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1979 (8) TMI 223
Issues:
Petition under Article 226 challenging orders rejecting release application under U.P. Urban Buildings Act - Appellate court's arbitrary order without reasons - Consideration of bonafide need of landlord - Applicability of Explanation (iv) of Section 21 - Duty of appellate court to consider evidence and give reasons for decision - Quashing of appellate court's judgment and remand for fresh decision.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a petition under Article 226 challenging orders related to the release of a portion of a house under the U.P. Urban Buildings Act. The landlords had applied for release, which was rejected by the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge in appeal. The main contention was the arbitrary nature of the appellate order without providing reasons or considering evidence, specifically regarding the bonafide need of the landlords.
The District Judge's judgment was found to be deficient as it did not adequately consider the bonafide need of the landlords. The judgment only briefly touched upon this crucial aspect without any discussion of evidence or reasons for the decision. Reference was made to a previous case highlighting the importance of the appellate court's duty to judicially consider facts and circumstances before giving a decision.
The judgment also discussed the applicability of Explanation (iv) of Section 21 of the Act, emphasizing that the need of the landlord is the primary consideration for a release application. The judgment cited a Full Bench decision regarding the retrospective nature of certain provisions, clarifying the legal position on this matter.
Furthermore, the judgment outlined the duty of the appellate court to state points for determination, decision thereon, and reasons for the decision, especially in cases of affirmance. It stressed the importance of the appellate court's thorough consideration of evidence and articulation of reasons to ensure a just and non-arbitrary decision-making process.
Ultimately, the High Court concluded that the District Judge's judgment lacked legal validity due to the absence of proper reasoning and consideration of evidence. The judgment was quashed, and the case was remanded for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The parties were directed to bear their own costs, bringing closure to the legal dispute.
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1979 (8) TMI 222
Issues Involved:
1. Vagueness of the grounds of detention.
2. Irrelevance of the grounds of detention.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Vagueness of the Grounds of Detention:
The petitioner challenged the detention order under Article 32 of the Constitution, arguing that some grounds were so vague that he could not exercise his fundamental right to make a representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The grounds of detention were communicated to the petitioner via an annexure to the District Magistrate's order. The respondents' counsel could not argue that no part of the annexure was vague. The annexure included statements such as the petitioner being a "die-hard Naxalite" and organizing meetings to instigate lawlessness, without specifying locations or details. For instance, the first paragraph did not mention the places where the petitioner organized meetings or the nature of lawlessness instigated. Similarly, the fifth paragraph vaguely mentioned the petitioner instigating educated unemployed youth without detailing the nature or purpose of the instigation. The sixth paragraph was also vague as it did not specify the villages or the name of the house owner allegedly set on fire. The court held that such vagueness impinges on the fundamental right under Article 22(5) to make a representation against the detention order, as established in State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya and other cases.
2. Irrelevance of the Grounds of Detention:
The petitioner also argued that several grounds of detention were irrelevant for making an order under Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978. Paragraph 2 mentioned the petitioner organizing a meeting to protest against the treatment of Z. A. Bhutto, which did not fall within the purview of "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" as defined in Section 8(3)(b). Paragraph 3 alleged the petitioner made derogatory remarks against the Chief Minister and asked people to rise in revolt, but did not indicate any promotion of enmity or use of force. Paragraph 4 referred to a poster advocating revolution, which did not necessarily imply acting prejudicially to public order. Paragraph 5, mentioning the petitioner instigating a hunger strike, was also deemed irrelevant as it did not connect to public disorder. The inclusion of irrelevant grounds among relevant ones infringes the detenu's constitutional rights, as established in cases like Keshav Talpade v. The King Emperor and others. The court concluded that the detention order was vitiated due to the inclusion of irrelevant grounds, leading to the petitioner's release.
Separate Judgment by Chinnappa Reddy, J.:
Justice Chinnappa Reddy added a note agreeing with the conclusions of Justice Shinghal. He emphasized that preventive detention, while recognized as a necessary evil, must satisfy the requirements of both Articles 19 and 22 of the Constitution. He reiterated that Article 22(5) ensures the detenu's rights to be informed of the grounds of detention and to make a representation against it. The inclusion of irrelevant or vague grounds infringes these rights. He disagreed with the respondents' counsel's attempt to separate introductory facts from grounds of detention, stating that all factual allegations leading to the detention order are grounds of detention. He pointed out that expressions like "revolt" and "revolution" are context-dependent and do not inherently imply public disorder. Therefore, grounds based on such expressions were deemed vague and irrelevant.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court found that the grounds of detention were both vague and irrelevant, violating the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Consequently, the detention order was declared illegal, and the petitioner was ordered to be released.
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1979 (8) TMI 221
Issues:
Jurisdiction of the court, amendment of plaint, misdescription of party in legal proceedings
Jurisdiction of the Court:
The revisional application challenged an order directing the return of a plaint for presentation to the proper court due to lack of territorial jurisdiction. The suit was refiled in a different court, leading to subsequent legal proceedings.
Amendment of Plaint:
The plaintiff sought to amend the cause title of the plaint to reflect a change in the company's name. The court allowed the amendment, considering the provisions of the Companies Act and the impact on the legal proceedings.
Misdescription of Party in Legal Proceedings:
The main contention was whether the amendment of the plaint, changing the company's name, amounted to substituting a new plaintiff in place of the original one. The legal argument focused on the correct identification of the party in the proceedings.
The judgment analyzed the application for amendment in light of Section 23 of the Companies Act, which allows for changes in the name of a company without affecting its legal identity. The court considered precedents where misdescriptions in legal proceedings were corrected through amendments, emphasizing the importance of correctly identifying the party involved.
The court distinguished cases where changes in the company's name occurred during the pendency of legal proceedings from the present situation where the change predated the institution of the suit. It concluded that the amendment sought was a correction of a misdescription rather than a substitution of parties, thus upholding the order allowing the amendment of the plaint.
In summary, the judgment clarified the legal principles governing amendments in cases of misdescriptions of parties in legal proceedings, emphasizing the need for accurate identification without altering the entity of the party involved. The application for revision was dismissed, affirming the validity of the amendment in the plaint.
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1979 (8) TMI 220
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the application under Order 21, Rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) in summary proceedings under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882.
2. Merits of the petitioner's claim to possession of the suit premises.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of the Application under Order 21, Rule 100 of CPC:
The petitioner challenged the order passed by the Small Cause Court, Bombay, which dismissed his application for restoration of possession under Order 21, Rule 100 of the CPC. The trial court had relied on an unreported decision of the Bombay High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 386 of 1974 and a decision of the Calcutta High Court, concluding that such an application was not maintainable in summary proceedings under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882.
The petitioner argued that the decision in Civil Revision Application No. 386 of 1974 was rendered per incuriam, as it ignored the provisions of Section 48 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, and the rules framed by the High Court thereunder. Section 48 explicitly states that proceedings under Chapter VII should be regulated by the CPC. The petitioner cited several judgments from the Madras and Calcutta High Courts supporting the applicability of the CPC to such proceedings.
The court agreed with the petitioner, noting that the decision in Civil Revision Application No. 386 of 1974 was given in ignorance of the statutory provisions and was thus not binding. The court emphasized that Section 48 of the Act and the related rules clearly indicated that the CPC, including Order 21, Rule 100, applied to proceedings under Chapter VII. Consequently, the court held that the petitioner's application was maintainable.
2. Merits of the Petitioner's Claim to Possession:
The petitioner claimed that he was the rightful tenant of the suit premises and had been paying rent and municipal taxes. He contended that the ex parte order obtained by the respondent was in collusion with the heirs of Shankar Salunke and was not binding on him. The trial court, however, dismissed his application based on an alleged admission in a reply to a notice, concluding that the petitioner was in possession through the judgment-debtor.
The petitioner argued that the trial court's finding was perverse, as it overlooked his explanation and other evidence. He maintained that the alleged admission was neither unqualified nor true. The respondent countered that there was ample evidence to show that the petitioner was in possession through the judgment-debtor and that the application was rightly rejected on merits.
The court did not delve into the merits of the controversy at this stage, noting that the trial court had not properly considered all aspects before recording its finding. The court observed that the trial court might have been influenced by its initial conclusion on the maintainability issue. Therefore, the court remitted the matter back to the Small Cause Court, Bombay, for a fresh decision on merits in accordance with the law, after giving both parties a reasonable opportunity to present their cases.
Conclusion:
The court set aside the order of the Small Cause Court, Bombay, dated 19th November 1976, and remitted the matter back for a fresh decision on merits. The trial court was directed to decide the case expeditiously, considering all aspects and giving both parties a fair chance to present their arguments. The rule was made absolute, with no order as to costs.
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1979 (8) TMI 219
Issues: Failure to frame a charge under section 3 of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 against certain accused.
The judgment of the Supreme Court pertains to an appeal challenging the decision of the Bombay High Court regarding the framing of charges under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966. The State of Maharashtra appealed against the High Court's ruling that it was not necessary to frame a charge under section 3 of the Act against certain accused individuals. The case involved the theft of railway property, specifically seven tyres stolen from a railway station and subsequently sold to other accused. The prosecution alleged that the accused were in unlawful possession of the stolen railway property. The trial court and the Additional Sessions Judge of Jalgaon did not frame a charge under section 3 of the Act against all the accused, leading to the State's appeal.
The key legal provision under consideration was section 3 of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, which penalizes individuals found in possession of railway property reasonably suspected of being stolen or unlawfully obtained. The section requires three essential elements to be met: the property must be railway property, reasonably suspected of being stolen, and the accused must be found or proved to have been in possession of the property. The court confirmed that the stolen property in question was railway property and reasonably suspected of being unlawfully obtained. The crucial issue was whether the accused were found or proved to have been in possession of the railway property, as required by section 3.
The court analyzed the allegations against each accused individual. Accused 1, 2, 5, and an absconding accused were implicated in the theft of the tyres from the railway station. The court emphasized that the offense of theft necessitates a transfer of possession, even if temporary, from the original owner to the accused. Thus, the allegation that these accused individuals had removed the tyres implied they had been in possession of the stolen property. The court disagreed with the High Court's interpretation that possession at the time of seizure was necessary, stating that past possession was sufficient to trigger the application of section 3 of the Act.
The court criticized the High Court's reasoning that section 3 was akin to a provision in the Bombay Police Act regarding unexplained possession, emphasizing that section 3 penalizes individuals proven to have been in possession of stolen railway property. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and directed the trial court to frame a charge under section 3 of the Act against the accused involved in the theft, in addition to the charges under the Indian Penal Code. The court stressed the need for expedited trial proceedings due to the case's prolonged delay.
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1979 (8) TMI 218
Issues Involved:
1. Concluded Contract
2. Frustration of Contract
3. Exercise of Discretionary Power of Sale
4. Delegation of Powers by Trustees
5. Validity of Trustees' Actions
6. Reasonableness and Good Faith in Trustees' Actions
7. Judicial Control over Trustees' Discretionary Powers
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Concluded Contract
The primary issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the appellants and the Board of Trustees for the sale of 37 items of jewellery for Rs. 14.43 crores. The High Court found that there was no concluded contract, as the alleged acceptance of bids by four trustees on March 9, 1978, was not binding. The Supreme Court concurred, noting that "there was, in fact, no evidence that any binding contract came into existence."
2. Frustration of Contract
The second issue was whether the ad interim injunction of March 14, 1978, frustrated the contract by making further performance impossible. The Court held that the injunction prevented the appellants from tendering 90% of the tender amount and taking delivery of the jewellery, thus frustrating the contract. The Court stated, "We are clearly of the opinion that there was a frustration of the alleged contracts, in the facts and circumstances of the present case."
3. Exercise of Discretionary Power of Sale
The third issue was whether the trustees exercised their discretionary power of sale under Clause 13 of the trust deed reasonably and in good faith. The Court found that the trustees did not act with prudence and due care, as they sold the jewellery for Rs. 14.43 crores while an offer of Rs. 20.25 crores was available. The Court emphasized that "the trustees had not acted with prudence and due care or attention."
4. Delegation of Powers by Trustees
The fourth issue was whether it was competent for four of the trustees to effect a sale in the absence of authorization by the Chairman. The Court held that all trustees must act together unless the trust deed provides otherwise. The Court stated, "where there are several trustees they must act unanimously in making a sale or a contract of sale, unless it is provided otherwise by the terms of the deed."
5. Validity of Trustees' Actions
The fifth issue was the validity of the actions taken by the trustees on March 9, 1978. The Court found that no meeting of the Board of Trustees was held on that date, and the alleged acceptance of bids was a "complete myth." The Court noted, "The story of the alleged acceptance of bids by the remaining four trustees on March 9, 1978, appears to be a complete myth."
6. Reasonableness and Good Faith in Trustees' Actions
The sixth issue was whether the trustees acted reasonably and in good faith. The Court found that the trustees did not act reasonably and in good faith, as they did not ascertain the actual value of the jewellery and sold it at a significantly lower price. The Court stated, "the trustees in the facts and circumstances of the present case, did not act reasonably and in good faith i.e., with due care and attention."
7. Judicial Control over Trustees' Discretionary Powers
The seventh issue was whether the Court could control the discretionary power of the trustees under Section 49 of the Trusts Act. The Court held that discretionary powers must be exercised reasonably and in good faith, and the Court can control such powers if they are not. The Court stated, "when such discretionary power is not exercised reasonably and in good faith, such power may be controlled by a court."
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment setting aside the alleged sale of 37 items of jewellery for Rs. 14.43 crores but set aside the High Court's order accepting the bid of Rs. 20.25 crores by the eighth respondent, Peter Jansin Fernandez. The Court directed a re-auction of the jewellery, emphasizing the need for transparency and fairness in the sale process. The appeals were disposed of accordingly, with the appellants bearing their own costs and paying one set of costs to the respondents.
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1979 (8) TMI 217
Issues Involved:
1. Deficiency in the application for execution due to omission of the words "in writing".
2. Validity of the sanction u/s 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and its implications.
Summary of Judgment:
Issue 1: Deficiency in the Application for Execution
- The appellant argued that the application for execution was defective because it did not explicitly state that the lease was "in writing". It was contended that the amendment to include these words was barred by the limitation period of six months.
- The court held that "pleadings are not statutes and legalism is not verbalism". The application, when read as a whole, implied that the lease was in writing. The court emphasized that "law should not be stultified by courts by sanctifying little omissions as fatal flaws". Therefore, the application did not suffer from any verbal lacunae, and there was no need for amendment.
Issue 2: Validity of the Sanction u/s 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
- The court examined the social context and legislative intent behind Section 21, which provides a special procedure for eviction to maximize available accommodation for letting. The court highlighted that Section 21 is intended for residential purposes only and must be strictly construed to prevent misuse by landlords.
- The court outlined the essential conditions for the application of Section 21:
- The landlord must not require the premises "for a particular period" only.
- The letting must be for residential purposes.
- The Controller's permission is obligatory, specifying the particular period and residential use.
- The court stressed that the Controller must be vigilant and ensure that the conditions for sanction are genuinely met. If the sanction is procured by fraud or collusion, it is invalid.
- The court held that it is open to the tenant to challenge the validity of the sanction under Section 21. The executing court must examine whether the sanction is a make-believe, vitiated by fraud and collusion.
Conclusion:
- The court dismissed the appeal on the first point, holding that the application did not suffer from any deficiency.
- On the second point, the court directed the Controller to examine the validity of the sanction and other objections in light of the observations made. The court emphasized the importance of strict compliance with the conditions of Section 21 to prevent misuse and protect public interest.
- The appeal was dismissed, and the parties were directed to bear their respective costs throughout.
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1979 (8) TMI 216
Issues:
1. Applicability of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural lands Act, 1950.
2. Interpretation of the amended Section 28 requiring the landholder to give notice to the tenant within a period of six months of each default.
3. Retroactive application of the amendment to the proviso of Section 28(1).
Analysis:
1. The case involved a proceeding for ejectment under the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, with the main issue being the applicability of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the Act. The proviso stated that it would not apply to any tenant whose tenancy is terminated for non-payment of rent if the tenant had failed for three years to pay rent within the specified period. The proviso was subsequently amended in 1960 to include a requirement for the landholder to give intimation to the tenant of the default within six months of each default.
2. The appellant, the landowner, issued a notice terminating the tenancy on the ground of non-payment of rent after the proviso was amended. The tenants challenged the eviction proceedings, arguing that the amended Section 28 requiring the landholder to give notice to the tenant within six months of each default was not applicable to their case. They contended that the right to institute the proceeding for eviction had accrued before the proviso was amended and could not be taken away by the retrospective application of the amendment.
3. The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's argument, citing precedents that established that a mere right to take advantage of the provisions of an Act is not an accrued right. The Court highlighted that the application for possession was made after the proviso was amended, and even the right to institute the proceeding did not appear to have accrued before the amendment. Therefore, the Court held that the amended Section 28 applied to the case, and the appellant's appeal was dismissed with costs.
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1979 (8) TMI 215
Issues: Determination of turnover based on best judgment assessment, consideration of diary entries in assessment, burden of proof on the Department in taxation proceedings.
Analysis:
1. The case involved two revisions filed under Section 11 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act to determine whether the best judgment assessment of oil manufacture based on electricity assessment was flawed due to the Additional Judge Revision not considering certain diary entries from a broker's diary during a survey of another assessee's premises without allowing the assessee to cross-examine the broker.
2. The principle of correlating turnover of oil manufacture with electricity consumption was deemed appropriate, but the argument raised was that this principle did not apply due to alleged suppression of material. The diary entry indicating the sale of oil by the assessee was contested, as it was seized from a broker present during a survey, but the broker was not produced for examination, leading to doubts about the authenticity and relevance of the entry.
3. The court deliberated on whether the diary entry could be considered as evidence of suppressed turnover without proper verification or connection to the assessee. It emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the Department in taxation proceedings, and mere absence of the broker or efforts to produce other involved parties did not justify drawing adverse inferences against the assessee.
4. Reference was made to a previous case highlighting the necessity for the Department to produce relevant persons for cross-examination when entries in account books of other dealers are relied upon for assessment. In the absence of concrete evidence linking the diary entry to the assessee's suppressed turnover, the Additional Judge Revision was deemed correct in accepting the turnover disclosed in the account books.
5. Consequently, the revision was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the assessee. The judgment underscored the importance of proper evidence and burden of proof in taxation proceedings, emphasizing the need for the Department to substantiate allegations with concrete proof rather than assumptions or unverified entries.
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1979 (8) TMI 214
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the petitioners are employees of the Central Government.
2. Whether the petitioners' conditions of service are governed by rules applicable to temporary employees of the Central Government.
3. Whether the orders of retrenchment proposed or passed against the petitioners violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the petitioners are employees of the Central Government:
The petitioners contended that they are employees of the Central Government, while the respondents argued that they were appointed by the Beas Construction Board and not the Central Government. The Supreme Court examined the provisions of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, particularly sections 79 and 80, and concluded that the petitioners, though appointed by the Beas Construction Board, are indeed employees of the Central Government. The Court noted that the Beas Construction Board was constituted by the Central Government for administrative expediency and acted as a statutory agency for the Central Government. Therefore, the petitioners' appointments were made for the benefit and at the behest of the Central Government.
2. Whether the petitioners' conditions of service are governed by rules applicable to temporary employees of the Central Government:
The petitioners sought a declaration that they are quasi-permanent employees under the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. The Court held that while the petitioners have been in continuous temporary service for more than three years, the declaration of quasi-permanent status depends on the satisfaction of the appointing authority regarding their work, conduct, and character. The Court stated that it is not possible to grant this relief as it requires an assessment by the appointing authority. However, the Court clarified that the petitioners could make representations for any benefits they are entitled to under the rules.
3. Whether the orders of retrenchment proposed or passed against the petitioners violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution:
The petitioners argued that their retrenchment violated the guarantee of equality under Articles 14 and 16, as they were being treated differently from deputationists from State Government services. The Court found no substance in this argument, noting that the petitioners and deputationists belong to different classes. The petitioners were appointed on a temporary basis for the Beas Project, while the deputationists were employees of the State Governments. The Court held that the petitioners' retrenchment was in accordance with the terms of their appointment, which provided for termination upon completion of the project. Therefore, the proposed retrenchment did not violate the equality guarantee.
Work-Charged Employees:
The Court also addressed the cases of work-charged employees, noting that their employment was temporary and tied to specific projects. The Court observed that many work-charged employees had accepted alternative employment or retrenchment compensation. The Court emphasized that work-charged employees are entitled to benefits under the Industrial Disputes Act, and noted that a settlement and an award had already provided benefits to these employees. The Court dismissed the petitions of work-charged employees, stating that they are bound by the settlement and award.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the petitioners are employees of the Central Government, but their conditions of service are primarily governed by the terms of their appointment. The Court did not grant the reliefs claimed by the petitioners under the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. The Court also held that the proposed retrenchment of the petitioners did not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The petitions, Special Leave Petition, and the C.M.P. for condonation of delay were dismissed. The Court recorded an assurance from the Solicitor General that the 'last come, first go' rule would be applied among the petitioners and that preference would be given to them for future direct recruitments.
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1979 (8) TMI 213
The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal challenging a scheme of consolidation of holdings in Village Bhawanipur, Punjab. The High Court justified dismissing the writ petition due to delay in challenging the scheme and failure to include other affected landholders in the petition. No costs were awarded. (Case citation: 1979 (8) TMI 213 - SC)
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1979 (8) TMI 212
The appellant, an office Superintendent, was initially reverted after an enquiry but later reinstated. Subsequently, he was again reverted after a second enquiry. The Supreme Court upheld the second reversion and the reduced amount paid during suspension. The appeal was dismissed as the appellant had already retired.
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1979 (8) TMI 211
Issues Involved:
1. Necessity of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for eviction under State Rent Control Acts.
2. Validity of the notice given by the landlady.
3. Bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlady.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Necessity of Notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act:
The central issue in this case was whether a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary for eviction under State Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court addressed a divergence of opinions among various High Courts and previous decisions of the Supreme Court on this matter. The Court noted that State Rent Control Acts were enacted post-World War II to protect tenants from undue eviction and exorbitant rent demands. These Acts vary in language and scheme across states but generally provide specific grounds for eviction, making the necessity of a notice under Section 106 debatable.
The Court observed that under the Transfer of Property Act, leases are contractual, and a lease can be terminated by giving a notice under Section 106. However, State Rent Control Acts override this by providing specific grounds and procedures for eviction, thus making the determination of a lease by notice under Section 106 redundant. The Court cited various High Court decisions and previous Supreme Court rulings, noting that the requirement of notice under Section 106 should not be uniformly applied across different State Rent Acts.
The Court concluded that when a tenant incurs liability for eviction under a State Rent Act, the landlord's action of filing an eviction suit is tantamount to expressing an intention to terminate the lease. Therefore, a notice under Section 106 is not obligatory unless explicitly required by the State Rent Act.
2. Validity of the Notice Given by the Landlady:
The Court did not find it necessary to decide on the validity of the notice given by the landlady under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The primary controversy was whether such a notice was required at all, given the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Rent Act. The Court emphasized that the Tamil Nadu Rent Act, like other State Rent Acts, provides specific grounds and procedures for eviction, making the notice under Section 106 unnecessary.
3. Bona Fide Requirement of the Premises by the Landlady:
The Rent Controller initially dismissed the landlady's petition for eviction on the grounds of personal necessity, deeming it not genuine. However, the Appellate Court found the landlady's requirement for the premises bona fide but maintained the dismissal due to an invalid notice. The High Court, following its previous decision, ruled that a notice under Section 106 was not necessary for eviction under the Tamil Nadu Rent Act.
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, agreeing that no notice under Section 106 was required. The Court also noted that no substantial point was presented to challenge the Appellate Court's finding of bona fide necessity by the landlady. The appeal was dismissed, and the Court directed the parties to bear their own costs.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court resolved the issue of the necessity of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for eviction under State Rent Control Acts, concluding that such a notice is not required unless explicitly mandated by the State Rent Act. The Court upheld the High Court's decision that the landlady's bona fide requirement for the premises justified the eviction, dismissing the tenant's appeal.
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1979 (8) TMI 210
Issues Involved:
1. Joint Family Status and Redemption of Mortgages
2. Limitation Period for Redemption
3. Acknowledgement of Liability and Fresh Start of Limitation
4. Appropriate Article of Limitation Regulation for Suit by Non-Redeeming Co-Mortgagor
Summary:
1. Joint Family Status and Redemption of Mortgages:
The appellant contended that the mortgages were made by members of a joint Hindu family and that redemption by one co-mortgagor was on behalf of all. Alternatively, it was argued that if the family had divided in status, the property would be held as tenants-in-common. The court did not allow this plea as it was not raised in earlier proceedings. The court noted: "The fact remains that this plea about the family being joint in status at the material time, was not agitated before the learned Single Judge, nor pressed into argument before the Full Bench in Letters Patent Appeal."
2. Limitation Period for Redemption:
The trial court held that the plaintiff's suit was within the 50-year limitation period u/s Article 136 of the Travancore Limitation Regulation. However, the Single Judge and the majority of the Full Bench held that the suit was barred by limitation, applying a 12-year period u/s Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The dissenting judge opined that the 50-year period should start from the date of redemption by the redeeming co-mortgagor.
3. Acknowledgement of Liability and Fresh Start of Limitation:
The appellant argued that release deeds executed by the original mortgagees amounted to acknowledgements of liability, thus providing a fresh start of limitation. The court rejected this, stating: "A mere admission of a past liability is not sufficient to constitute such an 'acknowledgement'." The court found that the release deeds did not amount to acknowledgements of a subsisting liability.
4. Appropriate Article of Limitation Regulation for Suit by Non-Redeeming Co-Mortgagor:
The court examined whether the suit was governed by Article 136 of the Travancore Limitation Regulation (50 years) or Article 132/144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (12 years). The court concluded that the suit was time-barred regardless of the article applied, as it was filed more than 28 years after the last redemption in 1918. The court stated: "The suit was thus filed more than 12 years after the expiry of the 50 years' limitation prescribed for a suit for redemption under Article 136 of the Travancore Regulation, and more than 28 years after the redemption in 1918."
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the plaintiff's claim regarding suit items 31 to 40, 42, and 44 was time-barred. The appeal was dismissed with each party bearing their own costs. The court concluded: "For all the fore-going reasons, we uphold the finding of the High Court that the plaintiff's claim in regard to suit items 31 to 40, 42 and 44 was time barred and dismiss the appeal."
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1979 (8) TMI 209
The petitioner owns a property in Kottayam district. The tax remittance was refused due to ownership dispute. The court directed the first respondent to consider and finalize the petitioner's representation within six weeks. No notice issued to the 4th respondent.
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1979 (8) TMI 208
Issues:
The liability to pay octroi duty on uncrushed salt brought within municipal limits for crushing and export.
Summary:
The Supreme Court considered two Civil Appeals by a company against the Gujarat High Court's judgment holding the company liable to pay octroi duty on uncrushed salt brought within municipal limits for crushing and export. The company operated a salt manufacturing works outside municipal limits, with a part of the trolly track and grinding mill within municipal limits. The High Court allowed the appeals partially, exempting uncrushed salt directly sent to the jetty from octroi duty. The main issue was whether salt brought for crushing and export within municipal limits is liable to octroi duty.
The Court analyzed the relevant ordinance and rules empowering the imposition of octroi duty on goods brought for consumption or use within municipal limits. It was found that the uncrushed salt brought for crushing and export within municipal limits qualifies as goods for consumption or use as per the rules. The Court discussed the meanings of "consumption" and "use" in legal contexts, emphasizing that the act of crushing uncrushed salt commercially transforms it into a different article, constituting consumption. The Court concluded that octroi duty is leviable on uncrushed salt brought for crushing and export within municipal limits due to both consumption and use of the salt.
In conclusion, the appeals were dismissed, affirming the liability of the company to pay octroi duty on uncrushed salt brought within municipal limits for crushing and export.
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1979 (8) TMI 207
Issues Involved:
1. Competence of the Commissioner for Settlements and Charitable Endowments to exercise functions under the Madras Act of 1951.
2. Validity of the demands made by the Commissioner for payment of fees.
3. Application of the Madras Act of 1951 to the South Kanara District and its compliance with Article 14 of the Constitution.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Competence of the Commissioner for Settlements and Charitable Endowments to Exercise Functions under the Madras Act of 1951:
The appellants argued that the notification authorizing the Commissioner for Settlements and Charitable Endowments for Mysore to exercise the functions of the Commissioner under the Madras Act of 1951 lacked legal authority. They contended that the Commissioner being a Corporation Sole, only the Central Government was competent to issue such a notification under section 122 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. The court, however, clarified that the power of the body corporate to function under the parent Act is not conditional on the issuance of directions by the Central Government. The court found that the Commissioner's authority to function remained unimpaired and could be exercised as contemplated by the Act, regardless of whether directions were issued by the Central Government.
2. Validity of the Demands Made by the Commissioner for Payment of Fees:
The appellants contested the demands made by the Commissioner on the ground that they were excessive and bore no relationship to the services rendered by the Department. They argued that there was no quid pro quo between the services rendered and the fees charged. The court examined the affidavit of Shri Annaji Rao, which detailed the services provided and the costs involved. It was noted that the total demand made on all religious institutions for fees during the years 1957 to 1964 amounted to Rs. 8,80,389/-, while the allocable expense for the services was Rs. 7,54,160/-. The court concluded that there was a fair correspondence between the fee charged and the cost of services rendered to the fee payers as a class. The court held that the necessity for establishing quid pro quo between the fee and the cost of services rendered is a matter that does not require mathematical precision but a general correlation. Consequently, the court found no substantial prejudice to the appellants due to the non-supply of detailed information sought by them and upheld the validity of the demands.
3. Application of the Madras Act of 1951 to the South Kanara District and its Compliance with Article 14 of the Constitution:
The appellants argued that the application of the Madras Act of 1951 to the South Kanara District alone, while similar institutions in other areas of Karnataka were not subjected to the same law, violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The court considered the historical context in which the Madras Act of 1951 continued to apply to South Kanara District after the reorganization of states. It was noted that the differential treatment arising from the application of laws continued in different regions of the same reorganized State did not immediately attract the clause of the Constitution prohibiting discrimination. The court referred to several precedents, including the Bhaiyalal Shukla case, which upheld the validity of geographical classifications based on historical reasons. However, the court also acknowledged that the continued application of unequal laws for an indefinite period could eventually become unconstitutional. The court expressed hope that the Karnataka Legislature would act promptly to remove the inequality by enacting comprehensive legislation applicable to all temples and Mutts in Karnataka. The court refrained from declaring the law inapplicable to South Kanara District immediately but warned that failure to address the inequality could result in a successful constitutional challenge in the future.
Separate Judgment by Shinghal J.:
Shinghal J. concurred with the dismissal of the appeals but disagreed with the view that the continued application of the Madras Act of 1951 to South Kanara District was "perilously near the periphery of unconstitutionality." He emphasized the importance of proper pleadings and evidence to establish a claim of discrimination under Article 14. He referred to the Bhopal Sugar Industries case, which held that mere efflux of time does not automatically raise the presumption of discrimination. Shinghal J. concluded that the appellants had not furnished the necessary particulars to support their plea of discrimination and that the continued application of the Madras Act of 1951 could not be deemed unconstitutional solely due to the lapse of time.
Conclusion:
The appeals were dismissed, and the court upheld the competence of the Commissioner, the validity of the demands made for payment of fees, and the continued application of the Madras Act of 1951 to the South Kanara District. However, the court urged the Karnataka Legislature to address the inequality by enacting appropriate legislation within a reasonable timeframe.
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1979 (8) TMI 206
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of promissory estoppel against the Government.
2. Validity of the agreement under public policy.
3. Refusal of import licenses under Rule 6(1)(c) of the Import Trade Control Order.
4. Delay in filing the petition.
5. Maintainability of the writ petition to enforce contractual rights.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of Promissory Estoppel Against the Government:
The petitioners claimed that the Government of India is estopped by principles of promissory estoppel from refusing import licenses during the subsistence of the agreement dated January 18, 1971. The petitioners argued that they altered their position based on the Government's representations and promises. The Court upheld this argument, referring to the Supreme Court's decision in M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Company Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, where it was held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies against the Government. The Court found that the petitioners had indeed altered their position in reliance on the Government's promise and that the Government could not repudiate its promise on vague grounds of public interest.
2. Validity of the Agreement Under Public Policy:
The respondents argued that the agreement was void as it was opposed to public policy. However, the Court rejected this argument, noting that the respondents failed to provide specific facts to substantiate their claim. The Court emphasized that a mere statement that a contract is opposed to public policy is insufficient without proper foundation. The Court also pointed out that the Government had already granted import licenses under the agreement, indicating that the contract was not initially considered void.
3. Refusal of Import Licenses Under Rule 6(1)(c) of the Import Trade Control Order:
The respondents contended that Rule 6(1)(c) prohibited the grant of licenses for canalised items. The Court found this argument unconvincing, noting that the rule is regulatory or discretionary, not mandatory. The Court also highlighted that the Government had entered into a contract with the petitioners despite the canalisation policy, and thus, the respondents could not refuse licenses based on this rule. The Court concluded that both orders denying the import licenses were unsustainable and unjustified.
4. Delay in Filing the Petition:
The respondents argued that the petitioners approached the Court after a considerable delay. However, the Court did not find this argument sufficient to non-suit the petitioners, noting that the petitioners had engaged in extensive correspondence with the authorities seeking relief before filing the petition.
5. Maintainability of the Writ Petition to Enforce Contractual Rights:
The respondents argued that the writ petition was not maintainable for enforcing contractual rights. The Court disagreed, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Balu Sukhram Singh v. Ram Dular Singh and others, which held that a writ petition is maintainable even if the right to relief arises from an alleged breach of contract, provided the action challenged is of a public authority invested with statutory power. The Court concluded that the petition was maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Conclusion:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding that the respondents wrongfully and illegally deprived the petitioners of their rights. The petition was allowed, and the respondents were directed to grant the import licenses within eight weeks. The respondents were also ordered to pay the costs of the petition.
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1979 (8) TMI 205
Issues:
Conviction under Section 85(i)(ii) of the Gold (Control) Act based on possession of primary gold. Interpretation of evidence regarding ownership and control of seized items. Application of Sections 98B and 99 of the Act in establishing guilt.
Analysis:
The judgment involves a case where the accused was convicted under Section 85(i)(ii) of the Gold (Control) Act based on the possession of primary gold. The prosecution's case revolved around the accused being the head of the family and thus assumed to be in possession, custody, or control of the seized gold items. However, the defense argued that there was no legal evidence to establish the accused's status as the head of the family or his ownership of the primary gold. The defense contended that the conviction was based on assumptions rather than concrete evidence.
The prosecution, on the other hand, argued that the evidence on record clearly established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. They relied on Sections 98B(ii) and 99 of the Act to support their claim that the accused, being the head of the family, was in possession, control, or custody of the primary gold. The prosecution highlighted the examination of the accused under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where he claimed the gold belonged to his deceased sister. They also pointed out that the accused owned the flat where the gold was found, further implicating him in the case.
The court analyzed the evidence presented and referred to the case law to determine the burden of proof on the prosecution. The court found that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was in possession, control, or custody of the primary gold in question. The court noted discrepancies in the evidence regarding ownership and control of the seized items, emphasizing that mere assumptions about the accused's status as the head of the family were insufficient to prove guilt.
Moreover, the court examined the provisions of Sections 98B and 99 of the Act, which deal with presumptions related to the mental state of the accused and ownership of seized items. The court concluded that the prosecution did not meet the standard of proof required to invoke these provisions, thereby rejecting the prosecution's arguments based on these sections.
In the final verdict, the court made the Rule absolute, setting aside the conviction and sentences imposed on the accused. The accused was acquitted, and any fines paid were ordered to be refunded. The petitioner was discharged from his bail bond, bringing the case to a close.
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1979 (8) TMI 204
Whether the giving of fire-arms by a person holding a licence for repairing and dealing in fire- arms for repairs to mechanic who holds no such licence, but does the repair job at his workshop at a place different from the factory or place of business of the licence holder, amounts to "delivery of those arms into the possession of another person" within the contemplation of Section 29(b) of the Arms Act, 1959?
Held that:- There is nothing in those materials to show that before handing over those fire- arms to Mrityunjoy Dutta for repairs, the respondents had done anything to ascertain that Mrityunjoy Dutta was legally authorised to retain those arms even for the limited purpose of repairing them. Thus, prima facie the materials before the Magistrate showed that the respondents had delivered the fire-arms in question into the possession of Mrityunjoy Dutta, without previously ascertaining that he was legally authorised to have the same in his possession, and as such, the respondents appeared to have committed and offence under Section 29(b) of the Act. Further, by allowing the fire-arms to be removed to a place other than the places of their business or factory specified in Column 3 of their licences in Form IX, the respondents appear to have contravened condition 1(c) of their licence - Appeal allowed and set aside the orders of the Courts below whereby respondents 1 to 4, herein, were discharged.
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