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1987 (8) TMI 458
Issues:
1. Interpretation of the term "shop" under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948.
2. Determination of whether the establishment of the petitioner qualifies as a "shop" under the Act.
3. Analysis of the decision of the Employees' Insurance Court and the subsequent appeal to the High Court.
4. Examination of the legal obligations of the petitioner under the Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The central issue in this case pertains to the interpretation of the term "shop" as used in the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. The Act was extended to certain establishments by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, including those employing 20 or more persons. The notification listed "shops" as one of the establishments covered by the Act. The absence of a specific definition of "shop" in the Act or the notification led to a debate regarding the scope of this term.
2. The petitioner, a limited company engaged in importing fertilizers, contested the classification of its establishment as a "shop" under the Act. The petitioner argued that since goods were not physically delivered at its premises, it should not be considered a "shop." However, the High Court ruled in favor of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation, determining that the petitioner's activities, including negotiations, supervision of goods, and collection of payments, constituted trading activities typically associated with a "shop."
3. The Employees' Insurance Court initially sided with the petitioner, declaring that its establishment was not covered by the Act. Subsequently, the Regional Director of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation appealed to the High Court, which overturned the lower court's decision. The High Court held that the petitioner's place of business met the criteria of a "shop" as per the notification issued by the State Government.
4. Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the petitioner's establishment qualified as a "shop" under the Act. The Court highlighted that the Act's provisions should be liberally construed to fulfill the legislative intent, ensuring that welfare objectives are not thwarted. As the petitioner had employed more than 20 individuals and engaged in selling activities at its premises, it was deemed obligated to comply with the Act's requirements. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the applicability of the Act to the petitioner's establishment.
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1987 (8) TMI 457
Issues:
1. Revision petition against the order reducing the upset price of the property.
2. Justification of reducing the upset price to Rs. 10,000.
3. Interpretation of the court's power to fix and reduce upset price.
4. Consideration of relevant factors in determining the upset price.
5. Arbitrary nature of the order and the need for a proper enquiry.
Analysis:
1. The judgment concerns a revision petition challenging the order of the District Munsif, Kancheepuram, which reduced the upset price of agricultural property advertised for sale to Rs. 10,000 in an execution proceeding of a money decree.
2. The executing court's decision to reduce the upset price to Rs. 10,000 is questioned. The court has the authority to fix and adjust the upset price, as established in previous judgments. The upset price serves as a reserve price to safeguard the interests of the judgment-debtor during the auction.
3. The court's power to determine the upset price is not arbitrary but based on objective considerations of relevant factors like the nature of the property, its use, and cultivation type. The upset price should reflect the expected value of the property to be auctioned, ensuring a fair starting point for bidding.
4. In this case, the District Munsif's order lacked justification for setting the upset price at Rs. 10,000, solely relying on the decree-holder's estimate despite their earlier valuation of Rs. 15,000. The order was deemed arbitrary and required proper consideration and enquiry.
5. Consequently, the revision petition was allowed, setting aside the order to reduce the upset price. The District Munsif was directed to reevaluate and determine the appropriate upset price after conducting a thorough enquiry. The execution proceedings were to continue in compliance with the law, emphasizing the importance of a fair and justified upset price determination.
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1987 (8) TMI 456
Issues:
Challenge to termination order based on lack of reason provided by punishing authority violating natural justice principles.
Analysis:
The appellant, a Bus Conductor, challenged the termination of his service due to failure of the punishing authority to provide a reason for the order, alleging a violation of natural justice principles. A charge of not issuing tickets to passengers was leveled against the appellant, leading to a disciplinary proceeding. The Enquiry Officer found the charge proved, and the punishing authority terminated the appellant's service based on this finding.
The appellant contended that the termination order was illegal due to the absence of reasons, contrary to natural justice principles. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, stating that it lacked jurisdiction. On appeal, the Additional District Judge held the Civil Court had jurisdiction but deemed the order invalid for lacking reasons, thus allowing the appeal and setting aside the termination order.
The State of Haryana appealed to the High Court, which affirmed the Civil Court's jurisdiction but reversed the decision on the validity of the termination order, deeming it legal. The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the lower court's judgment. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.
The appellant argued that the punishing authority did not apply their mind before issuing the order, as evidenced by the absence of reasons. However, the High Court noted that the punishing authority's order was detailed, spanning seven pages, outlining the charge, witness depositions, Enquiry Officer's findings, and appellant's explanation. The punishing authority explicitly stated the basis for terminating the service, indicating a thorough consideration of the case.
The Supreme Court found that the punishing authority had indeed applied their mind, as evidenced by the detailed order and reliance on the Enquiry Officer's report and findings. The Court held that agreeing with the Enquiry Officer's findings and reasons was sufficient, negating the need for redundant discussion. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit. However, considering the appellant's circumstances, the Court suggested re-employment due to being a first-time offender with dependents and no other livelihood.
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1987 (8) TMI 455
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the High Court's order to delete respondents Nos. 2 and 3 from the criminal revision petition.
2. Whether respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were necessary parties in the criminal revision petition.
3. Scope of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 of the CrPC.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the High Court's Order to Delete Respondents Nos. 2 and 3:
The High Court directed the deletion of respondents Nos. 2 and 3, who were not parties to the original complaint, from the criminal revision petition. The appellants contended that the High Court's order was passed without proper opportunity for hearing, although it was admitted that the petitioners were heard. The Supreme Court found no grievance in the High Court's procedure, stating, "This is not unusual and there is no grievance that the petitioners had no hearing."
2. Whether Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 Were Necessary Parties:
The appellants argued that respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were necessary parties because the allegations in the complaint pertained to them. The learned Advocate General for the State of Karnataka contended that joining unnecessary parties in a revision arising out of criminal proceedings could have far-reaching consequences and potentially delay the proceedings. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's decision to delete the names, noting, "Admittedly these two respondents who have been deleted by the impugned order of the High Court were not parties before the court below."
3. Scope of the High Court's Revisional Jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 of the CrPC:
The appellants emphasized that Section 397 empowers the High Court to call for records and examine the propriety of the order, while Section 401 provides the revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court clarified that the High Court's role is to examine the legality, correctness, and propriety of the order issuing process based on the complaint and accompanying papers. The Court stated, "The High Court in revision under Section 401 read with 397 only is concerned to see those papers which were before the court below."
The Supreme Court further elaborated that the High Court is not expected to investigate the motivations behind the prosecution or the involvement of external parties. It emphasized, "The High Court is only expected to see the legality, correctness or the propriety of the order, which is an order of issue of process."
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order, concluding that respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were not necessary parties in the criminal revision petition and that the High Court's revisional jurisdiction was correctly exercised. The appeal was dismissed, and the order passed by the High Court was maintained.
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1987 (8) TMI 454
Issues:
Interpretation of an agreement for management of business as sub-tenancy.
Analysis:
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an agreement for the management of a business should be considered a sub-tenancy in the case at hand. The petitioner contended that he was a sub-tenant with the landlord's knowledge and consent, arguing that he should have been made a party to the eviction suit separately. However, the High Court held that the petitioner was not a sub-tenant and was bound by the eviction decree against the tenant. The Court examined the agreement dated 1st September 1966, which outlined the terms between the parties. The agreement specified that the second party would manage the business on behalf of the first party for a fixed term, making fixed monthly payments and bearing incidental costs. The Court noted that there was no exclusive possession granted to the respondent, and the arrangement was for managing the business, not for sub-tenancy.
The Court referred to a previous decision in M/s Girdbar Lal & Sons v. Balbir Nath Matbur and Others, where consent by the landlord to sub-tenancy was considered valid. However, in the present case, the Court found that the agreement did not create a sub-tenancy. The Court also examined the definition of 'tenant' under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, but concluded that it did not apply as there was no sub-tenancy established in this case. Therefore, the Court upheld the High Court's decision, stating that the petitioner was not a sub-tenant and was bound by the eviction decree against the tenant. Consequently, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed, and no costs were awarded in the matter.
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1987 (8) TMI 453
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the detention order under the Cofeposa Act.
2. Alleged double detention and non-application of mind.
3. Delay in considering the petitioner's representation.
4. Suppression of material documents by the detaining authority.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the Detention Order under the Cofeposa Act:
The High Court examined the validity of the detention order issued to prevent the petitioner from smuggling and abetting the smuggling of goods. The order was based on the recovery of significant quantities of Hashish concealed in machinery items meant for export, and the petitioner's alleged involvement in these activities. The detaining authority concluded that despite pending adjudication and prosecution under the Customs Act and N.D.P.S. Act, the petitioner's detention under the Cofeposa Act was necessary.
2. Alleged Double Detention and Non-Application of Mind:
The petitioner's counsel argued that the detention order was issued mechanically without due application of mind, violating Article 22 of the Constitution and Section 3(1) of the Cofeposa Act, as the petitioner was already in jail as an under-trial prisoner. The court emphasized that a preventive detention order against an already confined person requires the detaining authority to show awareness of the detainee's current confinement and a compelling necessity for further detention. The court noted the Supreme Court's stance that the detention order must reflect this awareness and necessity, failing which it would suffer from non-application of mind. The court found that the detaining authority did not demonstrate such awareness, rendering the order of detention invalid.
3. Delay in Considering the Petitioner's Representation:
The petitioner claimed that his representation sent on 23/12/1986 was neither considered nor decided upon promptly. The respondents denied receiving the representation but alternatively stated that it was rejected on 6/03/1987. The court observed that even taking the respondents' stand at face value, the delay in communicating the decision was unreasonable. Citing Supreme Court precedents, the court held that any unreasonable delay in considering a detenu's representation invalidates the detention. The court found the delay in this case unjustifiable and sufficient to invalidate the detention order.
4. Suppression of Material Documents by the Detaining Authority:
The petitioner contended that several crucial documents were either not placed before the detaining authority or were not given due importance, constituting suppression of material facts. These documents included the petitioner's retraction of his confessional statements, applications for medical examination, medico-legal reports, and bail applications. The respondents claimed that these documents were considered but not relied upon. The court emphasized that all relevant documents must be considered by the detaining authority, and their non-consideration or dismissal as irrelevant amounts to non-application of mind. The court held that the failure to consider these material documents vitiated the detention order.
Conclusion:
The High Court concluded that the detention order suffered from non-application of mind, unreasonable delay in considering the petitioner's representation, and suppression of material documents. Consequently, the court set aside the detention order and directed the petitioner's immediate release unless required to be detained under other competent orders.
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1987 (8) TMI 452
Issues:
1. Validity of property sales during the subsistence of attachment.
2. Interpretation of Section 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. Effect of restoration of Title Execution Case on attachment.
4. Impact of judicial orders on third-party rights.
5. Relevance of Calcutta High Court Rule 57 amendment.
Issue 1: Validity of property sales during the subsistence of attachment:
The appellant contended that property sales during the attachment period were void under Section 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The sales occurred before the Title Execution Case was dismissed for default, and the subsequent restoration of the case revived the attachment. The argument was based on the principle that any transfer during an attachment is void against claims enforceable under the attachment.
Issue 2: Interpretation of Section 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
Section 64 prohibits private transfers or payments contrary to an attachment. The provision aims to protect the rights of decree holders by invalidating transactions made during an attachment period. The explanation to the section clarifies its scope and applicability in attachment scenarios.
Issue 3: Effect of restoration of Title Execution Case on attachment:
The judgment analyzed the impact of restoring the Title Execution Case on the attachment status. It cited precedents from Madras and Bombay High Courts to support the view that restoration of a case revives all ancillary orders, including attachments. The restoration was deemed to retroactively reinstate the attachment during its subsistence period.
Issue 4: Impact of judicial orders on third-party rights:
The judgment distinguished the case law regarding the revival of execution proceedings and its effect on third-party rights. It emphasized that restoration of an execution application does not prejudice the rights of bona fide purchasers who acquired property assuming the orders were valid. The rights of strangers who acquired title during a non-attachment period were protected.
Issue 5: Relevance of Calcutta High Court Rule 57 amendment:
The judgment discussed the amendment to Rule 57 of Order 21 by the Calcutta High Court, which allowed the court to continue an attachment despite dismissing an execution application. However, the amendment did not alter the fundamental principle that restoration of a case revives attachments and ancillary orders.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the Calcutta High Court's judgment. It held that the restoration of the Title Execution Case reinstated the attachment, rendering the property sales during the attachment period void. The decision reaffirmed the importance of protecting decree holders' rights during execution proceedings and clarified the legal implications of attachment and restoration in civil cases.
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1987 (8) TMI 451
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the High Court in habeas corpus matters.
2. Validity of the detention order under COFEPOSA.
3. Territorial jurisdiction based on the detenu's activities and residence.
4. Impact of the detention order on fundamental rights under Article 19 of the Constitution.
Summary:
1. Jurisdiction of the High Court in Habeas Corpus Matters:
The primary issue is whether the Bombay High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a habeas corpus petition u/s 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner argued that the High Court has jurisdiction because the detenu was detained at Ulhasnagar, Maharashtra, and the detention order affects her fundamental rights.
2. Validity of the Detention Order under COFEPOSA:
The detenu, Smt. Durga Ramchand Bhatia, was detained u/s 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA). The order was passed by a Joint Secretary to the Government of India with the objective "to prevent her from smuggling goods." The petitioner contended that the detention order relates to activities within Maharashtra, thus part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court.
3. Territorial Jurisdiction Based on the Detenu's Activities and Residence:
The respondents argued that the detenu's smuggling activities occurred outside Maharashtra, and the detention order was made in Delhi, with the detenu to be detained in Calcutta. The Court noted that the detenu's activities in Maharashtra were not directly related to the smuggling for which she was detained. The Court emphasized that the object of the detention order was to prevent smuggling, which did not occur in Maharashtra.
4. Impact of the Detention Order on Fundamental Rights under Article 19:
The petitioner argued that the detention order infringes on the detenu's fundamental rights under Article 19, specifically her right to move freely and reside in any part of India. The Court referred to the Gujarat High Court's decision in Smt. Manjulaben v. C. T. A. Pillay, which allowed habeas corpus petitions to be filed in any High Court based on the impact on fundamental rights. However, the Court disagreed with this expansive view, stating that allowing such petitions in any High Court would lead to "forum shopping" and chaos.
The Court concluded that the Bombay High Court has jurisdiction because the detenu was taken into custody and served with the detention order at Ulhasnagar, Maharashtra. The Court acknowledged the convenience of the detaining authority but decided not to direct the petitioner to move another court, considering the time already spent and the detenu's circumstances.
Order:
The case shall proceed to a hearing on merits in the Bombay High Court.
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1987 (8) TMI 450
Issues Involved:
1. Scheme of Amalgamation
2. Objections by Creditors
3. Objections by Central Government
4. Interest of Workmen
5. Exchange Ratio of Shares
6. Alleged Tax Evasion
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Scheme of Amalgamation:
The appellants, Bengal Tea & Industries Limited (Appellant No. 1) and Bengal Tea & Fabrics Limited (Appellant No. 2), proposed a scheme of amalgamation under sections 391(1) and 393 of the Companies Act, 1956. The scheme included the transfer of all assets and liabilities from Appellant No. 1 to Appellant No. 2, effective from April 1, 1985. The scheme was approved unanimously by the shareholders of both companies in meetings held on November 16, 1985. The appellants then filed a petition under sections 391(2) and 394 for the Court's sanction of the scheme.
2. Objections by Creditors:
Punjab National Bank (Respondent No. 2) opposed the scheme, arguing that it did not adequately provide for the transfer of cash balances, reserve funds, investments, and other assets. They contended that the scheme did not ensure that the liabilities of Appellant No. 1 would become the liabilities of Appellant No. 2. However, the Court found these objections unsubstantial, noting that the scheme explicitly included all assets and liabilities of the transferor company and that the creditors could proceed against the transferee company as they could against the transferor company.
3. Objections by Central Government:
The Regional Director, Company Law Board, opposed the scheme, arguing that the exchange ratio was highly unfavorable to the shareholders of Appellant No. 1. They contended that the break-up value of the shares was significantly higher than the proposed exchange ratio. Additionally, it was argued that Appellant No. 2 had not carried out any significant business and was liable to be wound up under section 434(c) of the Companies Act, 1956. The Court dismissed these objections, stating that the valuation of shares is a matter of expert opinion and that the shareholders of Appellant No. 1 had unanimously approved the scheme.
4. Interest of Workmen:
The Central Government argued that the scheme might result in the retrenchment of workmen due to the proposed economies of a centralized and larger concern. The Court found this objection without substance, noting that the scheme explicitly provided for the transfer of all employees from Appellant No. 1 to Appellant No. 2 without interruption in their service and on the same terms and conditions.
5. Exchange Ratio of Shares:
The Regional Director contended that the exchange ratio was unfair and unfavorable to the shareholders of Appellant No. 1. The Court noted that the shareholders of Appellant No. 1, who held 93.8% of the shares, had unanimously approved the scheme. No shareholder had objected to the scheme, either during the meeting or after the advertisement of the application for sanction. The Court held that the fairness of the exchange ratio is primarily a matter for the shareholders to decide, and in the absence of any objection from them, the Court would not interfere.
6. Alleged Tax Evasion:
The Central Government also suggested that the scheme might be a device for tax evasion. However, the Court found no evidence to support this claim. There was no specific allegation in the affidavit filed by the Regional Director, and no particular tax evasion was identified. The Court concluded that unless it is specifically established that the scheme was a device for evasion of payment of any tax, it cannot be rejected on this ground.
Conclusion:
The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment and order dated July 11, 1986, and sanctioned the scheme of amalgamation under sections 391(2) and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956. The objections raised by the creditors and the Central Government were dismissed, and the scheme was found to be fair and reasonable, benefiting both companies and their shareholders. The Court also provided specific directions for the Official Liquidator to file and serve his return within stipulated timeframes.
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1987 (8) TMI 449
Issues Involved:
1. Liability of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Managing Director, and Board of Directors u/s 47 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.
2. Validity of the complaint filed by the appellant.
3. Technical flaws in the complaint and their impact on the prosecution.
Summary:
1. Liability of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Managing Director, and Board of Directors u/s 47 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974:
The primary issue was whether the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Managing Director, and members of the Board of Directors of Messrs Modi Industries Limited could be prosecuted under s. 47 of the Act without prosecuting the Company itself. The Court held that under s. 47(1), every person responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company itself, shall be deemed guilty of the offence. The proviso to s. 47(1) shifts the burden on the delinquent officer to prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent it. Sub-s. (2) further provides that if the offence is committed with the consent or connivance of any director, manager, secretary, or other officer, they shall also be deemed guilty. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Managing Director, and members of the Board of Directors could be prosecuted for the offence.
2. Validity of the complaint filed by the appellant:
The complaint was filed by the appellant under s. 44 of the Act for the contravention of ss. 25(1) and 26. The High Court had quashed the proceedings on the ground that there could be no vicarious liability under s. 47 unless there was a prosecution of the Company. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the technical flaw in the complaint was due to the failure of the industrial unit to furnish the requisite information. The Court held that the flaw could be easily remedied by amending the complaint to include Messrs Modi Industries Limited as the accused.
3. Technical flaws in the complaint and their impact on the prosecution:
The High Court had quashed the proceedings due to a technical flaw in the complaint, which named Messrs Modi Distillery instead of Messrs Modi Industries Limited. The Supreme Court noted that this flaw was attributable to the deliberate failure of the industrial unit to provide necessary information. The Court emphasized that such a technical flaw should not allow the respondents to escape prosecution. The Court directed the matter to be remitted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate to allow the appellant to amend the complaint formally.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate directing the issue of process to the respondents. The learned Magistrate was instructed to proceed with the trial expeditiously in accordance with the law.
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1987 (8) TMI 448
Issues involved: Disputes between partners of Balasubramania Foundry, appointment of Receiver, claims of workers for past dues, legal misconduct by arbitrator, errors in award, objections to award, setting aside the award, principles of arbitration.
Disputes between partners and appointment of Receiver: The Supreme Court referred disputes between partners of Balasubramania Foundry to an Arbitrator due to legal proceedings in Coimbatore courts. The Arbitrator, Justice C.J.R. Paul, published the award on 3rd April, 1985. An application for the appointment of a Receiver was also directed to be proceeded with in the trial court.
Claims of workers and objections: Workers' claims for past dues were referred for arbitration, with the Arbitrator filing the award in the Court. Allegations of legal misconduct by the arbitrator and errors in the award were raised. Workers claimed insufficient provision for their dues, but the Court found that adequate provisions had been made, dismissing objections to the award.
Legal principles and setting aside the award: The Court reiterated principles of arbitration, stating that an award could only be set aside for errors on its face, not for mistakes of fact. The Court found no legal errors apparent on the face of the record and dismissed objections to the award. The award was made the rule of the Court, with no interim interest but interest on judgment at 9%.
Conclusion: The objections to the award were dismissed, and workers' objections were disposed of by confirming sufficient provisions in the award for their gratuity claims. The award was made the rule of the Court, and judgment was passed in terms of the award, with no order as to costs. Petitions were disposed of accordingly.
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1987 (8) TMI 447
Issues Involved:
1. Whether 8-C or 13-C could be considered a step in the suit, disqualifying the defendant from seeking a stay under sec. 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition & Enforcement) Act.
2. Whether 13-C was in the nature of a written statement, precluding the defendant from seeking a stay.
3. Whether the defendant could be said to have abandoned the right to seek a stay in the circumstances of the case.
Summary:
1. Step in the Suit:
The Court examined whether the applications 8-C or 13-C filed by GEC could be considered a step in the suit, thereby disqualifying them from seeking a stay under sec. 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition & Enforcement) Act. The Court concluded that 8-C and 13-C were preliminary objections and not steps in the suit. These applications were designed to prevent the court from proceeding with the suit rather than aiding its progress. The Court held that an invitation to reject a plaint or dismiss a suit on grounds such as jurisdiction or maintainability is not an invitation to adjudicate on the merits of the controversy.
2. Nature of 13-C:
The Court analyzed whether 13-C was in the nature of a written statement. It concluded that neither 8-C nor 13-C could be treated as a written statement. These applications were objections to the trial of the suit on merits and were not intended to answer the plaint. The Court noted that the plaintiff himself did not consider 13-C as a written statement, as evidenced by his application to set the defendant ex parte for not filing a written statement.
3. Abandonment of Right to Seek Stay:
The Court considered whether the defendant had abandoned the right to seek a stay. It found that the defendant consistently referred to his preliminary objections and never abandoned them. The Court noted that the defendant's conduct, including the filing of application 83-C following the High Court's directive, demonstrated that he did not abandon his right to seek a stay. The Court emphasized that 83-C was a reiteration and revival of 13-C with an emphasis on the objection relating to sec. 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition & Enforcement) Act.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, concluding that the defendant sought a stay of the suit before filing a written statement or taking any other step in the suit and never abandoned the right to have the suit stayed. The suit No. 127 of 1982 in the Court of Mirzapur was stayed under sec. 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition & Enforcement) Act.
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1987 (8) TMI 446
Issues Involved:
1. Entitlement to count previous Central Government service for pension in an autonomous body.
2. Validity of the condition making the government order applicable only to employees retiring after its issuance.
3. Classification of pensioners based on the date of retirement under Article 14 of the Constitution.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Entitlement to Count Previous Central Government Service for Pension in an Autonomous Body:
The primary issue was whether an employee of an autonomous body established under the Central Government could claim the benefit of the period of service rendered in a pensionable post under the Central Government for computing qualifying service for pension. The petitioner, who worked as an Upper Division Clerk in the Central Government from 1950 to 1953, joined the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) in 1953. The petitioner retired from ICAR in 1980 and was granted pensionary benefits based on his service from 1953 to 1980. He requested that his prior service from 1950 to 1953 be counted towards his pension, which was initially denied due to existing policies.
2. Validity of the Condition Making the Government Order Applicable Only to Employees Retiring After Its Issuance:
The government issued an order on August 29, 1984, allowing the counting of service rendered under the Central Government towards pension in an autonomous body. However, Paragraph 7 of the order stated that it would be applicable only to employees who retired after the date of the order. The petitioner challenged this condition, arguing that it created an unjust classification of pensioners based on their retirement date, which was not warranted under Article 14 of the Constitution.
3. Classification of Pensioners Based on the Date of Retirement Under Article 14 of the Constitution:
The petitioner contended that the classification of pensioners into two classes-those who retired before and after the government order-was unconstitutional as it lacked a nexus to the objective of the order. The respondents argued that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit as he retired before the order's issuance and joined ICAR as a fresh entrant. The court found that the classification was unjustified and discriminatory. The court held that the government order should apply to all pensioners who rendered service under the Central Government or an autonomous body, irrespective of their retirement date, as long as they were alive on August 29, 1984.
Conclusion:
The court directed the respondents to revise the petitioner's pension by including his service under the Central Government for computing qualifying service. The petitioner was entitled to the difference in pension from August 29, 1984, the date of the government order, but not for the period before. The writ petition was allowed, and no costs were imposed.
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1987 (8) TMI 445
Issues:
Appeal against eviction order based on arrears of rent, dispute over rental amount, validity of rent note, arrears calculation, lease term interpretation, requirement of registration for lease from year to year.
Analysis:
The tenant appealed against an eviction order citing arrears of rent, claiming the rent was lower than alleged by the landlord. The rent note discrepancy led to a dispute, with the landlord asserting a higher rent amount. Evidence showed initial payment of higher rent, later partially returned. The landlord claimed the return indicated a shorter lease term. The landlord sought arrears for specific periods, which the tenant partially tendered, arguing against eviction under Section 13 of the Rent Act.
The courts found the rent note valid, rejecting the tenant's claim of lower rent. They held the tenant in arrears for multiple periods, justifying the eviction order. Even if the lease ended after a year, the tenant was considered holding over, liable for monthly rent. The tenant's failure to tender full arrears supported the eviction decree.
The tenant argued the rent note's yearly terms required registration for enforcement. Citing legal precedents, the tenant contended the unregistered document couldn't serve as evidence for a year-to-year lease. However, the High Court deemed the lease ended after a year, making the tenant liable for monthly rent payments. The tenant's failure to pay two months' rent supported the eviction ruling.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions, finding the tenant in arrears and failing to tender the full amount owed. The appeal was dismissed, with costs awarded to the landlord. The judgment emphasized the tenant's obligation to pay rent monthly, irrespective of the lease term, and validated the eviction based on arrears and non-payment.
This comprehensive analysis highlights the key legal issues, evidentiary disputes, lease term interpretation, and the court's rationale for upholding the eviction order based on arrears of rent and non-compliance with payment obligations.
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1987 (8) TMI 444
The High Court of Allahabad allowed the revision against the Tribunal's order for the assessment year 1977-78. The Tribunal rejected the books of account of the brick kiln business due to non-production during a survey, but the Court found no defect in the maintained books and set aside the Tribunal's order. The Court directed the Tribunal to accept the book version under Section 11(8). (Case Citation: 1987 (8) TMI 444 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT)
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1987 (8) TMI 443
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the landlord's bona fide requirement for eviction u/s 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is established.
2. Whether the landlord ceases to be the owner of the property due to the cancellation of the lease by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA).
Summary:
Issue 1: Bona Fide Requirement for Eviction u/s 14(1)(e)
The respondent-landlord filed an application for eviction before the Rent Controller, Delhi, on various grounds. The Rent Controller granted an order for eviction u/s 14(1)(e) on the ground that the premises were bona fide required by the respondent-landlord for their own residence. Both the trial court and the appellate court concluded that the respondent-landlord had established his bona fide requirement, and the order of eviction was maintained.
Issue 2: Ownership Status Due to Lease Cancellation by DDA
The appellant-tenant contended that the DDA had canceled the lease in favor of the respondent-landlord, thereby ceasing the respondent's ownership of the property, making them ineligible for eviction u/s 14(1)(e). The landlord-respondent argued that the DDA had stayed further action on the lease cancellation upon their representation, and thus, the lease had not been terminated, nor had the respondent ceased to be the owner.
The High Court considered the affidavit and circumstances, concluding that the landlord, whose lease was terminated but possession not taken, continued to be a tenant holding over and thus did not cease to be the owner. The High Court maintained the decree for eviction.
Before the Supreme Court, the appellant's counsel argued that the landlord must establish ownership to get a decree for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement. The counsel conceded that the term 'owner' is not defined in the Act and that modern context does not preclude a landlord from being considered an owner merely because the property is on leased land.
The Supreme Court noted that the issue of lease cancellation was not raised in the trial court, and the parties had no opportunity to lead evidence. The documents indicated that the DDA had issued a notice for lease cancellation, but further proceedings were stayed, and the restoration of the lease was under consideration. The landlord's possession had not been taken by the DDA, and the structure on the land was owned by the respondent-landlord.
The Court held that the term 'owner' in the context of Sec. 14(1)(e) should be understood vis-a-vis the tenant, meaning the owner should be something more than the tenant. The Court referenced the Delhi High Court's interpretation in T.C. Rekhi v. Smt. Usha Gujral, which supported a broader understanding of 'owner' to include those holding long leases.
The Supreme Court concluded that the respondent-landlord continued to be the owner of the premises despite the lease issues and maintained the decree for eviction. The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.
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1987 (8) TMI 442
Issues involved: Appeal against eviction under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.
Analysis of Judgment:
1. Interpretation of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act:
The Supreme Court upheld the eviction order under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, ruling that the portion leased out for non-residential purposes was not a separate and distinct unit, entitling the landlord to seek eviction. Reference was made to the decision in Shri Balaganesan Metals v. M.N. Shanmugham Chetty, where the section was analyzed and explained. The Court rejected the argument that the residential and non-residential parts should be treated as separate units, emphasizing that in this case, they did not warrant such treatment as the portion was only a small part of the residential building.
2. Interpretation of the phrase "as the case may be":
The Court dismissed the contention that the expression "as the case may be" in the section was not properly appreciated. It was clarified that this phrase refers to the situation where there are separate and distinct units, and the concept of need will apply accordingly. The Court cited relevant legal authorities to explain the meaning of this expression and concluded that it had been properly construed in the judgment.
3. Consideration of comparative hardship:
The appellant's argument regarding comparative hardship was rejected by the Court. It was noted that the appellant, an affluent businessman, could easily find alternative accommodation, while the respondents had no other residential house and would face immense hardship if not allowed to occupy the additional portion in their house. The Court emphasized that there was no question of balance of convenience and ultimately dismissed the appeal, stating that there would be no order as to costs.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the eviction order under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, emphasizing that the portion leased out for non-residential purposes was not a separate unit. The Court also clarified the interpretation of the phrase "as the case may be" and rejected the argument regarding comparative hardship, ultimately dismissing the appeal.
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1987 (8) TMI 441
Issues Involved:
1. Effect of the quota rule on inter se seniority.
2. Continuation or alteration of the quota rule during the relevant period.
3. Impact of the Supreme Court's judgment in Badami's case.
4. Effect of the observations in Iyer's case.
5. Necessity of any other directions.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Effect of the Quota Rule on Inter Se Seniority:
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the quota rule is legally binding and must be strictly observed. The Court referenced its previous judgment in S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, emphasizing that the quota rule is linked with the seniority rule and cannot be altered based on administrative exigencies. The Court reiterated that promotions or appointments exceeding the prescribed quota are irregular and necessitate pushing down of officers to maintain the quota balance. This principle was upheld in Badami's case, which established that the quota rule must be enforced strictly, and seniority must be determined based on the quota system.
2. Continuation or Alteration of the Quota Rule:
The Court examined the relevant rules from 1957, 1959, and 1966, concluding that the quota system continued throughout the relevant period. Despite arguments to the contrary, the Court found no evidence that the quota rule was abandoned. The 1977 amendment to the Karnataka Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules confirmed the continuation of the quota system, with adjustments in the ratio over time. The Court rejected the contention that the quota system had been given up and affirmed the High Court's finding that the quota system remained in force.
3. Impact of the Supreme Court's Judgment in Badami's Case:
The Court upheld the binding nature of Badami's case, which dealt with similar rules and situations. The High Court's doubt regarding the exclusion of temporary posts from the cadre was dismissed. The Supreme Court reiterated that temporary posts created due to service exigencies are outside the cadre and should not be considered for working out the quota. The conclusion in Badami's case that the quota covered permanent posts was reaffirmed as correct and binding.
4. Effect of the Observations in Iyer's Case:
The High Court's reliance on Iyer's case to limit the carry-forward period to three years was found to be misplaced. The Supreme Court clarified that the three-year carry-forward rule in Iyer's case was specific to the rules under consideration in that case and did not have general applicability. The Mysore State Civil Service (General Recruitment) Rules, 1957, and their 1977 amendment allowed for temporary promotions in excess of the quota, indicating that the transgression of the quota rule was intended to be temporary. The Court emphasized that the quota rule in Badami's case should be applied without the three-year limitation.
5. Necessity of Any Other Directions:
The Court highlighted the adverse impact of frequent service litigations on the efficiency and discipline of public service. It urged the State of Karnataka to comply with the quota rule to avoid future litigations. The Court expressed hope that the State would not demote officers who had been in promotional posts for several years but would adjust the Gradation List to reflect the principles indicated in the judgment. The appeals and writ petitions of the direct recruits were allowed, while those of the promotees were dismissed. No costs were awarded to any party.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court's judgment emphasized the strict enforcement of the quota rule for determining inter se seniority, affirmed the continuation of the quota system, upheld the binding nature of Badami's case, clarified the limited applicability of Iyer's case, and called for adherence to the quota rule to prevent future litigations. The appeals and writ petitions of the direct recruits were allowed, and those of the promotees were dismissed without costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 440
Issues involved:
The entitlement of interest on the amount awarded by Arbitrator for the requisition of premises u/s Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act 1952.
Judgment Summary:
The Supreme Court, in a judgment delivered by Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji, addressed the issue of interest entitlement on the amount awarded by an Arbitrator for premises requisitioned u/s Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act 1952. The Court reiterated the principle that upon the expropriation of land under statutory power, the owner is entitled to interest from the date possession was taken, unless the statute clearly shows a contrary intention. The Court held that the claim for interest proceeds on the assumption that the owner, upon losing possession of immovable property, is entitled to claim interest in place of the right to retain possession. The Court affirmed that the general rule of payment of interest should not be excluded by the Act, and the appellants were entitled to interest on the amount awarded for the period specified. The interest rates were determined based on the respective periods, and the appellants were also awarded costs of the appeal.
In conclusion, the Court directed the respondents to pay the awarded amount within three months and granted liberty to apply to the High Court of Calcutta in case of difficulty in calculating the amount. The appellants were further granted costs of the appeal, and the appeal was disposed of accordingly.
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1987 (8) TMI 439
The High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that "vermicelli" sold under the trade name "Bambino vermicelli" is not considered "food" and cannot be taxed under entry 129A but should be taxed as "maida" under entry 60. The writ petition was allowed, and assessments were directed to be modified accordingly.
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