Home Case Index All Cases Income Tax Section Wise 2010 2010 (8) This

Law	-- All -- GST Income Tax Benami Property Customs Corporate Laws Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy FEMA Law of Competition PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Wealth tax Indian Laws
Court	-- Any -- Supreme Court SC Orders / Highlights High Court Appellate Tribunal Tribunal Appellate authority for Advance Ruling Advance Ruling Authority National Financial Reporting Authority Competition Commission of India ANTI-PROFITEERING AUTHORITY Commission Central Government Board DISTRICT/ SESSIONS Court Commissioner / Appellate Authority Other
Citation	--Year-- 2025 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 Upto 1949 - -Volume- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 -
Landmark	Nil - N/A Referred in >= 2 Cases Referred in >= 4 Cases Referred in >= 5 Cases Referred in >= 10 Cases Referred in >= 15 Cases Referred in >= 25 Cases Referred in >= 50 Cases Referred in >= 100 Cases
Order by	TMI Citation Date of Decision

Advanced Search Options

Case Laws

Showing 1 to 20 of 899 Records

• 2010 (8) TMI 1191
  
  The Supreme Court considered an appeal by the Reserve Bank of India against an order issued by a learned Single Judge in a bail application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The order directed a cooperative bank to release deposits of less than Rs. 10,000 to depositors as and when funds were received. The background of the case involved an application for bail by accused individuals in a criminal case, which was granted by a Magistrate and challenged by depositors before the High Court. The High Court did not cancel the bail but issued a consequential order on 20th December 2002, directing the bank to release funds to depositors with smaller deposits.The Reserve Bank of India challenged this order, arguing that it exceeded the scope of a bail application and contravened provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The respondents were served, but only the accused respondent who had been granted bail appeared before the Court, stating that his bail had been confirmed and he had no further comments.The Court held that the High Court's directions went beyond the scope of a bail application and could have far-reaching consequences on the banking system nationwide. It emphasized that the High Court should have confined its orders to matters relevant to the bail application. The Court acknowledged the Reserve Bank of India's concerns and allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders dated 20th December 2002 and 7th February 2003.In conclusion, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Reserve Bank of India, holding that the High Court's directions in the bail application exceeded their jurisdiction and could impact banks across the country. The Court set aside the orders issued by the High Court in this matter.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1190
  
  ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

  The Court considered several core legal issues in this case:

  (i) The admissibility and reliability of the dying declaration made by Sonu @ Savita to the Investigating Officer.

  (ii) Whether the dying declaration, in the absence of corroboration, can be the sole basis for convicting the accused with capital punishment.

  (iii) The justification for awarding the death sentence to Atbir and life imprisonment to Ashok, considering the principles laid down by the Court regarding capital punishment.

  (iv) The motive attributed to the accused, particularly regarding the alleged lust for property.

  ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

  (A) Admissibility and Reliability of the Dying Declaration

  The Court analyzed the admissibility and reliability of the dying declaration made by Sonu @ Savita. The legal framework for dying declarations is well established, with the Court noting that such declarations can be the sole basis for conviction if they inspire full confidence in their truthfulness and voluntariness. The Court referred to several precedents, including Munnu Raja v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar, which emphasize that while dying declarations must be approached with caution, they do not require corroboration if they are deemed reliable.

  In this case, Sonu @ Savita's statement was recorded by the Investigating Officer in the presence of a doctor, who certified that she was in a fit mental state to make the declaration. The Court found no infirmity in the declaration, noting that it was consistent and coherent. The medical evidence, including the testimony of doctors who treated Sonu, supported the conclusion that she was capable of making a statement despite her injuries.

  The Court rejected the defense's argument that the dying declaration was unreliable due to the severity of Sonu's injuries, particularly to her neck. The medical testimony indicated that while Sonu had severe injuries, she was conscious and capable of understanding and responding to questions at the time of the declaration.

  (B) Motive

  The Court found that the prosecution had successfully established a motive for the crime. The evidence suggested that Atbir and his family were motivated by a desire to inherit property from Jaswant Singh, which was perceived to be threatened by the presence of his second wife and her children. The Court accepted the prosecution's argument that this motive provided a strong rationale for the accused's actions.

  (C) Justification for Death Sentence

  The Court considered the principles laid down in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab and Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab regarding the imposition of the death penalty. These principles require a balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, with the death penalty reserved for the "rarest of rare" cases.

  The Court found that the murders committed by Atbir were extremely brutal and diabolical, with multiple victims, including his stepmother and siblings, killed in a premeditated and ruthless manner. The Court noted the aggravating factors, including the number of victims, the method of killing, and the motive of greed, outweighed any mitigating circumstances. The Court concluded that the case warranted the death penalty for Atbir, as it fell within the "rarest of rare" category.

  SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

  The Court upheld the conviction and sentence of death imposed on Atbir, finding that the dying declaration was reliable and that the crime's brutality justified the capital punishment. The Court also confirmed the life imprisonment sentence for Ashok, finding no grounds for interference with the lower courts' decisions.

  Key principles established include the sufficiency of a dying declaration as the sole basis for conviction if it is deemed reliable and the application of the "rarest of rare" doctrine in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty.

  The Court's final determination was to dismiss both appeals, affirming the sentences imposed by the lower courts.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1189
  
  ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

  The core legal question considered by the Supreme Court was whether the appellant, S.S. Chheena, could be charged under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for abetting the suicide of Saurav Mahajan, despite the absence of any mention of the appellant in the suicide note left by the deceased. The Court examined whether there was credible material or evidence to establish a prima facie case of abetment against the appellant.

  ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

  Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents:

  The Court analyzed the legal framework surrounding Section 306 IPC, which deals with the abetment of suicide. The section stipulates that if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide shall be punished. The Court referred to Section 107 IPC, which defines "abetment" as instigating a person to do a thing, engaging in a conspiracy for the doing of that thing, or intentionally aiding the doing of that thing.

  The Court also considered precedents, including Gangula Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Mahendra Singh v. State of M.P., Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal, and Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), to interpret the scope of abetment under Section 306 IPC.

  Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:

  The Court emphasized that for a charge under Section 306 IPC, there must be a clear mens rea to commit the offense, requiring an active or direct act of instigation or aid that leads the deceased to commit suicide. The Court noted that the deceased's suicide note did not mention the appellant, and there was no credible material linking the appellant to the alleged abetment.

  The Court highlighted that mere allegations of harassment or humiliation, without any direct link to the suicide, do not satisfy the requirements of abetment under Section 306 IPC. The Court also considered whether the deceased was hypersensitive to ordinary discord, which would not typically lead to suicide.

  Key Evidence and Findings:

  The primary evidence considered was the suicide note left by the deceased, Saurav Mahajan. The note attributed his decision to commit suicide to false allegations made by Harminder Singh and others, but it did not implicate the appellant, S.S. Chheena. The Court found no material evidence suggesting that the appellant had instigated or aided the suicide.

  Application of Law to Facts:

  The Court applied the legal principles of abetment to the facts of the case, concluding that there was no evidence of direct or indirect instigation or aid by the appellant that could have led to the suicide. The absence of any mention of the appellant in the suicide note further weakened the case against him.

  Treatment of Competing Arguments:

  The appellant argued that there was no credible material against him and that the suicide note did not implicate him in any way. The prosecution's argument relied on alleged threats and humiliating phrases, but the Court found these insufficient to establish a prima facie case of abetment. The Court reiterated that a charge under Section 306 IPC requires a clear and direct connection between the accused's actions and the suicide.

  Conclusions:

  The Court concluded that the framing of charges against the appellant under Section 306 IPC was erroneous and unsustainable due to the lack of credible evidence. The Court held that it would be unjust to subject the appellant to a criminal trial without any substantial material linking him to the alleged abetment.

  SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

  The Court held that for a charge of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC, there must be a clear mens rea and a direct or active act of instigation or aid. The absence of any mention of the appellant in the suicide note and the lack of credible evidence rendered the charges against the appellant unsustainable.

  The Court stated, "Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained." This principle underscores the necessity of a direct link between the accused's actions and the suicide for a charge under Section 306 IPC.

  The final determination was that the order framing charges against the appellant was quashed, and all proceedings against him were set aside. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's judgment was overturned.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1188
  

  1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

  The core legal issues presented and considered in this judgment are:

  • Whether the respondents, who were appointed on a daily wage basis and continued for over 15 years, are entitled to regularization of their services.
  • Whether the principles laid down in the case of State of Karnataka v. Umadevi apply to the respondents' case.
  • What constitutes a 'one-time measure' for regularization as per the Umadevi judgment, and how should it be implemented?

  2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

  Issue 1: Entitlement to Regularization

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The judgment refers to the principles established in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, which held that appointments made without following due process do not confer a right to regularization.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court emphasized that regularization is not an automatic entitlement for employees appointed irregularly. However, an exception exists for employees who have served for more than ten years without court protection.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: The respondents had been employed for over 15 years without any court intervention, fulfilling one of the conditions for the exception under Umadevi.
  • Application of Law to Facts: The court applied the Umadevi exception, noting that the respondents had served for over ten years in sanctioned posts and possessed the requisite qualifications.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellants argued against regularization based on the general principles of Umadevi, but the court found that the specific exception applied.
  • Conclusions: The court concluded that the respondents are entitled to be considered for regularization under the Umadevi exception.

  Issue 2: Application of Umadevi Principles

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Umadevi judgment outlined conditions under which irregular employees may be regularized as a one-time measure.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court reiterated that the Umadevi exception applies to employees who have served for over ten years in sanctioned posts without court orders.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: The respondents fit the criteria outlined in Umadevi for consideration of regularization.
  • Application of Law to Facts: The court applied the Umadevi exception, directing that the respondents' cases be considered for regularization.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellants' reliance on the general principles of Umadevi was countered by the specific exception applicable to the respondents.
  • Conclusions: The court concluded that the respondents' cases should be considered under the Umadevi exception.

  Issue 3: Implementation of 'One-time Measure'

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Umadevi judgment required a one-time measure for regularization within six months of its decision.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court clarified that the one-time measure should include all eligible employees, even if their cases were pending in court.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: The Zila Panchayat had not undertaken the one-time measure as per Umadevi for the respondents.
  • Application of Law to Facts: The court directed the Zila Panchayat to conduct a one-time regularization exercise, including the respondents.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The court addressed the appellants' oversight in excluding the respondents from the one-time measure.
  • Conclusions: The court mandated the Zila Panchayat to complete the one-time measure, considering the respondents for regularization.

  3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

  • Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning: "The one-time exercise will be concluded only when all the employees who are entitled to be considered in terms of Para 53 of Umadevi, are so considered."
  • Core Principles Established: The judgment reinforces the Umadevi exception for regularization and clarifies the implementation of the one-time measure.
  • Final Determinations on Each Issue: The court directed the Zila Panchayat to conduct a one-time regularization exercise, considering the respondents' eligibility under the Umadevi exception.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1187
  
  Issues:
  Whether a petition for sanction of a scheme of arrangement under Sections 391/394 of the Companies Act, 1956 is maintainable before the Company Judge in view of the alleged pendency of a reference under Section 15 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act (SICA) before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR)/Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR).
  
  Analysis:
  The judgment pertains to a company petition seeking approval of a scheme of arrangement under Sections 391/394 of the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner-company had previously applied for the scheme's sanction, which was approved by the Board of Directors, leading to a meeting of secured creditors. However, objections were raised regarding the maintainability of the petition due to a pending reference under SICA before the BIFR/AAIFR.
  
  The key issue addressed by the Court was whether the petition under Sections 391/394 of the Companies Act could proceed despite the pending reference under SICA. The Court examined the history of the petitioner-company's references under SICA, noting that while a previous reference had been rejected, a subsequent reference was pending before the BIFR, albeit stayed due to a challenge before the Delhi High Court.
  
  The Court analyzed the provisions of SICA, emphasizing that once a reference is registered, the enquiry commences, signifying the initiation of proceedings before the BIFR. It was established that the petitioner-company's reference was pending before the BIFR, even though no scheme had been formulated as of the judgment.
  
  Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Tata Motors Ltd. Vs. Pharmaceutical Products Of India Ltd, the Court highlighted that SICA prevails over the Companies Act, with the jurisdiction of the civil court being limited in cases where a reference has been made to the BIFR. The Court clarified that the Company Court's authority is subject to SICA or any scheme formulated by the BIFR.
  
  The Court concluded that the petition under Sections 391/394 of the Companies Act was maintainable despite the pending reference under SICA, as long as the Company Court's exercise of power was in accordance with SICA or any scheme framed by the BIFR. The objections raised by the respondents regarding maintainability were overruled, and their applications were rejected.
  
  In summary, the judgment establishes that a company petition under Sections 391/394 of the Companies Act can proceed alongside a pending reference under SICA, provided the Company Court's actions align with SICA's provisions or any scheme devised by the BIFR.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1186
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Scope and applicability of Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
  2. Applicability of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA) in eviction proceedings.
  3. Legitimacy of the petition filed by the Government Undertaking.
  4. Imposition of costs for frivolous litigation.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Scope and Applicability of Article 227 of the Constitution of India:
  
  The judgment begins by clarifying the scope of Article 227, emphasizing that the jurisdiction of the High Court under this Article is limited. It is not intended for correcting mere errors but is to be exercised sparingly to ensure that subordinate courts remain within their authority. The court references the case of Waryam Singh and another vs. Amarnath and another, highlighting that the power of superintendence should be used only in appropriate cases. The court further reiterates that under Article 227, it does not disturb concurrent findings of fact by lower courts unless there is a jurisdictional error or a legal proposition is ignored.
  
  2. Applicability of Section 22 of SICA in Eviction Proceedings:
  
  The petitioner, a sick company, argued that Section 22 of SICA should protect it from eviction proceedings, as it would impose additional financial liability and affect its rehabilitation process. However, the court noted that Section 22(1) of SICA does not prevent suits for possession against a sick company. The trial court and first appellate court both found that the eviction proceedings did not fall under the categories automatically suspended by Section 22(1), as outlined in the Supreme Court's decision in M/s Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. The court emphasized that eviction proceedings by a landlord do not constitute proceedings against the property of the sick company as contemplated under Section 22.
  
  3. Legitimacy of the Petition Filed by the Government Undertaking:
  
  The court criticized the petitioner, a Government Undertaking, for filing a meritless and frivolous petition. It highlighted that the petitioner did not initially raise the plea concerning SICA in its written statement and attempted to introduce it without amending the written statement. The court found no illegality or irrationality in the orders of the lower courts and deemed the petition as an unnecessary waste of public resources.
  
  4. Imposition of Costs for Frivolous Litigation:
  
  The judgment strongly condemned the practice of frivolous litigation by Public Sector Undertakings, noting that such actions waste public money and burden the judiciary. The court imposed a cost of Rs. 50,000 on the petitioner, directing that the amount be recovered from the salaries of the officials responsible for pursuing the litigation. The court emphasized the need for a strong message against mindless litigation and stressed the importance of using public resources judiciously.
  
  In conclusion, the petition was dismissed with costs, and the court ordered compliance with its directives regarding the recovery of costs from the responsible officials. The judgment serves as a caution against frivolous litigation and underscores the limited scope of Article 227 and Section 22 of SICA in eviction proceedings.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1185
  
  Issues: Delay in trial leading to prolonged incarceration of the accused under the NDPS Act, grant of bail, need for speedy trial, violation of fundamental rights, conditions for bail, directive for expediting trial, notice to states for cases of undertrials in custody for extended periods.
  
  In this judgment by the Supreme Court, the appellant, an accused under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988, had been in custody for over twelve years without the trial's conclusion in sight. The Court noted the need for speedy trials, especially when bail is restricted under the NDPS Act. Referring to previous observations emphasizing the importance of avoiding unduly long deprivation of personal liberty pending trial, the Court highlighted that continued imprisonment beyond a certain point could violate fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Despite past reminders, the issue of prolonged incarceration without progress remained unresolved.
  
  Considering the appellant's extended custody and the lack of immediate trial conclusion prospects, the Court deemed it appropriate to grant bail. The Court directed the appellant to furnish a personal bond with specific conditions, including regular reporting to the trial court and restrictions on leaving the court's jurisdictional area. Any violation of these conditions could lead to bail cancellation at the trial court's discretion. Additionally, the trial court received instructions to expedite the trial and aim to conclude it within a year from the judgment's receipt.
  
  Furthermore, the Court issued a directive to all states through their Chief Secretaries to provide information on cases where undertrials in NDPS Act matters had been in custody for five years or more. The states were required to submit affidavits within eight weeks, and the office was tasked with sending a copy of the order to ensure compliance. The case was listed for further directions immediately after the specified eight-week period, emphasizing the need for timely action and monitoring of cases involving prolonged undertrial detention under the NDPS Act.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1184
  
  Issues:
  1. Corporate membership of a club as an expenditure for an Artificial Juridical Person.
  2. Deduction under sections 35AB, 80HH, and 80I of the Income Tax Act.
  3. Treatment of various incomes derived from industrial undertaking.
  4. Allowance of interest expenses and expenses on "knowhow."
  
  Analysis:
  
  1. The appellant raised concerns about allowing the corporate membership of a club as an expenditure, arguing it was not wholly and exclusively for business purposes, especially for an Artificial Juridical Person. The Tribunal's decision aligned with a previous High Court ruling, dismissing the appeal as it did not raise any legal question.
  
  2. Regarding deductions under sections 35AB, 80HH, and 80I of the Income Tax Act, the Tribunal's decision was based on precedent cases, indicating no legal question arose. The senior advocate acknowledged the settled controversy, leading to the dismissal of this ground of appeal.
  
  3. The issue of treating certain incomes as derived from industrial undertakings was addressed by the Tribunal, following a High Court decision. The Tribunal's decision was upheld, as it did not present any legal question for consideration.
  
  4. The Tribunal's decision on interest expenses and expenses on "knowhow" was challenged by the appellant. The Tribunal's reliance on its previous decision and the revenue's unsuccessful appeal in a related case led to the dismissal of this ground. However, questions related to deductions under various sections were admitted for further consideration.
  
  Conclusion:
  The judgment addressed various issues raised by the appellant concerning deductions, treatment of incomes, and expenses. While some grounds were dismissed due to lack of legal questions, others were admitted for detailed examination. The Tribunal's reliance on precedent cases and previous decisions played a crucial role in the outcome of the judgment.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1183
  
  The Appellate Tribunal ITAT Chennai upheld the deletion of penalty under sec. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the assessee as similar cases were decided in favor of the assessee previously. The Tribunal found that filing revised returns after the time limit prescribed under sec. 139(5) of the Act did not make a difference as the returns were regularized by the Department and no willful non-disclosure of income was found. The CIT(A) was justified in deleting the penalty, and the appeals of the Revenue were dismissed on 18-08-2010.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1182
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Determination of the "appropriate government" under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
  2. Maintainability of applications under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTU and PULP Act).
  3. Control and management of Tata Memorial Centre (TMC).
  4. Vesting of property and assets of TMC.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Determination of the "Appropriate Government" under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
  The primary issue was whether the Central Government or the State Government is the "appropriate government" for Tata Memorial Centre (TMC) under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The court examined the statutory framework and relevant case law, including the Constitution Bench judgment in Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union Waterfront Workers (2001) 7 SCC 1. It was determined that the Central Government would be the "appropriate government" only if the industry is carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. The court concluded that TMC does not function under the authority of the Central Government, as its administration and management are vested in its Governing Council, making the State Government the "appropriate government."
  
  2. Maintainability of Applications under the MRTU and PULP Act:
  The applications filed under Sections 13 and 14 of the MRTU and PULP Act were challenged on the grounds that the Central Government, not the State Government, was the "appropriate government" for TMC. The court held that since the State Government is the "appropriate government" for TMC under the Industrial Disputes Act, the applications under the MRTU and PULP Act were maintainable. The Industrial Court's decision to dismiss the applications on merits was upheld.
  
  3. Control and Management of Tata Memorial Centre (TMC):
  The court analyzed whether TMC functions independently or under the control of the Central Government. It was noted that TMC was established by Sir Dorabji Tata Trust and later managed by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. The administration and management of TMC are vested in its Governing Council, which operates independently. The court found no evidence of Central Government interference in TMC's day-to-day activities, confirming its independent functioning.
  
  4. Vesting of Property and Assets of TMC:
  The court examined the vesting of TMC's property and assets. Initially, the Tata Memorial Hospital was set up by Sir Dorabji Tata Trust and later dedicated to the nation, with the Central Government taking over control and management. However, the 1966 agreement between the Central Government and the Trust led to the formation of TMC as a society, with future acquisitions vested in the Governing Council. The court held that the property and assets of TMC are deemed to be vested in its Governing Council, not the Central Government.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court concluded that the State Government is the "appropriate government" for TMC under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and consequently under the MRTU and PULP Act. The applications filed under the MRTU and PULP Act were maintainable, and the Industrial Court's decision to dismiss them on merits was upheld. The Division Bench's judgment was set aside, and the order of the Industrial Court, as confirmed by the Single Judge, was restored. The appeal was allowed, and the parties were directed to bear their own costs.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1181
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality of the Magistrate's power to return the charge sheet.
  2. Validity of the second charge sheet filed by a different police officer.
  3. Appropriateness of the lower court's order to implead additional accused u/s 319 Cr.P.C.
  4. Necessity for further investigation by the Crime Investigation Department (CID).
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Legality of the Magistrate's power to return the charge sheet:
  The court held that when a final report/charge sheet is filed, the Magistrate has no power or jurisdiction either under Cr.P.C. or under Criminal Rules of Practice to return the charge sheet questioning the propriety of the investigating officer. The Magistrate can only take cognizance of the case against some or all accused or reject the final report by giving reasons. Returning a charge sheet is permissible only for clerical or typographical errors.
  
  2. Validity of the second charge sheet filed by a different police officer:
  The court found that the process of filing a second charge sheet by another police officer, deleting names of two accused from the first final report, was unwarranted by law. The law does not empower an Additional Superintendent of Police to issue orders for such changes. The actions of the Magistrate and the investigating officer were deemed improper and without legal sanction.
  
  3. Appropriateness of the lower court's order to implead additional accused u/s 319 Cr.P.C.:
  The court noted that the lower court allowed the petition u/s 319 Cr.P.C. to issue summonses to additional accused based on the examination of P.Ws.1 and 2. However, the court entertained suspicion about the thoroughness of the investigation and expressed the need for further investigation. The court highlighted that the investigation was incomplete and lacked comprehensive evidence collection.
  
  4. Necessity for further investigation by the Crime Investigation Department (CID):
  The court emphasized the importance of a thorough investigation given the public interest and the involvement of a significant religious institution. It ordered further investigation by the CID of the State, directing the Additional Director General of Police, CID, Hyderabad, to form a Special Investigation Team. The CID was instructed to conduct a comprehensive investigation, not limited to the areas pointed out by the court, and to file periodical reports and an additional final report after the investigation.
  
  Conclusion:
  The trial of C.C. No. 306 of 2009 was stayed pending further investigation by the CID. The court directed the CID to examine all relevant aspects and individuals connected with the offence, irrespective of their status, to reach a logical conclusion. The petitions were posted for a report on 03.09.2010.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1180
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Nature of Expenditure: Whether the expenditure of Rs. 7.83 crores incurred for rectification and improvement of power lines is revenue or capital.
  2. Nature of Subsidy: Whether the subsidy received by the Assessee from the Government of Andhra Pradesh is revenue or capital in nature.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  Issue 1: Nature of Expenditure
  
  The primary issue in this case revolves around the classification of the expenditure incurred by the Assessee for rectification and improvement of power lines damaged due to a cyclone. The Assessee argued that 50% of the expenditure was on revenue account and the remaining 50% on capital account. However, the Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the entire amount, treating it as capital expenditure based on the fact that the expenditure was incurred out of a capital subsidy received from the Government of Andhra Pradesh.
  
  The CIT(A) reversed the AO's decision, holding that the expenditure was in the nature of current repairs and allowable as revenue expenditure. The CIT(A) emphasized that it is immaterial to debate the source of funds used for the expenditure, as the critical factor is the nature of the expenditure itself. The CIT(A) concluded that the expenditure was for rectification and improvement of existing structures damaged by the cyclone, which does not create any new asset or confer an enduring benefit to the Assessee.
  
  Upon appeal, the ITAT upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, agreeing that the expenditure was indeed revenue in nature. The Tribunal noted that the AO had misdirected himself by disallowing the expenditure solely because it was funded by a capital subsidy. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s reasoning and dismissed the Revenue's appeal on this ground.
  
  Issue 2: Nature of Subsidy
  
  The second issue pertains to the nature of the subsidy received by the Assessee. The Revenue argued that the subsidy should be considered as revenue receipt, citing the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd. v. CIT, which held that subsidies granted to assist in carrying out business operations are revenue receipts.
  
  The CIT(A) did not specifically address this issue, leading to a difference of opinion between the Vice President and the Accountant Member (AM) of the ITAT. The Vice President held that the subsidy was capital in nature, while the AM opined that the subsidy should be treated as revenue receipt, given that it was granted to assist in the rectification and improvement of power lines, which is a business operation.
  
  The matter was referred to a Third Member, who concurred with the AM's view. The Third Member emphasized that the purpose of the subsidy is crucial in determining its nature. Since the subsidy was granted to enable the Assessee to run its business more profitably and not for setting up the industry, it should be treated as revenue receipt. The Third Member cited the Supreme Court's decision in Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd. v. CIT, which supports the view that subsidies given to assist in business operations are revenue in nature.
  
  Based on the majority opinion, the ITAT concluded that the subsidy received by the Assessee was a revenue receipt and allowed the Revenue's appeal on this ground.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The ITAT's final decision resulted in the following outcomes:
  
  - The expenditure of Rs. 7.83 crores incurred for rectification and improvement of power lines was held to be revenue expenditure.
  - The subsidy of Rs. 8.50 crores received from the Government of Andhra Pradesh was determined to be revenue receipt.
  
  The appeal of the Revenue was partly allowed, with the expenditure being treated as revenue expenditure and the subsidy as revenue receipt.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1179
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against order of Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) involving disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) and depreciation on motor car.
  
  Issue 1 - Disallowance under section 40A(2)(b):
  The assessee appealed against the disallowance of interest paid to relatives under section 40A(2)(b). The Assessing Officer noted interest payment discrepancies between relatives and outsiders, leading to disallowance. The appellant argued that interest rate was justified based on bank rate and nature of loans. The Commissioner upheld the disallowance citing excess interest payment and lack of benefit to the assessee. On further appeal, it was argued that interest rate was reasonable compared to bank loan rates. The Tribunal found the interest rate not excessive, considering actual borrowed amount and prevailing market rates, thus deleting the disallowance.
  
  Issue 2 - Depreciation on motor car:
  The appellant contested the disallowance of depreciation on a motor car for personal use. The Tribunal noted that only actual depreciation allowed can be reduced for subsequent year's written down value. As there was no dispute on the written down value, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal for seeking a direction on subsequent year's depreciation. The appeal was partly allowed.
  
  This judgment highlights the assessment of interest disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) based on market rates and loan nature, and the treatment of depreciation on a motor car for personal use.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1178
  
  The Supreme Court of India in 2010 condoned the delay in filing process fee and spare copies for issuance of notice to the sole respondent. The office was directed to check and proceed further with the matter.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1177
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Entitlement of Senior Laboratory Assistants to the same pay scale as Research Assistants.
  2. Competence of the Chief Engineer to modify or amend ROPA Rules.
  3. Validity of the High Court's decision upholding the Tribunal's order.
  4. Delegation of judicial powers by the Tribunal to the Chief Engineer.
  5. Applicability of res judicata to the Chief Engineer's decision.
  6. Issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the State to act contrary to statutory rules.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Entitlement of Senior Laboratory Assistants to the same pay scale as Research Assistants
  The controversy centers around whether Senior Laboratory Assistants in the Roads and Buildings Research Institute and other divisions under the Public Works (Roads) Department, Government of West Bengal, are entitled to the same pay scale as Research Assistants. The High Court dismissed the writ petition by the State of West Bengal and confirmed the State Administrative Tribunal's order granting scale No. 11 to Senior Laboratory Assistants, which was contested by the State.
  
  Issue 2: Competence of the Chief Engineer to modify or amend ROPA Rules
  The Chief Engineer extended scale No. 11 to the respondents, which was not acceptable to the State Government. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the respondents, rejecting the State's objections that the Chief Engineer was not competent to modify or amend ROPA Rules.
  
  Issue 3: Validity of the High Court's decision upholding the Tribunal's order
  The High Court dismissed the State's writ petition and upheld the Tribunal's order, adopting a reasoning that the Tribunal had delegated power to the Chief Engineer to decide the issue, which was binding and unchallenged. This reasoning was found to be untenable and unsustainable in law by the Supreme Court.
  
  Issue 4: Delegation of judicial powers by the Tribunal to the Chief Engineer
  The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's practice of directing applications to be treated as representations before executive authorities is illegal and unconstitutional. The Tribunal cannot delegate its jurisdiction to extra-constitutional authorities like the Chief Engineer.
  
  Issue 5: Applicability of res judicata to the Chief Engineer's decision
  The High Court erred in holding that the Chief Engineer's decision operates as res judicata. The Chief Engineer did not undertake any quasi-judicial duty, and his administrative decision does not bind the courts or operate as res judicata.
  
  Issue 6: Issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the State to act contrary to statutory rules
  The Supreme Court held that no writ of mandamus lies compelling the State to act contrary to statutory rules. The State Government is obligated to follow the statutory rules, and the Court cannot direct the Government to act contrary to these rules. The orders of the Tribunal and the High Court, which compelled the State to give pay scales contrary to statutory rules, were set aside.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and the Tribunal's order. The amounts paid to the respondents pursuant to the impugned orders shall not be recovered. The appeal was allowed without any order as to costs.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1176
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Liability of Directors for Company Debts
  2. Application for Leave to Defend
  3. Allegations of Fraud and Misrepresentation
  4. Piercing the Corporate Veil
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Liability of Directors for Company Debts:
  The primary issue was whether the appellants, as erstwhile Directors of M/s. Dawson Leasing Limited, could be held personally liable for the company's debts. The court emphasized that a company is a separate legal entity from its directors and shareholders. Directors owe fiduciary duties to the company but not contractual duties to third parties unless they have provided personal guarantees or engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation. The court cited the principle from *Salomon vs. Salomon & Co. Ltd.* and subsequent cases, affirming that directors are not personally liable for company debts unless specific exceptions apply.
  
  2. Application for Leave to Defend:
  The appellants filed an application for unconditional leave to defend the suit, arguing that the suit was not maintainable under Order XXXVII of the Civil Procedure Code and that they were not personally liable. The trial court dismissed this application, stating that no triable issue was raised and decreed the suit in favor of the respondents. However, the High Court found that the trial court failed to establish how the appellants were personally liable and granted the appellants unconditional leave to defend the suit.
  
  3. Allegations of Fraud and Misrepresentation:
  The respondents alleged that the appellants had "deceitfully defrauded" them by inducing them to invest in non-convertible debentures and then dishonoring the cheques issued. The court noted that fraud must be pleaded with particularity and proved meticulously. The respondents' allegations were found to be vague and unsupported by detailed evidence. The court highlighted that the respondent No.4 was himself a Director of the company and involved in the decision to issue the debentures, undermining the fraud allegations.
  
  4. Piercing the Corporate Veil:
  The court considered whether the corporate veil could be pierced to hold the directors personally liable. It concluded that the respondents had not made a sufficient case to justify piercing the corporate veil. The court reiterated that lifting the corporate veil is an exception to the principle of separate corporate personality and is only justified in cases of fraud, tax evasion, or other specific circumstances. In this case, no such justification was provided.
  
  Conclusion:
  The High Court set aside the judgment and decree dated 18.09.2009 of the Additional District Judge, granting the appellants unconditional leave to defend the suit. The matter was remitted back to the trial court for trial in accordance with the law. The appeal succeeded, and the case was directed to proceed on 20.09.2010.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1175
  
  Issues involved:
  Petition against order allowing amendment to relief clause u/s Order 6 Rule 17, CPC after 9 years of filing; Amendment barred by limitation u/s Article 113 of Limitation Act; Necessity of amendment for just decision of the case; Application of amended proviso to Order 6 Rule 17, CPC; Legal position on allowing amendments u/s Order 6 Rule 17, CPC.
  
  The petition challenged an order allowing the Plaintiff to amend the relief clause by inserting a specific relief for "vacant possession of the plot after demolition of the construction" under Order 6 Rule 17, CPC. The Petitioner contended that the suit was filed in 2001, and the amendment sought after 9 years was barred by limitation u/s Article 113 of the Limitation Act, citing Vidyabai v. Padmalatha, AIR 2009 SC 1433.
  
  The Respondent supported the amendment, stating it was necessary for a just decision as construction was raised during the suit despite an undertaking by the Defendants. Referring to Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan, AIR 2001 SC 699, the Respondent argued for the validity of the amendment.
  
  The suit involved reliefs for declaration, perpetual injunction, and mandatory injunction. The Plaintiff sought to amend the relief clause to specifically include "vacant possession after demolition of the construction." The Defendants disputed the timing of construction raising but acknowledged the matter for trial evidence.
  
  While the Plaintiff's evidence was complete, the Defendants' evidence was pending. The Apex Court clarified in State Bank of Hyderabad v. Town Municipal Council (2007) 1 SCC 765 that the amended proviso to Order 6 Rule 17, CPC was not applicable to cases filed before 1-7-2002, allowing the amendment post-trial commencement.
  
  The Plaintiff's amendment aimed to restore possession by removing the construction, enhancing the specificity of the relief clause. The Petitioner's limitation argument was refuted, citing Article 65 of the Limitation Act for the 12-year limitation on adverse possession.
  
  Referring to Ragu Thilak D. John and B.K.N. Pillai cases, the Apex Court emphasized the wide power to amend pleadings in the interest of justice, discouraging a hyper-technical approach. The amendment was deemed necessary for a just decision without altering the suit's nature.
  
  The High Court found no error in the Trial Court's order, dismissing the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1174
  
  Issues involved:
  The judgment involves the consideration of substantial questions of law in ITA Nos. 131, 153, and 247 of 2010 regarding the eligibility of the assessee Trust for exemption u/s 11 and 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  
  ITA No. 131 of 2010:
  The substantial questions of law in ITA No. 131 of 2010 revolved around whether the assessee is carrying out activities incidental to the main objects of the Corporation for which it has been granted registration under Section 12AA, and whether the assessee Trust is eligible for exemption u/s 11 and 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite engaging in business activities with profit motives rather than charitable activities.
  
  Judgment Details:
  The High Court heard the arguments from both parties and noted that the questions raised in ITA No. 131 of 2010 were similar to those addressed in a previous order in ITA No. 563 of 2006 (Commissioner of Income-tax, Panchkula v. The Haryana Warehousing Corporation). The Court found that the questions were already settled in the earlier order, where it was decided in favor of the assessee. Consequently, the Court ruled against the revenue and in favor of the assessee, leading to the dismissal of the appeals. The Court directed a copy of the order to be placed on the files of the connected cases for reference.
  
  Conclusion:
  The High Court's judgment resolved the issues raised in ITA Nos. 131, 153, and 247 of 2010 by referring to a previous order and ruling in favor of the assessee Trust regarding its eligibility for exemption u/s 11 and 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1173
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the summoning order dated 26th April 2006.
  2. Separate accusation of Mr. Sandeep Khanna and M/s. Kripa Overseas.
  3. Cheque given as security and its implications under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  4. Impact of the Memorandum of Understanding dated 3rd May 2007 on the ongoing case.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of the Summoning Order Dated 26th April 2006:
  The petitioner contended that the summoning order was non-speaking, mechanical, and passed without application of mind. The court examined the order and found that it was a computer print-out with handwritten entries for dates and counsel names. The court held that the handwritten entries did not prove that the order was pre-dictated or mechanically issued. The order explicitly stated that the Magistrate had heard the complainant's counsel, perused the affidavit, and found sufficient evidence to summon the accused. Thus, the court rejected the claim that the order was passed without examining the allegations and evidence.
  
  2. Separate Accusation of Mr. Sandeep Khanna and M/s. Kripa Overseas:
  The petitioner argued that Mr. Sandeep Khanna, being the sole proprietor of M/s. Kripa Overseas, should not have been made a separate accused. The court noted that the complaint described both the individual and the business name separately, likely out of abundant caution. The court concluded that this did not merit interference with the summoning order as the net effect was that Mr. Sandeep Khanna, the sole proprietor, was summoned.
  
  3. Cheque Given as Security and Its Implications Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act:
  The petitioner argued that the cheque of Rs. 10 Crores was given as security, and hence, no offence under Section 138 of the Act was made out on its dishonour. The court referred to various judgments, including K.S. Bakshi and Anr. v. State and Anr., and concluded that the context and purpose of the cheque issuance were crucial. The court held that mere use of the term "security" in the complaint was irrelevant. What mattered was whether the cheque was issued towards payment of debt or liability. The court found that the cheque formed part of the consideration under the contract and was thus issued towards a liability. Therefore, prima facie, a case under Section 138 was made out.
  
  4. Impact of the Memorandum of Understanding Dated 3rd May 2007:
  The petitioner claimed that the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) amounted to a compromise, thus compounding the offence. The court referred to the MOU, which stipulated that legal cases would be withdrawn only after the entire payment was made. Since the payments were not made, the court held that the offence was not compounded. The court also referred to the Supreme Court's observations in Lata Construction v. Rameshchandra Ramniklal Shah, emphasizing that the original contract rights were not extinguished as the payment condition was not met. Consequently, the court rejected the contention that the offence was compounded by the MOU.
  
  Conclusion:
  The petition was dismissed, and the court held that the observations made were specific to the disposal of the petition and not binding on the trial court. The court found no merit in the petitioner's arguments regarding the summoning order, separate accusation, cheque as security, and the impact of the MOU.

  ---

• 2010 (8) TMI 1172
  
  The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal based on a previous decision in ITA No. 439/2008, setting aside the tribunal's order with no costs.

  ---

12345........ 45