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• 1986 (8) TMI 459
  
  1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

  The core legal questions considered in this judgment were:

  • Whether the presentation of the settlement deed (Ex. B-3) for registration by a person without authority was valid under the Indian Registration Act.
  • Whether the registration of the settlement deed was valid and effective in conveying title to the properties in favor of the settlees.
  • Whether there was any ratification by competent parties of the registration of the settlement deed.
  • Whether the plaintiff was estopped from claiming a share in the properties due to her husband's attestation of the settlement deed.
  • Whether the appellants had acquired title to the properties through adverse possession.

  2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

  Validity of Presentation for Registration:

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Indian Registration Act, particularly Sections 32 and 33, was central to this issue. Section 32 specifies who can present documents for registration, while Section 33 deals with the recognition of powers of attorney. Precedents such as Mujibunnissa v. Abdul Rahim and Jambu Prasad v. Muhammad Aftab Ali Khan were considered.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found that the presentation of the settlement deed by K. M. Azizullah Sahib, who was no longer authorized due to the death of the principal, was invalid. The registration was deemed defective as it did not comply with the requirements of the Indian Registration Act, affecting the jurisdiction of the registering authority.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: The power of attorney agent, D.W. 9, admitted knowing his authority had ended with the principal's death. The registration was based on a presentation by a person not legally entitled to do so.
  • Application of Law to Facts: The Court applied the provisions of the Registration Act to conclude that the registration was invalid due to the lack of proper authority for presentation.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant's reliance on Maung Lu Gale v. U Po Hlaing was rejected as inapplicable, as the facts involved fraudulent presentation for registration.
  • Conclusions: The presentation for registration was invalid, affecting the registration's validity and the conveyance of title.

  Ratification of Registration:

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The concept of ratification in contract law was considered, but no specific statutory provision was cited.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found no evidence of ratification by all necessary parties. Only some heirs had acted in a manner that could imply acceptance.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: While some heirs dealt with the properties, others, including the settlor's daughter and two sons, did not signify acceptance of the registration.
  • Application of Law to Facts: Without unanimous acceptance by all heirs, ratification could not be assumed.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellants' argument of implied ratification was dismissed due to lack of factual support.
  • Conclusions: The registration was not ratified by all heirs, maintaining its invalidity.

  Estoppel Due to Attestation:

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The principle of estoppel in property law was considered.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court determined that the plaintiff was not estopped from claiming a share, as her husband's attestation occurred before he acquired any interest in the property.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: The attestation by the plaintiff's husband occurred before the settlor's death, and thus before any interest was acquired.
  • Application of Law to Facts: The timing of the attestation nullified any estoppel claim.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellants' estoppel argument was rejected based on the timing of the attestation.
  • Conclusions: The plaintiff was not estopped from claiming her share.

  Adverse Possession Claim:

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The law of adverse possession was relevant here.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found no adverse possession as the properties were under usufructuary mortgage, and any possession by the appellants was not adverse.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: The properties were leased back to the mortgagors, and the mortgage was only redeemed in 1963.
  • Application of Law to Facts: The appellants' possession was not adverse, and the suit was filed within the statutory period after redemption.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellants' adverse possession claim was dismissed due to lack of evidence of adverse possession.
  • Conclusions: The appellants did not acquire title through adverse possession.

  3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

  • Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning: "The presentation by a person not legally entitled to present a deed for registration cannot also, be countenanced as a defect in procedure, falling under S. 87 of the Indian Registration Act."
  • Core Principles Established: The registration of a document is invalid if presented by a person without authority, affecting the jurisdiction of the registering authority. Ratification requires acceptance by all necessary parties. Estoppel requires an interest at the time of attestation, and adverse possession requires clear evidence of adverse holding.
  • Final Determinations on Each Issue: The registration of the settlement deed was invalid, no ratification occurred, the plaintiff was not estopped, and the appellants did not acquire title through adverse possession.

  ---

• 1986 (8) TMI 458
  
  Issues:
  Appeal against acquittal under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
  
  Analysis:
  
  1. The case involved an appeal by the State of Andhra Pradesh against the acquittal of two respondents (accused 1 and 2) under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court had set aside their conviction and sentence of life imprisonment, leading to the appeal to the Supreme Court.
  
  2. The respondents were accused of murdering an individual in Kalekal village. The prosecution's case was based on eyewitness testimonies, including PWs 4, 5, 7, and 8. The Sessions Judge had convicted accused 1 and 2 based on this evidence, while acquitting accused 3 and 4 due to lack of proof of their involvement.
  
  3. The High Court overturned the conviction citing various reasons. It questioned the reliability of the witnesses, highlighted procedural lapses, and raised doubts about the prosecution's case, leading to the acquittal of the respondents.
  
  4. The Supreme Court analyzed the evidence, particularly focusing on the testimony of PW 6, who was considered a crucial eyewitness. The Court found the High Court's failure to consider PW 6's credible and independent testimony as a serious flaw in its judgment.
  
  5. Additionally, the Supreme Court pointed out distortions in the High Court's perspective, such as questioning the conduct of PW 1 in reporting the incident directly to the Police Station and raising doubts about the motive without substantial evidence. The Court also criticized the High Court's unsupported theory regarding the timing of the incident.
  
  6. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found the evidence of PW 6 to be reliable and unassailable. Considering the discrepancies highlighted by the High Court in the testimonies of other witnesses, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of accused 1 and 2 under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, setting aside their acquittal by the High Court.
  
  7. The Supreme Court emphasized that the errors in the High Court's judgment were significant and could not be ignored, leading to the decision to restore the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment for the respondents. The Court directed the respondents to surrender themselves for serving the sentence.

  ---

• 1986 (8) TMI 457
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Conviction under Sections 302 read with Section 149, 396, 201 read with Section 149, 148, and 147 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
  2. Acquittal by the High Court.
  3. Evaluation of evidence by the High Court.
  4. Specific involvement of Accused 12 to 15.
  5. Sentencing and re-imposition of the death penalty.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Conviction under Sections 302 read with Section 149, 396, 201 read with Section 149, 148, and 147 IPC:
  The Additional Sessions Judge, Kumaun convicted all 19 accused for the offenses under Sections 302 read with Section 149, 396, 201 read with Section 149, 148, and 147 IPC. Accused 1, 2, and 16 were sentenced to death, while the others were sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. No separate sentences were awarded for the other convictions.
  
  2. Acquittal by the High Court:
  The High Court allowed the appeals of all 19 accused, dismissed the reference for confirmation of the death sentence, and set aside the convictions and sentences, setting the accused at liberty. The State of Uttar Pradesh appealed against this acquittal.
  
  3. Evaluation of Evidence by the High Court:
  The Supreme Court found that the High Court failed to view the evidence in its proper perspective and set unrealistic standards to evaluate the testimony. The High Court's insistence on "implicit proof" rather than "proof beyond reasonable doubt" led to the acquittal of the accused, which the Supreme Court deemed unsustainable.
  
  4. Specific Involvement of Accused 12 to 15:
  The Supreme Court noted that Accused 12 to 15 were not mentioned in the earliest record (Ex. Ka-7), and the eye-witnesses did not attribute any overt acts to them. The Sessions Judge overlooked these features while awarding convictions. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's acquittal of Accused 12 to 15.
  
  5. Sentencing and Re-imposition of the Death Penalty:
  The Supreme Court restored the convictions of Accused 1 to 11 and 16 to 19 under Sections 302 read with Section 149, 396, 201 read with Section 149, 148, and 147 IPC. However, considering the time elapsed, the Supreme Court decided not to re-impose the death sentence on Accused 1, 2, and 16, sentencing them instead to life imprisonment along with the others. No separate sentences were awarded for the other convictions.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court allowed Crl. Appeal No. 94 of 1978, allowed Crl. Appeal No. 95 of 1978 against all respondents except Accused 12, and dismissed Crl. Appeal No. 96 of 1978. Accused 1 to 11 and 16 to 19 were ordered to be re-arrested and placed in prison to serve the remaining part of their life imprisonment sentences.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 456
  
  Issues:
  1. Refusal to accept the list of witnesses filed by defendant No. 1.
  2. Interpretation of Sub-rule (3) to Rule 1 of Order 16, C.P.C.
  3. Fair trial and opportunity to know the nature of evidence.
  4. Denial of opportunity to defendant No. 1 to prove his case.
  5. Direction to trial court for further proceedings and payment of costs.
  
  Analysis:
  The judgment deals with the issue of the trial court refusing to accept the list of witnesses filed by defendant No. 1 on the day he was supposed to adduce evidence. The plaintiff objected to the list, citing delay and lack of acceptable reasons for the delay. The court considered the submission of the plaintiff regarding the importance of early submission of witness lists to ensure a fair trial and prevent suppression of evidence. However, the court emphasized that procedural formalities should not obstruct the flow of justice and proper adjudication. It noted that while formalities are important, they should not prevent a party from presenting evidence in just cases.
  
  The judgment also highlighted that the trial court should have granted some time to the plaintiff to adduce further evidence if aggrieved by the delay in filing the witness list by defendant No. 1. Rejection of the list altogether was seen as a denial of the defendant's opportunity to prove his case. The court directed the trial court to allow the plaintiff to present further evidence if desired and then proceed with the examination of defendant No. 1's witnesses. However, the defendant was ordered to pay a cost of Rs. 100 to the plaintiff within two weeks to mitigate any prejudice caused. Failure to pay the cost would confirm the trial court's original order.
  
  In conclusion, the civil revision was allowed, and no costs were imposed. The court emphasized the importance of balancing procedural requirements with the fundamental goal of ensuring a fair trial and proper adjudication of cases. The judgment underscored the need to provide parties with opportunities to present their evidence while also upholding the principles of justice and fairness in legal proceedings.

  ---

• 1986 (8) TMI 455
  
  Issues:
  1. Appealability of an order of transfer by a Government servant under Rule 19 of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1957.
  
  Analysis:
  The judgment revolves around the issue of whether an order of transfer made by an authority other than the Government itself is appealable before the Government under Rule 19 of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules. The High Court had differing opinions on the appealability of such orders, with one judge allowing appeals against transfer orders and another dismissing such appeals. The Division Bench upheld the view that no appeal lies to the State Government against a transfer order made by a subordinate authority. The Supreme Court, after considering the arguments, found no reason to interfere with the Division Bench's decision. The key consideration was whether an order of transfer varied to the disadvantage of a Government servant's conditions of service, attracting the right of appeal under Rule 19.
  
  The judgment delves into the provisions of Rule 19, which entitles members of the Services to appeal against orders that deny or vary their pay, allowances, pension, or other conditions of service to their disadvantage. It also discusses the nature of penalties that can be imposed on Government servants under Rule 8, specifying that appeals are provided against orders imposing such penalties. The Court emphasized that if an order of transfer does not amount to a penalty or any other order falling within Rule 19, it is not appealable. The judgment clarifies that transfer is an incident of service and does not result in any alteration to the conditions of service to the Government servant's disadvantage.
  
  Furthermore, the judgment distinguishes between an abusive exercise of the power of transfer and a transfer made in the exigencies of service. It references a decision of the Bombay High Court regarding mala fide transfers, emphasizing that transfers must be made in public interest and not for collateral purposes or oblique motives to be considered appealable. The Court highlights that transfer is an implied condition of service and that the appointing authority has discretion in this matter, which should be exercised honestly and reasonably in public interest.
  
  The judgment also addresses the impact of frequent, unscheduled, and unreasonable transfers on Government servants and their families, stressing the need for a reasonable and fair transfer policy that applies equally to everyone. It acknowledges the historical practice of restricting the period of posting for superior or more responsible posts to prevent vested interests. The Court emphasizes the importance of considering the welfare of Class III and Class IV employees in the transfer policy.
  
  In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition, affirming the Division Bench's decision, and granted the petitioner four months to join the new place of posting.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 454
  
  Issues: Valuation of closing stock for assessment years 1981-82 to 1984-85; Consistency of valuation method; Disallowance of dieselising expenditure for assessment years 1981-82 and 1982-83
  
  Valuation of Closing Stock:
  The appeals by the revenue challenged the Commissioner (Appeals)'s order regarding the valuation of closing stock for the assessment years 1981-82 to 1984-85. The main contention was the method used by the assessee-firm in valuing its closing stock. The assessee consistently followed a specific method of valuation, which was accepted by the department for over 15 years. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the assessee's valuation method, emphasizing that it did not result in income understatement. The Tribunal found that the ITO did not identify any inherent defect in the assessee's accounting system for valuing closing stock. Therefore, the Tribunal confirmed the Commissioner (Appeals)'s decision to accept the assessee's valuation method and dismissed the revenue's appeals.
  
  Consistency of Valuation Method:
  The assessee demonstrated that it had consistently valued its closing stock using a specific method since the assessment year 1969-70. The Commissioner (Appeals) acknowledged this consistent approach and noted that the department had accepted the method for several years. The Tribunal highlighted that the ITO did not provide any evidence of a flaw in the assessee's accounting system for valuing closing stock. As the revenue did not challenge the acceptance of the valuation method by the department, and no defect was found in the system, the Tribunal upheld the Commissioner (Appeals)'s decision to allow the assessee's appeals.
  
  Disallowance of Dieselising Expenditure:
  Regarding the disallowance of dieselising expenditure for the assessment years 1981-82 and 1982-83, the revenue raised concerns about the treatment of this expenditure by the Commissioner (Appeals). The Tribunal supported the Commissioner (Appeals)'s decision not to treat a portion of the conversion charges as a personal account and dismissed the revenue's grievance for the assessment year 1981-82. Additionally, the revenue's claim of duplication of dieselising expenditure for the same car in the assessment year 1982-83 was not addressed by the Commissioner (Appeals) and was deemed not arising from the Commissioner (Appeals)'s order. Therefore, the Tribunal dismissed this ground as well.
  
  In conclusion, the Tribunal upheld the Commissioner (Appeals)'s decision on the valuation of closing stock and the treatment of dieselising expenditure, ultimately dismissing the revenue's appeals for all the assessment years in question.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 453
  
  Issues:
  Jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the petition and grant reliefs to the detenus.
  
  Analysis:
  The petitioners sought various reliefs concerning the alleged torture of detenus in jail. The detenus were arrested for serious offenses and were being tried in an Additional Special Court at Jodhpur. The petitioners claimed to be friends and political associates of the detenus and sought reliefs such as production of detenus before the Court, judicial inquiry into the incident, transfer of under-trials to a jail in Punjab, medical facilities, and simplification of interview procedures. The Court deliberated on its jurisdiction to entertain the petition and grant reliefs in such circumstances.
  
  The Court noted that the detenus were under-trials in the Central Jail at Jodhpur, and the incident in question occurred there. The petitioners argued that the Court had jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain the petition and provide the reliefs requested. However, the Court expressed reluctance to grant relief in a case where it faced challenges in conducting an inquiry due to distance and other factors. The Court highlighted the availability of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur, which could more effectively handle the matter and provide necessary relief to the petitioners.
  
  The Court emphasized that while Article 226 grants wide and extraordinary powers, the decision to exercise those powers remained discretionary. It concluded that in the present case, it was not inclined to interfere, considering the jurisdiction and capabilities of the Rajasthan High Court to address the grievances raised by the petitioners. Therefore, the Court dismissed the petition in limine, indicating that the petitioners should seek remedies in the Rajasthan High Court, which had the jurisdiction and means to address the issues raised in the petition comprehensively.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 452
  
  Issues:
  Challenge to detention order under Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974; Jurisdictional plea raised by Respondents; Conflict of opinion regarding anticipatory bail under Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction of the Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
  
  Analysis:
  The Petitioner challenged the detention order dated 15th June, 1985, under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, seeking interim relief in the form of a stay of arrest or operation of the order. Initially, the petition was dismissed as the Petitioner failed to produce a copy of the detention order and was not detained within the jurisdiction of the Court. However, upon producing the detention order and fearing arrest within the Court's jurisdiction, the challenge was laid.
  
  The Respondents raised a plea of jurisdiction, to which the Petitioner's Counsel cited various judgments, including a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court and decisions from the Delhi and Karnataka High Courts, regarding the power of the Court under Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure, for anticipatory bail. The Patna High Court's Full Bench judgment highlighted the interpretation of "the High Court" or "the Court of Session" in Section 438, emphasizing jurisdiction based on the locale of the offence.
  
  The Court clarified that the conflict regarding anticipatory bail under Section 438 was not relevant to the present case, as the Petitioner approached the Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, challenging the detention order. Referring to a previous judgment, the Court emphasized the importance of jurisdiction and the discretion to exercise it, suggesting that the Bombay High Court was more suitable to grant relief in this matter. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, directing the Petitioner to seek remedy in the Bombay High Court for prompt and adequate relief.
  
  In conclusion, the Court dismissed the petition, maintaining that the Bombay High Court was the appropriate forum for the Petitioner to seek relief regarding the detention order. The Court reiterated the significance of jurisdiction and the discretion to exercise it, emphasizing the availability of prompt and adequate relief in the Bombay High Court for the Petitioner's case.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 451
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Applicability of Order 8, Rule 9, C.P.C. to miscellaneous proceedings.
  2. Interpretation of Section 141, C.P.C. regarding miscellaneous proceedings.
  3. Right to file a rejoinder in temporary injunction applications.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Applicability of Order 8, Rule 9, C.P.C. to Miscellaneous Proceedings:
  
  The plaintiffs filed suits for permanent injunction and applications for temporary injunction under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2, C.P.C. The trial court held that Order 8, Rule 9, which allows subsequent pleadings by leave of the court, applies to suits but not to applications for temporary injunction. The plaintiffs argued that the procedure for suits should apply to miscellaneous proceedings, including temporary injunction applications. The court found that the proceedings for temporary injunction are miscellaneous and separately registered, thus, the procedure for suits should be followed as far as applicable. The court emphasized that such orders have significant bearing on the main suit, especially in cases of permanent injunctions.
  
  2. Interpretation of Section 141, C.P.C. Regarding Miscellaneous Proceedings:
  
  Section 141, C.P.C. states that the procedure provided in the Code for suits shall be followed in all proceedings in any civil court, as far as applicable. The trial court's interpretation was that Section 141 did not extend to temporary injunction applications. However, the plaintiffs contended that Section 141 should apply to all civil proceedings, including miscellaneous ones. The court agreed with the plaintiffs, stating that the phrase "as far as it can be made applicable" in Section 141 should not be narrowly interpreted. The court concluded that the procedure for suits should apply to miscellaneous proceedings unless specifically prohibited by law.
  
  3. Right to File a Rejoinder in Temporary Injunction Applications:
  
  The plaintiffs sought to file a rejoinder to the defendants' reply in the temporary injunction application. The trial court denied this, stating that Order 8, Rule 9 did not apply to temporary injunction applications. The plaintiffs argued that new pleas or facts introduced by the defendants in their reply necessitated a rejoinder to clarify and explain these points. The court found merit in the plaintiffs' argument, noting that the contingency of filing a rejoinder arises only when new facts are introduced by the defendant. The court held that the trial court should have allowed the rejoinder to ensure justice and truth in the proceedings.
  
  Supporting Case Law:
  
  The court referenced several cases to support its conclusions. In Ganpat Kinushet Sonar v. Vithal Bhikan Patil, it was held that Section 141 applies to miscellaneous proceedings. In Ram Chandra Aggarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court held that Section 141 applies to civil proceedings, not just original proceedings. The court also cited a Full Bench decision in Nathu Prasad v. Singhai Kapurchand, which held that an application under Order 9, Rule 9, C.P.C. is a proceeding within Section 141. The court distinguished these cases from those cited by the defendants, noting that the latter dealt with execution proceedings, not applicable to the present case.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court allowed the revision petitions, setting aside the trial court's orders. The plaintiffs were granted leave to file a rejoinder under Order 8, Rule 9 read with Section 141, C.P.C., ensuring that the procedure for suits is applied to miscellaneous proceedings to achieve justice. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 450
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Partition and separate possession of the 2/15th share in the suit properties.
  2. Accounting of the family business.
  3. Validity of the conveyance executed by the Official Assignee.
  4. Effect of annulment of adjudication on the joint family status and property rights.
  5. Registration requirement of the conveyance document.
  6. Entitlement of the plaintiffs to the family business and properties.
  
  Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Partition and Separate Possession of the 2/15th Share in the Suit Properties:
  The plaintiffs, who are brothers, filed the suit for partition and separate possession of their 2/15th share in the suit properties, claiming that they were part of a Hindu joint family and that there was no division of the family assets. The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to 1/5th share each after the death of Kothandarama Chettiar's widow. The court, however, concluded that the 2nd defendant's 1/4th share in the joint family property had been transferred to Ganapathi Chetty and later vested with the Official Liquidator. Consequently, the plaintiffs could not claim any share in the 2nd defendant's portion of the family properties.
  
  2. Accounting of the Family Business:
  The plaintiffs sought an accounting of the family business from defendants 3 and 4. The court dismissed this claim, noting that the business had passed out of the 2nd defendant's branch and was converted into a partnership by the remaining coparceners, who became the absolute owners of the business. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs had no right to claim any share or accounting in the business.
  
  3. Validity of the Conveyance Executed by the Official Assignee:
  The court upheld the validity of the conveyance executed by the Official Assignee to Ganapathi Chetty under Ex.D-8, despite it being unregistered. The court reasoned that the conveyance was made under a court order and, therefore, did not require registration under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, as per Section 2(d) of the Act. The court confirmed that the 1/4th share of the 2nd defendant was validly transferred and vested with the Official Liquidator.
  
  4. Effect of Annulment of Adjudication on the Joint Family Status and Property Rights:
  The court determined that the annulment of adjudication did not result in the properties reverting to the insolvent. Instead, the properties continued to vest with the Official Assignee for transfer to the guarantor, Ganapathi Chetty. The court emphasized that there was no revesting of the estate on annulment, and the 2nd defendant's share had gone out of the family, leaving nothing for the plaintiffs to claim.
  
  5. Registration Requirement of the Conveyance Document:
  The court rejected the argument that the conveyance document (Ex.D-8) required registration. It held that the document was executed under a court order, making it exempt from registration under Section 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act. The court cited relevant case law to support its conclusion that the transfer by the Official Assignee under court orders did not require registration.
  
  6. Entitlement of the Plaintiffs to the Family Business and Properties:
  The court concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any share in the family business or the 2nd defendant's share in the family properties, as these had been validly transferred and vested with the Official Liquidator. However, the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs were entitled to a fractional share in their grandfather Kothandarama Chetty's properties and jewels. The shares were worked out as follows: each plaintiff was entitled to 23/900th share in their grandfather's properties and 1/15th share in the jewels of the 1st defendant.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeal preferred by the plaintiffs and the 2nd defendant was dismissed, and the Memorandum of Cross-Objections preferred by defendants 3 to 5 was allowed in part, modifying the shares of the plaintiffs and defendants 6 and 7 as indicated. Each party was ordered to bear their own costs in the appeal and the Memorandum of Cross-Objection.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 449
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Liability of the appellant to pay closure compensation to employees.
  2. Applicability of Standing Orders 16 & 17.
  3. Entitlement of Badli workmen to closure compensation.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Liability of the appellant to pay closure compensation to employees:
  The appellant, Prakash Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd., faced an order from the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, directing the payment of compensation to its employees and some Badli workmen for the period from March 24, 1964, to June 10, 1964, during which the mill was closed due to circumstances beyond the appellant's control. The respondent-Sangh demanded wages for the affected employees during this period, which led to an application before the First Labour Court, Bombay, under sections 79 and 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. The Labour Court initially held the appellant liable to pay 50% of the total basic wages and dearness allowance as closure compensation, equating the closure to a layoff under section 2(kkk) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Industrial Court, upon appeal, remanded the matter for a fresh inquiry, which again resulted in a similar decision by the Labour Court. The Industrial Court, upon a subsequent appeal, directed compensation at the rate of 50% of basic wages and dearness allowance, with exceptions for certain categories of employees.
  
  2. Applicability of Standing Orders 16 & 17:
  The appellant argued that under Standing Orders 16 & 17, which allow for closure without notice and without compensation due to events beyond the company's control, it was not liable to pay any compensation. Standing Order 16 specifies that in the event of a fire, catastrophe, machinery breakdown, or other uncontrollable events, the company may stop operations without notice and compensation. However, the court rejected this contention, stating that Standing Orders 16 & 17 do not preclude the payment of compensation for closure. The court emphasized that the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 42 and section 78(1)(a)(iii) of the Act allow employees to challenge the refusal of compensation for closure before the Labour Court. Hence, the application by the respondent-Sangh was maintainable, and the appellant was liable to pay compensation despite the closure being under the provisions of the Standing Orders.
  
  3. Entitlement of Badli workmen to closure compensation:
  The Industrial Court had directed compensation to Badli workmen, who are casual employees without a guaranteed right to employment. The court noted that Badli workmen only get work in the absence of regular employees and do not have their names on the muster rolls. The appellant contended that Badli workmen, having no right to employment, were not entitled to compensation. The court agreed with this view, stating that compensating Badli workmen would be penalizing the appellant unjustly. The court referenced section 25C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which excludes Badli workmen from layoff compensation. The court also distinguished this case from the Apollo Mills case, where compensation to Badli workmen was awarded without the issue being separately raised or challenged. Thus, the court concluded that Badli workmen are not entitled to closure compensation under Standing Orders 16 & 17.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeal was allowed in part. The court upheld the order of the Industrial Court directing payment of compensation to the regular employees at the specified rate but set aside the order directing compensation to Badli workmen. There was no order for costs.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 448
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Violation of Fundamental Rights u/Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 25(1) of the Constitution.
  2. Legality of expulsion based on non-participation in the National Anthem.
  3. Interpretation of religious freedom and its limits under the Constitution.
  
  Summary:
  
  Violation of Fundamental Rights u/Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 25(1):
  The appellants, students and followers of Jehovah's Witnesses, were expelled for not singing the National Anthem, though they stood respectfully. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court misdirected itself by focusing on the content of the Anthem rather than the appellants' religious beliefs. The Court recognized that Jehovah's Witnesses hold sincere religious beliefs that prohibit them from participating in certain rituals, including singing national anthems. The Court cited various international cases and encyclopedic references to establish the global recognition of these beliefs.
  
  Legality of Expulsion:
  The Court examined whether the expulsion violated the appellants' rights under Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 25(1). It found no law obliging anyone to sing the National Anthem and stated that standing respectfully without singing does not constitute disrespect. The Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, and the Kerala Education Act were reviewed, and it was determined that the expulsion was not justified under these laws. The circulars relied upon by the Kerala Education Authorities lacked statutory basis and could not override fundamental rights.
  
  Interpretation of Religious Freedom:
  The Court emphasized that Art. 25 guarantees freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice, and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, and health. It reiterated that any restriction on this right must be based on law with statutory force, not mere executive instructions. The Court referred to previous judgments, including those from the American and Australian jurisdictions, to underscore the importance of protecting genuine religious beliefs, even if they appear unconventional.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court concluded that the expulsion of the children violated their fundamental rights under Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 25(1). The appeal was allowed, and the authorities were directed to readmit the children and facilitate their education. The judgment highlighted India's tradition of tolerance and the need to uphold constitutional principles of religious freedom. The appellants were awarded costs.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 447
  
  Issues:
  1. Dispute over ownership and possession of property.
  2. Validity of sale deed and additional agreement.
  3. Allegations of breach of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.
  4. Interpretation of Section 31(1) of the Act.
  5. Legalization of property purchase by Reserve Bank.
  6. Applicability of subsequent events in legal proceedings.
  
  Analysis:
  
  1. The judgment concerns a dispute over ownership and possession of a property in Chandigarh. The plaintiffs purchased a flat from the defendant but faced issues regarding possession of certain floors, leading to a lawsuit for possession and damages.
  
  2. The defendant contested the suit, claiming the property was sold for a higher amount and an additional agreement existed for the balance payment. However, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the sale deed for Rs. 75,000 was valid and no breach of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act was proven.
  
  3. The defendant's argument that the additional agreement was valid was refuted by the court. The document presented as evidence was deemed questionable in terms of authenticity and execution, leading to a rejection of the defendant's claims.
  
  4. The interpretation of Section 31(1) of the Act was crucial in determining the validity of the property purchase. The court clarified that while contravention of the Act could lead to penalties, it did not render the transaction void, especially when subsequent events, like a certificate from the Reserve Bank, legalized the purchase.
  
  5. The Reserve Bank's certificate authorized the plaintiffs to hold the property, effectively curing any potential illegality in the purchase. The court allowed the certificate as evidence, highlighting the significance of subsequent events in legal proceedings.
  
  6. The judgment emphasized the importance of considering subsequent events in legal matters, citing precedents that support the inclusion of such developments for a fair and just resolution. The court dismissed the appeals, affirming the lower court's decisions and upholding the plaintiffs' rights to possession and damages.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 446
  
  Issues:
  1. Whether the assessee's claim of trading loss of Rs. 1,06,004.70 due to sinking of a ship should be allowed.
  2. Whether rectification under section 154 of the Income-tax Act is permissible in this case.
  
  Analysis:
  
  Issue 1:
  The appeal was filed by the assessee against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) for the assessment year 1978-79, challenging the disallowance of trading loss of Rs. 1,06,004.70 incurred due to the sinking of a ship carrying goods. The assessee initially did not claim this amount as a business or trading loss in the return but later sought rectification under section 154, which was rejected by the ITO. The Tribunal also refused to entertain the additional ground raised by the assessee regarding the trading loss. The department contended that since the Tribunal had rejected the additional ground, rectification under section 154 was not permissible. However, the Tribunal held that the loss of stock-in-trade is a trading loss and is an allowable deduction as per relevant case laws and the Income-tax Act. The Tribunal directed the ITO to look into the assessee's claim of trading loss and allow it, stating that there was a mistake of law apparent from the record.
  
  Issue 2:
  The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal observing that the assessee did not treat the value of lost goods as a permanent loss during the accounting year and had not written it off as a loss in their accounts. The Commissioner opined that determining whether the loss was incurred required detailed investigation, and rectification under section 154 was not justified. However, the Tribunal disagreed, citing relevant case laws and circulars emphasizing the duty of the assessing officer to assist the taxpayer in claiming entitled reliefs. The Tribunal noted that the sinking of the ship and the loss to the assessee were supported by correspondence with the insurance company before the end of the accounting year. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, directing the ITO to rectify the mistake and allow the trading loss claimed by the assessee.
  
  In conclusion, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, directing the ITO to rectify the mistake and allow the trading loss claimed by the assessee due to the sinking of the ship carrying goods. The Tribunal emphasized the duty of the assessing officer to assist taxpayers in claiming entitled reliefs and held that there was a mistake of law apparent from the record, justifying rectification under section 154 of the Income-tax Act.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 445
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Authority to seize passport under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.
  2. Validity of the seizure order.
  3. Relevance of the passport in adjudication proceedings.
  4. Duration of the seizure and custody of the passport.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Authority to Seize Passport under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973:
  The central issue in this case is whether the authorities under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 ('the Act') have the power to seize the passport of the petitioner, who is alleged to have breached Section 29 of the Act. The petitioner, a foreign national from South Africa, entered India on a South African passport and is accused of carrying on business in India without the Reserve Bank's permission, violating Section 29(1)(a) of the Act. Pending adjudication proceedings under Section 51, the petitioner's passport was seized under Section 38 of the Act.
  
  2. Validity of the Seizure Order:
  The petitioner contended that the seizure order was null and void, arguing that the enforcement officer lacked the authority to seize the passport. Section 38 of the Act allows for the seizure of any document or thing believed to be relevant to an investigation or proceeding under the Act. The court found that the order, although not explicitly stating "reason to believe," indicated that the authority considered the passport relevant to the proceedings. The court held that the absence of the phrase "reason to believe" did not invalidate the order, as the authority's considered opinion implied such belief. Thus, the seizure order was deemed valid.
  
  3. Relevance of the Passport in Adjudication Proceedings:
  The petitioner argued that his passport was neither a document nor a thing as contemplated by Section 38 and was irrelevant to the adjudication proceedings. The court disagreed, stating that the passport is both a document and a thing, as defined by ordinary dictionary meanings. The court further held that the passport was relevant to the proceedings under Section 51 read with Section 50, as it could prove the petitioner's status as a foreign national residing in India without the necessary permissions. The court also rejected the petitioner's argument that his admission of being a foreign national rendered the passport irrelevant, citing the proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act, which allows the adjudicating authority to require proof of admitted facts.
  
  4. Duration of the Seizure and Custody of the Passport:
  The petitioner contended that the seizure of his passport should not continue indefinitely, as it would unreasonably restrict his right to move out of India. The court agreed that the seizure and custody of the passport could not be indefinite and must be conterminous with the adjudication proceedings. The court referred to Section 41 of the Act, which limits the custody of documents furnishing evidence of contravention to one year or until the completion of adjudication proceedings. The court directed the respondents to complete the adjudication proceedings within eight weeks and communicate the result within one week thereafter. If the petitioner is found not to have violated Section 29(1), the passport must be returned immediately. If a penalty is imposed, the passport should be returned upon payment of the penalty, without prejudice to the petitioner's right to appeal.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court upheld the seizure of the petitioner's passport under Section 38 of the Act, finding it relevant to the adjudication proceedings. However, it directed the respondents to complete the proceedings within a specified timeframe to prevent indefinite deprivation of the petitioner's right to travel.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 444
  
  Issues:
  1. Taxability of salary earned by the assessee in India for assessment year 1974-75.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  The primary issue in this case before the Appellate Tribunal ITAT Mumbai was whether the salary earned by the assessee, who was the Chief Engineer of a vessel outside the territorial limits of India, is taxable in India for the assessment year 1974-75. The initial assessment treated the assessee as a "resident" despite claiming status as a "non-resident," prompting a revision petition by the assessee. The CIT directed the ITO to re-examine the taxability of the salary income, leading to subsequent assessments and appeals.
  
  The Revenue contended that since the employer, Shipping Corporation of India, is an Indian company with its office in India and utilized funds from India to pay the salary, the income accrued within Indian limits under section 5(2)(b). On the other hand, the assessee argued that the situs of the agreement or source of payment is not determinative, emphasizing that the place where services were rendered is crucial in determining where the income accrued, citing various legal precedents.
  
  Upon considering the submissions and legal authorities, the Tribunal held that the location where services were rendered is pivotal in determining the accrual of income. The Tribunal emphasized that the place of the agreement or source of payment is not decisive, but rather where the services were actually provided. The Tribunal referenced case law and clarified that the place of payment is not a decisive factor in determining taxability, emphasizing that the income earned by the assessee outside India is not taxable in India.
  
  Additionally, the Tribunal examined the Service Conditions for floating Staff Personnel of Shipping Corporation of India and clarified that the advance payments made to the assessee were based on earnings in foreign waters, indicating that substantial income was earned outside Indian territories. The Tribunal also referenced a CBDT circular regarding advances paid to seamen in foreign currency, supporting the position that income earned outside India qualifies for deduction under the IT Act.
  
  Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded that the salary income earned by the assessee outside India as a Chief Engineer of a vessel is not taxable in India. Therefore, the appeal by the Revenue was dismissed, upholding the decision of the AAC that the salary is not subject to taxation in India for the assessment year in question.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 443
  
  Issues:
  Age determination for eligibility in direct recruitment to Rajasthan Administrative Service under the Rules.
  
  Analysis:
  The case involved the determination of age for eligibility in direct recruitment to the Rajasthan Administrative Service. The appellant's date of birth was January 2, 1956, and the question was whether he had attained the age of 28 years on January 1, 1984, making him ineligible for consideration under the Rules. The Rajasthan Public Service Commission had prescribed a minimum age of 21 years and a maximum of 28 years for candidates applying for the service. The appellant's candidature was rejected on the grounds of exceeding the age limit, leading to a legal challenge. The High Court initially ruled in favor of the appellant, stating that he had not attained the age of 28 years on January 1, 1984, as claimed by the Commission.
  
  However, on appeal, a Division Bench disagreed with the Single Judge's interpretation. They emphasized the specific language of the Rules, which stated that a candidate "must not have attained the age of 28 years on the first day of January next following the last date fixed for receipt of application." The Bench concluded that the appellant, born on January 2, 1956, had indeed attained the age of 28 years on January 1, 1984, making him ineligible for the examination under the Rules. They referred to legal principles regarding age determination and previous court decisions to support their interpretation.
  
  The appellant argued that the Union Public Service Commission interpreted similar age requirements differently, but the Supreme Court held that the interpretation of the Rules could not be based on the Commission's practices. The Court analyzed the language of Rule 11-B, emphasizing that a person attains a specified age on the day preceding the anniversary of their birth day. They cited legal principles and English court decisions to support this interpretation. The Court also highlighted the Indian Majority Act, 1875, which provides guidelines for computing a person's age.
  
  Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench's decision, ruling that the appellant had exceeded the age limit by one day and was disqualified for direct recruitment to the Rajasthan Administrative Service. The Court acknowledged the potential hardship faced by the appellant due to this strict interpretation of age limits and suggested the need for provisions allowing for age limit relaxations in deserving cases. The appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 442
  
  Issues:
  Interference in a transaction between a banker and a beneficiary of a letter of guarantee or indemnity by granting an injunction at the instance of the buyer. Interpretation of the terms of a contract of sale involving a letter of credit. Application for a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 of the CPC, 1908. Prima facie case assessment in a dispute over quality and performance of goods. Obligations of a bank under letters of indemnity. Application of principles from United Commercial Bank's case to a banker's letter of indemnity.
  
  Analysis:
  The case involved a dispute between a buyer and sellers regarding the quality and performance of goods under a contract of sale involving a letter of credit. The buyer sought a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 of the CPC, 1908 to prevent the bank from honoring letters of indemnity issued to the shipping company. The High Court denied the injunction, finding that the buyer had no prima facie case and that the balance of convenience did not favor granting the injunction. The court emphasized that the buyer had already sold the goods and realized substantial proceeds, questioning the buyer's claim for damages. The Division Bench upheld the High Court's decision, citing the absolute obligation of the bank under the letters of indemnity, regardless of the buyer-seller dispute.
  
  The judgment referenced the principles established in United Commercial Bank's case, emphasizing the banker's obligation under an irrevocable letter of credit to pay, irrespective of instructions from the buyer. The court highlighted that interference in banking transactions, including letters of credit and guarantees, should be limited to exceptional cases, to maintain trust in international commerce. The judgment concluded that the same principles should apply to a banker's letter of indemnity, dismissing the appeal and ordering costs to be paid.
  
  In summary, the court's decision centered on upholding the bank's obligation under the letters of indemnity, emphasizing the importance of honoring banking commitments in commercial transactions. The judgment highlighted the buyer's actions in selling the goods and retaining proceeds, undermining the claim for damages. The application of established principles from previous cases, particularly United Commercial Bank's case, guided the court's decision to dismiss the appeal and maintain the integrity of banking transactions.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 441
  
  Issues involved:
  The judgment involves consideration of the acquittal of certain accused under s. 307/149 IPC, the justification of extending the benefit of s. 360 Cr.P.C. for releasing the accused on probation of good conduct, and the legality of the compensation awarded to the victim Joginder.
  
  Acquittal under s. 307/149 IPC:
  The Supreme Court analyzed the intention of the accused in committing the offense under s. 307 IPC, emphasizing that the intention to commit murder must be established for an "attempt to murder" charge. The Court considered various factors such as the nature of the weapon used, motive, and manner of attack. It was concluded that the accused did not have the intention to commit murder, as they did not use the sharp edge of the weapon despite being armed. The Court upheld the acquittal under s. 307 IPC due to the lack of evidence supporting the intention to commit murder.
  
  Benefit of probation of good conduct:
  The Court examined the High Court's decision to grant the accused the benefit of probation under s. 360 Cr.P.C. The judgment highlighted that the accused had no prior enmity with the victim and the incident arose from a sudden altercation. Considering that the accused did not have the intention to commit murder, the Court found the extension of probationary benefit appropriate for first-time offenders. The judgment emphasized the purpose of probation in encouraging offenders to take responsibility for their actions and protecting them from the negative impact of imprisonment.
  
  Compensation awarded to Joginder:
  Regarding the compensation awarded to Joginder, the Court referred to s. 357 Cr. P.C., which allows courts to order compensation to victims of the offense. The judgment emphasized the importance of awarding reasonable compensation to victims to reconcile them with the offender and ensure justice. The Court found the initial compensation inadequate considering Joginder's permanent disability and inability to speak. After assessing the accused's ability to pay, the Court directed the respondents to pay an additional sum of &8377; 50,000 to Joginder within two months. The modification was made only to the compensation amount, while upholding the rest of the High Court's decision.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court modified the High Court's order by increasing the compensation to Joginder and upheld the acquittal under s. 307 IPC and the benefit of probation granted to the accused. The appeals were disposed of accordingly.

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• 1986 (8) TMI 440
  
  Issues: Delay in filing special leave petitions, Condonation of delay under Limitation Act, Application of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, Interpretation of sections 25 and 28A, Justification for reopening of final award, Comparison with previous judgments on limitation.
  
  Analysis:
  The Supreme Court addressed the issue of delay in filing special leave petitions, emphasizing the importance of condonation under the Limitation Act, 1963. The petitioners sought to rely on the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, specifically sections 25 and 28A, to support their claim for redetermination of compensation. However, the Court found that these provisions did not apply to the petitioners as they were not part of the intended beneficiary class. The petitioners had already received enhanced compensation through civil court proceedings and had not challenged the final judgment for over three years. The Court noted that there was no provision in the Act for reopening a final award except under section 28A, which had specific conditions that were not met by the petitioners. The judgment highlighted that granting special leave based solely on a change in law was not sufficient to condone the delay.
  
  Moreover, the Court distinguished the present case from previous judgments, such as Madras Port Trust's case, where the issue of limitation was considered in a different context. The Court emphasized that the government or public authorities could rely on technical pleas like limitation if well-founded, and citizens could not use their own delay as a basis for condonation. The judgment reiterated the importance of upholding legal principles and not granting special leave in cases where there was no justification for condoning significant delays. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the special leave petitions due to the excessive delay and imposed costs on the petitioners, emphasizing the need to adhere to statutory timelines and legal procedures without unjustified leniency.

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