|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 89 Records
-
1969 (9) TMI 132
Issues Involved:
1. Immunity from detention due to serious illness under Section 59 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).
2. Interpretation of Section 51(c) CPC regarding the judgment debtor's means to pay and neglect to pay.
3. Application of International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, particularly Article 11, in the context of imprisonment for inability to fulfill a contractual obligation.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Immunity from Detention Due to Serious Illness Under Section 59 CPC:
The court examined whether the judgment debtor could claim immunity from detention in civil prison on the grounds of serious illness as per Section 59 of the Civil Procedure Code. The appellant argued that the debtor was not in a fit state of health for detention due to serious illness. The court acknowledged the humanitarian impulse of Section 59 CPC, emphasizing that driving a seriously ill person into a prison cell is brutal unless the objective is to inflict suffering. The court noted that the lower courts had not given serious consideration to the appellant's health condition and had misconceived the scope of Section 59 CPC. The court decided to remand the case for a fresh inquiry, allowing the debtor to present medical evidence of his serious illness.
2. Interpretation of Section 51(c) CPC Regarding the Judgment Debtor's Means to Pay and Neglect to Pay:
The court elaborated on the interpretation of Section 51(c) CPC, which deals with the conditions under which a judgment debtor can be detained in civil prison for failing to pay a decree amount. It clarified that mere inability to pay does not justify detention; there must be contumacious or unworthy conduct on the part of the debtor. The court emphasized that the debtor must have had the means to pay after the decree was passed and must have refused or neglected to pay. The court also highlighted that past affluence could justify detention only if accompanied by a refusal or neglect to pay at that time. The court found that in the present case, there was a clear finding of the debtor's means to pay the decree debt, and no substantial change in circumstances or other demanding claims had been established. Therefore, the order for arrest and detention could not be held erroneous.
3. Application of International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, Particularly Article 11:
The appellant's counsel argued for a humanistic interpretation of the law, invoking Article 11 of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, which states that "No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation." The court acknowledged the progressive perspective of these covenants, emphasizing the subordination of property rights to personal freedom. However, it clarified that while these covenants could inform judicial institutions and inspire legislative action, they did not create binding rules enforceable by municipal courts unless actual legislation was undertaken. The court noted that Section 51 CPC did not violate Article 11, as it allowed for detention only if the debtor had means and refused or neglected to pay. The court concluded that the interpretation of Section 51 CPC harmonized with the objectives of the International Covenants, but total immunity from arrest based on Article 11 was not warranted.
Conclusion:
The court set aside the orders of the lower courts and remanded the case to the court of first instance for a fresh inquiry into the debtor's health condition under Section 59 CPC. The court emphasized the need for a liberal interpretation of this provision and allowed both sides to present evidence on the limited point in issue. The court also addressed the broader implications of international human rights covenants, affirming their inspirational value while recognizing the limitations of their direct applicability in domestic courts.
-
1969 (9) TMI 131
Issues:
1. Government's revision of royalty for the periods 1959-62 and 1962-65.
2. Interpretation of the terms of the agreement dated 7-4-56.
3. Enforceability of contractual terms through a writ of mandamus.
4. Allegations of gross injustice and hardship due to delayed revision of rates.
5. Applicability of Clause 34 of the agreement regarding recovery of dues.
6. Jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for contractual disputes.
Analysis:
1. The judgment deals with an application under Article 226 challenging the revision of royalties by the State Government for the periods 1959-62 and 1962-65. The petitioner, a limited company, owned a factory in Assam and had a lease agreement with the Government regarding the extraction of timber from forest reserves. The Government revised the royalty rates, leading to a dispute over the timing and authority of such revisions.
2. The interpretation of the terms of the agreement dated 7-4-56 was crucial in determining the legality of the Government's actions. The petitioner argued that the agreement had statutory force and could be enforced through a writ of mandamus. However, the Court held that the agreement was a legal contract, not a statutory one, and disputes under it were subject to the decision of the Government of Assam as per Clause 46 of the agreement.
3. The Court emphasized that Article 226 of the Constitution could not be invoked for the enforcement of contractual terms, even if one party was the Government. The petitioner's contention of hardship and injustice due to delayed rate revisions was deemed to be an issue for the Government to address, not the Court. The Court's role was limited to administering the law within established principles.
4. Regarding the applicability of Clause 34 of the agreement for the recovery of dues, the Court clarified that this provision did not make the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation automatically applicable. The method of recovery specified in the agreement was enforceable as a contractual term, without additional legal implications.
5. The judgment concluded that the petitioner's rights under the law were not violated, but the dispute centered on contractual obligations. Citing a Supreme Court decision, the Court reiterated that duties arising from a contract with a public servant could not be enforced through a writ under Article 226. As a result, the petition was dismissed, with each party bearing their own costs.
6. In agreement with the Chief Justice, the judgment discharged the rule nisi and vacated the stay orders, affirming the dismissal of the petition due to its lack of merit. The Court's decision underscored the limitations of invoking Article 226 for contractual disputes and the need for parties to resolve such matters through contractual mechanisms rather than seeking judicial intervention.
-
1969 (9) TMI 130
Issues:
1. Breach of agreement for land purchase and subsequent legal proceedings.
2. Dispute over apportionment of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act.
3. Stay of proceedings pending appeal for specific performance suit.
4. Revision against order continuing stay of proceedings under Section 30.
5. Ex parte order directing payment of compensation and disposal of land.
Analysis:
1. The case involved an agreement for land purchase where the sale deed was not registered, leading to a dispute between the parties. Subsequently, a notification under the Land Acquisition Act was issued for a portion of the land. Legal actions, including a suit for specific performance, were initiated by the appellant. The suit was dismissed, and an appeal was pending in the High Court.
2. A dispute arose regarding the apportionment of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, which was referred to the Court. The proceedings were stayed pending the decision of the civil suit for specific performance, as the jurisdiction of the Senior Subordinate Judge was questioned.
3. After the dismissal of the suit, the respondents sought payment of compensation, which was contested by the appellant. The Additional District Judge continued the stay of proceedings pending the appeal in the High Court, citing the importance of determining the validity of the original agreement.
4. The respondents filed a revision in the High Court against the order continuing the stay of proceedings under Section 30. A Single Judge reversed the order, directing payment of a specific amount to the respondents, with conditions regarding land disposal and appeal outcome.
5. The appellant challenged the High Court orders, arguing jurisdictional errors and ex parte decision-making. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, set aside the orders, and allowed parties to seek speedy disposal of the appeal through appropriate proceedings in the High Court.
-
1969 (9) TMI 129
Issues:
1. Interpretation of the provisions of the Redemption of Mortgages (Punjab) Act 2 of 1913 regarding the redemption of a mortgage.
2. Determination of the effect of an order rejecting a petition for redemption by the Assistant Collector on the limitation period for filing a suit for redemption.
3. Analysis of the jurisdiction of the Assistant Collector in dismissing a petition for redemption under Section 9 of the Act.
4. Examination of the necessity of filing a suit under Section 12 of the Act to challenge the order of the Collector.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a dispute over the redemption of a mortgage under the Redemption of Mortgages (Punjab) Act 2 of 1913. The plaintiffs sought redemption of a mortgage in favor of Meda, which was initially rejected by the Assistant Collector. The Trial Court granted redemption of a second mortgage but dismissed the suit for redemption of the first mortgage. The District Court and the High Court allowed the redemption, leading to an appeal by the sons of Meda to the Supreme Court.
2. The key issue revolved around the effect of the Assistant Collector's order rejecting the petition for redemption on the limitation period for filing a suit for redemption. The Assistant Collector rejected the petition citing complicated questions of fact and law, which, according to the appellant, should have barred the subsequent suit for redemption. However, the Supreme Court held that the order did not conclusively bar the suit as it did not raise any cloud on the mortgagor's title arising from the mortgage.
3. The appellant contended that the order of the Assistant Collector became final under Section 12 of the Act, preventing the mortgagor from filing a suit for redemption after the expiry of one year from the date of the order. The Court disagreed, emphasizing that the Assistant Collector's order did not fall within the terms of Section 9 of the Act, which authorizes dismissal for specific reasons. The Court highlighted that the order did not bar the claim for relief through a civil suit and, therefore, did not require setting aside.
4. The Court referenced precedents like Tulsi Das v. Diala Ram and Dewan Chand v. Raghbir Singh to support its conclusion that the Assistant Collector's decision did not affect the parties' rights and did not necessitate a suit under Section 12. The judgments emphasized that the Collector's decision to refer the matter to a civil court did not impede a suit for redemption. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the redemption of the mortgage in favor of the plaintiffs.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court clarified the interpretation of the Redemption of Mortgages (Punjab) Act 2 of 1913, emphasizing that an order rejecting a petition for redemption by the Assistant Collector does not bar a subsequent suit for redemption and does not affect the mortgagor's right to seek relief through a civil court.
-
1969 (9) TMI 128
Issues Involved:
1. Rights of lessees after the notification of an estate under Section 3 of the Act.
2. Rate at which compensation for termination of lease-hold rights should be computed.
3. Validity of Rule 1(ii) in relation to Section 20(2) of the Act.
4. Deduction of cesses in determining compensation.
5. Entitlement to interest on unpaid rents collected by the Government.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Rights of Lessees After Notification of an Estate:
The appellants contended that once the estate was notified under Section 3 of the Act and the Government took possession of the lease-hold lands, the lessees ceased to have any rights and were reduced to the position of landholders with rights preserved under Section 20 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that this contention was not raised before the High Court and thus could not be agitated for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Court noted that the appellants were entitled to the amount collected by the Government under Act XXX of 1947, as the provisions of that Act, including Section 3(4) relating to reduction of rents, continued to apply even after the notification of the estate.
2. Rate at Which Compensation for Termination of Lease-Hold Rights Should Be Computed:
The appellants argued that the compensation should be computed based on the settlement rate under Section 22 of the Act, rather than the reduced rent under Act XXX of 1947. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's view that the rent payable under Act XXX of 1947 should be considered, as the settlement rates represented the revenue payable to the Government, not the rents due to the appellants from their tenants. The Court found no basis to equate the rents payable by tenants to the appellants with the land revenue payable to the Government.
3. Validity of Rule 1(ii) in Relation to Section 20(2) of the Act:
The appellants challenged Rule 1(ii), arguing that compensation should be based on the unexpired portion of the lease, which was nearly 26 years. The Supreme Court held that Section 20(2) did not restrict the rule-making authority from framing Rule 1(ii) as it did. The rule provided that compensation for a specified number of years should be limited to either twenty times the net annual income or the net income multiplied by the unexpired portion of the lease, whichever was less. The Court found no repugnancy between Rule 1(ii) and Section 20(2) of the Act.
4. Deduction of Cesses in Determining Compensation:
The appellants contended that after the estate vested in the Government, there was no landholder to whom cesses were payable, and thus they were not liable to pay cesses. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that cesses had to be deducted from the annual gross income to arrive at the net annual income for compensation purposes. The Court noted that the term "rent" included cesses and taxes, and under Rule 2, the average net income had to be considered, which necessitated the deduction of cesses.
5. Entitlement to Interest on Unpaid Rents Collected by the Government:
The appellants argued that they were entitled to interest on the amounts of unpaid rents collected by the Government from 1950 to 1961. The Supreme Court agreed, citing Section 55(1) of the Act, which obligated the manager to collect rent and any interest payable thereon and to pay the same to the landholder. The Court referenced the principle that interest should be awarded when possession of immovable property is lost, and awarded interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amounts collected by the manager.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed to the extent that the appellants were declared entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amounts of rents collected by the manager on behalf of the Government. The final figure of compensation was to be determined after accounting for the accrued interest. No order as to costs was made.
-
1969 (9) TMI 127
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Haveli at Nadiad and the properties detailed in plaint schedules A & B are the properties of a public religious trust created by the followers of Vallabh cult residing at Nadiad.
2. The origin and management of the suit temple and its properties.
3. The nature of the Vallabh Sampradaya's worship practices and whether they allow for public temples.
4. The validity of the alienations made by the widow of the last Maharaj.
5. The evidence regarding the public or private nature of the temple and its properties.
6. The right of the Vallabh Sampradayees to worship in the temple.
7. The management and usage of the temple's income and properties.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Public Religious Trust:
The main issue was whether the Haveli at Nadiad and the properties detailed in plaint schedules A & B are the properties of a public religious trust. The plaintiffs, representing the Vallabh Sampradayees, claimed that the temple and its properties were dedicated to the deity Shree Gokulnathji and managed by the Maha Prabhu as a trustee. They contended that the properties were purchased from contributions made by the devotees and that the temple was a place of public worship. The defendants, however, argued that the temple and its properties were private, owned by the Goswami Maharaj, and that the Vallabh Sampradayees could only worship through the Maharaj in his Haveli.
2. Origin and Management:
The plaintiffs claimed that the temple existed since the late 18th century and was constructed by the followers of the Vallabha School. The idol of Gokulnathji was originally worshipped at Nagarwad and later consecrated in the new Mandir at Santh Pipli, Nadiad. They invited Goswami Mathuranathji to manage the temple. The defendants initially admitted that Mathuranathji was the first to settle in Nadiad and worship the idol in his Haveli but later changed their version, claiming that the idol was brought by Mathuranathji's ancestors.
3. Worship Practices:
The defendants argued that the Vallabh Sampradaya does not permit the founding of public temples and that worship can only be conducted through the Maharaj in his Haveli. However, the court referred to the precedent set in Tilkavat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan, which established that the Vallabh School does not prohibit worship in public temples. Each temple's public or private nature must be determined based on its specific facts.
4. Validity of Alienations:
The plaintiffs sought to declare the alienations made by the widow of the last Maharaj as illegal and not binding on the deity. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the High Court reversed this decision, accepting that the properties were part of a public religious trust and that the alienations were invalid.
5. Evidence of Public or Private Nature:
The court examined voluminous evidence, including oral testimonies and documentary evidence, to determine the nature of the temple and its properties. The existence of two sets of accounts-one for the temple and one for the Maharaj-indicated that the temple was treated as a separate entity. The plaintiffs produced evidence of gifts and bequests made to the temple, separate from those made to the Maharaj, and the public's right to worship in the temple.
6. Right to Worship:
The plaintiffs asserted that the Vallabh Sampradayees had the right to worship in the temple as of right. The court found evidence supporting this claim, including the management of the temple by the Mahajan and the public's contributions to the temple's expenses.
7. Management and Usage of Income:
The court concluded that the temple's income and properties were primarily used for the expenses of the sevas and utsavas and the upkeep of the temple. The Maharaj had the right to utilize the income for his and his family's maintenance in a reasonably comfortable manner, but the primary purpose was the temple's upkeep.
Conclusion:
The court upheld the High Court's decision that the Haveli at Nadiad and the properties detailed in plaint schedules A & B are the properties of a public religious trust. The alienations made by the widow of the last Maharaj were declared invalid. The temple was established as a public temple, and the Vallabh Sampradayees had the right to worship there. The appeal was dismissed, with no order as to costs.
-
1969 (9) TMI 126
Issues:
1. Whether the tenancy created by the mortgagee in possession survived the termination of the mortgagee interest to be binding on the purchaser.
2. Whether the tenants were protected by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (3 of 1949).
3. Determination of mesne profits.
4. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to possession before the full term of the lease with right to renewals.
Analysis:
The Supreme Court heard appeals regarding a property dispute involving a cinema building in Jullundur City, originally owned by Azim Baksh, declared evacuee property after his migration to Pakistan. The property was leased and sub-leased multiple times, eventually purchased by Raja Gyan Nath. The main issues revolved around the survival of the tenancy post-mortgagee interest termination, tenant protection under the Rent Restriction Act, determination of mesne profits, and the plaintiff's entitlement to possession before the lease term's completion.
The Court established that a mortgagee's interest ends upon redemption, terminating any derivative titles unless explicitly agreed upon by the mortgagor. While exceptions exist under s. 76(a) for prudent management binding post-termination, they are typically limited to agricultural lands. In this case, a long lease at a low rent for urban property was deemed imprudent, precluding the tenant's rights extension beyond the original lessor's interest.
Regarding tenant protection under the Rent Restriction Act, the Court found the tenancy ceased with the mortgagee's interest termination upon full mortgage payment by the purchaser, eliminating the landlord-tenant relationship. The Act's definitions applied only if the tenancy survived post-mortgage, which was not the case here due to the mortgage's extinction upon sale.
In determining mesne profits, the Court upheld the High Court's decision to limit profits to the actual rent paid for the premises, considering the rent of &8377; 250/- per month as appropriate despite potential inclusion of passage rent.
Ultimately, the Court dismissed both appeals, affirming the lower court's decision on all issues and ordering costs to be set off with the resulting difference payable.
-
1969 (9) TMI 125
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the dismissal order dated March 10, 1964.
2. Compliance with Regulation 16(3) during the enquiry process.
3. Entitlement to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution.
4. Grant of reinstatement with full pay and emoluments.
5. Jurisdiction of courts to enforce a contract of personal service.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Dismissal Order:
The primary issue was whether the dismissal order dated March 10, 1964, was valid. The trial court, Civil Judge, and Allahabad High Court all held that the order was null and void due to non-compliance with Regulation 16(3) and violation of the principles of natural justice. The courts found that the enquiry conducted was not proper and did not adhere to the mandatory provisions of Regulation 16(3).
2. Compliance with Regulation 16(3):
Regulation 16(3) mandates that no punishment other than fine, censure, or postponement/stoppage of increments or promotion shall be imposed without giving the employee an opportunity to tender an explanation in writing, cross-examine witnesses, and produce evidence in defense. The enquiry officer admitted that he did not take evidence in respect of any charge, collected information behind the respondent's back, and did not provide an opportunity for the respondent to cross-examine witnesses or produce evidence. This non-compliance led to the conclusion that the enquiry was vitiated.
3. Entitlement to Protection under Article 311:
All courts concurred that the respondent was not entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution. This article provides certain protections to public servants, but it was determined that the respondent did not fall under its purview.
4. Grant of Reinstatement with Full Pay and Emoluments:
The trial court initially denied reinstatement with full pay and emoluments, citing Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. However, the Civil Judge and Allahabad High Court reversed this decision, granting both reinstatement and full pay. The High Court held that the regulations framed under the Agricultural Produce (Development and Warehousing) Corporations Act, 1956, had statutory force, and the violation of Regulation 16(3) justified the declaration.
5. Jurisdiction of Courts to Enforce a Contract of Personal Service:
The Supreme Court examined whether the courts could enforce a contract of personal service by granting reinstatement. It discussed precedents where courts have jurisdiction to declare decisions of statutory bodies as ultra vires and void, especially when there is a breach of mandatory statutory obligations. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the regulations, though binding, did not create a statutory obligation of a mandatory nature. Therefore, the non-compliance with Regulation 16(3) resulted in wrongful dismissal, attracting liability for damages but not justifying reinstatement.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal to the extent that the High Court's judgment declaring the dismissal order null and void and reinstating the respondent was set aside. The respondent was not entitled to reinstatement with full pay and emoluments but could seek damages for wrongful dismissal. The Supreme Court emphasized that the breach of Regulation 16(3) did not amount to a breach of a statutory obligation warranting reinstatement.
-
1969 (9) TMI 124
Issues:
1. Interpretation of Section 23(1)(a) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.
2. Validity of the Gujaranama deed dated October 5, 1949 as a transfer by way of sale or gift.
3. Procedural irregularities in the proceedings before the Rehabilitation Grants Officer.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Interpretation of Section 23(1)(a) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950
The main issue in this appeal was whether the Gujaranama deed dated October 5, 1949, executed by Raja Anand Brahma Shah, constituted a transfer by way of sale or gift within the purview of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act. The appellant argued that the transaction should be construed as a gift, rendering it ineligible for recognition for rehabilitation grant assessment. However, the court disagreed, emphasizing the language of the deed which indicated a settlement in lieu of maintenance rights, not a gift or sale. The court relied on legal precedents and the specific wording of the deed to conclude that the transfer did not fall under the ambit of Section 23(1)(a).
Issue 2: Validity of the Gujaranama deed dated October 5, 1949 as a transfer by way of sale or gift
The court delved into the contents of the Gujaranama deed to determine the nature of the transaction. The deed explicitly stated that the transfer was made to provide maintenance to the respondent, acknowledging the customary right of maintenance for junior family members. The court highlighted that there was no monetary consideration involved, indicating that it was not a sale. Based on the admission in the deed and the context of impartible estate customs, the court concluded that the transaction was a settlement in lieu of maintenance, not a gift or sale. Therefore, the court ruled that the deed was not prohibited under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act.
Issue 3: Procedural irregularities in the proceedings before the Rehabilitation Grants Officer
The appellant raised concerns about procedural irregularities before the Rehabilitation Grants Officer, alleging a failure to follow Civil Procedure Code provisions. However, the court dismissed the need for remand, noting that the appellant did not contest the customary maintenance rights in the written statement. As no factual disputes were raised during the proceedings, and the challenge was primarily on a legal question, the court found no grounds for remand. Consequently, the court rejected the contention for remand and upheld the decision in favor of the respondent.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions and ruling in favor of the respondent. The court held that the Gujaranama deed was not a transfer by way of sale or gift under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act, emphasizing the settlement nature of the transaction for maintenance rights. Additionally, the court found no procedural irregularities warranting remand, leading to the dismissal of the appeal with costs.
-
1969 (9) TMI 123
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the company was in substance a partnership.
2. Whether the principles of partnership law apply to the winding-up of a private limited company.
3. Whether the breakdown of mutual confidence and trust between the parties justifies the winding-up of the company.
4. Whether the alleged exclusion of one group from management constitutes grounds for winding-up.
5. Whether the learned trial judge erred in dismissing the winding-up petition and the application for a provisional liquidator.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the company was in substance a partnership:
The court found that the company, though incorporated as a private limited company, was in substance a partnership. The original idea was to start a partnership venture, which later took the form of a private company. The shareholding was divided among two groups, reflecting the original partnership idea. The court noted that the company was treated by the parties as a partnership, with equal participation in management and mutual confidence being the basis of the association. The court concluded that the company was constituted in the image of a partnership.
2. Whether the principles of partnership law apply to the winding-up of a private limited company:
The court held that if a private company is in substance a partnership, the principles of partnership law should apply. This means that circumstances justifying the dissolution of a partnership would also justify the winding-up of the company. The court referred to the celebrated judgment in In re Yenidje Tobacco Company Ltd., where it was held that the principle of partnership can be invoked for winding-up a private company in substance a partnership. The court rejected the argument that the principle of partnership applies only in cases of deadlock.
3. Whether the breakdown of mutual confidence and trust between the parties justifies the winding-up of the company:
The court found that there was a complete breakdown of mutual confidence and trust between the two groups in the company. The group led by V.D. Jhunjhunwala had lost confidence in the group led by R.P. Jhunjhunwala, leading to a state of animosity that precluded any reasonable hope of reconciliation and friendly cooperation. The court held that such a breakdown of mutual confidence and trust justified the winding-up of the company, applying the principles of partnership law.
4. Whether the alleged exclusion of one group from management constitutes grounds for winding-up:
The court found that the group led by R.P. Jhunjhunwala was effectively excluded from the management of the company. This exclusion, coupled with the breakdown of mutual confidence and trust, constituted grounds for winding-up. The court noted that in a partnership, such exclusion would justify dissolution, and the same principle should apply to the company.
5. Whether the learned trial judge erred in dismissing the winding-up petition and the application for a provisional liquidator:
The court held that the learned trial judge erred in dismissing the winding-up petition and the application for a provisional liquidator. The court found that the principles of partnership law applied to the company and that the breakdown of mutual confidence and trust, along with the exclusion of one group from management, justified the winding-up of the company. The court set aside the judgment and order of the learned trial judge and remanded the applications for re-hearing according to the usual procedure.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment and order of the learned trial judge, and remanded the applications for winding-up and the appointment of a provisional liquidator for re-hearing. The court emphasized the need for expedition in dealing with these applications. The costs of the appeals and the hearing before the learned trial judge were made costs in the winding-up proceedings. The court also stayed the operation of its order until three weeks after the long vacation, with interim orders remaining subsisting in the meantime. An undertaking was given by the respondents that the company would not increase its existing share capital in the interim period.
-
1969 (9) TMI 122
Issues Involved:
1. Dissolution of marriage.
2. Failure to comply with the decree for restitution of conjugal rights.
3. Allegations of cruelty.
4. Reconciliation efforts.
5. Compliance with the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Dissolution of Marriage:
The present appeal arises from a suit for the dissolution of marriage instituted by the respondent husband against the appellant wife. The husband sought a decree of divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on the ground that the wife failed to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights for a period of two years.
2. Failure to Comply with the Decree for Restitution of Conjugal Rights:
The husband alleged that the wife did not return to his house despite a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The High Court had decreed that the wife should return to the husband's house, though not necessarily at Naihati, and render conjugal rights. The husband admitted in his cross-examination that he made no attempt to bring his wife back after the decree, did not send any letters, and made no inquiries about her.
3. Allegations of Cruelty:
The wife resisted the suit on the grounds of cruel treatment during her short stay at the husband's family dwelling house in Naihati. She alleged that she faced incessant torture, humiliation, and neglect. The trial court initially dismissed the suit based on these allegations of cruelty. The High Court, however, did not delve into the merits of these allegations but used the phrase "not necessarily at Naihati" to indicate that the husband should set up a separate matrimonial home to facilitate the wife's return.
4. Reconciliation Efforts:
The High Court had suspended the execution of the decree for three months to allow for reconciliation. The wife and her relatives made attempts to reconcile, but they received no response from the husband or his family. The wife also sent letters expressing her willingness to live with the husband, though not at Naihati. These letters were presumed to have been received by the husband based on certificates of posting, but he denied receiving them.
5. Compliance with the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:
The High Court emphasized that the decree for restitution of conjugal rights was primarily to give a fair trial to the husband's offer to take back the wife. The husband was expected to take proactive steps to facilitate the wife's return, which he failed to do. The court concluded that the wife did not fail to comply with the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, as the husband did not maintain his offer or make necessary arrangements for her return.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the judgment and decree of the trial court were set aside. The petition for divorce filed by the husband was dismissed. The wife was awarded costs throughout, and any amount paid by the husband towards litigation expenses was to be considered in assessing the costs to be paid by him.
-
1969 (9) TMI 121
The Supreme Court allowed three petitions under Article 32, stating that the detentions were illegal due to delays in considering representations by the State Government. The detenus were entitled to prompt consideration of their representations, which was not done, leading to their immediate release.
-
1969 (9) TMI 120
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the application for stage carriage permits under Section 46 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
2. Jurisdiction and power of the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Committee.
3. Compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 46 and the prescribed form.
4. Authority of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
Detailed Analysis:
Validity of the Application for Stage Carriage Permits under Section 46 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939:
The appellant, a State Corporation, applied for stage carriage permits on several routes. The applications were contested on the grounds that they did not fully comply with the mandatory information required under Section 46 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and the prescribed form. The Regional Transport Authority initially granted the permits to the appellant. However, the Appellate Committee later found that certain essential details were missing from the appellant's application, leading to a remand for reconsideration.
Jurisdiction and Power of the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Committee:
The Appellate Committee remanded the case to the Regional Transport Authority, directing the appellant to furnish complete information. The High Court later held that the Appellate Committee had no jurisdiction to allow the appellant to amend its defective application. The High Court remanded the appeals to the Appellate Committee to reconsider the applications of all parties except the appellant.
Compliance with the Mandatory Provisions of Section 46 and the Prescribed Form:
The High Court found that the appellant had not properly complied with the requirements of Section 46, particularly in columns 10, 14, and 15 of the prescribed form. The court held that the application lacked necessary particulars, making it defective and not deserving consideration. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, stating that the form prescribed by the State Government is valid and within the rule-making power under Section 68 of the Act. The Court emphasized that while the application must substantially conform to the requirements, the authorities do not have the power to summarily reject an application for lacking certain details.
Authority of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court acknowledged the High Court's power under Articles 226 and 227 to quash an order when the error is apparent on the face of the record. However, it clarified that the High Court's view that the application was invalid due to non-compliance with certain particulars was incorrect. The Supreme Court held that the application should be considered on merits, and any deficiencies in information should be addressed during the consideration process, not as a ground for summary rejection.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the Appellate Committee's order, allowing the appellant to furnish additional particulars. The Court emphasized that the application must be considered on its merits, and any deficiencies should be addressed during the evaluation process, not as grounds for summary rejection. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the appellant.
-
1969 (9) TMI 119
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the order of the Central Government under Section 33 of the Act is liable to be set aside on the grounds that it was passed by an officer not authorized to do so under Section 34 of the Act, because it was passed without giving an oral hearing to the petitioner and because he did not give reasons for the order?
2. Whether the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner passed under Section 24(1) of the Act was bad for an error of law apparent on the face of the record and because he did not give reasons?
3. Whether the order of the Settlement Officer with the delegated powers of the Regional Settlement Commissioner, dated 6-11-1962, was wrong?
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Order of the Central Government under Section 33 of the Act:
The petitioner challenged the order of the Central Government on three grounds: it was passed by an unauthorized officer, it was passed without giving an oral hearing, and it did not provide reasons for the dismissal. The court held that the Deputy Secretary was authorized to transact the business of the Government under the Transaction of Business Rules, thus rejecting the first ground. The court also found that the Central Government was not bound to give an oral hearing to the petitioner, as the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, and the Rules framed thereunder did not require it. The court emphasized that the principles of natural justice do not necessitate an oral hearing at every stage. Lastly, the court held that the Central Government was not required to provide reasons for its order if it adopted the reasons given by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, which were found to be sufficient and fully reasoned.
2. Order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 24(1) of the Act:
The petitioner contended that the Chief Settlement Commissioner made an error of law by holding that no proceeding for partition was pending on 31-12-1960 and did not provide reasons for his order. The court found that the view taken by the Chief Settlement Commissioner was arguable, as the petitioner did not move the Assistant Settlement Commissioner for the division of the property following the remand order dated 11-1-1960. The court also noted that the Chief Settlement Commissioner alternatively assumed that a partition proceeding was pending and held that the property was not partible. The court concluded that the Chief Settlement Commissioner was entitled to adopt the reasons given by Shri Behl and that the order was not bad for want of reasons.
3. Order of the Settlement Officer with delegated powers of the Regional Settlement Commissioner, dated 6-11-1962:
The petitioner argued that the order of the Settlement Officer was wrong as it did not take into account the opinion expressed by Shri Parshotam Sarup. The court found that the order of Shri Behl was a fully discussed and reasoned order and that it was not shown to be wrong in any respect. The court emphasized that the merits of the questions decided by the officer acting under the Act are not for the court to review, as it is not sitting in appeal over those orders.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petition, finding no merit in the grounds raised by the petitioner. The court upheld the orders of the Central Government, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, and the Settlement Officer with the delegated powers of the Regional Settlement Commissioner, concluding that they were valid and properly reasoned. No order was made as to costs.
-
1969 (9) TMI 118
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Industrial Tribunal acted illegally and without jurisdiction in making the Board liable for payment of bonus.
2. Whether there exists an employer-employee relationship between the Board and the Dock Labour workmen.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Tribunal's Jurisdiction and Liability of the Board:
The appeal, by special leave, by the Vizagapatam Dock Labour Board (the Board), contests the Industrial Tribunal's award that directed the Board to pay bonus to dock workers for the years 1964-65, 1965-66, and 1966-67. The Central Government had referred the question of bonus payment to the Tribunal, which included the Board, the Visakhapatnam Stevedores Association, individual Stevedores, and two Unions representing workers.
The Unions claimed that the work at Visakhapatnam Port was similar to that at other major ports where settlements on bonus had been reached. They argued that since the Board and the Stevedores Association were governed by the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1948 and the Vizagapatam Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme, 1959, their claim for bonus was justified.
The Stevedores Association contested the claim, asserting that the dock workers were employees of the Board, not the Stevedores, and thus, no claim for bonus could be made against them. The Board also contested, stating that it was a statutory body and not an industry under the Industrial Disputes Act, and the Stevedores were the actual employers responsible for the bonus.
The Tribunal, however, held the Board liable for the bonus, considering it the employer of the dock workers. It awarded bonus rates of 13 paise per ton for 1964-65, 14 paise per ton for 1965-66, and 15 paise per ton for 1966-67.
The Supreme Court found that the claim for bonus was primarily directed against the Stevedores Association and its members. The Tribunal was not justified in making the Board liable for the payment of bonus, as the claim was against the Stevedores. The Tribunal's understanding that the claim was against the Stevedores is evident from its own statements.
2. Employer-Employee Relationship:
The second contention was whether there existed an employer-employee relationship between the Board and the dock workers. The Supreme Court examined the Act and the Scheme, which regulate the employment of dock workers. The Board maintains a Dock Labour pool, supplies labor to the Stevedores, and collects wages from them to pay the workers. The Board also handles disciplinary actions and fixes wages.
The Court noted that the Board's primary responsibility is the administration of the Scheme, ensuring regular employment and adequate labor supply. The Stevedores are the actual employers who control and supervise the dock workers. The Board acts as an agent for the registered employers when allocating workers and handling payments.
The Court concluded that the Board could not be considered the employer of the dock workers. The relationship of master and servant exists between the Stevedores and the dock workers. The Board's functions under the Scheme do not establish an employer-employee relationship.
The Court also considered whether the Board could be considered an industry under the Industrial Disputes Act. It concluded that the Board does not carry on an industry, and thus, the Tribunal's direction for the Board to pay the bonus was incorrect.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the Industrial Tribunal's order dated May 24, 1968, and remanded I.D. No. 10 of 1967 to the Tribunal for disposal according to law. The Tribunal is to consider the claim against the Stevedores Association and its members, excluding the Dock Labour Board from the proceedings. The appeal was allowed, and parties were directed to bear their own costs.
-
1969 (9) TMI 117
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of Rule 7 read with Rule 5 and its Schedule of the Delhi Factories Rules 1950.
2. Whether the licence fee for renewal constitutes a fee or a tax.
3. Examination of services rendered by Inspectors under the Factories Act 1948.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Rule 7 read with Rule 5 and its Schedule of the Delhi Factories Rules 1950:
The appeal concerns the validity of Rule 7 read with Rule 5 and its Schedule of the Delhi Factories Rules 1950, which prescribe the licence fee for factories. The appellant company, operating several factories in Delhi, challenged the annual licence fee of Rs. 12,775.00, arguing it was excessive and not commensurate with services rendered. The High Court dismissed the petition, and the company appealed.
2. Whether the licence fee for renewal constitutes a fee or a tax:
The appellant contended that the renewal fee was merely an endorsement for the next year and did not entail services commensurate with the amount charged, thus lacking the element of quid-pro-quo, which distinguishes a fee from a tax. The High Court, however, found that the work carried out by Inspectors under the Act, ensuring health and welfare provisions for workers, constituted services rendered in return for the fee. The court noted that 60% of the licence fee was used for running the department.
The Supreme Court referenced prior cases, including *Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema* and *H.H. Sudhundra Thirtha Swamiar v. Commissioner for Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments, Mysore*, to determine the nature of the levy. It was established that a fee does not lose its character due to compulsion or lack of direct service to individuals. The levy is a fee if there is a reasonable relation between the levy and the expenses for maintaining the service.
3. Examination of services rendered by Inspectors under the Factories Act 1948:
The Supreme Court examined the Factories Act provisions, highlighting the extensive duties of Inspectors, including ensuring compliance with health, safety, and welfare standards. Inspectors provide technical advice and guidance, which benefits factory owners by preventing dangerous conditions and ensuring timely repairs. The court concluded that the Inspectors' duties involve significant technical knowledge and provide substantial benefits to factory owners, thus justifying the licence fee.
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's finding that 60% of the licence fee was spent on services for factory owners, and there was no evidence that the fees were merged into the general public revenue. Therefore, the licence fee was not a tax but a fee appropriately levied.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the validity of Rule 7 read with Rule 5 and its Schedule of the Delhi Factories Rules 1950. The court concluded that the licence fee for renewal was a fee, not a tax, and was justified by the services rendered by Inspectors under the Factories Act 1948. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
-
1969 (9) TMI 116
Issues:
1. Validity of West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Amending and Validating Ordinance, 1965 and Act XXVIII of 1965.
2. Jurisdiction of the State Legislature to validate an order of transfer quashed by a writ of certiorari.
3. Scope and effect of Validating Act and Ordinance in relation to court judgments.
4. Competence of the legislature to pass retrospective laws and amend statutes.
5. Authority of the legislature to pass Amending and Validating Acts.
6. Effect and validity of retrospective legislation on court judgments.
Analysis:
Issue 1:
The appellant challenged the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Amending and Validating Ordinance, 1965, and Act XXVIII of 1965. These laws aimed to validate the withdrawal or transfer of cases from Special Courts. The Ordinance and Act retroactively validated past actions taken by the State Government regarding case transfers.
Issue 2:
The appellant argued that the State Legislature and Governor could not validate an order of transfer previously quashed by a writ of certiorari. However, the High Court held that the retrospective operation of the Ordinance and Act validated the original transfer order from its inception.
Issue 3:
The Fourth Special Court's interpretation of the Validating Act and Ordinance was challenged. The High Court correctly held that the legislation validated past actions without affecting court judgments. The legislature's power to amend laws retrospectively was upheld, ensuring the legality of past transactions.
Issue 4:
The judgment highlighted the competence of a State Legislature to pass laws within its constitutional authority, subject to limitations. The legislature can enact laws prospectively or retrospectively, with the power to amend statutes to remedy defects or validate past actions.
Issue 5:
The concept of Amending and Validating Acts was discussed, emphasizing their role in amending laws retrospectively to protect and validate past actions. The legislature's jurisdiction to pass such Acts, even after court judgments, was affirmed through legal precedents.
Issue 6:
The judgment cited various cases, such as Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India, to illustrate the effect and validity of retrospective legislation on court judgments. It established that if a law does not violate constitutional limitations, it can override court decisions and cure identified defects.
In conclusion, the appeal challenging the Validating Ordinance and Act was dismissed, affirming the legislature's authority to pass retrospective laws and validate past actions, even in the presence of court judgments.
-
1969 (9) TMI 114
Issues:
1. Validity of the arbitration agreement under the Indian Arbitration Act.
2. Disclosure of arbitrators' names and its compliance with natural justice.
3. Conflict between the Rules of Arbitration of the Indian Chamber of Commerce and the provisions of the Act.
4. Impact of rules on the powers and jurisdiction of the court under relevant provisions of the Act.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: The main issue in this case was the validity of the arbitration agreement under the Indian Arbitration Act. The appellant argued that the arbitration agreement was void and ineffective due to conflicting clauses in the contract. The contract specified that disputes would be referred to the Indian Chamber of Commerce for arbitration, but the appellant was not a member of the Chamber. The appellant contended that the Rules of the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Chamber were illegal and void. However, both the High Court and the Supreme Court rejected these contentions and upheld the validity of the arbitration agreement.
Issue 2: Another crucial issue raised was the non-disclosure of the names of the arbitrators by the Registrar of the Chamber of Commerce. The appellant argued that this non-disclosure violated natural justice and infringed the provisions of the Act. The appellant sought information regarding the arbitrators but was not provided with the names. The Court examined the Rules of Arbitration of the Chamber, which allowed for non-disclosure of arbitrators' names to non-members. The Court held that the power given to the Registrar was discretionary and did not conflict with the Act as parties would eventually know the arbitrators' names once proceedings commenced.
Issue 3: The appellant also contended that Rule III of the Rules of Arbitration of the Indian Chamber of Commerce conflicted with the Act. The Rule stated that the Tribunal would consist of persons selected by the Chamber's Committee. The appellant argued that this rule was in conflict with the Act. The Court examined a similar judgment of the Calcutta High Court but disagreed with its interpretation, holding that the Chamber's Rules did not offend any sections of the Act.
Issue 4: The final issue revolved around the impact of the Chamber's Rules on the powers and jurisdiction of the court under the relevant provisions of the Act. The Court emphasized that the appellant had agreed to submit to the arbitration of the Chamber, thereby being bound by all its Rules. The Court found no conflict between the Chamber's Rules and the Act, stating that the Rules did not interfere with the court's powers under the Act. The Court highlighted that the Chamber's non-disclosure rule aimed to prevent any party from influencing arbitrators before proceedings commenced.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the arbitration agreement, dismissed the appellant's contentions regarding non-disclosure of arbitrators' names, and found no conflict between the Chamber's Rules and the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act. The Court emphasized the discretionary power of the Registrar and the importance of parties being able to raise objections during arbitration proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, with no order as to costs.
-
1969 (9) TMI 113
Issues Involved:
1. Section 5(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and Article 14 of the Constitution.
2. Constitutionality of the Act concerning Article 19(1)(g).
3. Necessity of appointing a committee under Section 5(1)(a) of the Act.
4. Quasi-judicial nature of fixing minimum wages and principles of natural justice.
5. Permissibility of fixing different minimum wages in different industries.
6. Division of the State into zones for fixing different rates of minimum wages.
7. Rational basis for the division of the State into zones.
8. Valuation of food provided to employees.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Section 5(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and Article 14 of the Constitution:
The contention was that Section 5(1) of the Act is violative of Article 14 as it confers unguided and uncontrolled discretion on the Government to follow either of the alternative procedures prescribed in clauses (a) and (b). The Court held that the power under Section 5(1) is not arbitrary as the Government can be trusted to exercise that power to further the purposes of the Act. The legislative policy is clear, and the Government is merely charged with implementing that policy. Discretion to select one of the two procedures depends on the nature of the employment and the information the Government has in its possession.
2. Constitutionality of the Act concerning Article 19(1)(g):
The provisions of the Act were challenged as they allegedly interfered with the freedom of trade guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g). The Court reiterated that the Act aims to prevent the exploitation of unorganized labor and ensure minimum wages, which is a step towards fulfilling the mandate of Article 43 of the Constitution. The Act does not violate Article 19(1)(g) as the freedom of trade does not include the freedom to exploit.
3. Necessity of appointing a committee under Section 5(1)(a) of the Act:
It was argued that the Government must appoint a committee under Section 5(1)(a) to inquire and advise on fixing minimum wages. The Court held that the Government has the discretion to choose between the procedures in Section 5(1)(a) and Section 5(1)(b). The Government had sufficient data to proceed under Section 5(1)(b) and had consulted the advisory committee constituted under Section 7.
4. Quasi-judicial nature of fixing minimum wages and principles of natural justice:
The contention was that fixing minimum wages is a quasi-judicial act, and the Government failed to observe the principles of natural justice. The Court noted that whether the power is quasi-judicial or administrative, the principles of natural justice apply. However, the procedure adopted was adequate and effective, and reasonable opportunity was given to all concerned parties to represent their case.
5. Permissibility of fixing different minimum wages in different industries:
The argument that the Government cannot fix different minimum wages for different industries was dismissed. The Court referred to its earlier decision in M/s. Bhaikusa Yamasa Kahatriya v. Sangamner Akola Taluka Bidi Kamgar Union, which upheld the Government's power to fix different minimum wages based on varying economic conditions, cost of living, and nature of work.
6. Division of the State into zones for fixing different rates of minimum wages:
The division of the State into zones and fixing different rates of minimum wages for different zones was challenged. The Court held that such division is permissible under Section 3(3) and is consistent with the scheme of the Act. The Government's decision was based on rational considerations, such as the economic significance of Bangalore and Mangalore.
7. Rational basis for the division of the State into zones:
The Court found that the division into zones was done on a rational basis. The Government provided valid reasons for its decision, including the status of Bangalore as the state capital and Mangalore as a major port. The cost of living index was not the sole factor; other considerations were also relevant.
8. Valuation of food provided to employees:
The valuation of the food provided to employees was contested as unreasonably low. The Court found this argument petty and misconceived. The minimum wage calculation includes various components, not just food. The notification allowed employers to deduct the cost of meals provided, which was an option, not a duty. The relevant rule for valuation was Rule 22(2)(v), considering food as an amenity.
Conclusion:
The appeal and the writ petition were dismissed with costs. The Court permitted the owners of residential hotels and eating houses to pay the arrears of minimum wages within six months, subject to interest at 6% per annum.
-
1969 (9) TMI 112
Issues Involved:
1. Determination of Standard Rent
2. Applicability of Section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
3. Legal Presumption of Postal Money Order Dispatch
4. Deposit of Rent for Three Consecutive Months
Detailed Analysis:
1. Determination of Standard Rent
The appellant, Chawla, contended that the Controller was bound to determine the standard rent of the premises in the proceeding instituted by Sethi, and since the Controller failed to do so, the order in ejectment was illegal. The court clarified that under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the standard rent must be determined by the Controller. Sections 6 and 9 of the Act provide the framework for determining the standard rent, which must be done through an application made within two years from the commencement of the Act or from the date of letting. The court held that the prohibition against recovery of rent in excess of the standard rent applies only from the date on which the standard rent is determined by the Controller and not before that date. The court rejected the argument that the standard rent could be determined as a defense in an ejectment proceeding without adhering to the limitation period prescribed under Section 12 of the Act.
2. Applicability of Section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
Chawla argued that the courts below erred in holding that he could not obtain the benefit of Section 14(2) of the Act. Section 14(2) provides that no order for the recovery of possession shall be made if the tenant makes payment or deposits as required by Section 15. However, the court noted that Chawla had previously committed default in payment of rent and had obtained the benefit of Section 14(2) by depositing the due amount in an earlier proceeding. Since Chawla had again defaulted in payment for three consecutive months, he was not entitled to claim the protection of Section 14(2). The court emphasized that the proviso to Section 14(2) is mandatory, and Chawla was not entitled to the benefit due to his previous default.
3. Legal Presumption of Postal Money Order Dispatch
Chawla contended that the legal presumption arising from the dispatch of a postal money order for Rs. 320 addressed to Sethi had been ignored by all the courts. The court found that Chawla failed to prove that the money order was duly addressed to Sethi and that Sethi refused to accept it. The only evidence was a postal receipt that did not bear Sethi's residential address. Sethi's testimony that no one had tendered the postal money order to him was believed by the courts. Therefore, this contention was dismissed.
4. Deposit of Rent for Three Consecutive Months
Chawla argued that he had made a deposit of rent for three months and if that deposit were taken into account, he was not in arrears for three consecutive months at the date of the initiation of the proceeding. The court noted that this plea was not raised before the Rent Controller or the Rent Control Tribunal and was sought to be urged for the first time before the High Court, which declined to entertain it. The court did not permit counsel to raise this plea as its determination depended on proof of facts that were never proved.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the Rent Controller, the Rent Control Tribunal, and the High Court. The appeal was dismissed with costs, affirming that the Controller's failure to determine the standard rent did not invalidate the ejectment order, and Chawla was not entitled to the benefit of Section 14(2) due to his previous defaults. The legal presumption regarding the postal money order was not substantiated, and the plea concerning the deposit of rent for three months was not entertained.
|
9911796707
