the rules in question. Consequently, the Court deemed the 1962 order requiring the G.D.C. & A. examination for promotion as valid, leading to the appeal being allowed and the High Court judgment set aside. Notably, no recovery was to be made from the respondents, and no costs were awarded in this case.
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1975 (8) TMI 137
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the lease executed in favor of the Defendant-Appellant.
2. Applicability of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.
3. Applicability of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
4. Applicability of Section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act.
5. Applicability of Section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Summary:
1. Validity of the Lease Executed in Favor of the Defendant-Appellant:
The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit claiming that a lease executed in favor of the Defendant-Appellant, M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd., in respect of Strider Vilas Theater (now known as Plaza Talkies) by its former owners, the Bhatias, is void and ineffective against the plaintiff's rights under decrees obtained in Civil Suit No. 15A of 1954 and Civil Suit No. 3B of 1952. The plaintiff sought a declaration to ensure that an auction purchaser would acquire rights free from any obligation towards the Defendant-Appellant under the void lease.
2. Applicability of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act:
The defendant-appellant argued that the plaintiff had neither a legal character nor any present right in any property for which a declaration could be granted u/s 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. However, the Court held that Section 42 merely gives statutory recognition to a well-recognized type of declaratory relief and subjects it to a limitation but does not exhaust every kind of declaratory relief or circumscribe the jurisdiction of Courts to give declarations of right in appropriate cases falling outside Section 42.
3. Applicability of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act:
The Court found that the lease of 1956 purported to create entirely new rights pendente lite and was, therefore, struck by the doctrine of lis pendens, as explained by this Court in Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami & Ors., embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
4. Applicability of Section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act:
The appellant argued that a case falling within Section 65A(2)(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, confining the duration of a lease by a mortgagor to three years, displaces the provisions of Section 52. The Court, however, held that the special doctrine of lis pendens is applicable here, making the purported lease of 1956 invalid from the outset, thus not necessitating the consideration of Section 65A(2)(e).
5. Applicability of Section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code:
The Court found that the Plaza Talkie was attached in execution of the decree in suit No. 3B of 1952 on 4-5-1955 and that this attachment was in existence when the impugned lease was executed on 30-3-1956. Therefore, the lease of 1956 was struck by the provisions of Section 64 Civil Procedure Code, which constitutes an application of the doctrine of lis pendens in the specified circumstances.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the Special Leave Petitions (Civil) were also dismissed in view of the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 1041 of 1968.
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1975 (8) TMI 136
Issues involved: Appeal abatement due to death of defendant, application for setting aside abatement, devolution of interest, interpretation of Order 22, rule 10.
The Supreme Court heard an appeal against a decree by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, where the plaintiff sought recovery of possession of a Dera and its properties. The defendant contended that he was lawfully appointed as the mahant of an independent Dera at Landeke. The trial court decreed the suit, but the decree was reversed on appeal. During the pendency of the appeal in the High Court, the defendant passed away, leading to the question of abatement. The appellant failed to bring on record the legal representatives within the prescribed period, later claiming lack of knowledge about the defendant's death. The High Court held that the appeal had abated, rejecting the appellant's plea. Additionally, the appellant argued that even without impleading the legal representatives, the appeal should not abate as he claimed to represent the Dera as its duly elected Chela. The High Court disagreed, stating that the legal representatives should have been brought on record within the specified time.
The Supreme Court analyzed the situation and disagreed with the High Court's view. They emphasized that the interest in the subject matter of the suit devolved upon the defendant's Chela after his death, allowing the appeal to continue against the new party under Order 22, rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court clarified that this rule applies not only in cases of death but also in instances of devolution of interest for any reason. They highlighted that the devolution of interest occurred when the Chela was elected as the new mahant after the defendant's demise. The Court cited precedents to support their interpretation of Order 22, rule 10 in cases of trusteeship succession during the pendency of a suit.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decree, directing the High Court to decide the appeal on its merits. The appeal was allowed without any order on costs.
This summary provides a detailed breakdown of the legal judgment, addressing each issue involved and highlighting the key arguments and interpretations made by the Supreme Court.
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1975 (8) TMI 135
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Forest Settlement Officer's order dated May 9, 1955.
2. Whether the appeal filed under Section 17 of the Indian Forest Act was within the prescribed time limit.
3. Jurisdiction of the appellate tribunal in setting aside the order of the Forest Settlement Officer.
4. Validity of the State Government's order on the revision petition filed by the appellant.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Forest Settlement Officer's Order Dated May 9, 1955:
The appellant had claimed Sirdari rights over certain plots of land under Section 6 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. The Forest Settlement Officer recorded an order on May 9, 1955, admitting the appellant's claim and directed the Divisional Forest Officer to inform within 15 days whether he wanted the land on payment of compensation. The respondents contended that this order was passed without any notice to them and in their absence. They became aware of the order only on April 24, 1956, when another order was recorded stating that the claim had been admitted and further action would be taken under Section 11(2)(iii) of the Act.
2. Whether the Appeal Filed Under Section 17 of the Indian Forest Act was Within the Prescribed Time Limit:
The State of Uttar Pradesh, through the Divisional Forest Officer, filed an appeal on July 20, 1956, under Section 17 of the Act. Section 17 prescribes a time limit of three months from the date of the order for presenting an appeal. The appellate tribunal held that since the order dated May 9, 1955, was not delivered in the presence of the parties or after giving them notice, the period of limitation should run from April 24, 1956, when the respondents came to know of the order. The High Court upheld this view, stating that it would be unjust to compute the limitation from the date recorded by the Forest Settlement Officer if the parties were not informed.
3. Jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal in Setting Aside the Order of the Forest Settlement Officer:
The appellant argued that the appellate tribunal set aside the order dated May 9, 1955, though the appeal was directed against the order dated April 24, 1956, which was not an appealable order. The High Court held that the appeal was indeed against both orders, as the prayer in the petition of appeal referred to 'orders' in the plural and described them as orders admitting the claim of the respondent. Thus, the appellate tribunal had jurisdiction to set aside the order dated May 9, 1955.
4. Validity of the State Government's Order on the Revision Petition Filed by the Appellant:
The appellant had filed a revisional application to the State Government under Section 18(4) of the Act against the order of the appellate tribunal, which the State Government rejected on March 9, 1960. The appellant's writ petition did not contain a prayer for quashing or setting aside this order. The High Court did not consider the validity of this order, and the appellant was not allowed to raise this issue at this stage.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the appeal with costs. The Court affirmed that the appeal under Section 17 was within the time limit as the period of limitation should run from April 24, 1956, when the respondents came to know of the order. The appellate tribunal had jurisdiction to set aside the order dated May 9, 1955, and the appellant could not challenge the findings of fact or the State Government's order on the revision petition at this stage.
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1975 (8) TMI 134
Issues Involved:
1. Interference by the High Court with the findings of the Tribunal.
2. Admissibility and reliance on Exhibit P-45.
3. Scope of Article 226 in departmental inquiries.
4. Non-supply of 'B' Report and Investigation Report to the respondent.
Summary:
1. Interference by the High Court with the findings of the Tribunal:
The principal question canvassed was whether the High Court should have interfered with the findings of the Tribunal. The Tribunal had found the respondent guilty of charges related to false claims for travelling allowance and recommended dismissal. The High Court set aside the dismissal, stating that the prosecution did not adduce every material and essential evidence to make out the charges and that the Tribunal's conclusion was not based on evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in re-assessing the evidence and substituting its own conclusions for those of the Tribunal.
2. Admissibility and reliance on Exhibit P-45:
The High Court doubted the admissibility of Exhibit P-45, a signed statement by the respondent, and considered it unsafe to rely on. The Supreme Court noted that the Tribunal had given the respondent full opportunity to deal with Exhibit P-45 and found it genuine. The High Court's approach to treating the enquiry as a criminal prosecution was incorrect.
3. Scope of Article 226 in departmental inquiries:
The Supreme Court reiterated that under Article 226, the High Court's jurisdiction is supervisory, not appellate. The High Court should not review the evidence or arrive at an independent finding unless there is a violation of natural justice or statutory rules. The findings of fact by the Tribunal should not be questioned unless there is no evidence to support them. The High Court erred in re-assessing the evidence and setting aside the Tribunal's conclusions.
4. Non-supply of 'B' Report and Investigation Report to the respondent:
The respondent contended that the 'B' Report and Investigation Report were not provided to him. The High Court did not address this issue as it set aside the dismissal on other grounds. The Supreme Court found that the Tribunal did not rely on these reports to support the charges but only referred to them in the context of the respondent's challenge to Exhibit P-45's genuineness. The Tribunal's findings were based on other evidence, and the non-supply of these reports did not affect the outcome.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and upheld the Tribunal's findings and the dismissal order. The High Court's interference with the Tribunal's findings and re-assessment of evidence was deemed unjustified.
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1975 (8) TMI 133
Issues involved: Challenge to election of respondent No. 1 to Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly Pandhurna constituency based on publication and circulation of defamatory leaflet.
Summary:
The appeal was filed against the Madhya Pradesh High Court's judgment dismissing the election petition challenging the election of respondent No. 1 to the Legislative Assembly. The main issue pressed in the appeal was regarding the publication and circulation of a defamatory leaflet aimed at prejudicing the election prospects of another candidate, respondent No. 2. The appellant alleged that the leaflet contained false and defamatory statements about respondent No. 2's personal character and conduct, which were attributed to respondent No. 1 or his agents. The High Court dismissed the election petition primarily on the grounds of lack of evidence and failure to prove the falsity of the contents of the leaflet.
In response to the allegations, respondent No. 1 denied any involvement in the publication of the leaflet and stated that he had no connection with it. The High Court held that the appellant failed to prove that the contents of the leaflet were false to the knowledge of respondent No. 1 or that he did not believe them to be true. Consequently, no corrupt practice as defined in the Representation of the People Act was established. The High Court also found issues related to the wide circulation of the leaflet and the involvement of specific individuals to be inconsequential in the absence of proof of corrupt practice.
During the appeal, the appellant sought to introduce a photostat copy of the manuscript of the leaflet as evidence, alleging that it was written by respondent No. 1. However, the High Court refused to admit the photostat copy as secondary evidence due to insufficient grounds provided by the appellant. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, stating that the appellant failed to establish a basis for introducing the photostat copy as evidence.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of proving the falsity of statements in a defamatory publication to establish corrupt practice under the law. Since there was no evidence on record to demonstrate the falsity of the leaflet's contents, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision to dismiss the election petition. Ultimately, the appeal was deemed to lack merit and was dismissed with costs.
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1975 (8) TMI 132
Issues:
1. Interpretation of Rule 85(4) regarding the issuance of form No. 31 under U.P. Sales-tax Rules.
2. Discretion of Sales-tax Officer in determining the number of forms to be issued.
3. Availability of alternative remedy through the appellate authority.
4. Challenge to sub-rule (4) of Rule 85.
Analysis:
The judgment by the Allahabad High Court involved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution concerning the issuance of form No. 31 under the U.P. Sales-tax Rules. The petitioner, a coal dealer, had requested 300 forms, but the Sales-tax Officer deemed this demand excessive and directed the petitioner to justify the need for the forms. After examination, the Sales-tax Officer concluded that only 10 forms were warranted, citing improper accountability of previously issued forms by the petitioner.
The Court referred to Rule 85(4), which empowers the Sales-tax Officer to issue forms based on the genuineness of the dealer's demand. It was highlighted that an assessee is not entitled to an unlimited number of forms, and the officer can refuse further issuance if previous forms are unaccounted for. The Court emphasized that the discretion to issue forms lies with the Sales-tax Officer, guided by the genuine requirement of the dealer.
Furthermore, the judgment pointed out that the petitioner could seek recourse through the appellate authority if dissatisfied with the Sales-tax Officer's decision on the number of forms. The Court clarified that it could not intervene in such disputes and advised the petitioner to pursue the appellate route for resolution. Additionally, the Court rejected a challenge to sub-rule (4) of Rule 85, as it was not raised in the writ petition.
In conclusion, the petition was dismissed, and the Court directed the petitioner to utilize the already issued forms genuinely. The judgment underscored the importance of following proper procedures and utilizing available remedies for addressing grievances related to the issuance of forms under the Sales-tax Rules.
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1975 (8) TMI 131
Issues Involved:
1. Conviction under s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
2. Conviction under s. 161, Penal Code.
3. Presumption under s. 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
4. Abetment of an offence under s. 161, Penal Code and s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Summary:
1. Conviction under s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act:
The appellant was convicted by the Special Judge, Delhi, and the conviction was upheld by the High Court of Delhi. The appellant was accused of soliciting and accepting a bribe of Rs. 100/- on behalf of Inspector Gupta for expediting the installation of an electric connection. The appellant, a permanent labourer, claimed he was merely following Gupta's instructions and was unaware that the money was a bribe.
2. Conviction under s. 161, Penal Code:
The appellant was charged with accepting illegal gratification as a motive or reward for doing an official act. The courts below convicted the appellant based on the presumption u/s 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which the appellant failed to rebut. However, the Supreme Court found that the appellant was acting as an innocent carrier for Gupta and was not in a position to show any favor to the complainant.
3. Presumption under s. 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act:
The presumption u/s 4(1) is rebuttable, and the accused can disprove it by showing a preponderance of probability in his favor. The Supreme Court noted that the appellant's conduct was consistent with that of an innocent carrier, and the prosecution's evidence did not establish that the appellant had the requisite mens rea to accept the bribe.
4. Abetment of an offence under s. 161, Penal Code and s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act:
The Supreme Court held that the appellant could not be guilty of abetment as the principal accused, Gupta, was acquitted. The appellant lacked the intention to aid the commission of the crime, and his actions were not indicative of a guilty mind.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the charges against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant's conviction was set aside, and he was acquitted of all charges. The appeal was allowed.
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