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1989 (8) TMI 378
Issues Involved:
1. Obligation of medical practitioners to provide immediate medical aid.
2. Legal impediments and procedural formalities affecting medical aid.
3. Professional ethics and responsibilities of medical practitioners.
4. Publicity and awareness of the legal and ethical obligations of doctors.
Summary:
Obligation of Medical Practitioners to Provide Immediate Medical Aid:
The petitioner, a human rights activist, filed an application u/s Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking a directive that every injured citizen should receive immediate medical aid to preserve life, and that procedural criminal law should follow thereafter to avoid negligent death. The case highlighted an incident where a scooterist, after being knocked down, was denied immediate medical attention due to procedural formalities, leading to his death.
Legal Impediments and Procedural Formalities Affecting Medical Aid:
The Secretary, Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Medical Council of India, and Indian Medical Association were impleaded as respondents. The Medical Council of India emphasized that medical practitioners must attend to the sick and injured immediately, and procedural formalities should not hinder this duty. The affidavit from the Union of India confirmed that no provisions in the Indian Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code, or Motor Vehicles Act prevent doctors from promptly attending to seriously injured persons before police formalities.
Professional Ethics and Responsibilities of Medical Practitioners:
The Medical Council of India referred to clauses 10 and 13 of the Code of Medical Ethics, which mandate that physicians must respond to emergencies and not neglect patients. The Committee under the Director-General of Health Services decided that medical officers should start treatment immediately and inform the police concurrently, without waiting for police formalities. The Supreme Court reiterated that preservation of human life is paramount, and no law or state action can delay this obligation.
Publicity and Awareness of the Legal and Ethical Obligations of Doctors:
The Court directed that this decision be published in all journals reporting Supreme Court decisions and given wide publicity through national media, Doordarshan, and All India Radio. Copies of the judgment were to be forwarded to every High Court, medical college, and State Government to ensure that every practicing doctor is aware of their obligations.
Additional Observations:
The judgment highlighted the unfortunate state of affairs where high-level decisions do not reach the common man. It emphasized that the duty to save life is inherent in human instinct and professional ethics. The Court assured medical professionals that they should not fear legal harassment for providing immediate medical aid and urged the legal and police authorities to minimize unnecessary harassment of medical professionals.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court ordered that every doctor within India must be aware of their obligation to provide immediate medical aid, irrespective of procedural formalities. The judgment is to be followed unless altered, and State Governments and Union Territories have the liberty to file representations within three months if they seek any modifications. The Court appreciated the petitioner's efforts and the cooperation of the Union of India, Medical Council of India, and Indian Medical Association. No order for costs was made.
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1989 (8) TMI 377
Issues: Jurisdictional challenge in a criminal complaint under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code filed at New Delhi against the petitioner for disputes arising from a civil nature contract.
Analysis:
1. The petitioner, a supplier of carpets, entered into agreements with respondent No. 2 at Bhadohi, specifying the supply of carpets to the branch office at Bhadohi. Disputes arose, leading to a subsequent agreement dated 4-2-1988 at Bhadohi. The petitioner challenges the complaint filed at New Delhi, alleging lack of territorial jurisdiction.
2. The agreements between the parties clearly indicate Bhadohi as the place of agreement and delivery of carpets. The complaint filed in New Delhi by respondent No. 2, despite no dealings between Bhadohi and New Delhi offices, lacks jurisdictional basis. The court cites a similar case precedent to support the jurisdictional analysis.
3. Witness testimonies and documentary evidence further establish the agreements and transactions occurred at Bhadohi. The court emphasizes that filing a complaint in a jurisdiction lacking territorial connection amounts to an abuse of court process. Therefore, the court quashes the proceedings against the petitioner for lack of jurisdiction.
4. The court highlights the importance of territorial jurisdiction in criminal complaints, emphasizing that parties should not be compelled to submit to a court's jurisdiction in a distant location. The judgment concludes by quashing the criminal complaint and summoning of the petitioner, as the proceedings lacked jurisdiction.
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1989 (8) TMI 376
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the arbitral award made before publishing the arbitration agreement under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. Procedural irregularities in the arbitration process.
3. Consequences of non-publication of the arbitration agreement within the stipulated time.
4. Jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal and the effect of simultaneous references under Sections 10 and 10-A of the Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Arbitral Award:
The appeal concerns the validity of an arbitral award made before the publication of the arbitration agreement under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The principal question is whether non-publication of the arbitration agreement as required under Sub-section (3) of Section 10-A renders the arbitral award invalid and unenforceable. The Supreme Court examined the statutory provisions, particularly Section 10-A, which mandates the publication of the arbitration agreement in the Official Gazette within one month from the date of receipt by the appropriate government. The Court concluded that the publication of the arbitration agreement is obligatory and non-compliance with this requirement would be fatal to the arbitral award.
2. Procedural Irregularities:
The management challenged the arbitral award on the grounds of procedural irregularities, including the absence of the Deputy Commissioner during the arbitration proceedings and the lack of opportunity to produce evidence. However, the High Court did not examine all the contentions urged by the management and quashed the award solely on the basis of non-publication of the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court did not delve into these procedural irregularities in detail but focused on the primary issue of publication.
3. Consequences of Non-Publication:
The Court analyzed whether the requirement of publication within the time prescribed under Sub-section (3) of Section 10-A is mandatory or directory. It referred to various authorities and judicial precedents to conclude that while publication of the arbitration agreement is necessary, the time limit of one month is directory and not imperative. However, the Court emphasized that the agreement must be published before the arbitrator considers the merits of the dispute, and failure to do so would invalidate the arbitral award.
4. Jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal:
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of simultaneous references under Sections 10 and 10-A of the Act. It noted that once the parties have chosen to refer their dispute to arbitration under Section 10-A, the government cannot subsequently refer the same dispute for adjudication under Section 10. The reference made by the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) was quashed. The Court directed the State Government to publish the arbitration agreement and referred the matter to the Industrial Tribunal for passing an arbitration award in accordance with the law.
Relief and Directions:
The Supreme Court issued the following directions:
1. The State Government shall publish the arbitration agreement in the Government Gazette within four weeks.
2. The agreement stands referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Haryana at Ambala for passing an arbitration award.
3. The reference made under Section 10(1) of the Act to the Industrial Tribunal is quashed.
4. The management shall withdraw the Letters Patent Appeal and the Writ Petition pending in the High Court within three weeks, failing which the High Court shall dispose of them as infructuous.
The Tribunal was directed to dispose of the matter expeditiously, within six months from the date of first appearance of the parties. The appeal was disposed of with no order as to costs.
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1989 (8) TMI 375
Issues: Determination of unaccounted stocks as income from undisclosed sources under the IT Act for the assessment year 1971-72 based on a discrepancy in stock figures between the assessee's books and those pledged with the bank.
Analysis:
1. The Tribunal referred the question of law regarding the conclusion that a sum of Rs. 3,34,390 represented unaccounted stocks of the assessee. The discrepancy arose when the ITO found excess stock pledged with the bank compared to the books of accounts. The assessee failed to reconcile this difference, leading to the treatment of the excess stock value as income from undisclosed sources.
2. The AAC considered the argument that the stocks would have been insured if present in the godowns, but this was not accepted as sufficient evidence. An affidavit highlighted the practice of furnishing false statements to the bank, but the bank's confirmation of the correctness of stock statements prevailed. The Tribunal, after examining all facts, upheld the lower authorities' decision, emphasizing the assessee's failure to provide concrete evidence to counter the presumption under section 69 of the IT Act.
3. The Tribunal found the assessee's explanations lacking in credibility, noting the discrepancy in stock figures provided to the IT Department and the bank. The failure to explain this difference led to the conclusion that the undisclosed income was correctly assessed by the authorities. The Tribunal's decision was based on a thorough review of all evidence presented.
4. Citing the Supreme Court's stance on assessing evidence based on human probabilities, the judgment emphasized the Tribunal's role as the final fact-finding authority. The weight of evidence, including the bank's statement and the lack of contradictory affidavit, was deemed appropriate for the Tribunal to evaluate in determining the credibility of the assessee's claims.
5. The High Court concurred with the Tribunal's decision, stating that no legal question arose. The Tribunal's comprehensive consideration of all evidence and its factual findings were deemed conclusive. The judgment favored the Revenue, affirming the treatment of the excess stock value as income from undisclosed sources under the IT Act for the assessment year in question.
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1989 (8) TMI 374
Issues Involved:
1. Allegations of corrupt practices under Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
2. Non-compliance with Section 81(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
3. Interpretation and application of Sections 81, 83, and 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
4. Requirement of furnishing documents forming an integral part of the election petition.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Allegations of Corrupt Practices:
The appellant, a voter in the Mala constituency, challenged the election of the first respondent (the sitting Chief Minister) to the Kerala Legislative Assembly on grounds of corrupt practices. The allegations included:
- The second respondent withdrawing from the election and supporting the first respondent, claiming the first respondent's government would consider including the Kudumbi Samudayam community in the Scheduled Castes list.
- Government servants being asked to lead processions in support of the first respondent.
- The use of a video cassette titled "Malayude Purogathi" in the constituency, which featured speeches by government officers, allegedly at the instigation of the first respondent.
2. Non-Compliance with Section 81(3):
The first respondent contended that the election petition should be dismissed under Section 86(1) due to non-compliance with Section 81(3), as copies of the notice, photograph, and video cassette were not provided along with the election petition. The High Court upheld this contention, leading to the dismissal of the election petition.
3. Interpretation and Application of Sections 81, 83, and 86:
- Section 81(3): Mandates that every election petition must be accompanied by as many copies as there are respondents, and each copy must be attested to be a true copy.
- Section 83: Requires the election petition to contain a concise statement of material facts and full particulars of any corrupt practice, and to be signed and verified.
- Section 86(1): Compels the court to dismiss an election petition for non-compliance with Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117.
The Supreme Court emphasized that both Section 81(3) and Section 86(1) are mandatory. Non-compliance with Section 81(3) necessitates dismissal of the petition.
4. Requirement of Furnishing Documents:
The Supreme Court analyzed whether the video cassette formed an integral part of the election petition:
- Integral Part: When a document is referenced in the petition and its contents are not pleaded, it becomes part of the petition by reference. Thus, a true copy of the petition must include such documents.
- Non-Integral Part: If the document's contents are fully pleaded in the petition, it does not form an integral part, and a copy need not be served.
In this case, the video cassette was deemed an integral part of the petition as it was referenced in paragraph 5(xi) without detailing its contents. The appellant's failure to provide a copy of the video cassette along with the petition meant the first respondent could not fully understand or respond to the allegations.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, dismissing the election petition due to non-compliance with Section 81(3), as the video cassette, forming an integral part of the petition, was not served on the first respondent. The appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1989 (8) TMI 373
Issues:
Amendment of plaint seeking additional relief of damages under Order 6 Rule 17, Section 151 of CPC, and Section 40 of Specific Relief Act.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Amendment of Plaint
The plaintiff sought an amendment of the plaint to claim additional relief of damages under Order 6 Rule 17, Section 151 of the CPC, and Section 40 of the Specific Relief Act. The plaintiff's services were terminated by the defendants, and he challenged the termination on various grounds, including lack of proper authority, violation of natural justice, and breach of implied contract terms. The plaintiff also sought a declaration of continued employment and reinstatement, along with damages. The Specific Relief Act allows for damages in addition to or in substitution for injunction, and the court may award such damages upon proper claim in the plaint. The court emphasized the importance of preventing multiplicity of suits and compelled the plaintiff to seek all possible reliefs in one suit to avoid forfeiting the right to sue for damages later.
Issue 2: Opposition to Amendment
The defendants vehemently opposed the amendment, arguing that it would fundamentally alter the nature of the suit and cause delay. However, the court found no merit in these arguments, stating that seeking an alternative relief for damages would not drastically change the suit's character or cause surprise to the defendants. Additionally, the court noted that the suit was at a preliminary stage, and allowing the amendment would not prejudice the defendants as all reliefs sought arose from the termination of services.
Issue 3: Criteria for Amendment
Under Order 6 Rule 17, all amendments should be allowed if they do not work injustice to the other party and are necessary for determining the real questions in controversy. In this case, the court found that the proposed amendments were necessary to determine the real issues between the parties and would not cause injustice. Therefore, the court allowed the plaintiff's amendment request, subject to the payment of costs to the defendant.
In conclusion, the court granted the plaintiff's application for amendment of the plaint to include a claim for damages, emphasizing the importance of seeking all possible reliefs in one suit to avoid future litigation. The court found the amendment necessary for determining the real issues in controversy and did not see any valid reasons to deny the request.
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1989 (8) TMI 372
Issues:
1. Quashing of criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. Interpretation of the offense under Section 287 Indian Penal Code.
3. Requirement of permission for investigation under Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for non-cognizable offenses.
4. Abuse of process of the court in continuation of criminal proceedings without proper permission.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking the quashing of criminal proceedings against the petitioner related to an incident at the petitioner's factory. The petitioner was accused of not putting a safety guard on a power press, which resulted in grievous hurt to an employee. The initial charge was under Section 338 of the Indian Penal Code, but the Magistrate opined that the offense actually fell under Section 287 IPC, a non-cognizable offense. The defense argued that since the offense was non-cognizable, police investigation without permission under Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was improper, citing relevant case laws.
The judge considered the arguments presented and reviewed the circumstances. Referring to precedents, it was highlighted that for non-cognizable offenses, police require permission from a Magistrate for investigation. Even though the case was initially registered under a cognizable offense, the actual offense falling under a non-cognizable category necessitated proper authorization for investigation. The judge noted the absence of a revision by the State against the Magistrate's ruling that the offense was under Section 287 IPC, indicating a procedural lapse in investigating a non-cognizable offense without the requisite permission.
Consequently, the judge concluded that the continuation of criminal proceedings without the mandated permission for a non-cognizable offense would constitute an abuse of the court's process. Therefore, the judge exercised the powers under Section 482 and quashed the proceedings against the petitioner related to the FIR, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the procedural requirements for investigating non-cognizable offenses to prevent misuse of the legal process.
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1989 (8) TMI 371
... ...
... ... ..... l dismissed.
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1989 (8) TMI 370
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the dispossession of the plaintiff by defendant No. 3.
2. Right to renewal of the agreement by the plaintiff.
3. Nature of the agreement: whether it was a license or sub-lease.
4. Conduct of defendant No. 3 and its impact on the appeal.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the dispossession of the plaintiff by defendant No. 3:
The trial court found that defendant No. 3 had unlawfully obtained possession of the restaurant and the premises by colluding with defendants Nos. 1 and 2, and had surreptitiously entered into possession behind the plaintiff's back. The trial court held that the plaintiff was unlawfully deprived of possession and that defendant No. 3 could only regain possession by recourse to law. The High Court agreed with the trial court's assessment, noting serious inconsistencies in the evidence provided by defendant No. 3 and his witnesses, and concluded that defendant No. 3's actions amounted to trespass. The Supreme Court upheld these findings, emphasizing that settled possession cannot be disturbed except by legal means, citing precedents such as Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh and Ors. and Midnapur Zamindary Company Limited v. Naresh Narayan Roy.
2. Right to renewal of the agreement by the plaintiff:
The trial court rejected the contention that the possession should not be restored to the plaintiff because the agreement period had expired. It held that the right of renewal remained in favor of the plaintiff. The High Court also rejected this contention, stating that allowing defendant No. 3 to remain in possession would be a travesty of justice. The Supreme Court did not find it necessary to delve into whether the plaintiff was entitled to renewal, as the primary issue was the unlawful dispossession.
3. Nature of the agreement: whether it was a license or sub-lease:
The High Court observed that although the agreements were termed as "license," they were actually sub-leases, which meant the plaintiff's possession was lawful even after the period of the license. The Supreme Court chose not to consider this question in detail, as the suit was filed shortly after the plaintiff was unlawfully deprived of possession, making the distinction between license and sub-lease less relevant to the case.
4. Conduct of defendant No. 3 and its impact on the appeal:
The Supreme Court noted the unlawful conduct of defendant No. 3, including taking possession behind the plaintiff's back and attempting to retain possession by any means, right or wrong. The Court highlighted that defendant No. 3 had even filed a bogus suit to delay compliance with the decree. The Court found that such conduct did not merit any interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs throughout.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upheld the judgments of the lower courts, and ordered the Court Receiver of the Bombay High Court to take possession of the business and premises and put the plaintiff in possession as his agent. This order was to remain in force for eight weeks, subject to any orders by the executing court.
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1989 (8) TMI 369
Issues:
- Suit for perpetual injunction and possession over disputed land
- Claim of continuous possession by the defendant
- Maintainability of the suit without a declaration of title
- Interpretation of evidence and revenue records for establishing title
- Errors in judgment by the High Court
Analysis:
The case involved an appeal by the defendant in a suit for perpetual injunction over a disputed land in Bangalore City. The plaintiff-respondents claimed ownership based on the land being transferred to Guttahalli Hanumaiah in 1929 and subsequent possession by his widow and plaintiff No. 1. The trial court decreed the suit, but the first appellate court reversed the decision, citing continuous possession by the defendant since 1927 and the suit's lack of maintainability. The High Court allowed the second appeal, restoring the trial court's decree.
Regarding the suit's scope, the plaintiffs explicitly pleaded their title in the plaint, stating that the land was transferred to Guttahalli Hanumaiah in 1929. The court emphasized that the entire plaint must be considered, not just the relief portion, to determine the nature of the suit. The High Court's confusion on whether the issue of title was involved led to inconsistent observations and errors in law. The court found errors in the interpretation of evidence and revenue records by the High Court, emphasizing that revenue records do not establish title.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court's approach was unsatisfactory, leading to serious errors in judgment. The case was remitted to the High Court for a fresh decision, emphasizing the need for a proper assessment of court fees. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's decision. The costs were to abide by the final result in the litigation, and the second appeal was to be reheard by the High Court.
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1989 (8) TMI 368
Issues Involved:
1. Admissibility of additional grounds of appeal.
2. Eligibility for concessional rate of duty under Notification No. 40/78.
3. Applicability of the date of duty payment for determining the rate of duty.
4. Eligibility for special discount in valuation.
5. Levy of Countervailing Duty (C.V. Duty).
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Admissibility of Additional Grounds of Appeal:
The appellants raised additional grounds of appeal, arguing that the duty was paid on 3-10-1980, and thus the amended Notification No. 111/80-Cus., dated 19-6-1980, should apply. The Tribunal admitted additional ground No. 16, citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sarjoo PrasadRam Kumar, which allows raising jurisdictional objections at any stage. However, additional ground No. 17, regarding the levy of C.V. Duty, was rejected as it was not raised before any authority and no separate refund claim was filed under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. Eligibility for Concessional Rate of Duty under Notification No. 40/78:
The appellants claimed the benefit of Notification No. 40/78, which provides a concessional rate of 25% ad valorem for "Tool Room Precision Optical Co-ordinate Jig Boring Machine including Numerical (Control)." The adjudication authority found that the imported machine lacked a built-in optical coordinate system and had a digital readout added at an additional price. The Tribunal agreed, stating that the notification clearly covers only jig boring machines with a built-in optical coordinate system and inclusive of numerical control. Therefore, the benefit of the notification could not be extended to the goods in dispute.
3. Applicability of the Date of Duty Payment for Determining the Rate of Duty:
The appellants argued that the rate of duty should be determined based on the date of duty payment (3-10-1980) rather than the date of the Bill of Entry (19-1-1979). The Tribunal rejected this argument, citing the Bombay High Court's judgment in Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, which held that the relevant date for duty is the date when the Bill of Entry is presented. The Tribunal also referenced the Tribunal's decision in The Tuticorin Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Cochin, which supports this view.
4. Eligibility for Special Discount in Valuation:
The appellants sought a special discount of 10% on the assessable value, claiming it was given due to the exhibition purposes. The Tribunal rejected this claim, stating that the goods were invoiced at full value at the time of the original import, and a special discount cannot be deducted from the assessable value under Section 14(1)(a) of the Customs Act, 1962. The Tribunal cited judgments in Automotive Enterprises v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, and Union of India v. Glaxo Laboratories (India) Ltd., which support this position.
5. Levy of Countervailing Duty (C.V. Duty):
The appellants argued that no C.V. Duty was leviable if the date of the Bill of Entry (19-1-1979) is considered, as per Notification No. 364/76. However, the Tribunal did not entertain this argument, as the additional ground of appeal regarding C.V. Duty was rejected earlier. The Tribunal emphasized that new pleas at the appellate stage are not permissible if they were not raised in the initial proceedings, as supported by the judgment in Unique Beautycare Product Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal confirmed the findings of the lower authorities and dismissed the appeal, upholding the view that the goods did not qualify for the concessional rate under Notification No. 40/78, the relevant date for duty determination is the date of the Bill of Entry, and the special discount cannot be deducted from the assessable value. The additional ground regarding C.V. Duty was not considered.
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1989 (8) TMI 367
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 13 of the Andhra Pradesh Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938 (A.R. Act) to nationalized banks.
2. Constitutional validity of Section 4(e) of the A.R. Act.
3. Applicability of Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1946, to agricultural loans.
4. Applicability of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, to debts owed to banks.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of Section 13 of the Andhra Pradesh Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938 (A.R. Act) to Nationalized Banks:
The plaintiff, a nationalized bank, filed a suit for the recovery of dues on an agricultural loan. The trial and appellate courts dismissed the suit, upholding the respondent's defense that Section 13 of the A.R. Act prohibited the charging of compound interest. The bank argued that Section 4(e) of the A.R. Act excluded its application to banks constituted under a statute. However, both courts rejected this argument, relying on an earlier decision in Indian Bank, Alamuru v. Muddana Krishna Murthy, which held that banks constituted under the Banking Companies Act were not exempt from the A.R. Act.
2. Constitutional Validity of Section 4(e) of the A.R. Act:
In the second appeal, the High Court examined the constitutional validity of Section 4(e) of the A.R. Act, despite it not being raised by the respondent. The High Court found that the provision violated Article 14 of the Constitution, as it created an impermissible classification of debtors based on the identity of the creditor, which had no rational nexus with the object of the A.R. Act. The High Court held that Section 4(e) brought about an impermissible classification of debtors and was therefore unconstitutional.
3. Applicability of Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1946, to Agricultural Loans:
The High Court also held that Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act, introduced by the Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 1984, did not override the provisions of the A.R. Act. The High Court concluded that the appellant-bank, like any other creditor, was forbidden under Section 13 of the A.R. Act from charging compound interest on agricultural loans. The court further noted that Section 21-A was prospective in operation and did not affect debts incurred prior to its enactment.
4. Applicability of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, to Debts Owed to Banks:
The High Court did not directly examine the applicability of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, to debts owed to banks, as it primarily relied on the A.R. Act. However, the court noted that other decisions had held that the Usurious Loans Act was no longer applicable to any debt due to a banking company following the introduction of Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act. The High Court's observations suggested that the Usurious Loans Act could still apply to loans advanced by banks, but this was not fully explored in the judgment.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's finding on the unconstitutionality of Section 4(e) of the A.R. Act, holding that it was not appropriate for the High Court to have taken up this question in the absence of any plea raised by the respondent. The Supreme Court remitted the second appeal to the High Court for consideration of the applicability of Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act to the Usurious Loans Act and whether the appellant-bank could rebut the presumption of excessive interest. The second appeal was directed to be placed before a Division Bench of the High Court for further hearing. The appeal was disposed of without an order as to costs.
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1989 (8) TMI 366
Issues:
1. Challenge against reversion and repatriation.
2. Validity of order of compulsory retirement.
3. Competency of Excise Commissioner to make the retirement order.
4. Interpretation of Rule 3.14 of Punjab Civil Services Rules.
5. Acquisition of lien in the Excise Department.
6. Existence of lien in the parent department.
7. Applicability of service jurisprudence principles.
8. Authority to pass the order of compulsory retirement.
9. Finalization of pensionary benefits.
Analysis:
1. The appellant challenged the reversion and repatriation in a civil court, seeking a declaration that the reversion was illegal. The court ruled in favor of the appellant, stating that he was holding a substantive post as an Excise Sub-Inspector, and the reversion without proper enquiry amounted to a penalty.
2. The appellant was compulsorily retired from service by the Excise Commissioner under Punjab Civil Services Rules. The appellant contested the validity of the retirement order, arguing that the Commissioner lacked competency as he belonged to the Police Department. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the appellant had a fresh appointment in the Excise Department, not a deputation from the Police Department.
3. The appellant's counsel relied on Rule 3.14 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules and a previous court decision. The argument was based on the appellant not acquiring a lien in the Excise Department due to lack of confirmation, and the contention that the lien in the parent department should have been suspended for future benefit.
4. The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's contention regarding Rule 3.14, stating that the rule was not applicable as the appellant had a legal right to the ex-cadre post and was opposing repatriation. The Court emphasized that the appellant's denial of repatriation forfeited the benefit of the rule.
5. The Court also dismissed the argument that the appellant needed confirmation in the Excise Department to acquire a lien. It was clarified that lien signifies the right to hold a post substantively, and acquiring a lien in a new post automatically extinguishes the previous lien, following the principle of service jurisprudence.
6. The Civil Court's ruling that the appellant had the right to continue as an Excise Sub-Inspector invalidated any claim of retaining a lien in the parent department. Consequently, the Excise Commissioner was deemed the competent authority to issue the order of compulsory retirement.
7. The appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded. The Court directed the respondent to determine and pay the pensionary benefits to the appellant's legal heirs within three months, considering the pending proceedings and the appellant's service history.
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1989 (8) TMI 365
Issues:
1. Dispute over possession of land between two sisters' successors.
2. Claim of exclusive ownership by one sister's successors.
3. Burden of proof on plaintiffs in possession dispute.
4. Legal principles regarding joint ownership of undivided property.
5. Requirement of identifying suit property for possession claim.
6. Impact of sale deed on co-owners' interests.
7. Relief sought by plaintiffs in possession dispute.
Analysis:
1. The case involves a dispute over the possession of land between the successors of two sisters, Mrs. Dayabai Lakshmanan and Mrs. Grace Pritabai Morris. The properties were jointly owned, and no partition had occurred between the sisters, leading to the current legal battle over ownership rights.
2. The judgment delves into the claim of exclusive ownership made by the successors of Mrs. Grace Pritabai Morris based on a partition agreement and subsequent sales of land portions. The court examines the legal implications of these transactions and the rights conferred upon the successors in the absence of a formal partition.
3. The burden of proof in possession disputes is highlighted, emphasizing that the plaintiffs must establish their case with reliable and admissible evidence. Legal precedents are cited to underscore the importance of proving title and the limitations of relying on weaknesses in the defendant's case.
4. The judgment discusses the legal principles governing joint ownership of undivided property, emphasizing that a purchaser from a co-owner does not automatically gain exclusive possession rights. The Transfer of Property Act is referenced to explain the rights of transferees in such scenarios, emphasizing joint ownership rather than exclusive possession.
5. The requirement of accurately identifying the suit property for a possession claim is crucial. The court scrutinizes various maps and documents presented by the plaintiffs to ascertain the exact boundaries and descriptions of the land in question. Failure to provide clear evidence and discrepancies in the presented maps weaken the plaintiffs' case.
6. The impact of a sale deed on the interests of co-owners is explored, with the judgment indicating that the sale does not necessarily affect the rights of other co-owners. The court's analysis focuses on the implications of the sale on the interests of the co-owners and the limitations of the purchasers' claims.
7. Finally, the relief sought by the plaintiffs in the possession dispute is addressed. While the court dismisses the suit against the appellants, it grants a decree in favor of the plaintiffs for a refund of the consideration paid, along with interest. The judgment aims to bring the litigation to a conclusion by providing a monetary remedy to the plaintiffs in lieu of possession rights.
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1989 (8) TMI 364
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Circular dated 23-8-1982.
2. Interpretation of Clause 3 of the Nationalised Banks (Management and Miscellaneous Provisions) Scheme, 1980.
3. Compliance of the Circular with Section 9 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970.
4. Representative nature of the Board of Directors.
5. Discretion of the Central Government in appointing Directors.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Circular dated 23-8-1982:
The petitioners, representing a Central Trade Union and its office-bearers, challenged the Circular dated 23-8-1982 issued by the Ministry of Finance. They argued that the Circular was contrary to the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 and the Nationalised Banks (Management and Miscellaneous Provisions) Scheme, 1980. The Circular stated that the Central Government was no longer bound to appoint Directors from a panel of names submitted by the respective Association representing the majority of non-workmen-employees. The Court declared the Circular ultra vires the Act and the Scheme, rendering it null and void.
2. Interpretation of Clause 3 of the Nationalised Banks (Management and Miscellaneous Provisions) Scheme, 1980:
Clause 3 of the Scheme was scrutinized to determine whether it allowed the Central Government to appoint any officer as a Director without considering the panel submitted by the Association. The Court noted that the Scheme was intended to provide a truly representative Board of Directors. The consistent practice before the Circular was to appoint Directors from a panel of names submitted by the majority association of non-workmen-employees. The Court found that the Central Government's new interpretation, which allowed the appointment of any officer irrespective of their association, was incorrect and out of harmony with the legislative intent and constitutional principles.
3. Compliance of the Circular with Section 9 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970:
Section 9 of the Act empowers the Central Government to make a scheme for the constitution of the Board of Directors, including representatives of employees and other specified categories. The Court emphasized that the discretion granted to the Central Government in appointing Directors must be exercised reasonably to reflect the true intent of the legislature. The Circular's approach of appointing any officer without considering the panel was found to be inconsistent with the Act's objective of a representative Board.
4. Representative nature of the Board of Directors:
The Court highlighted that the Act aimed to nationalize banks to serve the national policy and objectives. The Board of Directors was intended to be truly representative, reflecting the interests of employees, depositors, farmers, workers, and artisans. The Court asserted that employees, being well-organized and motivated, should ideally be represented through election. The Circular's approach undermined this representative character by allowing appointments without considering the employees' choice.
5. Discretion of the Central Government in appointing Directors:
While the Central Government has discretion in choosing the mode of appointment (election or nomination), the Court clarified that this discretion is not unrestricted. The Central Government must exercise its discretion reasonably to ensure the best form of representation for each category. The Court rejected the argument that the Government could avoid election even when it was appropriate and feasible. The Court suggested that the Government could amend the Scheme to improve the election process but must continue the practice of appointing from the panel until such amendments are made.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court declared the Circular dated 23-8-1982 ultra vires the Act and the Scheme, nullifying it. The Court emphasized the need for a truly representative Board of Directors and the reasonable exercise of the Central Government's discretion in appointing Directors. The decision reinforced the importance of democratic selection and representation in the management of nationalized banks.
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1989 (8) TMI 363
Issues: Liability of owner of insured vehicle for accident caused by unlicensed driver, Liability of insurer to indemnify owner against judgment.
In this judgment, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the liability of the owner of an insured vehicle for an accident caused by the negligence of an unlicensed driver. The case involved a constable being knocked down by a tractor driven by an unlicensed driver, leading to a claim for compensation by the constable's family against the owner of the vehicle and the insurer. The Tribunal found that the accident occurred due to the negligent driving of the unlicensed driver and held the owner solely liable for compensation since the driver did not have a valid license. The High Court affirmed this decision, focusing on the liability of the insurer to indemnify the owner against the judgment. The Tribunal awarded compensation, which was not challenged before the Supreme Court.
The Court examined Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which imposes a duty on the insurer to satisfy judgments against insured persons for third-party risks. The exception to this liability is outlined in sub-section 2(b), stating that the insurer is not liable if there has been a breach of specified policy conditions, such as the vehicle being driven by an unlicensed person. The Court emphasized that if there is a breach of this condition, the insurer is not obligated to indemnify the owner against the judgment.
The appellants argued that the insurer should still be liable to pay the compensation, citing a previous case where the insured was not found at fault for entrusting the vehicle to a licensed driver. However, the Court distinguished the present case, emphasizing that the owner failed to prove that the vehicle was being driven by a licensed driver at the time of the accident. The Court reiterated that the insurer cannot be held liable if there is a breach of the policy condition regarding the driver's license.
Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the insurer's obligation to indemnify the owner was discharged as the owner failed to prove that the vehicle was being driven by a licensed driver and had also falsely claimed to have sold the vehicle to a third party. The Court clarified that in such circumstances, the insurer cannot be held responsible, and the decision in the previous case cited by the appellants did not apply. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and no costs were awarded in the case.
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1989 (8) TMI 362
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 11-A, Section 11-B, and Section 42-A of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960, as amended by the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1989.
2. Validity of amendments to Sections 41, 42, and 46 of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960, by the Amending Act.
3. Encroachment on judicial power by the legislature.
4. Violation of the Rule of Law.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 11-A, Section 11-B, and Section 42-A of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960, as amended by the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1989:
The petitioners challenged the validity of these provisions, arguing that they make a direct inroad into the judicial powers of the State and are violative of the Rule of Law, which is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution. Sub-section (2) of Section 11-A empowers the competent authority to dispose of cases under the Act, notwithstanding any stay granted or other process issued by the Civil Court. Similarly, Section 42-A states that any stay granted by the appellate authority before 1st November 1988 shall stand vacated on that date. The Court held that these provisions enable the competent authority to flout orders passed by a Civil Court or an appellate or revisional authority in exercise of judicial power, which is not permissible. These provisions were deemed to be an encroachment on judicial power and violative of the Rule of Law, thus deserving to be struck down.
2. Validity of amendments to Sections 41, 42, and 46 of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960, by the Amending Act:
The proviso added to Sections 41 and 42 states that surplus land vested in the State Government shall not revert to the holder thereof as a consequence of remand of the case. The Court found that these provisions modify an order or decision given by a Court or a Tribunal in exercise of judicial power, thus encroaching on judicial power. The amendments to these sections were also struck down for being violative of the Rule of Law. However, the substitution of Section 46, which removes the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to decide matters under the Act, was upheld as valid. The Court found no cogent reason to declare this provision invalid.
3. Encroachment on judicial power by the legislature:
The Court emphasized that the legislative power is to make, alter, amend, or repeal laws, while judicial power is to ascertain, construe, and determine the rights and obligations of the parties. The legislature cannot directly overrule or set aside judicial decisions by a mere declaration. The impugned provisions were found to be an exercise of judicial power by the legislature, which is not permissible under the constitutional scheme.
4. Violation of the Rule of Law:
The Court reiterated that the Rule of Law is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution. The impugned provisions, by making judicial orders ineffective and modifying judicial decisions without changing their basis, were found to be violative of the Rule of Law. Consequently, these provisions were declared void and unconstitutional.
Conclusion:
The petitions were partly allowed. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 11-A, Section 11-B, the proviso to Sections 41 and 42, and Section 42-A of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960, as amended by the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1989, were declared void and unconstitutional. Section 46, as amended, was upheld as valid. Parties were ordered to bear their own costs, and any security amount deposited was to be refunded to the petitioners.
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1989 (8) TMI 361
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit.
2. Maintainability of the suit in the present form.
Summary:
Issue 1: Jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the civil court has the jurisdiction to entertain a suit filed by the appellant plaintiff, an employee of M/s. Empire of India and Ceylon Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd., who was dismissed from service. The appellant sought a declaration that his dismissal was null and void, back wages, and an injunction against the dismissal order. The trial court held that the civil court had jurisdiction, but the High Court reversed this decision, stating that the relief sought could only be granted under the Industrial Disputes Act, thereby barring the civil court's jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the relief of reinstatement and back wages is available only under the Industrial Disputes Act, which provides a specific procedure and machinery for such disputes. The Court referenced Section 9 of the CPC, which states that civil courts have jurisdiction unless expressly or impliedly barred. The Court concluded that the Industrial Disputes Act impliedly excludes the jurisdiction of civil courts for such matters.
Issue 2: Maintainability of the suit in the present form
The trial court framed two preliminary issues: whether the suit was maintainable in its present form and whether the court had jurisdiction. The trial court found the suit maintainable, but the High Court disagreed, asserting that the nature of the relief sought by the appellant was such that it could only be granted under the Industrial Disputes Act.
The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court, noting that the appellant's claim essentially sought reinstatement and back wages, which are remedies provided exclusively under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court highlighted that the Act not only confers the right to such relief but also outlines a detailed procedure and machinery for obtaining it, thereby implying the exclusion of civil court jurisdiction.
The appeal was dismissed, with the Supreme Court directing both parties to bear their own costs, considering the appellant's long-standing unemployment.
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1989 (8) TMI 360
Issues Involved:
The only issue involved in this appeal is whether the document executed by the parties is an agreement of leave and licence or a deed of lease.
Judgment Details:
1. The trial court passed a decree for eviction of the appellant, which was confirmed on appeal by the District Judge. The High Court dismissed the second appeal filed by the appellant, concluding it by concurrent findings of fact.
2. The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court, stating that the case had to be decided based on the nature of possession of the appellant, which depended on the correct interpretation of the document.
3. The document was described as an agreement of leave and licence, but the substance of the document indicated that the appellant was being let in as a tenant. The terms of the document, such as the monthly rental and the right of renewal, were more in line with a lease rather than a licence.
4. The Court highlighted that the exclusive possession of a party is an important consideration, along with the intention of the parties and whether the document creates any interest in the property. The Rent Acts aim to protect the tenant from exploitation by the landlord, and the interpretation should advance this objective.
5. The surrounding circumstances, such as the notice to vacate served after the expiry of the agreement term, also supported the conclusion that the document was a lease. The appellant was found to be enjoying exclusive possession as a month-to-month tenant.
6. Therefore, the Court held that the document was indeed a lease, and the appellant was a month-to-month tenant protected by the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. The appeal was allowed, the decree passed by the lower courts was set aside, and the suit was dismissed.
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1989 (8) TMI 359
Issues Involved:
1. Challenge to the Constitution (Sixty-Fourth Amendment) Bill, 1989.
2. Federal structure and basic features of the Constitution.
3. Legislative and constituent power of Parliament under Article 368.
4. Jurisdiction and maintainability of the writ petition.
5. Cause of action and judicial review at the Bill stage.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Challenge to the Constitution (Sixty-Fourth Amendment) Bill, 1989:
The writ petitioner challenged the Constitution (Sixty-Fourth Amendment) Bill, 1989, arguing that it is not an ordinary amendment but a maneuver to erode the foundation of the Constitution by legislating about Panchayats, which are integral to local government and fall under Entry No. 5 of List-II of the Seventh Schedule. The petitioner contended that the Bill interferes with the basic structure and features of the Constitution, violating Article 40 and the Directive Principles of State Policy.
2. Federal structure and basic features of the Constitution:
The petitioner argued that the Bill seeks to establish legislative and executive supremacy of the Union over the States in the matter of village Panchayats administration, thereby destroying the essential federal structure of the Constitution. The proposed Articles 243B, 243E, 243J, and 243M make the State Legislature's power subordinate to the provisions of this constitutional amendment, conferring authority upon Central Agencies like the Comptroller & Auditor-General of India and the Election Commission.
3. Legislative and constituent power of Parliament under Article 368:
The petitioner asserted that the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution under Article 368 does not extend to altering the basic structure of the Constitution. The petitioner cited the Supreme Court's judgments in Keshavananda Bharati, Minerva Mills Ltd., and Wamon Rao cases, which established that the Parliament's constituent power is distinct from its ordinary legislative power and is subject to limitations.
4. Jurisdiction and maintainability of the writ petition:
The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution to entertain the writ petition since a substantial part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner contended that the threat posed by the Bill forms a substantial part of the cause of action, justifying pre-enactment judicial review to prevent irreparable damage to the Constitution.
5. Cause of action and judicial review at the Bill stage:
The learned Attorney-General, representing the respondents, argued that the Parliament, which is sovereign, cannot be restrained by a Court of Law at the Bill stage. The respondents contended that the Bill, being a proposal before Parliament, is not justiciable until it becomes an Act. The Attorney-General cited various judgments, asserting that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to interfere with the legislative process of Parliament and that any challenge to the Bill is premature.
Judgment:
The Court held that the writ petition is premature and not maintainable. It emphasized that the legislative competency of Parliament should not be interfered with by the High Court at the Bill stage. The Court stated that the Constitution (Sixty-Fourth Amendment) Bill, 1989, if enacted and enforced, can be challenged for its vires in a Court of Law. The Court dismissed the writ petition, stating that no cause of action arises until the Bill is enacted into law and enforced. The Court also disapproved of the personal abuses hurled at Mr. Rajiv Gandhi in the writ petition, noting that such allegations had no bearing on the reliefs sought and appeared to be political gimmicks.
Conclusion:
The Court dismissed the writ petition as premature and not maintainable, emphasizing that judicial review of the Bill is not permissible until it is enacted and enforced. The Court also criticized the petitioner for including unnecessary personal allegations in the petition.
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