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1984 (8) TMI 365
The Supreme Court granted Special Leave in a case involving a dispute over deficit court fees. The Court condemned the respondents for wasting valuable time and granted the appellant four weeks to pay the deficit fees. The respondents were ordered to pay costs of Rs. 500 to the appellant.
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1984 (8) TMI 364
Issues Involved:
1. Territorial Jurisdiction
2. Proof of Misconduct
3. Authority of the Disciplinary Officer
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Territorial Jurisdiction:
The primary issue was whether the Kerala High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed by the respondent. The appellants contended that no part of the cause of action arose within Kerala, as the order of removal was served at the respondent's last known address in Madras. However, the learned single Judge held that the cause of action partly arose in Kerala since the respondent received the order while in Badagara, Kerala. The judgment emphasized that a part of the cause of action arises where the order becomes effective by service on the employee. The court relied on precedents such as Umasankar Chatterjee v. Union of India, W.W. Joshi v. State of Bombay, and Demolal v. Union of India, which held that the cause of action includes the place where the consequences of the order fall on the servant. Therefore, the Kerala High Court had jurisdiction as the order of removal became effective upon service in Kerala.
2. Proof of Misconduct:
The second issue was whether the respondent committed misconduct under the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966, by publishing a letter in the press without prior sanction. The charge was based on Rules 3(1)(i), 3(1)(iii), and 19(1). The learned single Judge found that the letter aimed to focus on the need for safety measures and was part of a national debate, not directed against any specific authority or intended to harm the railway administration's image. The judgment emphasized the constitutional right to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), which, although subject to reasonable restrictions, should be interpreted liberally. The court concluded that the letter did not amount to misconduct as it did not induce indiscipline or inefficiency and did not attract the ban under Rule 19(1).
3. Authority of the Disciplinary Officer:
The third issue was whether the authority who passed the removal order was competent. The respondent argued that the Divisional Operating Superintendent, who issued the removal order, was not the appointing authority and thus lacked jurisdiction. The appellants claimed that the respondent was appointed by the Divisional Personnel Officer, who was of the same rank as the Divisional Operating Superintendent. The court noted that if the respondent was appointed by the General Manager, as indicated in Ext. P1, the removal order would violate Article 311 of the Constitution. However, since the court found the removal order invalid on other grounds, it did not delve further into this issue.
Conclusion:
The Kerala High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the single Judge's decision that the writ petition was maintainable within its jurisdiction, the charge of misconduct was not proven, and the removal order was invalid. The court also refused the appellant's oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, stating that the case did not involve a substantial question of law of general importance.
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1984 (8) TMI 363
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court to commit two petitioners to civil jail for contempt of court. The petitioners' appeal was dismissed as they did not have a further right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The court found no merit in the petitioners' argument that the undertaking given was not related to the property concerned. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed.
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1984 (8) TMI 362
Issues Involved:
1. Whether it is necessary to go into the contention of the petitioners that there is no seizure?
2. Whether, before initiating a proceeding under S. 6A of the Act, it is necessary for the Deputy Commissioner to be satisfied that there is a prima facie case?
3. Whether before passing the order under S. 6A(2) of the Act, it is necessary for the Deputy Commissioner to record a finding in terms of S. 6A(2) of the Act?
4. Whether it is necessary to afford an opportunity of being heard to the affected party at the stage of directing the seized commodities to be disposed of in one of the modes prescribed by S. 6A(2) of the Act?
5. Whether the impugned orders fall within the proviso to S. 6A(2) of the Act?
6. What order?
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
Point No. 1:
The court observed that the impugned orders mention that the Tahsildar, an enforcement officer, reported the seizure to the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner initiated proceedings under S. 6A of the Essential Commodities Act based on this report. The court held that whether there was an actual seizure is a matter for the Deputy Commissioner to verify, as the seizure of an essential commodity is the foundation for initiating proceedings under S. 6A. Therefore, this contention is left open to be raised before the Deputy Commissioner.
Point No. 2:
The court emphasized that initiating a proceeding under S. 6A of the Act has serious consequences, including the potential disposal of the seized commodity without notice or hearing. Thus, it is necessary for the Deputy Commissioner to be satisfied that there is a prima facie case of contravention of the order issued under S. 3 of the Act before initiating proceedings under S. 6A. This satisfaction must be recorded to avoid arbitrary exercise of power. The court held this point in favor of the petitioners, affirming that such satisfaction must be documented.
Point No. 3:
The court noted that S. 6A(2) allows the Deputy Commissioner to dispose of the seized commodities even before the final decision. However, this can only be done if the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the commodity is subject to speedy and natural decay or it is expedient in the public interest. A positive finding on these conditions must be recorded before ordering the disposal. In this case, no such findings were recorded, making the impugned orders unsustainable. The court answered this point in the affirmative and in favor of the petitioners.
Point No. 4:
The court stated that it is not an invariable rule that notice and an opportunity of being heard must be given before passing an order under S. 6A(2). However, in cases where no harm is caused by issuing notice and hearing, it is necessary to comply with the rule of audi alteram partem. Failure to do so in such cases vitiates the order. The court cited a similar view from the case of S.R. Balasubramanian v. District Collector, Palghat. The court concluded that while it cannot be a general rule, in specific cases, notice and hearing are required.
Point No. 5:
The court analyzed the three modes of disposal under S. 6A(2) and the proviso, which allows disposal through fair price shops at the retail sale price fixed by the government. The impugned orders directed the seized commodities to be taken towards levy, which the court found did not fall within the prescribed modes. The court rejected the contention that the levy rate could be equated to the controlled price or retail sale price, citing the decision in Joe Pereira v. Union of India. The court held that the levy rate is neither the controlled price nor the retail sale price, making the impugned orders unsustainable.
Order:
The court allowed the writ petitions, quashed the impugned orders directing the disposal of the seized commodities under S. 6A(2), and directed the first respondent to expeditiously dispose of the proceedings under S. 6A in accordance with the law and the observations made in this order. Pending the disposal of these proceedings, the seized commodities shall not be disposed of. The court also directed that this order be communicated to all Deputy Commissioners.
Conclusion:
The petitions were allowed, and the impugned orders were quashed. The Deputy Commissioner must record satisfaction of a prima facie case before initiating proceedings and must document findings before ordering the disposal of seized commodities. Notice and hearing are required in cases where no harm is caused by such procedures. The orders directing disposal at the levy rate were found unsustainable.
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1984 (8) TMI 361
Issues Involved:
1. Sufficiency of service of notice of the final decree proceeding on the petitioner through the process server.
2. Proper service of notice of the final decree proceeding on the petitioner by registered post.
3. Service of notice by the civil Court commissioner before making the survey of the subject matter of partition.
4. Knowledge of the final decree proceeding by the petitioner due to his participation in Misc. Case No. 45 of 1976.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Sufficiency of Service of Notice Through Process Server:
The petitioner argued that the service of notice by affixture was insufficient as he was in Calcutta. The Court found that the process server did not effect personal service of the notice as required by Order 5, Rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The notice was affixed as per Rule 17, but the sufficiency of this service was not accepted until the postal acknowledgment came back after refusal. The Court emphasized that the onus of proof shifted to the opposite party once the petitioner denied service of notice. The opposite party failed to prove the essential ingredients of Order 5, Rule 17 by not examining the process server or providing necessary evidence. Therefore, it was held that there was no sufficient service of notice of the final decree proceeding on the petitioner.
2. Proper Service of Notice by Registered Post:
The petitioner denied receiving or refusing the notice by registered post. The Court noted that the postal cover with the endorsement by the Postman was not proved and admitted into evidence. The Postman was also not examined. According to Order 5, Rule 10 and Rule 19A of the CPC, proper service by registered post requires proof that the notice was prepaid, properly addressed, and duly sent with acknowledgment due. The absence of such proof led the Court to conclude that the declaration of the Court regarding the sufficiency of service by registered post was not based on evidence. Consequently, the finding that there was proper service of notice by registered post was not accepted.
3. Service of Notice by Civil Court Commissioner:
There was no evidence on record to show that the civil Court commissioner served notice on the petitioner before making the survey. The commissioner was not examined, and no documents were proved or exhibited to support the claim. Thus, the Court could not accept the finding that the petitioner was aware of the final decree proceeding through the civil Court commissioner's notice.
4. Knowledge of Final Decree Proceeding Due to Participation in Misc. Case No. 45 of 1976:
The petitioner was appointed as a receiver in the original suit, and the opposite party alleged that he did not deliver paddy, leading to Misc. Case No. 45 of 1976. The Court found no evidence that the petitioner was aware of the final decree proceeding while contesting the Misc. Case. The records of Misc. Case No. 45 of 1976 were not brought on record, and the petitioner's attention was not drawn to any specific statements during cross-examination. The Court emphasized that no adverse order could be passed without notice to a party, adhering to the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the finding that the petitioner had knowledge of the final decree proceeding due to his participation in Misc. Case No. 45 of 1976 was not sustained.
Conclusion:
The Court held that there was no service of notice of the final decree proceeding on the petitioner, and he had no knowledge thereof. Consequently, the ex parte final decree was set aside, subject to the payment of costs of Rs. 150 by the petitioner to the opposite party in the trial court. The revision was accordingly allowed.
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1984 (8) TMI 360
Issues:
Challenge to judgment of District Judge on Urban Ceiling Appeals
Interpretation of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
Effect of land notification under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act
Validity of proceedings under the Urban Land Act post Land Acquisition notification
Interpretation of Section 42 of the Urban Land Act
Analysis:
The judgment of the High Court dealt with three writ petitions challenging the District Judge's decision on Urban Ceiling Appeals. The main issue revolved around whether proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 could be initiated for lands notified under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The District Judge had ruled that such lands intended for acquisition by the State Government for construction purposes should be excluded from the total holding of the respondents for calculating excess vacant land under the Ceiling Act.
In one of the cases, the respondent had filed a statement under the Urban Land Act claiming no excess vacant land. However, the Competent Authority declared a certain area as excess vacant land, leading to an appeal before the District Judge. Subsequently, a notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued for the same land, prompting the respondent to argue that the land could not be declared surplus due to the acquisition notification. The District Judge accepted this argument, leading to the filing of writ petitions challenging these judgments.
The State contended that the Competent Authority taking possession of the land declared surplus under the Urban Land Act extinguished the respondents' rights. However, the High Court disagreed, stating that possession under the Land Acquisition Act was necessary for title extinguishment. The High Court also disagreed with the Delhi High Court's interpretation in a similar case, emphasizing that the Land Acquisition Act and the Urban Land Act serve different purposes and are not inconsistent.
The High Court highlighted the overriding effect of Section 42 of the Urban Land Act, stating that it prevails in matters covered by the Act. The Court emphasized that the title of land notified under the Land Acquisition Act does not extinguish until possession is taken by the authorities. Therefore, the High Court allowed all three writ petitions, quashing the District Judge's orders on the Ceiling Appeals and discharging the stay orders without costs.
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1984 (8) TMI 359
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
2. Validity of the acquittal order by the Sessions Judge.
3. Determination of jurisdiction under Section 630 of the Companies Act.
4. Interpretation of agreements between the company and the landlord.
5. Existence of a bona fide dispute regarding the title to the premises.
6. Applicability of Section 630 of the Companies Act to the accused.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of Writ Petition:
The learned counsel for the accused contended that a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against orders of acquittal is not maintainable due to the remedy provided under Section 378(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Additionally, it was argued that an application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, invoking inherent powers of the court, cannot convert an order of acquittal into an order of conviction. The complainant company had no satisfactory answer to these contentions. Consequently, the court held that neither the writ petition under Article 227 nor the application under Section 482 was maintainable, leading to the discharge of the rule granted in Writ Petition No. 259 of 1984.
2. Validity of the Acquittal Order:
The complainant company also filed an application under Section 378(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code seeking leave to appeal against the acquittal order. The court condoned the delay in filing the application, granted leave, admitted the appeal, and treated the arguments advanced as those in the appeal itself. The main question was whether the Magistrate could determine the dispute as to the title to or property in the suit premises under Section 630 of the Companies Act or if it should be left to the civil court.
3. Jurisdiction under Section 630 of the Companies Act:
Section 630 of the Companies Act penalizes wrongful withholding of property by an officer or employee of a company. The court noted that the Magistrate's jurisdiction under this section extends only to cases where there is no bona fide dispute regarding the property being that of the company. In cases involving such disputes, particularly those of a civil nature, the Magistrate should not determine the same under the summary procedure envisaged by Section 630. The Supreme Court's decision in Karamchand Ganga Pershad v. Union of India was cited to emphasize that civil court decisions are binding on criminal courts, but not vice versa.
4. Interpretation of Agreements:
The main dispute was the interpretation of three agreements between the landlord and the company, styled as "Paying Guest" agreements. The question was whether these agreements made the company a licensee or tenant. The Sessions Judge held that the agreements were license agreements and did not create any interest in the premises in favor of the company. The company had no existing right in the premises after the expiry of the last agreement on December 31, 1975.
5. Bona Fide Dispute:
The accused claimed to be a tenant directly from the landlord and argued that the company had no interest in the premises. The company alleged that a letter supporting the accused's claim was forged. The Magistrate accepted the company's allegation, but the Sessions Judge found that the dispute regarding the title to the premises was bona fide and of a purely civil nature, best left to the civil court. The pending suit filed by the accused in the Small Causes Court for a declaration of tenancy and the injunction against eviction further supported this view.
6. Applicability of Section 630 to the Accused:
The accused contended that he was not an employee of the company at the date of the complaint, and thus, the charge under Section 630 could not be sustained. The Sessions Judge's finding that the dispute fell outside the ambit of Section 630 and within the jurisdiction of the civil court was upheld. The complainant company's reliance on previous decisions was found inapplicable as they did not address the point at issue.
Conclusion:
The appeal against the acquittal was dismissed. The Declaratory Suit No. 1366 of 1983 filed by the accused in the Small Causes Court, claiming tenancy, and the dispute before the Labour Court, being I.D.A. No. 199 of 1980, were expedited.
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1984 (8) TMI 358
Issues involved: Determination of entitlement under the Nationalisation Act for a coking coal mine's owner based on stock in trade, accounting treatment of stock during the period of management under the Management Act, interpretation of relevant provisions of the Nationalisation Act, and the applicability of commercial accounting practices.
Summary:
The case involved a partnership firm owning a coking coal mine in Bihar, which was initially managed under the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance of 1971 and later nationalized under the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1971. The dispute arose regarding the treatment of stock in trade during the period of management and its impact on the owner's entitlement under the Nationalisation Act.
The owner claimed entitlement under the Nationalisation Act based on the stock of coal at the time of management takeover and the closing balance. The High Court ruled in favor of the owner, directing recasting of accounts to consider the stock in trade. Government companies appealed this decision, arguing against including the stock in trade in the accounts.
The Supreme Court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Nationalisation Act, particularly Sections 4, 10, 21, and 22, which outlined the transfer of ownership, compensation mechanisms, and accounting procedures. The Court emphasized the need to follow commercial accounting practices in determining the owner's entitlement, especially considering the stock in trade's value.
The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the stock in trade should not be considered, highlighting the necessity of balancing accounts as per commercial norms. Referring to the prescribed form for accounts, the Court criticized the oversight of not considering the stock and the unnecessary litigation caused by the government companies.
Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the owner's right to include the stock in trade for determining entitlement under the Nationalisation Act. The appellants were directed to pay costs, emphasizing the importance of adhering to statutory requirements and commercial accounting principles.
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1984 (8) TMI 357
Issues:
- Validity of agreement for arbitration in partnership deed
- Whether suit proceedings are liable to be stayed
- Relief sought by the plaintiffs
Analysis:
1. The case involved a suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts. The defendant filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, seeking a stay on the grounds that the partnership had already been dissolved and disputes were to be settled through arbitration as per the partnership deed. The trial court framed issues including the validity of the agreement for arbitration and whether the suit proceedings should be stayed. The trial court, after considering evidence, allowed the defendant's application and stayed the suit. The plaintiffs appealed against this decision.
2. The High Court analyzed the appeal and noted that the plaintiffs sought dissolution of the partnership based on just and equitable grounds under Section 44(g) of the Partnership Act. The court emphasized that the decision on whether to dissolve the partnership should be made by the court and not arbitrators, citing relevant case laws. The court also highlighted the distinction between dissolution by filing a suit and dissolution under Section 43 of the Partnership Act, emphasizing that the partnership does not automatically dissolve by filing a suit for dissolution.
3. The court addressed the trial court's reliance on previous judgments regarding dissolution of partnerships and arbitration clauses. The High Court disagreed with the trial court's interpretation and held that even if the partnership had dissolved, the question of rendition of accounts should be decided by the civil court and not arbitrators. The court reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed the defendant's application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
4. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the trial court's judgment, and directed the parties to appear before the trial court to proceed with the suit. The court concluded by stating that each party would bear their own costs, bringing the matter to a resolution.
5. In summary, the High Court's judgment clarified the distinction between dissolution of a partnership through a suit and dissolution under the Partnership Act. It emphasized the role of the civil court in deciding on dissolution and rendition of accounts, overturning the trial court's decision to stay the suit and dismissing the defendant's application for arbitration.
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1984 (8) TMI 356
Issues involved: Determination of interest payable on compensation awarded for land acquisition u/s Land Acquisition Act.
Summary:
The Supreme Court heard an appeal challenging the High Court's order determining interest on compensation for land acquisition. The land Acquisition officer initially awarded a sum as compensation, which was later increased by the District Judge and further by the High Court. The High Court awarded interest at 4% per annum on the enhanced compensation amount. The appellants sought a review, citing an amendment increasing the interest rate to 6% u/s Haryana Act No. 8 of 1967. The High Court ruled in favor of the appellants, applying the higher interest rate. However, an inconsistency arose in the High Court's judgment regarding the interest rate on the enhanced compensation amount. The Supreme Court held that the right to compensation arises when the land is acquired, and the quantification process is separate. Therefore, the appellants were entitled to interest at 6% per annum on the enhanced compensation amount from the date possession was taken. The appeal was allowed, modifying the High Court's order, and costs were awarded to the appellants.
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1984 (8) TMI 355
Issues Involved:
1. The validity of the raffle tickets presented by the petitioners.
2. The jurisdiction and discretion of the Director of Raffles in rejecting the claims.
3. The implications of the criminal court's findings on the claims for the prize money.
4. The procedural correctness and finality of the Director of Raffles' orders under Rule 36-h of the Tamil Nadu Raffle Rules, 1976.
5. The entitlement of the petitioners to the prize money.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The Validity of the Raffle Tickets Presented by the Petitioners:
The case involved two petitioners claiming a bumper prize from the Tamil Nadu Raffles for a ticket bearing No. AB275522. The Director of Raffles received claims from both petitioners and a third party, Pappa, who alleged losing the ticket. Expert opinions were sought from the Government Press and the Tamil Nadu Forensic Science Laboratory. The forensic analysis revealed discrepancies in both tickets, leading to suspicions of tampering. The criminal proceedings against the petitioners resulted in acquittals, with the courts finding the evidence insufficient to prove forgery beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. The Jurisdiction and Discretion of the Director of Raffles in Rejecting the Claims:
The Director of Raffles rejected the claims under Rule 36-h of the Tamil Nadu Raffle Rules, 1976, which mandates the rejection of claims for mutilated, tampered, torn, disfigured, or forged tickets unless their genuineness can be verified. The court found that the Director failed to provide reasons for rejecting the claims, rendering the orders untenable. The petitioners argued that the Director did not exercise proper jurisdiction and failed to apply his mind to the matter.
3. The Implications of the Criminal Court's Findings on the Claims for the Prize Money:
The court emphasized that the authorities, having chosen to bring the matter before the criminal court, were bound by its findings. The acquittals in the criminal cases meant the authorities could not disregard the verdicts and seek to re-examine the genuineness of the tickets. The court cited precedent to support the principle that findings of criminal courts should be treated as conclusive in subsequent proceedings.
4. The Procedural Correctness and Finality of the Director of Raffles' Orders under Rule 36-h of the Tamil Nadu Raffle Rules, 1976:
The court found the Director's orders lacking in procedural correctness due to the absence of reasons for rejecting the claims. The court held that the authorities could not ignore the criminal court's verdicts and reiterated that the matter should not be re-examined by the Director of Raffles. The court underscored the importance of finality in legal proceedings and the need for authorities to accept the criminal court's findings.
5. The Entitlement of the Petitioners to the Prize Money:
The court concluded that the first petitioner (Gnanavelan) was entitled to the prize money as the criminal court had acquitted him, and the authorities had failed to prove the ticket was forged. The court directed the Registrar to effect payment to the first petitioner after deducting income tax. For the second petitioner (Subramaniam), the court found that a fresh examination by the Director of Raffles was necessary due to the subsisting doubt about the ticket's genuineness and directed the Director to re-examine the claim with full reasons in case of rejection.
Conclusion:
The court allowed Writ Petition No. 1384 of 1984, quashing the Director's order and directing payment to the first petitioner. Writ Petition No. 3635 of 1984 was allowed in part, with the Director of Raffles directed to re-examine the second petitioner's claim. The court rejected the request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, finding no substantial question of law arising from the judgment.
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1984 (8) TMI 354
The High Court of Allahabad dismissed the Department's revisions for the assessment years 1975-76 and 1976-77. The issue was whether the assessee imported brass scrap or made local purchases of old utensils. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's case based on evidence provided, shifting the burden to the Revenue which failed to rebut the case. The Court found the assessee not liable to tax as neither a manufacturer nor an importer of brass scrap. The revisions were dismissed, and each party will bear their own costs.
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1984 (8) TMI 353
Issues involved:
The issue involved in this case is whether a firm of lawyers can be considered a 'commercial establishment' as per the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960.
Judgment Details:
The appellant, who was a clerk in a firm of lawyers, had his services terminated by the firm. The Appellate Authority upheld the firm's objection that it was not a commercial establishment. The appellant then filed a writ petition in the High Court of Kerala, which was dismissed. The subsequent appeal was also dismissed, leading to this special leave appeal before the Supreme Court.
The definition of 'commercial establishment' under section 2(4) of the Act includes various types of establishments such as commercial, industrial, trading, banking, or insurance establishments, among others. It also specifies that a commercial establishment does not include a factory to which the Factories Act, 1948 applies.
The Court analyzed the definitions provided in the Act and concluded that a lawyer's office or the office of a firm of lawyers does not fall under the definition of a 'commercial establishment.' The Act's provisions related to registration, hours of work, holidays, wages, employment of children and women, and health and safety measures further support this conclusion.
The Court rejected the argument that a lawyer's office could be considered a commercial establishment based on the employees mainly engaging in office work. It emphasized that a lawyer's office is not an 'administrative service' as per the Act's definition.
The Court distinguished this case from previous judgments related to the definition of 'industry' and 'commercial establishment,' highlighting the specific context of this appeal. It also referred to a case involving the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry to illustrate the wide scope of the term 'commercial establishment' in a different context.
The High Court's reasoning was upheld, and it was held that the office of a lawyer or a firm of lawyers does not qualify as a 'commercial establishment' under the Act. The Bar Council of Kerala and Clerks Association of the Supreme Court Bar were appreciated for their assistance in the matter.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.
Separate Judgment:
There was no separate judgment delivered by the judges in this case.
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1984 (8) TMI 352
Issues Involved:
1. Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
2. Validity of the entire land acquisition notification.
3. Delay in taking possession and its impact on compensation.
Summary:
1. Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court found that the Government of Bihar's action of releasing a portion of land (4.03 acres) belonging to influential persons (Pandey families) from the acquisition process was a clear act of favoritism. This release was done without any reasonable classification or nexus to the object of the notification, thus violating Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court noted that the Government's justification for the release, citing the existence of large buildings on the land, was a false pretext. Photographic evidence showed only small hutments on the land, and the Pandey families did not dispute this. Consequently, the release of land was declared non est (null and void) as it was violative of Article 14.
2. Validity of the Entire Land Acquisition Notification:
The appellants argued that the entire acquisition should be declared unconstitutional due to the partial violation of Article 14. However, the Court held that the release of the land was a separate and subsequent act and did not invalidate the entire notification issued u/s 4 on 19.8.74. The original notification remained valid, and the land released to the Pandey families would form part of the acquisition as it did on 19.8.74. The Court distinguished this case from Lila Ram v. Union of India, where the argument was based on the lack of public purpose in acquiring the land.
3. Delay in Taking Possession and Its Impact on Compensation:
The appellants contended that the delay between the date of the section 4 notification and the actual taking over of possession should result in compensation being paid according to the land's value at the time of possession. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the delay was not the Collector's fault but due to stays by the Government and courts. However, recognizing the equity of the situation, the Court awarded additional compensation in the form of interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum for two years on the value of the land owned by each landowner. This equitable compensation was awarded in the special facts of the case and would not be subject to appeal under the Act.
Conclusion:
The appeals, special leave, and writ petitions were disposed of with the release of land to the Pandey families being declared non est, and the original notification u/s 4 being upheld. The appellants were awarded additional equitable compensation, but no order as to costs was made. Appeals and petitions were partly allowed.
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1984 (8) TMI 351
Issues Involved:
1. Whether failure to pay the employers' contribution to the Provident Fund is a continuing offence.
2. Whether the complaint for non-payment of the contribution has to be filed within the stated period of limitation.
Summary:
Issue 1: Continuing Offence
The Supreme Court examined whether the non-payment of the employer's contribution to the Provident Fund constitutes a continuing offence. The appellants were charged with non-payment of contributions from February 1970 to June 1971. The trial court and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that the offence was continuing, thus no limitation period applied. The Supreme Court affirmed this view, stating that each day the contribution was not paid constituted a fresh offence. The Court referenced several cases to illustrate the concept of a continuing offence, emphasizing that the nature of the offence and the statute's purpose are crucial in determining whether an offence is continuing.
Issue 2: Limitation Period
The appellants argued that the offence was not continuing and thus subject to the limitation period u/s 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the offence of non-payment of the employer's contribution is a continuing offence. Therefore, u/s 472 of the Code, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment during which the offence continues. The Court also noted that u/s 473 of the Code, a court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation if it is necessary in the interests of justice.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, confirming that the offence of non-payment of the employer's contribution to the Provident Fund is a continuing offence. Consequently, the period of limitation prescribed by section 468 of the Code does not apply. The prosecutions were ordered to proceed expeditiously in accordance with the law, considering all points together without treating any particular point as preliminary. Appeals dismissed.
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1984 (8) TMI 350
Issues Involved:
1. Bias in the selection of books.
2. Procedural changes for the selection of books due to exigencies.
3. Role and influence of the Assessment Sub-Committee.
4. Doctrine of necessity in the presence of government officials.
5. Relief for books already purchased and distributed.
Summary:
1. Bias in the Selection of Books:
The appellants argued that some members of the Assessment Sub-Committee were biased as they had submitted their own books for selection. The Supreme Court emphasized the principle "Nemo judex in causa sua" (no man shall be a judge in his own cause), stating that justice must not only be done but also be seen to be done. The Court found that the presence of authors on the committee who had submitted their books for selection could lead to actual or perceived bias, which is impermissible. The Court rejected the High Court's reasoning that participation in the selection process waived the right to challenge bias.
2. Procedural Changes for the Selection of Books Due to Exigencies:
The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that given the exigency of the situation, the State Government's deviation from the usual procedure for selecting books was justified. The Central Government's grant had to be utilized within a specific timeframe, necessitating a quicker selection process. The Court noted that the usual procedure was administrative, not statutory, and could be altered by the State Government.
3. Role and Influence of the Assessment Sub-Committee:
The Supreme Court held that the influence of author-members on the Assessment Sub-Committee could not be overlooked. The Court noted the potential for subtle influence or quid pro quo arrangements among members, which could compromise the integrity of the selection process. The Court emphasized that the possibility of bias, rather than actual bias, was sufficient to disqualify an author-member from participating in the selection process.
4. Doctrine of Necessity in the Presence of Government Officials:
The High Court had applied the doctrine of necessity to justify the presence of government officials on the committee, even if they had submitted books for selection. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the doctrine of necessity did not apply as there were alternatives, such as appointing substitutes or requiring resignations from interested members.
5. Relief for Books Already Purchased and Distributed:
The Supreme Court acknowledged that no relief could be granted for books selected and purchased for the years 1980, 1981, and 1982, as well as those purchased from the Central Government grant, as they had already been distributed. The Court focused on laying down guidelines for future selections to prevent similar issues.
Guidelines for Future Selections:
The Supreme Court laid down comprehensive guidelines to ensure fairness and impartiality in the selection of books for educational institutions:
1. Committees should include both government officials and eminent non-official members, appointed based on merit.
2. Members whose books are submitted for selection must resign or be replaced.
3. Publishers or their representatives should not be members of the committee or participate in its deliberations.
The Court directed the State of Orissa to amend its Government Resolution or issue a fresh notification incorporating these guidelines before the next selection of books. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.
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1984 (8) TMI 349
Issues Involved:
1. Inter-se seniority between promotees and direct recruits.
2. Interpretation of the proviso to Rule 7.
3. Validity of Rule 8(2) of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970.
4. Constitutionality of the seniority list.
5. Impact of Rules 16 and 17 on the quota rule.
6. Equitable determination of seniority.
Summary:
1. Inter-se Seniority between Promotees and Direct Recruits:
The Supreme Court addressed the contentious issue of seniority between promotees and direct recruits within the Delhi Higher Judicial Service. The petitioners, promotee Additional District and Sessions Judges, contended that seniority should be based on the dates of continuous officiation and not on the date of direct recruitment. They argued that the current system, which allows direct recruits to rank higher despite being appointed later, violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
2. Interpretation of the Proviso to Rule 7:
The Court examined whether the proviso to Rule 7 prescribes a quota or merely a ceiling for direct recruits. The proviso states, "not more than 1/3rd of the substantive posts in the Service shall be held by direct recruits." The Court concluded that this language imposes a ceiling rather than establishing a quota, as it does not explicitly mandate that 1/3rd of the posts must be filled by direct recruits.
3. Validity of Rule 8(2) of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970:
Rule 8(2) states that seniority between direct recruits and promotees shall be determined by the rotation of vacancies based on quotas reserved by Rule 7. The Court found that Rule 8(2) assumes a quota that does not exist in Rule 7. Therefore, Rule 8(2) should be read to apply only to simultaneous appointments or initial recruitment, avoiding any interpretation that would lead to injustice.
4. Constitutionality of the Seniority List:
The Court held that the seniority list, which was based on the quota and rota rule, violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The list unjustly placed direct recruits above promotees who had been officiating for years. The Court quashed the seniority list and directed the preparation of a new list based on continuous officiation.
5. Impact of Rules 16 and 17 on the Quota Rule:
Rules 16 and 17 allow for the creation of temporary posts and temporary appointments to substantive vacancies, respectively. The Court noted that these rules permit appointments from amongst promotees only, thereby suspending the quota rule when such appointments are made. Consequently, the quota and rota rule cannot apply in these situations.
6. Equitable Determination of Seniority:
The Court emphasized that promotees appointed under Rules 16 and 17 should be considered for seniority along with direct recruits if they are appointed in consultation with the High Court and have completed ten years of service in the Delhi Judicial Service. The seniority should be determined based on the dates of continuous officiation in non-fortuitous vacancies.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court ruled that the proviso to Rule 7 and Rule 8(2) do not inherently suffer from constitutional infirmity but must be interpreted to avoid injustice. The seniority list was quashed, and a new list was ordered to be prepared based on continuous officiation. The judgment highlighted the need for careful implementation of rules to maintain equity and avoid disparities in judicial service appointments. The petitions were partly allowed, with no order as to costs.
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1984 (8) TMI 348
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of c.v. duty based on the date of importation versus the date of removal from the warehouse.
2. Interpretation of Section 15(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962.
3. Impact of exemption notifications and their rescission on duty liability.
4. Jurisdictional adherence to High Court decisions by Customs authorities.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of c.v. Duty Based on the Date of Importation versus the Date of Removal from the Warehouse:
The core issue revolves around whether the c.v. duty should be applicable based on the date of importation (when goods enter territorial waters) or the date of removal from the bonded warehouse. The respondents argued that the goods were exempt from c.v. duty at the time of importation under Exemption Notification No. 364, dated 2-8-1976, and thus should not be liable for c.v. duty even though the exemption was rescinded by Notification No. 63, dated 1-3-1979, before the goods were removed from the warehouse. The Customs authorities, however, charged c.v. duty based on the date of removal from the warehouse, citing Section 15(1)(b) of the Customs Act.
2. Interpretation of Section 15(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962:
The Customs authorities and the Departmental Representative argued that Section 15(1)(b) mandates that the rate of duty is to be the rate in force on the date on which the goods are actually removed from the warehouse. This interpretation was supported by the Supreme Court decision in M/s. Prakash Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. B. Sen and Others, which emphasized that the rate of duty applicable should be the rate in force on the date of removal from the warehouse.
3. Impact of Exemption Notifications and Their Rescission on Duty Liability:
The respondents cited the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in M/S. Sawhney v. M/s. Sylvania & Laxman Limited, which held that the applicability of an exemption notification should be determined based on the state of affairs at the date of importation. They argued that the goods were exempt from c.v. duty at the time of importation, and the subsequent rescission of the exemption should not affect their duty liability. However, the Customs authorities contended that the exemption notification's rescission made the goods liable for c.v. duty at the time of their removal from the warehouse.
4. Jurisdictional Adherence to High Court Decisions by Customs Authorities:
The respondents argued that the Appellate Collector of Customs (Appeals), Bombay, was bound by the decisions of the Bombay High Court, specifically the decision in Sylvania & Laxman's case. The Supreme Court's decision in East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs was cited to support the argument that the Collector of Customs (Appeals) must adhere to the jurisdictional High Court's decisions. The Tribunal, however, noted that the latter decision of the Bombay High Court in Synthetics & Chemicals Limited v. S.C. Coutinho and Others, which accepted the principle that the rate of duty should be determined based on Section 15 of the Act, was not considered by the Appellate Collector.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal concluded that the Appellate Collector of Customs (Appeals), Bombay, erred in allowing the appeals based on the decision in Sylvania & Laxman's case without considering the latter decision in Synthetics & Chemicals and the Supreme Court's ruling in Prakash Cotton Mills. The Tribunal held that the rate of duty should be determined based on the date of removal from the warehouse as per Section 15(1)(b) of the Customs Act. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order passed by the Collector of Customs (Appeals), Bombay, and accepted all four appeals, affirming the Customs authorities' imposition of c.v. duty based on the date of removal from the warehouse.
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1984 (8) TMI 347
Issues Involved:
1. Confiscation of non-notified goods valued at Rs. 1675/-
2. Absolute confiscation of notified goods valued at Rs. 11,063/-
3. Imposition of personal penalty of Rs. 10,000/- on the appellant
Detailed Analysis:
1. Confiscation of Non-Notified Goods Valued at Rs. 1675/-
The Additional Collector ordered the absolute confiscation of non-notified goods valued at Rs. 1675/- for violation of the Baggage (Conditions of Exemption) Rules, 1975. The appellant argued that these goods were regularly imported and available in the market. The Additional Collector's reasoning was based on the condition that the goods should not be sold within five years or until their value depreciated by 50%. However, the show cause notice did not reference these conditions, and the adjudicating authority did not provide a clear finding on which condition was violated. The Tribunal found that the Additional Collector erred in ordering absolute confiscation without offering an option to pay a fine in lieu of confiscation, as required under Section 125 of the Customs Act. The Tribunal set aside the order of absolute confiscation and directed the unconditional release of the non-notified goods valued at Rs. 1675/-.
2. Absolute Confiscation of Notified Goods Valued at Rs. 11,063/-
The notified goods were confiscated under Sections 111(p), 111(d), and 111(o) of the Customs Act. The appellant contended that goods valued at Rs. 9,873/- were imported on payment of duty and should not be confiscated absolutely. The Tribunal noted that the Additional Collector did not specify which conditions of import were violated. Even if the goods were liable for confiscation due to non-compliance with Chapter IV-A and Section 111(o), the Additional Collector was required to offer an option to pay a fine instead of absolute confiscation. The Tribunal set aside the absolute confiscation of goods valued at Rs. 9,873/- and directed their release on payment of a fine of Rs. 9,873/-. The confiscation of goods valued at Rs. 850/- was upheld as the appellant did not produce any receipts for these goods.
3. Imposition of Personal Penalty of Rs. 10,000/- on the Appellant
The Tribunal considered whether the penalty of Rs. 10,000/- was justified. The appellant had not engaged in smuggling, and except for goods valued at Rs. 850/-, all other goods were validly imported. The Tribunal found that while there was a breach of Chapter IV-A provisions, it did not warrant a penalty of Rs. 10,000/-. The penalty was reduced to Rs. 2,000/-.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed in part. The non-notified goods valued at Rs. 1675/- were ordered to be released unconditionally. The notified goods valued at Rs. 9,873/- were to be released on payment of a fine of Rs. 9,873/-. The personal penalty was reduced from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 2,000/-. The order of the Additional Collector, as confirmed by the Board, was otherwise upheld. The appellant was to be granted consequential relief within three months from the date of communication of this order.
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1984 (8) TMI 346
Issues:
Whether the value of straw packing for china and porcelain goods should be included in their assessable value.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Inclusion of Straw Packing in Assessable Value
The central issue in this case is whether the value of straw packing for china and porcelain goods should be considered in their assessable value, especially when the packing is provided upon request only and not as a standard practice. The Respondent argued that since they primarily sell the goods loose in wholesale and provide straw packing only upon special request, the cost of such packing should not be included in the assessable value. However, the Revenue contended that as per Section 4(4)(d)(i) of the Act, the cost of packing should be included in the assessable value, particularly for goods like china and porcelain that are normally sold packed to prevent breakage in wholesale trade.
Issue 2: Interpretation of Relevant Legal Provisions
The Tribunal analyzed the provisions of Section 4(4)(d)(i) of the Act, which explicitly state that the cost of packing should be included in the assessable value. The Tribunal referred to previous decisions, including one by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which emphasized that the cost of packing in which goods are ordinarily sold in wholesale trade must be considered for inclusion in the assessable value, regardless of whether the goods are actually sold with such packing in individual transactions.
Issue 3: Application of Legal Precedents
The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision and its own previous ruling in a similar case involving Panyam Cements to establish that the cost of packing must be included in the assessable value based on the usual course of sales in wholesale trade. The Tribunal emphasized that the ordinary practice of selling goods in a packed condition to wholesale buyers is the determining factor for including the value of packing in the assessable value, irrespective of the actual sales in loose conditions.
Conclusion
After considering the arguments and legal precedents, the Tribunal held that the value of packing for china and porcelain goods must be included in the assessable value as per Section 4(4)(d)(i) of the Act. The Tribunal overturned the Collector (Appeals) order and restored the adjudication order, stating that the Appellant is entitled to consequential relief. The decision clarifies that the inclusion of packing cost is mandatory for goods ordinarily sold in wholesale trade in a packed condition, even if some sales are made without such packing upon request.
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