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1980 (8) TMI 217
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED The judgment primarily addresses the following legal questions: - Whether a subsequent decision by the Supreme Court or a larger bench of the same court, taking a different or contrary view on a point covered by an earlier judgment, constitutes a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).
- Whether the failure of a court to consider an existing decision of the Supreme Court or a High Court that takes a different or contrary view on a point covered by its judgment amounts to a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1: Subsequent Decision by a Superior Court - Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The legal framework involves Order 47, Rule 1 of the CPC, which provides grounds for review, including an error apparent on the face of the record. The explanation added by Act 104 of 1976 to Rule 1 clarifies that a subsequent decision by a superior court shall not be a ground for review.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court reasoned that a judgment that was correct when made does not become erroneous due to a subsequent decision by a superior court. The purpose of review is to correct an error apparent at the time the judgment was given, not due to later developments.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The court cited several precedents, including Lord Davey's statement in Rajah Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Rajah Vellanki Venkatrama Rao, and the Supreme Court's decision in Raja Shaturanjit v. Mohammad Azmat Azim Khan, to support its conclusion.
- Application of Law to Facts: The court applied the principle that a subsequent decision does not create an error apparent on the face of the record, as the error was not present when the original judgment was rendered.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The court rejected the argument that a subsequent decision by the Supreme Court is akin to retrospective legislation, emphasizing that courts are entitled to their interpretation of the law until the Supreme Court declares otherwise.
- Conclusions: The court concluded that a subsequent decision by the Supreme Court or a larger bench does not constitute a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record.
Issue 2: Failure to Consider Existing Decisions - Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The framework involves the application of Article 141 of the Constitution, which mandates that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts. The court also referenced various precedents regarding the failure to consider existing decisions.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court distinguished between the failure to consider a Supreme Court decision and a High Court decision. It held that failure to consider a Supreme Court decision results in not applying the law, constituting an error apparent on the face of the record.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The court cited decisions such as The Selection Committee for Admission to the Medical and Dental College, Bangalore v. M. P. Nagaraj and Tungabhadra Industries Ltd v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh to support its reasoning.
- Application of Law to Facts: The court applied the principle that failure to consider a Supreme Court decision is an error apparent, while failure to consider a High Court decision is merely an erroneous judgment.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The court addressed contrary views, such as those from the Madras High Court, and explained why it disagreed with them, emphasizing the distinction between Supreme Court and High Court decisions.
- Conclusions: The court concluded that failure to consider a Supreme Court decision constitutes an error apparent, while failure to consider a High Court decision does not.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS - Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning: "The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India." "A subsequent decision of the Supreme Court or a larger Bench of the same court rendering a decision taking a different or contrary view on a point covered by the said judgment, does not amount to a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record."
- Core Principles Established: A subsequent decision by a superior court does not constitute an error apparent on the face of the record. Failure to consider a Supreme Court decision is an error apparent, while failure to consider a High Court decision is not.
- Final Determinations on Each Issue: The court determined that subsequent decisions by superior courts do not create errors apparent for review purposes. However, failure to consider existing Supreme Court decisions does constitute an error apparent.
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1980 (8) TMI 216
The appellant was convicted of offences under Sections 417 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction under Section 471 was altered to Section 465. The sentences were set aside and the matter was remitted to the trial court to consider probation under the Probation of Offenders Act. Fine imposed on the appellant shall be refunded.
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1980 (8) TMI 215
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the penalty imposed on the Petitioner.
2. Validity of the findings of the Enquiring Officer.
3. Consideration of evidence by the Departmental Authorities.
4. Application of Rule 18(2) of the Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
5. Omission of properties in the return submitted by the Petitioner under Rule 18(1).
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the penalty imposed on the Petitioner:
The Petitioner, a clerk in the Departmental Telegraph Office (D.T.O.), Cuttack, challenged the penalty of pay reduction imposed on him. The penalty involved reducing his pay from Rs. 420/- to Rs. 300/- for three years with cumulative effect. The Petitioner sought quashing of this penalty through a writ of certiorari.
2. Validity of the findings of the Enquiring Officer:
The charges against the Petitioner included possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income, acquisition of property without prior sanction, and submission of an incorrect statement of assets and liabilities. The Enquiring Officer found the Petitioner guilty of all charges. However, the Court noted that the findings were based on "suspicions or mere suppositions" and ignored evidence favorable to the Petitioner, making the conclusions arbitrary and capricious.
3. Consideration of evidence by the Departmental Authorities:
The Court observed that the Departmental Authorities did not properly consider the evidence. For instance, the Petitioner's income from land was significantly understated by the authorities. The Enquiring Officer excluded a certificate from the local Tahasildar, which indicated a higher income, on procedural grounds. The Court found that the Petitioner was not given a fair opportunity to prove this certificate. Additionally, the Enquiring Officer ignored testimonies and documents supporting the Petitioner's claims about his assets and income.
4. Application of Rule 18(2) of the Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964:
The second charge involved the Petitioner acquiring property without prior sanction, as required under Rule 18(2). The Petitioner argued that he had informed the authorities about the acquisitions and that the properties in his wife's name should not be considered under this rule. The Court agreed, stating that Rule 18(2) restricts acquisitions by the Government servant, not by their family members, unless it is a benami transaction. The Departmental Authorities failed to apply their minds to this aspect.
5. Omission of properties in the return submitted by the Petitioner under Rule 18(1):
The third charge related to the omission of properties in the return submitted by the Petitioner. The properties in question were in his wife's name. The Court noted that without a finding that these properties were acquired by the Petitioner using his funds, he could not be held guilty of this charge. The Departmental Authorities did not establish that the properties were benami transactions.
Conclusion:
The Court found that the non-consideration of favorable evidence, admission of inadmissible evidence, and non-application of mind to material aspects resulted in manifest injustice. Therefore, the Court quashed the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the appellate authority. The case was remanded to the appellate authority for fresh disposal according to law, with an opportunity for the Petitioner to be heard. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
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1980 (8) TMI 214
The Supreme Court set aside the lower court's order and remanded the appeal to the High Court to decide whether to admit or reject it wholly. There was no amendment in the CPC allowing partial admission of appeals. No costs were awarded for the present appeal.
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1980 (8) TMI 213
Issues Involved:
1. Limitation of the claim for the price of motor accessories supplied.
2. Award of interest in the absence of a contract for interest.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Limitation of the Claim for the Price of Motor Accessories Supplied:
The defendant argued that the claim for the amount of Rs. 5,274.71 demanded under bill No. 94 dated 1-4-1962 was barred by limitation as per Article 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a three-year period from the date of delivery of goods. The suit was filed on 6-4-1965, more than three years from the delivery date, making it allegedly time-barred.
The court noted that although a general plea of limitation was raised, it was not pressed in the trial court or the lower appellate court. The defendant had effectively abandoned this plea. Furthermore, the plea of limitation was not raised in the memorandum of appeal filed before the High Court and was introduced only during the arguments of the second appeal.
The court emphasized that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. Since the plea was not raised earlier and required factual investigation, it could not be entertained for the first time in the second appeal. The court also considered the acknowledgment of liability by the defendant through the issuance of post-dated cheques on 12-5-1962. The issuance of these cheques was seen as an acknowledgment of the debt, thereby providing a fresh period of limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act. The court concluded that the plea of limitation was devoid of merit and could not be raised at this stage.
2. Award of Interest in the Absence of a Contract for Interest:
The plaintiff claimed interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the unpaid bills, asserting that there was an agreement to this effect. The lower appellate court, however, did not record any finding on the existence of such an agreement. The defendant contended that interest for the period prior to the suit could not be awarded without a finding of an agreement for interest, citing the Privy Council decision in B. N. Ry. Co. Ltd. v. Ruttanji Ramji and the Supreme Court decision in Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India.
The court referred to Section 61(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, which allows the court to award interest at a rate it deems fit in the absence of a contract to the contrary. The defendant did not allege any contract to the contrary and denied any business dealings with the plaintiff. Consequently, the court had the discretion to award interest on the amount due.
The court found that the lower appellate court had exercised its discretion appropriately in awarding interest at the rate of 12%, which was not unreasonable given the circumstances. The defendant had issued cheques for the price claimed and then stopped payment without a valid excuse, raising a false defense and repudiating liability. The court held that the award of interest was justified and reasonable.
Conclusion:
Both contentions raised by the defendant were found to be devoid of merit. The appeal was dismissed with costs, affirming the lower appellate court's decision to decree the suit with interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
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1980 (8) TMI 212
Issues:
Interpretation of Section 13 of the Indian Stamp Act and Rule 7 of the Central Provinces and Berar Stamp Rules, 1942.
Analysis:
The judgment in question involves the interpretation of Section 13 of the Indian Stamp Act and Rule 7 of the Central Provinces and Berar Stamp Rules, 1942. The main issue revolves around the utilization of stamp papers when drawing up an instrument. Bhave, J. had taken a strict view that all stamp papers must be utilized for the instrument, with part of it on each sheet, to prevent subsequent addition of stamps to make up for any deficit duty. However, Tankha, J. doubted this view, leading to a reference for clarification.
The primary contention was whether the stringent interpretation of Section 13 and Rule 7, as held by Bhave, J., was necessary or if a more lenient approach should be adopted. The advocate for the non-applicant argued that the purpose of these provisions was to ensure the stamp could not be reused, and that mere defacing or crossing out the paper should suffice. Reference was made to the Supreme Court's stance that the Stamp Act should not be used as a technicality to defeat claims.
The judges analyzed various authorities cited by the counsel, emphasizing that the cancellation of stamps should be effective to prevent reuse. They highlighted that the purpose of the Stamp Act was revenue collection, not to provide technical loopholes for litigants. The judges concluded that the interpretation should be more flexible, focusing on whether the stamp was effectively utilized at the time of drawing up the instrument, rather than a strict requirement for each sheet to contain part of the instrument.
In light of the arguments and authorities presented, the judges found Bhave, J.'s interpretation too narrow and stringent. They concurred with the views expressed in the cited authorities, emphasizing that the evidence of stamp utilization should be the determining factor, rather than a strict adherence to placing part of the instrument on each sheet. The Civil Revisions were directed to be placed before an appropriate Bench for further proceedings.
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1980 (8) TMI 211
Issues Involved:
1. Compliance with Rule 18 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules.
2. Adequacy of the sample weight as per Rule 22.
3. Determination of whether the sample was milk ice or milk ice-cream.
4. Adulteration of the sample based on the fat content.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Compliance with Rule 18 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules:
Issue: Whether the provisions of Rule 18 are mandatory and whether the rule is violated if the copy of the memorandum in Form VII and the impression of the seal are sent through the same messenger at the same time.
Judgment: The court unanimously agreed that Rule 18 is mandatory. The purpose of Rule 18 is to ensure the correct sample reaches the Public Analyst without tampering. The court clarified that "separately" means the sample and the memorandum in Form VII should not be enclosed together but sent in separate packets. It does not require sending them at different times or by different persons. The court found that sending both packets through the same messenger does not violate Rule 18, provided they are sealed separately.
Conclusion: The court held that there was no infraction of Rule 18 as the sample and the memorandum were sent in separate sealed covers, even though they were delivered by the same messenger.
2. Adequacy of the Sample Weight as per Rule 22:
Issue: Whether the sample weight being less than the prescribed 300 grams in Rule 22 prejudiced the respondent.
Judgment: The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in *State of Kerala v. Alasserry Mohammad*, which stated that Rule 22 is directory and not mandatory. The term "approximate quantity" indicates that the quantity should be close to the specified amount, and minor deviations do not constitute a violation if the sample is sufficient for analysis.
Conclusion: The court found that the sample weight of 200 grams did not prejudice the respondent and was sufficient for analysis. Therefore, the acquittal on this ground was set aside.
3. Determination of Whether the Sample was Milk Ice or Milk Ice-Cream:
Issue: Whether the sample taken was milk ice or milk ice-cream.
Judgment: The respondent had signed Form VI, describing the sample as "golden milk ice" and listing its constituents. The court noted that the respondent, being educated, had provided this description and the details of the constituents, which the Food Inspector could not have known otherwise.
Conclusion: The court held that the sample was indeed milk ice, as described by the respondent in Form VI. The trial magistrate's finding that it could not be determined with certainty was overturned.
4. Adulteration of the Sample Based on the Fat Content:
Issue: Whether the sample was adulterated based on its fat content.
Judgment: The Public Analyst found the milk fat content to be 4.16%, exceeding the maximum standard of 2% prescribed for milk ice. This deviation indicated that the sample was adulterated.
Conclusion: The court held that the sample did not conform to the definition of milk ice and was thus adulterated. The respondent was found guilty of selling an adulterated food article.
Final Judgment:
The order of acquittal was set aside. The respondent was convicted under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, read with Section 7, and sentenced to six months of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000. In default of payment of the fine, the respondent would undergo an additional two months of rigorous imprisonment.
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1980 (8) TMI 210
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction under Article 136 and Service Jurisprudence.
2. Seniority disputes among three groups of engineers in the U.P. Service of Engineers (Irrigation Branch).
3. Historical context and evolution of recruitment rules.
4. Validity and interpretation of seniority lists and appointment rules.
5. Application of the 1961 Memorandum and its impact on seniority.
6. Constitutional principles and their influence on service rules.
7. Officiating service and its relevance to seniority.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction under Article 136 and Service Jurisprudence:
The judgment begins by highlighting the problems caused by the "unlimited jurisdiction under Article 136," which leads to excessive litigation, clogging the judicial system. The court suggests that specialized tribunals should handle service jurisprudence to reduce the burden on higher courts.
2. Seniority disputes among three groups of engineers in the U.P. Service of Engineers (Irrigation Branch):
The primary issue revolves around the competitive claims to seniority among three groups of engineers: directly recruited graduate engineers, graduate engineers later absorbed, and diploma-holders promoted as Assistant Engineers. The disputes have led to multiple litigations, affecting the functioning of the engineers and the developmental projects they are involved in.
3. Historical context and evolution of recruitment rules:
The judgment traces the history of the U.P. Service of Engineers, noting that the service was initially governed by rules framed under the Government of India Act, 1919. The lack of comprehensive and updated rules has led to conflicts and litigation among the engineers. The court emphasizes the need for updated rules that align with constitutional principles and current realities.
4. Validity and interpretation of seniority lists and appointment rules:
The court examines the seniority lists prepared by the state, noting that the lists have been challenged multiple times. The High Court had quashed the seniority lists of 1965 and 1969, directing the state to prepare new lists in accordance with the rules. The court stresses the importance of Rule 23, which determines seniority based on the date of the order of appointment.
5. Application of the 1961 Memorandum and its impact on seniority:
The 1961 Memorandum introduced direct recruitment through competitive examinations conducted by the Public Service Commission and set quotas for different sources of recruitment. The court notes that the memorandum must be read in conjunction with the 1936 Rules, and it cannot override the rules. The court emphasizes that temporary appointments, if made substantively, should be considered for seniority purposes.
6. Constitutional principles and their influence on service rules:
The court stresses that the interpretation of service rules must be consistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, which mandate equality and non-discrimination. The court rejects the argument that the seniority list and rules are unconstitutional, emphasizing the need to interpret the rules in a manner that aligns with constitutional principles.
7. Officiating service and its relevance to seniority:
The court holds that officiating service should be considered for seniority if the appointments are regular and meet the necessary conditions, such as consultation with the Public Service Commission and completion of probation. The court emphasizes that long-term temporary appointments should not be disregarded for seniority purposes merely because they are labeled as temporary.
Conclusion:
The court directs the state to prepare a new seniority list based on the principles laid down in the judgment, ensuring that temporary appointments made substantively are considered for seniority. The court emphasizes the need for updated service rules that align with constitutional principles and address the current realities of the service. The appeals are partially allowed, and the writ petitions are dismissed, with the parties bearing their own costs.
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1980 (8) TMI 209
Issues Involved:
1. Delay in furnishing copies of documents and statements relied upon in the grounds of detention.
2. Delay in granting an interview to the detenu with his lawyer.
3. Counter-affidavit not affirmed by the detaining authority.
4. Consideration of irrelevant matters.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Delay in Furnishing Copies of Documents and Statements:
The petitioner argued that there was an impermissible delay in furnishing copies of the documents and statements relied upon in the grounds of detention, which violated Articles 21 and 22(5) of the Constitution. The respondent countered that the grounds of detention served were elaborate and contained all necessary information for making an effective representation. The Court noted that while the "grounds" include basic facts and materials, further particulars must be supplied with reasonable expedition. In this case, the grounds were elaborate, but the additional particulars took 17 days to be supplied, which the Court deemed not unreasonable given the circumstances, including the complexity of the case and ongoing investigations. Therefore, the delay did not amount to a denial of the detenu's right to make an effective representation.
2. Delay in Granting Interview with Lawyer:
The petitioner claimed there was an unreasonable delay of about 20 days in granting an interview with the lawyer, rendering the detenu's statutory right under Rule 14(xii) of the Gujarat Condition of Detention (COFEPOSA) Order 1975 meaningless. The respondent argued that the delay was inconsequential as Article 22 denies the detenu the right to consult a lawyer, though the State Government had granted this as a concession. The Court found that the delay in granting the interview did not affect the detenu's constitutional right to make a representation. The detenu was allowed an interview with his lawyer on February 20, 1980, and the copies of documents were received on March 11, 1980. Despite these, the detenu did not make any representation, indicating no prejudice was caused.
3. Counter-Affidavit Not Affirmed by Detaining Authority:
The petitioner contended that the counter-affidavit was not affirmed by the detaining authority but by another officer based on information from the record. The respondent clarified that the detention order was passed by the Home Minister and authenticated by the Deputy Secretary, who also filed the counter-affidavit. The Court overruled this contention, noting that no personal mala fides were alleged against the Minister, and it was not necessary for the Minister to file the counter-affidavit himself.
4. Consideration of Irrelevant Matters:
The petitioner argued that irrelevant matters were taken into consideration in the grounds of detention. The respondent maintained that these were introductory facts or the history of the case. The Court negated this contention, stating that the so-called irrelevant matters were merely introductory and did not affect the validity of the detention order.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition, concluding that the delay of 17 days in furnishing the copies of documents was not unreasonable and did not infringe upon the detenu's constitutional rights. The delay in granting an interview with the lawyer was also deemed inconsequential. The counter-affidavit was validly affirmed, and the consideration of introductory facts did not invalidate the detention order. The Court's decision was based on a thorough examination of the circumstances and legal principles involved.
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1980 (8) TMI 208
Issues Involved:
1. Competence of the Accountant General to retire the appellant.
2. Whether the retirement was in public interest.
3. Legality of the Reviewing Committee's recommendations.
4. Validity of the adverse confidential reports as a basis for retirement.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Competence of the Accountant General to Retire the Appellant:
The appellant challenged the competence of the Accountant General (A.G.) to compulsorily retire him, arguing that he was not the "appropriate authority" as per F.R. 56(j)(i). The appointing authority was the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (C & AG), and the appellant contended that the A.G., being subordinate to the C & AG, lacked the power to retire him. The court clarified that the distinction between "dismissal" and "compulsory retirement" is crucial, and the constitutional bar under Article 311(1) does not apply to compulsory retirement. The Note to F.R. 56 specifies that the authority empowered to make substantive appointments is the appropriate authority to retire government servants. The court found that the A.G. had been vested with the power to appoint Accounts Officers by a Notification of the Ministry of Finance dated 29-11-1972, making him the appropriate authority for compulsory retirement. Thus, the court saw no flaw in the impugned order.
2. Whether the Retirement was in Public Interest:
The court emphasized that compulsory retirement under F.R. 56(j)(i) must be justified solely by public interest. The onus is on the Administration to prove that the retirement was necessary in public interest. The court highlighted that security of tenure is crucial for the efficiency of service, and the Administration must ensure that servants are not plagued by uncertainty. The court stated that the exercise of power must be bona fide and promote public interest. The court found no demonstrable ground to infer mala fides but noted that the validity of the order depended on its support by public interest. The court reviewed the material to determine whether a rational mind could be satisfied that the compulsory retirement was necessary in public interest.
3. Legality of the Reviewing Committee's Recommendations:
The appellant argued that the Reviewing Committee was illegal and its recommendations vitiated the A.G.'s order. The court disagreed, stating that the decision to retire was that of the A.G., and the Reviewing Committee's presence was persuasive, not decisive. The court found that the Reviewing Committee's recommendations were based on adverse entries in the appellant's confidential reports, which indicated that the appellant was unable to perform his duties efficiently and effectively.
4. Validity of the Adverse Confidential Reports as a Basis for Retirement:
The court examined the adverse confidential reports, which dated from 1961-62 to 1970. The appellant had been promoted in 1961 and had drawn increments for over a decade without hindrance. The appellant pointed out that there were no adverse remarks in his confidential reports for the years 1971-72 to 1975-76. The court found that the Reviewing Committee and the A.G. had ignored these later entries. The court emphasized that an officer who had served continuously for 14 years, crossed the efficiency bar, and reached the maximum salary in the scale, with no adverse entries for five years before retirement, could not be retired based on outdated adverse reports. The court concluded that the order of compulsory retirement was flawed because it ignored vital material and relied on obsolete information. The court quashed the order but allowed the A.G. to take a fresh decision based on legal material and principles. The appellant was entitled to costs quantified at Rs. 2,000.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, the order of compulsory retirement was quashed, and the court left the law to take its course. The appellant was entitled to costs of Rs. 2,000.
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1980 (8) TMI 207
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellant was an "unauthorized occupant" under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.
2. Whether the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 overrides the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.
3. Whether the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 overrides the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.
Summary:
Issue 1: Unauthorized Occupant
The appellant argued that the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (Premises Act) did not apply as he was not an "unauthorized occupant" since he entered the premises lawfully before they were purchased by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC). The Supreme Court held that the definition of "unauthorized occupation" u/s 2(2)(g) of the Premises Act includes continued occupation after the authority has expired or been determined. The appellant's lease was determined by a valid notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, making him an unauthorized occupant under the Premises Act.
Issue 2: Conflict with Delhi Rent Control Act
The appellant contended that the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (Rent Act) overrides the Premises Act, as the Rent Act provides special protection to tenants. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the Premises Act, enacted in 1971, prevails over the Rent Act due to its later enactment and specific application to public premises. The Court emphasized that the Premises Act's objective is to provide a summary procedure for eviction from public premises, which is distinct from the broader scope of the Rent Act.
Issue 3: Conflict with Slum Areas Act
The appellant argued that s. 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (Slums Act) overrides both the Rent Act and the Premises Act. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the Premises Act, being subsequent and more specific, prevails over the Slums Act. The Court highlighted that the Premises Act provides a specific forum for evicting unauthorized occupants, which must be given precedence.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court overruled all the preliminary objections raised by the appellant. The appellant was found to be in unauthorized occupation under the Premises Act. The Premises Act was held to override both the Rent Act and the Slums Act due to its specific and subsequent nature. The appeal was dismissed, with the appellant agreeing to vacate the premises by August 1, 1982, upon filing an undertaking.
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1980 (8) TMI 206
Issues Involved:
1. Authority of the Secretary to pass the order of detention.
2. Application of mind by the detaining authority.
3. Delay and refusal in supplying copies of documents to the detenus.
4. Rejection of representation by an unauthorized person.
5. Competence of the person rejecting the representation.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Authority of the Secretary to Pass the Order of Detention:
The detenus challenged the validity of the detention order on the ground that it was signed by the Secretary in the Home Department, who allegedly had no authority to pass such an order. The argument was based on the rules of business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution. However, the court found that the original records demonstrated the Minister concerned had indeed passed the order of detention, rendering this contention devoid of merit.
2. Application of Mind by the Detaining Authority:
The detenus argued that the detaining authority did not consider the earlier statements of four persons from whom they claimed to have acquired the gems. These statements allegedly supported the detenus' contention with documentary evidence. The court found no evidence of smuggling and criticized the detaining authority for relying on the presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act, which was inapplicable under COFEPOSA. This indicated a non-application of mind by the detaining authority.
3. Delay and Refusal in Supplying Copies of Documents to the Detenus:
The detenus requested copies of statements and documents relied upon in the grounds of detention to make an effective representation. The State Government refused this request, which was later directed by the Central Government to be fulfilled. The court emphasized that the constitutional imperatives under Article 22(5) require the detaining authority to supply all basic facts and materials relied upon in the grounds of detention. The delay of over a month in supplying these documents was deemed unreasonable and vitiated the detention.
4. Rejection of Representation by an Unauthorized Person:
The detenus contended that their representation for revocation of detention was wrongly rejected by an unauthorized person, as only the Revenue Minister of the Union Government was authorized to deal with such representations under the Rules of Business. The court did not find sufficient evidence to support this contention.
5. Competence of the Person Rejecting the Representation:
The representation made by the detenus to the detaining authority was reportedly rejected by the Adviser to the Governor of Maharashtra, as the State was under President's rule. The court found that the Adviser was competent under the Rules of Business framed under Article 166 to deal with and reject such representations, thus dismissing this contention.
Conclusion:
The court found merit in the argument regarding the delay and refusal in supplying copies of documents to the detenus, which violated their constitutional right to make an effective representation. The other contentions were dismissed based on the evidence provided. The writ petitions were allowed, and the detenus were ordered to be released on April 23, 1980.
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1980 (8) TMI 205
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of Civil Court
2. Definition of "Officer" under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912
3. Applicability of Rule 115 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Rules, 1936
4. Interpretation of "Dispute touching the business of a society"
5. Interaction between the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 and the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchases) Act, 1953
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of Civil Court
The primary issue was whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit arising out of a disciplinary proceeding held by a Cane Growers' Cooperative Society against its employee. The court held that the civil court had jurisdiction. It was concluded that the dispute arising out of disciplinary proceedings resulting in the dismissal of an employee of the society cannot be said to be a dispute touching the business of the society. Therefore, such disputes do not fall under the compulsory arbitration provision of Rule 115 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Rules, 1936.
2. Definition of "Officer" under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912
The court examined whether the first respondent, a supervisor in charge of a manure godown, could be considered an "officer" under Section 2(d) of the 1912 Act. The definition includes a chairman, secretary, treasurer, member of the committee, or other person empowered under the rules or bye-laws to give directions in regard to the business of the society. The court found that the first respondent was not an officer as he did not have the authority to give directions in regard to the business of the society. He was merely a supervisor drawing a salary of Rs. 150 per month and was not empowered by any rules or bye-laws to give such directions.
3. Applicability of Rule 115 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Rules, 1936
Rule 115 provides that any dispute touching the business of a registered society between specified parties shall be decided by the Registrar or by arbitration. The court held that this rule was not applicable in this case because the dispute did not involve an "officer" of the society, as the first respondent was not classified as such. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil court was not ousted by Rule 115.
4. Interpretation of "Dispute touching the business of a society"
The court referred to previous judgments to interpret the term "business" in this context. It concluded that "business" does not mean the general affairs of the society but refers to the actual trading or commercial activities the society is authorized to undertake. Consequently, a dispute arising from disciplinary action against an employee does not touch the business of the society and therefore does not fall under Rule 115.
5. Interaction between the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 and the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchases) Act, 1953
The court clarified that the 1953 Act, which regulates the supply and purchase of sugarcane, does not override the provisions of the 1912 Act. The 1953 Act was enacted to regulate relations between cane-growers and sugar factories and does not affect the jurisdictional provisions of the 1912 Act regarding disputes involving cooperative societies. The High Court's reliance on the 1953 Act was found to be misplaced, as it neither repeals nor replaces the 1912 Act.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the High Court that the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the matter was remanded to the learned district judge for expeditious disposal.
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1980 (8) TMI 204
Issues involved: Validity of deed of adoption, Mental capacity of Mansaram at the time of executing the deed, Challenge to the High Court's judgment.
Validity of deed of adoption: The appellant challenged a deed of adoption executed by Mansaram in 1944, claiming Mansaram was not in a fit state of mind. The trial Court and District Court upheld the deed, but a single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court set it aside. The Supreme Court noted that the deed lacked crucial details like the year, date, and place of adoption, casting doubt on its validity. The appellant's argument focused on the deed's validity, not the fact of adoption, but the Court concluded that Mansaram's mental state rendered the deed invalid.
Mental capacity of Mansaram: Previous incidents, including a refused registration of another adoption deed due to Mansaram's apparent mental incapacity, raised doubts about his ability to understand and execute legal documents. The Court highlighted various instances where Mansaram displayed confusion and inconsistency, indicating his unsound mind. Despite witness testimonies, the Court found Mansaram's mental faculties too impaired to comprehend the adoption process or the consequences of the deed.
Challenge to the High Court's judgment: The High Court's decision to set aside the lower courts' judgments was based on a reevaluation of the evidence, which the Supreme Court found justified. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's conclusion that Mansaram was not in a fit state of mind during the adoption deed's execution. The Court emphasized that this case was exceptional, where the evidence clearly supported a single conclusion contrary to the lower courts' findings.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision to set aside the deed of adoption due to Mansaram's lack of mental capacity. The judgment serves as a reminder that High Courts should not interfere with factual findings unless the evidence overwhelmingly supports a different conclusion, as was the case here.
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1980 (8) TMI 203
Issues involved: Appeal filed by Director of Enforcement against order of Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, maintainability of appeal by Director of Enforcement.
Issue 1: Appeal filed by Director of Enforcement
The appeal was filed by the Director of Enforcement against the order of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, which set aside the order of adjudication holding the respondents guilty of contravention of Section 4(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and imposing a personal penalty. The respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal by the Director of Enforcement, contending that only the Central Government can be considered aggrieved under the Act for filing an appeal to the High Court. The Director of Enforcement sought to amend the cause title in the memorandum of appeal to substitute the name of the appellant as the Government of India, but this was dismissed as the Director of Enforcement cannot be equated with the Government of India.
Issue 2: Maintainability of appeal by Director of Enforcement
The Explanation to Section 54 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 specifies that only the Central Government can be an aggrieved party for filing an appeal against the order of the Appellate Board. The Director of Enforcement, as the initial authority passing the adjudication order, cannot be considered aggrieved simply because the Appellate Board set aside the order. It was emphasized that a quasi-judicial Tribunal like the Director of Enforcement cannot have a grievance when a higher appellate forum reverses its decision, as it would imply bias. Without statutory authorization for the Director of Enforcement to file an appeal, the appeal was deemed not maintainable. The court dismissed the appeal, stating that it was without prejudice to the right of the Government of India to file an appeal if advised to do so.
In conclusion, the appeal filed by the Director of Enforcement was dismissed as not maintainable due to lack of statutory authorization and the specific provision in the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act regarding aggrieved parties for filing appeals.
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1980 (8) TMI 202
Issues:
1. Quashing of charge under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code by a learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court.
2. Interpretation of the legal requirements for establishing criminal breach of trust in the absence of statutory rules.
3. Validity of grounds for quashing the proceedings against the respondents.
4. Application of legal principles from previous judgments to determine the existence of criminal breach of trust.
Analysis:
1. The appellant, a teacher at a school in Calcutta, filed a complaint against the Secretary and Head Master of the school for misappropriation of provident fund money. The charge under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code was framed against the respondents by the Presidency Magistrate after a judicial inquiry and examination of witnesses. However, a learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court quashed the charge and proceedings against the respondents, citing the absence of a Provident Fund Committee and rules under the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963, as grounds for the decision.
2. The Supreme Court held that the grounds cited for quashing the proceedings were not valid. The Court emphasized that the absence of statutory rules does not negate the existence of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. Referring to previous judgments, the Court clarified that the creation of a trust relationship does not require adherence to all technicalities of trust law. The Court also highlighted a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which emphasized that the act of informing employees about their contributions to a provident fund scheme and subsequently deducting and retaining the funds constitutes criminal breach of trust.
3. The Court concluded that the learned Judge's decision to quash the charge was erroneous. The Court agreed with the legal principles established in previous judgments and found that the impugned order was incorrect. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the order quashing the charge against the respondents was set aside. Additionally, the Court directed for the expedited trial of the case due to its age, ensuring timely resolution of the matter.
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1980 (8) TMI 201
Issues Involved:
1. Taxability of voluntary contributions received in the form of shares under sections 11 and 12(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Applicability of section 13(2)(h) concerning interest income.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Taxability of Voluntary Contributions
Eternal Science of Man's Society, New Delhi
- The primary issue was whether the sum of Rs. 4 lakhs received as shares from M/s. Daulat Ram Public Trust was taxable under sections 11 and 12(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1970-71.
- The Tribunal held that the shares were received as part of the corpus with restrictions on their use and sale, making them non-taxable.
- The ITO had added the value of the shares and dividend income to the society's income, which was contested and deleted by the Tribunal.
Daulat Ram Public Mission, New Delhi
- Similar to the Eternal Science of Man's Society, the assessee received shares worth Rs. 2,21,300 as corpus with restrictions.
- The Tribunal followed the same reasoning and held that the shares were part of the corpus and not taxable.
Daulat Ram General Education Society, New Delhi
- The society received shares worth Rs. 1,30,000 and Rs. 2,20,000 in different assessment years with similar restrictions.
- The Tribunal held that these contributions were part of the corpus and not taxable.
Legal Reasoning:
- Section 12(1) exempts income derived from voluntary contributions applicable solely to charitable/religious purposes.
- Section 12(2) deems such contributions as income derived from property for the purpose of section 11.
- The contributions in question were part of the corpus with specific restrictions, thus not constituting income.
- The amended section 12 clarifies that contributions forming part of the corpus are not taxable.
Conclusion:
- Voluntary contributions to the capital assets are excluded from taxable income.
- The Tribunal's decision was upheld, and the contributions were not considered taxable income.
Issue 2: Applicability of Section 13(2)(h) Concerning Interest Income
Eternal Science of Man's Society, New Delhi
- The ITO found that the interest income for the assessment years 1971-72 and 1972-73 was not spent and held it taxable under section 13(2)(h).
- The Tribunal held that the interest income was not taxable as it was not lent without adequate security or interest.
Daulat Ram Public Mission, New Delhi
- Similar findings were made for the assessment years 1971-72 and 1972-73.
- The Tribunal upheld the exclusion of interest income from taxable income, following the same reasoning.
Legal Reasoning:
- Section 13(2)(h) deals with funds invested in concerns where persons specified in section 13(3) have a substantial interest.
- The distinction between loans and investments was emphasized, with loans covered under section 13(2)(a).
- The Tribunal found that the funds were not lent without adequate security or interest, making section 13(2)(h) inapplicable.
Conclusion:
- The interest income was not deemed to have been used for the benefit of specified persons under section 13(2)(h).
- The Tribunal's decision was upheld, and the interest income was excluded from taxable income.
Final Judgment:
- All questions were answered in favor of the assessees.
- The voluntary contributions received as shares forming part of the corpus were not taxable.
- The interest income was not taxable under section 13(2)(h).
- The assessees were entitled to costs from the revenue, with counsel's fee set at Rs. 500.
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1980 (8) TMI 200
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellate and revising authorities failed to exercise independent judgment due to the Circular dated February 10, 1969.
2. Whether the censorship certificate length of the film is liable to excise duty under Item No. 37 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Independent Judgment by Authorities:
The respondents argued that the appellate and revising authorities were guided solely by the directions issued in the Circular dated February 10, 1969. They contended that the authorities did not exercise their independent and unfettered judgment, which is required for quasi-judicial powers. The trial judge accepted this contention, noting that the authorities could not have passed orders merely in obedience to the Circular's directions. The appellants, represented by Mr. Dalal, conceded this point and did not dispute the trial judge's finding on this issue.
2. Liability of Censorship Certificate Length to Duty:
The primary contention was whether the censorship certificate length of the film attracted excise duty under Item No. 37. The respondents argued that the censorship certificate length should not be included in the excisable length of the film. The trial judge accepted this argument, declaring the levy of duty on the censorship length illegal and setting aside the impugned orders and demand notice.
The appellants argued that the censorship certificate length becomes an integral part of the original film before it is exhibited, thus falling under Entry No. 37. They also suggested that it could be covered by the expression "films not otherwise specified" in Item No. 37. However, the court noted that the amendment by the Finance Act, 1969, did not materially alter the liability regarding the censorship length.
The court examined the Cinematograph Act, 1952, and its rules, which define "film" and the process for obtaining a censorship certificate. The Act and rules indicate that a completed film must be presented to the Board of Film Censors. The certificate, affixed to the film as a trailer, is merely a mark of certification and does not constitute a new film.
The court emphasized that the meaning of terms in fiscal statutes should align with how they are understood in trade and commerce. The censorship certificate length is not regarded as a separate film by industry standards or spectators. The court referenced the Gujarat High Court's decision in Cibatul Ltd. v. Union of India, which rejected the notion that affixing a trademark creates a new manufactured product.
Conclusion:
The court upheld the trial judge's decision that the censorship certificate length of the film is not liable to duty under Entry No. 37. The appeal was dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 600.
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1980 (8) TMI 199
Issues Involved:
1. Eligibility for concessional rate of excise duty.
2. Interpretation of the term "manufacturer" under Notification No. 47/1972.
3. Validity of the order dated 10-11-1972 by the Superintendent of Central Excise.
4. Entitlement to refund of Rs. 3,19,338.93.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Eligibility for Concessional Rate of Excise Duty:
The petitioners, M/s. Madras Rubber Factory Limited, claimed a concessional rate of 40% ad valorem for excise duty under Notification No. 47/1972, dated 17-3-1972, for their new industrial undertaking in Goa. They argued that the total value of tyres cleared by their Madras factory should not be aggregated with the new Goa factory for determining eligibility for the concessional rate. The notification specified that the concessional rate applies if the total value of tyres cleared in the preceding financial year did not exceed Rs. 4 crores.
2. Interpretation of the Term "Manufacturer" under Notification No. 47/1972:
The core issue was the interpretation of the term "manufacturer" in the notification. The petitioners contended that the term should be construed to mean separate entities for their Madras and Goa factories, each operating under distinct licenses. They argued that each factory should be treated as a separate manufacturer for the purpose of the notification, citing Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, which mandates separate licenses for different manufacturing premises.
3. Validity of the Order Dated 10-11-1972 by the Superintendent of Central Excise:
The Superintendent of Central Excise had passed an order on 10-11-1972, stating that the rate of duty is 50% ad valorem on all clearances, as the manufacturer at Madras and Goa is the same. The petitioners challenged this order, asserting that it was arbitrary and contrary to law. They argued that they had obtained separate licenses for their Madras and Goa factories, and therefore, they should be considered different manufacturers.
4. Entitlement to Refund of Rs. 3,19,338.93:
The petitioners also sought a refund of Rs. 3,19,338.93, which they claimed through applications dated 30-4-1973 and 17-3-1973. The refund was sought on the basis that they were entitled to the concessional rate of duty, which had been wrongly denied by the Superintendent of Central Excise.
Judgment Analysis:
Eligibility for Concessional Rate of Excise Duty:
The court held that the exemption contemplated in the notification is in respect of tyres for motor vehicles cleared by the manufacturer. The term "manufacturer" was interpreted to mean the single entity owning multiple factories. The court observed that the exemption does not refer to any licensed premises where tyres are manufactured but to the manufacturer as a whole. Therefore, the total value of tyres cleared by both the Madras and Goa factories should be aggregated to determine eligibility for the concessional rate.
Interpretation of the Term "Manufacturer":
The court rejected the petitioners' argument that separate licenses for different premises imply separate manufacturers. The court emphasized that the exemption is granted to the manufacturer, considering that a single manufacturer may own multiple factories. The requirement for separate licenses under Rule 174 does not alter the interpretation of "manufacturer" for the purpose of the exemption notification.
Validity of the Order Dated 10-11-1972:
The court upheld the order dated 10-11-1972 by the Superintendent of Central Excise, finding no error in the interpretation that the manufacturer at Madras and Goa is the same. The court concluded that the petitioners' contention that they should be considered different manufacturers was not supported by the law.
Entitlement to Refund:
Given the court's interpretation of the term "manufacturer" and the aggregation of clearances from both factories, the petitioners were not entitled to the concessional rate of duty. Consequently, their claim for a refund of Rs. 3,19,338.93 was also dismissed.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the petitioners were not entitled to any of the reliefs sought. The interpretation put forth by the Revenue on the notification was deemed correct, and the petitioners were ordered to bear the costs as admissible.
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1980 (8) TMI 198
Issues:
1. Competency of the trial court to conduct summary trials for offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding two years.
2. Validity of the summary trials conducted by the trial court.
3. Applicability of Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for enhancement of sentences.
4. Observations on the trial court's handling of the cases and plea of guilty entered by the respondents.
Analysis:
The judgment by Mr. U.N. Bhachawat, J., addresses multiple appeals against judgments of the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class regarding offences under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The appeals were filed by the Union of India seeking enhancement of sentences imposed on the accused persons. The primary issue raised was the competency of the trial court to conduct summary trials for offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding two years. The defense argued that the trial court's summary trials were illegal due to the nature of the alleged offences. The judge concurred, citing Section 260 of the Code, which limits summary trials to offences with imprisonment terms not exceeding two years. The judge further referenced Section 461 of the Code, emphasizing that trials conducted without proper empowerment are void.
Regarding the applicability of Section 386 of the Code for enhancement of sentences, the judge highlighted that in cases where the trial court lacks the authority to conduct summary trials, the appellate court can order re-trial by a competent court. The judgment emphasized the need for adherence to legal procedures and the importance of fair trials. The judge criticized the trial court for not following due process and potentially influencing the plea of guilty entered by the respondents. The judgment referenced a Supreme Court case to underscore the importance of judicial responsibility and fair trial practices.
In conclusion, the judge declared the trials conducted by the trial court as void, setting aside the convictions and sentences. The cases were remanded back to the trial court for re-trial following proper legal procedures. The judgment underscored the significance of upholding the integrity of the judicial process and ensuring fair treatment of the accused.
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