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1984 (9) TMI 306
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of High Courts to grant anticipatory bail for offences committed outside their territorial limits.
2. Interpretation of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning anticipatory bail.
3. Constitutional provisions related to arrest and detention.
4. Practical implications of granting anticipatory bail by different High Courts.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of High Courts to Grant Anticipatory Bail for Offences Committed Outside Their Territorial Limits:
The primary issue addressed is whether a High Court has the authority to grant anticipatory bail for offences committed beyond its territorial jurisdiction. The judgment references various High Court decisions with differing views. The Calcutta High Court in B. R. Sinha v. State (1982 Crl. L.J. 61) held that the High Court within whose jurisdiction the person resides can grant anticipatory bail even if the offence is committed outside its jurisdiction. The Karnataka High Court in L. R. Naidu v. State of Karnataka (1984 Crl.L.J. 757) followed this view. Conversely, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ravinder Mohan v. State of Punjab (1984 Crl. L.J. 714) dissented, stating that only the High Court within whose jurisdiction the offence is committed has the authority under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. Interpretation of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Concerning Anticipatory Bail:
The judgment emphasizes that Section 438 allows any person who anticipates arrest for a non-bailable offence to apply for anticipatory bail. The court must balance the constitutional guarantees under Articles 21 and 22, procedural safeguards under the Criminal Procedure Code, and the jurisdiction conferred on High Courts. The judgment notes that anticipatory bail is a pre-arrest legal process closely linked with an offence or crime, as observed by the Supreme Court in Gurbaksh Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1980 SC 1632).
3. Constitutional Provisions Related to Arrest and Detention:
Article 21 ensures that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Article 22(2) mandates that every person arrested and detained must be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours. The judgment highlights that the place of arrest provides a reasonable nexus for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 438.
4. Practical Implications of Granting Anticipatory Bail by Different High Courts:
The judgment addresses the practical difficulties arising from conflicting orders by different High Courts. It asserts that the court within whose jurisdiction the arrest is sought to be effected can decide on granting anticipatory bail. The court within whose jurisdiction the offence is committed is also competent to grant anticipatory bail. However, the anticipatory bail granted by the High Court or Sessions Court within whose jurisdiction the offence is committed will extend beyond the territorial limits of that court. The judgment concludes that the residence of the accused is not a relevant factor for fixing jurisdiction for anticipatory bail.
Case-Specific Orders:
Crl. M.C. No. 665 of 1984:
The petitioner, a stock and share broker from Kerala, apprehends arrest in connection with cases registered in West Bengal. The court directs that if the petitioner is arrested within Kerala, he shall be released on bail upon furnishing a bond for Rs. 2000/- and two solvent sureties. The petitioner must be available for interrogation in Kerala and shall not leave India without permission.
Crl. M.C. No. 708 of 1984:
The petitioner, a Class I Officer of the Indian Railways, apprehends arrest in connection with a case in Bihar. The court directs that if the petitioner is arrested within Kerala, he shall be released on bail upon furnishing a bond for Rs. 2000/- and two solvent sureties. The petitioner must be available for interrogation in Kerala and shall not leave India without permission.
Conclusion:
The judgment establishes that anticipatory bail can be granted by the High Court within whose jurisdiction the arrest is sought to be effected or the offence is committed. However, the relief granted should be restricted to arrests within the respective State, and the residence of the accused is not a determining factor for jurisdiction. The orders issued do not prevent the petitioners from seeking appropriate relief from the respective courts in West Bengal and Bihar.
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1984 (9) TMI 305
Issues Involved:
1. Legality and justification of the termination of services of Shri R.K. Kindra.
2. Adherence to principles of natural justice and equity in the enquiry proceedings.
3. Entitlement of the worker to any relief.
Summary of Judgment:
1. Legality and Justification of Termination:
The appellant, Rajinder Kumar Kindra, was dismissed from service by M/s. Raymond Woolen Mills Ltd. following charges of misappropriation, conspiracy, and negligence. The Enquiry Officer found him guilty of gross negligence and misconduct. However, the arbitrator found no evidence supporting the charges of misappropriation, manipulation of accounts, or conspiracy. The Supreme Court noted that the only misconduct alleged was the appellant's negligence in keeping his private cheque book, which was not a valid ground for dismissal. The Court held that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were perverse and based on no legal evidence.
2. Adherence to Principles of Natural Justice and Equity:
The arbitrator initially appointed, Shri G.C. Jain, concluded that the enquiry was vitiated due to the absence of evidence. However, a second arbitrator, Shri N.L. Kakkar, upheld the dismissal based on the same flawed evidence. The Supreme Court emphasized that the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the second arbitrator were perverse and not supported by any evidence. The Court reiterated that keeping one's private cheque book in any manner is not part of the performance of duty and does not constitute misconduct.
3. Entitlement to Relief:
The Supreme Court held that the appellant's dismissal was unsustainable and ordered his reinstatement with full back-wages and consequential benefits. The Court rejected the employer's argument that the appellant was gainfully employed during his dismissal period, noting that merely helping his father-in-law did not constitute gainful employment. The appellant was awarded costs of Rs. 3,000/- and was to be reinstated within a week with all consequential benefits.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the award of the arbitrator Shri Kakkar, and directed the reinstatement of the appellant with full back-wages and consequential benefits, emphasizing the perverse nature of the findings and the lack of evidence supporting the charges against the appellant.
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1984 (9) TMI 304
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of REP licence and its transferability.
2. Actual user condition and its applicability.
3. Customs authorities' change of stance and withholding of goods.
4. Issuance of show cause notice and its legality.
5. Import restrictions under the Import Policy of 1977-78.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of REP Licence and Its Transferability:
The petitioner, a partnership firm, imported tetracycline hydrochloride under REP licences transferred to them. These licences were originally issued under the Import Policy of 1977-78, which allowed the import of raw materials, components, consumables, stores, and packing materials. The REP licences were freely transferable and not subject to any actual user condition from 1st April 1978, as clarified by the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports.
2. Actual User Condition and Its Applicability:
Paragraph 30(1) of the Import Policy of 1977-78 stipulated that the imported goods must be required for use in the licence holder's factory and subject to actual user condition. However, from 1st April 1978, REP licences became freely transferable, and the actual user condition was no longer applicable. The customs authorities had previously allowed the clearance of tetracycline hydrochloride under these licences, acknowledging their transferability and exemption from the actual user condition.
3. Customs Authorities' Change of Stance and Withholding of Goods:
The customs authorities suddenly changed their stance and withheld five consignments of tetracycline hydrochloride imported by the petitioner. The petitioner had complied with all formalities, including transferring the licence and entering into a contract with foreign suppliers. The customs authorities' previous practice was to allow clearance of such goods, but they now claimed that the import could not be allowed unless the goods were required by the importer in their own factory.
4. Issuance of Show Cause Notice and Its Legality:
The customs authorities issued a show cause notice to the petitioner, alleging that the import of tetracycline hydrochloride was in contravention of the Import Policy of 1977-78 and the Customs Act, 1962. The petitioner argued that the show cause notice was arbitrary and illegal, as the identical goods had been released on earlier occasions under similar licences. The records showed that the customs authorities had previously allowed clearance of such goods after considering various objections and obtaining clarifications from the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports.
5. Import Restrictions Under the Import Policy of 1977-78:
The Import Policy of 1977-78 included certain restrictions on the import of raw materials, components, consumables, stores, and packing materials. Annexure I contained a list of banned items, and Annexure II contained a list of export-linked-import items. Tetracycline hydrochloride was not initially included in these lists but was later added as an export-linked-import item on 27th September 1977. The customs authorities argued that the restriction should apply retrospectively, but the court held that such restrictions could not have retrospective operation.
Conclusion:
The court found that the customs authorities' sudden change of stance and issuance of the show cause notice were arbitrary and without any new facts or materials. The petitioner had complied with all formalities, and the REP licence was valid for the import of tetracycline hydrochloride under the Import Policy of 1977-78. The court directed the customs authorities to assess the bills of entry and allow clearance of the goods within 48 hours, subject to the payment of assessed customs duties. The respondents were also directed to issue full wharfage and/or demurrage rent exemption certificates for the consignments.
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1984 (9) TMI 303
The High Court of Bombay held that the written down value and actual cost of assets acquired before 1-4-1961 should be determined according to the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, not the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The decision was based on a previous case and the parties were directed to bear their own costs.
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1984 (9) TMI 302
Issues: Determination of whether the appellants' underground petrol tanks qualify as "building" under section 299 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act.
Analysis:
1. The case revolves around the classification of the appellants' 3 underground petrol tanks as "building" under section 299 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. The tanks, each with a capacity of 2,000 gallons, are embedded in the ground and service the petrol station. The Municipal Corporation issued a notice under section 299 to take possession of the land occupied by the tanks, leading to the present appeal challenging the notice.
2. The appellants argue that the tanks should be considered "building" based on precedents where underground structures were deemed as such. However, the court examines the definition of "building" under the Act, which includes various structures made of different materials. The appellants describe the tanks with masonry work but fail to establish them as buildings.
3. The court rejects the argument that the tanks qualify as "building" as they are primarily containers for storing petrol and do not transform into buildings due to being underground. The masonry work on the tanks is for protection, not to convert them into a building. Comparisons to drainage pipes highlight the absurdity of considering tanks as buildings.
4. The court emphasizes that the tanks' capability to be shifted indicates they are not structures fixed to the ground like buildings. Legislative provisions within the Act further support that tanks do not fall under the definition of "building," as they lack the concept of occupancy associated with traditional buildings.
5. The court dismisses reliance on English court decisions, stating they are irrelevant to the current case and the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. It refutes the claim that the tanks are integral to the petrol pump complex, emphasizing that the tanks themselves do not meet the criteria to be classified as buildings.
6. Ultimately, the court concludes that the appellants' underground petrol tanks do not qualify as "building" under section 299 of the Act. The appeal is dismissed with costs, affirming that the tanks are not subject to the possession notice issued by the Municipal Corporation.
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1984 (9) TMI 301
Issues:
1. Interpretation of provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 regarding confiscation of goods and payment of fine.
2. Validity of the split up license and its conditions for importation of goods.
3. Determination of whether imported hydraulic pumps are considered components or spares under the Import and Export Policy.
4. Application of Appendices 5, 26, and 30 of the Import and Export Policy to the case.
5. Distinction between components and spares as per the policy.
6. Decision on whether the imported hydraulic pumps are permissible items for import under the policy.
Analysis:
The judgment concerns an application under Article 226 challenging the Collector of Customs' order confiscating goods under the Customs Act, 1962. The petitioner imported hydraulic pumps described as components for hydraulic excavators. The dispute arises from the Collector's view that the goods were not covered by the split up license, leading to the option of fine for release. The petitioner argued the goods fell under serial No. 411 of Appendix 5 of the 1983-84 Policy, while the Collector's order disagreed. The key issue revolves around whether the pumps are considered components or spares under the policy.
The judgment delves into the provisions of the Import and Export Policy regarding the split up license's validity for importation of goods. It highlights the conditions imposed on the license, including disposal to eligible actual users as per Paragraphs 186 and 232 of the Policy. The Collector's decision was based on the belief that the goods did not align with the license's coverage, leading to the confiscation order.
A crucial aspect of the judgment involves the interpretation of Appendices 5, 26, and 30 of the Policy to determine the classification of the imported hydraulic pumps. It examines the exclusion of certain items, such as pumps, under Appendix 26 and the distinction between components and spares as per the Policy's definitions. The judgment emphasizes the importance of understanding whether the pumps are intended for use as components in manufacturing, as declared by the actual user, Hindustan Motors Ltd.
The court scrutinizes the distinction between components and spares under the Policy, emphasizing that the same item can serve different purposes based on its use by the actual user. It concludes that the pumps imported by the petitioner, intended for manufacturing excavators by Hindustan Motors Ltd., qualify as components under Appendix 5 and not as spares under Appendix 26. The judgment emphasizes the need to consider the beneficial construction of fiscal enactments when in doubt, favoring the subject.
In the final analysis, the court rules in favor of the petitioner, setting aside the Collector's penalty order and directing the release of the hydraulic pumps upon payment of assessed duties. The judgment clarifies that the pumps are permissible items for import under the Policy as components, not spares, based on their intended use in manufacturing excavators.
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1984 (9) TMI 300
Issues involved: Interpretation of Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act regarding prosecution of individuals u/s company's contravention.
Summary:
The Supreme Court heard an appeal where the State of Madhya Pradesh filed a complaint against two individuals, the Managing Director and Production Manager of a company, for alleged violations of licensing orders. The individuals sought to quash the proceedings, arguing they could not be prosecuted unless the company itself was also prosecuted. The Court examined Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, which specifies liability for contraventions by a company. The Court clarified that the Act allows for prosecution of the company, persons in charge, and officers separately or together. It emphasized that prosecution of individuals does not require simultaneous prosecution of the company, as long as the contravention by the company is established. The Court referred to previous judgments to support its interpretation. The appeals were dismissed, upholding the maintainability of the prosecutions.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court clarified the interpretation of Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, affirming the separate prosecution of individuals u/s a company's contravention without the necessity of simultaneous prosecution of the company itself. The Court emphasized the need to establish the company's contravention before holding individuals liable, rejecting the contention that individuals must be prosecuted only if the company is also prosecuted. The Court's decision upheld the maintainability of the prosecutions in this case, dismissing the appeals.
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1984 (9) TMI 299
The High Court of Allahabad allowed the revision by the assessee for the assessment year 1977-78, against the Tribunal's order dated 26.4.1983, which rejected the book version. The rejection was based on two reasons: (1) Rokar and Khata were not found at the shop during the first survey, and (2) cash was short during the second survey. The Court held that the books cannot be rejected solely for these reasons, as the assessee provided plausible explanations. The revision was allowed, and each party will bear their own costs.
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1984 (9) TMI 298
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of octroi on goods in transit.
2. Entitlement to refund of octroi deposited on exported goods.
3. Interpretation of relevant rules and provisions regarding octroi and refunds.
Detailed Analysis:
Legality of Octroi on Goods in Transit:
The petitioner, a partnership firm dealing in bailing hoops and other commodities, sought a writ of mandamus against the Municipal Council, asking it to forbear from claiming octroi on goods in transit from one octroi limit to another, which are neither consumed nor used within the municipal area. The petitioner also sought a refund of the tax illegally collected, amounting to Rs. 809.59.
Entitlement to Refund of Octroi Deposited on Exported Goods:
The petitioner imported several consignments within the octroi limits and deposited them in the bonded warehouse maintained by the Council. These goods were later exported after following all required formalities and depositing the octroi amount as per the Maharashtra Municipalities (Octroi) Rules, 1968. The petitioner applied for a refund of the octroi deposited, but the Council rejected the claim, stating that the goods had changed ownership within the octroi limits.
The petitioner argued that the refusal to refund the octroi was illegal and unconstitutional since octroi can only be levied on goods consumed or used within the municipal limits. The petitioner maintained that the change of ownership within the octroi limits should not affect the liability for octroi if the goods are not used or consumed within those limits but are exported out.
The Council resisted the petition, arguing that the refund was rightly rejected because the goods had changed hands within the octroi limits, and the importer and exporter were not the same person, as per Rule 25(3)(d) of the Rules.
Interpretation of Relevant Rules and Provisions:
The court examined the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules. Section 2(28) of the Act defines octroi as "a tax on the entry of goods into a municipal area for consumption, use, or sale therein." Rules 19 and 20 prescribe the procedure for temporary detention of imported goods in a Bonded Warehouse and eventual export, while Rule 23 provides for the refund of deposits made under Rule 20. Rule 25 lays down the procedure for temporary detention of dutiable goods for eventual export with the importer himself, and Rule 28 provides for the refund of the deposit made under Rule 24 at the time of import.
The court noted that the petitioner had followed the procedure prescribed in Rules 19, 20, 24, and 25 while importing and exporting the goods. The Council had rejected the refund claim solely on the ground that the goods had undergone a change of ownership within the octroi limits.
The court referred to the Supreme Court's rulings in Burmah Shell Oil Co. v. Belgaum Borough Municipality and Hiralal v. Broach Municipality, which established that octroi is levied on goods brought within the octroi limits for consumption or use therein. If the goods are not imported for consumption or use within the limits but for export, they are not exigible to octroi.
The court found that the petitioner had imported the goods for eventual export and had followed the prescribed procedure for claiming a refund. The Council's refusal to refund the octroi on the grounds of change of ownership was not justified. The court held that the petitioner was entitled to a refund of Rs. 570 for the goods deposited in the Bonded Warehouse and Rs. 239.59 for the goods temporarily detained by the petitioner for eventual export.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the petition and directed the respondent Municipal Council to refund the petitioner the sum of Rs. 809.59 within three months. The petition was allowed, and no order as to costs was made.
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1984 (9) TMI 297
Issues Involved:
1. Unfettered right to appointment based on Subordinate Service Selection Board recommendation.
2. Compliance with Punjab Police Rules regarding direct recruitment and promotion quotas.
3. Allegations of mala fide actions by the State Government.
4. Violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
5. Validity of Board recommendations after the Board became functus officio.
6. Applicability of promissory estoppel against the State Government.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Unfettered Right to Appointment:
The main question was whether a person selected by the Subordinate Service Selection Board for direct appointment to the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police has an unfettered right to be appointed based on the Board's recommendation. The Court held that the selection by the Board is only a recommendation and the final authority for appointment lies with the Government. The Government may accept or decline the recommendation. The Constitution enjoins the Government to place its reasons for any departure from the recommendation before the Legislative Assembly, but this does not create an enforceable right for the appellants to be appointed.
2. Compliance with Punjab Police Rules:
The appellants argued that the State was bound to follow the Punjab Police Rules, specifically rule 12.3, which mandates that 25% of Assistant Sub-Inspector posts be filled by direct recruitment and 75% by promotion. The Court found that the State Government had adhered to this rule. Detailed information provided by the State revealed that promotions were made according to the quota, and the appellants' claim for a right to appointment based on this rule was unfounded.
3. Allegations of Mala Fide Actions:
The appellants alleged that the State Government's actions were mala fide, aiming to appoint its own favorites by making ad hoc appointments. The Court found no evidence to support these allegations. The learned Single Judge concluded that there were no vacancies in the direct recruitment quota and no ad hoc appointments in the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspectors. Therefore, the claim of mala fides was not substantiated.
4. Violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution:
The appellants contended that the Government's refusal to appoint them violated Articles 14 and 16, which guarantee equality before the law and equal opportunity in public employment. The Court held that the appellants' case was not identical to those who were appointed against the original 57 vacancies. Therefore, there was no violation of Articles 14 and 16.
5. Validity of Board Recommendations After Becoming Functus Officio:
The appellants argued that the recommendations made by the Board should remain effective even after the Board became functus officio. The Court did not find it necessary to delve into this issue in detail, as the primary question was whether the appellants had a right to appointment based on the Board's recommendation. Since the appellants had no such right, the issue of the Board's functus officio status was irrelevant.
6. Applicability of Promissory Estoppel:
The appellants invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel, arguing that the State Government should be estopped from refusing their appointment after the Board's recommendation. The Court dismissed this argument, stating that the notification issued by the Board was merely an invitation to apply for selection and did not constitute a promise of appointment. The appellants did not acquire any right to appointment merely by being recommended by the Board.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed, with the Court concluding that the appellants had no enforceable right to appointment based on the Board's recommendation. The allegations of mala fides and violations of constitutional rights were not substantiated, and the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not apply. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs.
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1984 (9) TMI 296
Issues Involved:
1. Status of an industrial undertaking upon appointment of an authorized controller under Sec. 18A of the IDR Act.
2. Exclusion of employees from the operation of the Bonus Act under Sec. 32(IV).
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Status of an Industrial Undertaking upon Appointment of an Authorized Controller under Sec. 18A of the IDR Act:
The core issue was whether the appointment of an authorized controller under Sec. 18A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (IDR Act) changes the status of an industrial undertaking to one that is carried on under the authority of the Central Government. The judgment clarified that the IDR Act was enacted to regulate scheduled industries and provide the Central Government with the means to implement industrial policy. Sec. 18A allows the Central Government to appoint an authorized controller to take over management if the industrial undertaking is mismanaged or fails to comply with government directions.
The court held that the appointment of an authorized controller does not equate to the Central Government taking over the industrial undertaking. The change is limited to management, and the industrial undertaking retains its identity and continues to be governed by the Companies Act or relevant laws. The authorized controller assumes the role of a director, but the ownership and identity of the industrial undertaking remain unchanged. Therefore, the appointment of an authorized controller does not make the industrial undertaking one carried on under the authority of the Central Government.
2. Exclusion of Employees from the Operation of the Bonus Act under Sec. 32(IV):
The second issue was whether employees of an industrial undertaking managed by an authorized controller are excluded from the Bonus Act under Sec. 32(IV). Sec. 32(IV) of the Bonus Act excludes employees employed by an establishment engaged in any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government. The court examined whether the industrial undertaking, upon the appointment of an authorized controller, falls under this exclusion.
The judgment emphasized that the expression "under the authority of any department of the Central Government" means direct responsibility for management by the department, including financial responsibility. The mere regulatory control or change in management does not qualify as being carried on under the authority of the Central Government. The court concluded that the industrial undertaking managed by an authorized controller does not acquire the status of being carried on under the authority of the Central Government. Therefore, the employees are not excluded from the operation of the Bonus Act.
Precedents and Supporting Cases:
The court referred to several precedents to support its conclusions. In Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. The State of Bihar, it was held that a government-controlled company does not become an agent of the Central Government. Similarly, in Workmen, Karnataka P.F. Employees Union v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, it was held that an instrumentality of the State is not an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. The court also referred to M/s Swadeshi Cotton Mills Thoznialar Shemalana Padukaypu Union v. M/s National Textile Corporation Ltd., where it was held that the appointment of an authorized controller does not make the industrial undertaking an undertaking of the Central Government.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the Tribunal erred in rejecting the references based on the exclusion under Sec. 32(IV) of the Bonus Act. The industrial undertaking managed by an authorized controller does not become an establishment engaged in an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. Consequently, the employees are entitled to claim bonus under the Bonus Act. The court quashed the Tribunal's awards and remitted the matters to the Industrial Court for disposal on merits, directing the Industrial Court to expedite the process. The National Textile Corporation, which took over the respondent company, is liable to pay the bonus for the period when the authorized controller was in charge.
Disposition:
The appeals were allowed, the awards of the Industrial Court were quashed, and the matters were remitted for disposal on merits. The respondent was directed to pay costs of Rs. 2,000 to the appellant.
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1984 (9) TMI 295
Issues Involved:
1. Maximum amount of pension under Rule 299(1)(b) of the Hyderabad Civil Services Rules.
2. Validity of the amendment to Rule 299(1)(b) restricting the maximum pension.
3. Previous approval of the Central Government for the amendment under Section 115(7) of the States Reorganization Act, 1956.
4. Waiver and estoppel regarding the right to claim pension.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Maximum Amount of Pension under Rule 299(1)(b) of the Hyderabad Civil Services Rules:
The core issue was whether the maximum pension for superior service under Rule 299(1)(b) was Rs. 1,000 per month or Rs. 857.15 per month. The appellants argued for Rs. 1,000 per month, while the State of Andhra Pradesh contended it was Rs. 857.15 per month. The court examined the historical context of the Hyderabad Civil Services Rules and the transition from Osmania Sikka to Indian Government currency. It concluded that the omission of "O.S." before "Rs. 1,000" in Rule 299 was deliberate, intending to provide a higher pension in Indian Government currency.
2. Validity of the Amendment to Rule 299(1)(b) Restricting the Maximum Pension:
The amendment dated February 3, 1971, sought to reduce the maximum pension from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 857.15 per month. The court scrutinized whether this amendment was valid, especially given the requirement of previous approval from the Central Government under Section 115(7) of the States Reorganization Act, 1956. The court found that the amendment was invalid and inoperative as it lacked the necessary prior approval from the Central Government.
3. Previous Approval of the Central Government for the Amendment under Section 115(7) of the States Reorganization Act, 1956:
The State argued that a letter dated April 28, 1973, from the Joint Secretary to the Government of India constituted prior approval. However, the court noted that this letter explicitly stated that no prior approval was necessary, thus not providing the required approval. The court emphasized that the amendment, which retrospectively reduced the pension, required such approval, which was not granted, rendering the amendment invalid.
4. Waiver and Estoppel Regarding the Right to Claim Pension:
The State contended that the appellants had waived their right to claim the higher pension by accepting the lower amount without protest. The court rejected this argument, stating that there was no factual basis for waiver or estoppel. The appellants had promptly filed writ petitions challenging the reduction in their pension, indicating no waiver of their rights.
Conclusion:
The court held that the appellants were entitled to receive a pension based on the maximum amount of Rs. 1,000 per month in Indian Government currency. The judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was reversed, and the State of Andhra Pradesh was directed to refix the pension accordingly and pay the balance amount within stipulated timelines. The appeals were allowed, and costs were awarded to the appellants.
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1984 (9) TMI 294
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to adolescent offenders transferred to Borstal Schools under Section 10-A of the Andhra Borstal Schools Act, 1925.
2. The legal status and treatment of adolescent offenders under the Andhra Borstal Schools Act, 1925.
3. The impact of Section 433A of the Code on the release of adolescent offenders detained in Borstal Schools.
Summary:
1. Applicability of Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
The main question was whether Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which mandates a minimum of fourteen years of imprisonment for life sentences, applies to adolescent offenders transferred to Borstal Schools u/s 10-A of the Andhra Borstal Schools Act, 1925. The Supreme Court held that Section 433A does not apply to such offenders. Once transferred to a Borstal School, the offender ceases to be a prisoner undergoing imprisonment and becomes a detenu, subject to the provisions of the Borstal Schools Act.
2. Legal Status and Treatment of Adolescent Offenders:
Adolescent offenders, defined as those aged between 16 and 21 at the time of conviction, may be detained in Borstal Schools instead of prisons for their reformation. The Act stipulates that detention in Borstal Schools is not equivalent to imprisonment, and such offenders cannot be detained beyond the age of 23 years. The Court emphasized that Borstal Schools are corrective institutions, not prisons, and the detention there is aimed at reformation rather than punishment.
3. Impact of Section 433A of the Code:
The Court noted that Section 433A, which restricts the remission of sentences for certain offences, does not override the provisions of the Borstal Schools Act. The Act is a special law aimed at the reformation of young offenders and remains unaffected by the general provisions of the Code. The Supreme Court held that the legislative intent behind Section 433A was not to nullify the benefits provided to adolescent offenders under the Borstal Schools Act.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that adolescent offenders transferred to Borstal Schools under Section 10-A of the Andhra Borstal Schools Act, 1925, are not subject to the fourteen-year minimum imprisonment requirement of Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The decision underscores the importance of reformation and rehabilitation for adolescent offenders, distinguishing their treatment from that of adult prisoners.
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1984 (9) TMI 293
Issues:
Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in refusing import license for specific items, discrimination in granting import licenses to petitioner compared to other firms.
Analysis:
The petitioner, engaged in manufacturing electronic items, sought import licenses for sub-assemblies and loud-speakers. The Director of Industries recommended the grant of supplementary licenses for these items, but the petitioner's application was rejected based on an "indigenous angle" by the Supplementary Licensing Committee. The petitioner alleged a violation of Article 14, claiming discrimination as other firms were granted licenses for the same items. The court scrutinized the records of the Committee meetings and found that similar firms were granted licenses for the same items, highlighting discriminatory treatment towards the petitioner. The court emphasized that executive actions in granting import licenses must not discriminate among similarly situated firms. The judgment concluded that the non-grant of a license to the petitioner was discriminatory and ordered the impugned orders to be quashed.
The court addressed a preliminary objection raised regarding the petitioner not exhausting departmental appeal remedies before approaching the court. However, considering the alleged infringement of a fundamental right under Article 14, the court held that alternative remedies do not bar the court's jurisdiction in such cases. Citing precedents, the court clarified that the availability of an alternative remedy is a self-imposed restriction and not a bar when fundamental rights are at stake. The court proceeded to allow the writ petition, quashing the impugned orders and mandating respondents to issue the import license for the specified items within two months.
In conclusion, the judgment highlights the importance of non-discriminatory practices in granting import licenses and upholds the petitioner's right to fair treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The court's decision to quash the impugned orders and direct the issuance of import licenses underscores the need for equitable treatment in administrative actions related to import licensing.
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1984 (9) TMI 292
Issues Involved:
1. Confiscation of vessels used for smuggling.
2. Imposition of personal penalties on the Masters of the vessels.
Detailed Analysis of the Judgment:
1. Confiscation of Vessels:
The appeals primarily concern the confiscation of various vessels under Section 115(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, for being used as means of transport in the smuggling of goods. The Additional Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay, ordered the confiscation of these vessels but allowed redemption on payment of fines. The Central Board of Excise and Customs confirmed these orders. The Tribunal examined whether the confiscation orders were justified given the established facts and circumstances of each case.
In each appeal, the Tribunal scrutinized the evidence and the nature of the goods found, their concealment, and the possibility of the Masters having knowledge or connivance in the smuggling activities. The Tribunal noted that the burden of proof under Section 115(2) is on the owner or the Master to prove that the vessel was used without their knowledge or connivance and that they had taken all possible precautions against such use.
The Tribunal found that in most cases, the goods were concealed in such a manner that even expert Customs officers needed multiple searches to find them. The Masters had conducted searches and made logbook entries, and there was no evidence implicating them in the smuggling activities. The Tribunal also noted that no rules had been framed prescribing the precautions required to be taken by the owners and Masters, as mentioned in Section 115(2).
Given these findings, the Tribunal concluded that the Masters had taken reasonable precautions and had no knowledge or connivance in the smuggling activities. Therefore, the orders of confiscation of the vessels were set aside.
2. Imposition of Personal Penalties on the Masters:
The Additional Collector imposed personal penalties on the Masters under Section 112 of the Customs Act for failing to declare the contraband goods found on their vessels, thereby violating Section 30 of the Customs Act. The Tribunal examined whether the imposition of these penalties was legally justified.
Section 30 requires the person in charge of a conveyance carrying imported goods to deliver an import manifest within twenty-four hours after arrival at a customs station and make a declaration as to the truth of its contents. The Additional Collector and the Board found that the Masters failed to declare the seized goods, thus violating Section 30 and becoming liable for penalties under Section 112.
However, the Tribunal referred to a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in The Mogul Line Ltd. v. A.K. Dutt, which held that the declaration under Section 30 pertains to goods legitimately carried in the vessel and not to smuggled goods of which the Master has no knowledge. The Tribunal followed this judgment and concluded that the imposition of penalties on the Masters for violating Section 30 was not legal. Therefore, the personal penalties imposed on the Masters were set aside.
Additional Observations:
The Tribunal highlighted that the findings of the Additional Collector and the Board were not based on sufficient evidence to establish that the vessels were used as means of transport in smuggling. The mere presence of smuggled goods on the vessels did not justify the conclusion that the vessels were used for smuggling. The Tribunal emphasized the need for concrete evidence to support such findings.
Conclusion:
All the appeals were allowed. The orders of confiscation of the vessels and the personal penalties imposed on the Masters were set aside. The fines and penalties, if paid, were ordered to be refunded.
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1984 (9) TMI 291
Issues:
1. Interpretation of Rule 56A(3)(i)(c) of Central Excise Rules - Mandatory or Directory?
2. Denial of proforma credit for non-compliance with Rule 56A(3)(i)(c).
Analysis:
Issue 1: Interpretation of Rule 56A(3)(i)(c) - Mandatory or Directory?
The Tribunal clarified that the question of whether Rule 56A(3) is mandatory or directory was not essential for the decision. The Tribunal noted the appellant's argument that the rule is directory, while the Departmental Representative contended it is mandatory and only the Central Government can relax it. However, the Tribunal deemed it unnecessary to give a verdict on this matter as it was not crucial to the case at hand. Therefore, the first question did not need to be referred to the High Court.
Issue 2: Denial of Proforma Credit for Non-compliance with Rule 56A(3)(i)(c)
Regarding the second question, the Tribunal examined a case where the applicant was importing aluminum sheets for fabrication into refrigerating and air-conditioning appliances, seeking a concession under Notification No. 95/79. The notification required compliance with Rule 56A of the Central Excise Rules. The Tribunal found that there was an unexplained delay in submitting the necessary forms as per Rule 56A(3). The Tribunal emphasized that statutory provisions should not be interpreted in a way that renders them redundant. Since there was no provision for condonation of delays and no explanation provided for the delay, the applicant was not entitled to the concession. The Tribunal also noted that even though Rule 56A(2) had specific provisions for non-allowance of relief, the absence of such provisions in Rule 56A(3) did not change the outcome. Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded that the question raised regarding denial of proforma credit did not warrant a reference to the High Court.
In conclusion, the application for reference to the High Court was rejected by the Tribunal based on the analysis and findings related to the interpretation of Rule 56A(3) and the denial of proforma credit for non-compliance with the rule.
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1984 (9) TMI 290
Issues Involved:
1. Classification of Polyvinyl Pyrrolidone (P.V.P.) under the Indian Tariff Act, 1934.
2. Whether P.V.P. is a synthetic resin or a drug.
3. Relevance of end-use in tariff classification.
4. Interpretation of tariff entries and the definition of "drug."
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Classification of Polyvinyl Pyrrolidone (P.V.P.) under the Indian Tariff Act, 1934:
The petitioners, manufacturers of pharmaceutical products, imported P.V.P. (marketed as 'Plasdone' or 'Povidone') and classified it under Tariff Item No. 87 of the Indian Tariff Act, 1934, which had a duty rate of 60%. The Customs authorities reclassified it under Tariff Item 82(3), applicable to artificial or synthetic resins, with a higher duty rate of 100% plus countervailing duty at 36%. The petitioners paid the duty under protest and sought a refund, which was denied by the Assistant Collector of Customs and subsequently by the Appellate Collector of Customs and in a revision application. The petitioners then filed the present petition, arguing that P.V.P. should be classified under Tariff Item 28 as a drug or alternatively under the residuary Item 87.
2. Whether P.V.P. is a synthetic resin or a drug:
The court examined various technical definitions and literature. P.V.P. is described as a synthetic polymer in several authoritative sources, including the Merck Index, United States Pharmacopoeia, and British Pharmaceutical Codex. The court noted that while all resins are polymers, not all polymers are resins, and P.V.P. is water-soluble, unlike typical resins. However, technical literature, including the McGraw-Hill Encyclopaedia of Science and Technology and the book "Water-Soluble Resins," classifies P.V.P. as a synthetic resin. The court concluded that P.V.P. is a synthetic polymer and falls under the broad definition of synthetic resins.
3. Relevance of end-use in tariff classification:
The petitioners argued that synthetic resins are typically used in industries like textiles or paints, not pharmaceuticals, and that pharmaceutical-grade P.V.P. is not known in the trade as a synthetic resin. The court found no evidence supporting this claim. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India, the court held that the end-use of a product is irrelevant for tariff classification unless explicitly mentioned in the tariff entry. The nature of the product at the time of importation is what matters, not its ultimate use.
4. Interpretation of tariff entries and the definition of "drug":
The petitioners contended that P.V.P. should be classified as a drug under Tariff Item 28, relying on the definition of "drug" under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The court noted that while the Act's definition includes substances used as components of a drug, this extensive definition is specific to the Act's purpose and cannot be applied to interpret Tariff Item 28. The court emphasized that a drug in common parlance is a substance with physiological action on the living body. P.V.P., being physiologically inert and used as a binder in tablets, does not qualify as a drug. The court referred to authoritative definitions and previous judgments, concluding that P.V.P. cannot be classified as a drug under Item 28.
Conclusion:
The court held that P.V.P. is a synthetic resin under Tariff Item 82(3) and not a drug under Item 28. The petitioners' claim for classification under the residuary Item 87 was also rejected. The petition was dismissed, and the rule was discharged with costs.
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1984 (9) TMI 289
Issues Involved:
1. Classification of the imported goods.
2. Applicability of the Interpretative Rules for classification.
3. Time bar for issuing the show cause notice.
4. Previous assessments and their relevance.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Classification of the Imported Goods:
The primary issue was the correct classification of the imported "top line tube winder endless belts." Initially, the Assistant Collector of Customs classified the belts under Heading 40.05/16 (3) as rubber products, which was contested by the importers. The Appellate Collector reclassified them under Heading 59.16/17 as textile articles commonly used in machinery or plant. However, upon review, the Government argued that the belts were essentially articles of plastic and should be classified under Heading 39.07.
2. Applicability of the Interpretative Rules for Classification:
Shri Sundar Rajan, representing the appellant, referred to Rule 3 of the Rules for the Interpretation of the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act. He argued that Rule 3(a) would apply if a specific description is available, but since the belts did not fit under Heading 59.16/17 or 40.05/16 (3), Rule 3(b) should be used. This rule states that classification should be based on the material or component giving the goods their essential character. The belts were found to have a core of high-tenacity polyester and a cover of high-quality polyurethane, with the essential quality derived from the polyurethane layer. Thus, the belts were classified as articles of plastic under Heading 39.07.
3. Time Bar for Issuing the Show Cause Notice:
Shri Dayasagar, representing the respondent, argued that the show cause notice was issued beyond the six-month period. However, it was clarified that the notice was issued within six months from the date of the Appellate Collector's order, making it timely. The Tribunal referred to Section 131(5) of the Customs Act, 1962, and relevant case law, including the Supreme Court's ruling in 1983 E.L.T. 1596, which clarified that the time limit for non-levy or short-levy does not apply to the revision of erroneous refunds.
4. Previous Assessments and Their Relevance:
The respondent argued that a previous consignment imported in 1976 was assessed under Chapter 59, suggesting consistency in classification. However, the Tribunal noted that there is no estoppel in taxing statutes, and previous assessments do not prevent the Government from reviewing and correcting classifications.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal concluded that the proper classification of the belts in question was under Heading 39.07 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, as articles of plastic, based on the essential character derived from the polyurethane layer. The impugned order by the Appellate Collector was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.
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1984 (9) TMI 288
Issues Involved:
1. Classification and assessment of fully assembled windows, doors, shutters, and other like products.
2. Classification and assessment of products cleared in CKD or ready-to-assemble condition.
3. Classification and assessment of processed aluminum sections claimed to be component parts.
4. Maintainability of appeal against provisional assessment.
5. Imposition of penalty for breach of Central Excise Rules.
Summary:
Issue 1: Classification and Assessment of Fully Assembled Products
The Tribunal held that fully assembled windows, doors, shutters, and similar items, when removed from the factory, are classifiable under T.I. 68 and liable to duty. The processes performed on aluminum sections, such as cutting, drilling, and punching, result in the creation of new products with distinct names, characters, and uses, thus constituting "manufacture."
Issue 2: Classification and Assessment of CKD or Ready-to-Assemble Products
The Tribunal decided that products cleared in CKD packs or ready-to-assemble condition, which require only minor operations at the site, are also classifiable under T.I. 68 and liable to duty. These items are considered "goods" as they are identifiable and marketable.
Issue 3: Classification and Assessment of Processed Aluminum Sections
The Tribunal found that merely cutting, drilling, and punching aluminum sections do not constitute "manufacture" as defined by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. DCM and South Bihar Sugar Mills v. Union of India. The processed sections do not acquire a distinct name, character, or use and are not "goods" liable to excise duty. The lower authorities failed to provide clear evidence that these processed sections are identifiable component parts.
Issue 4: Maintainability of Appeal Against Provisional Assessment
The Tribunal allowed the appeal against the order requiring the appellants to file price lists in part-II for every contract. It was held that the appellants could file price lists in part-VI or another appropriate form after discussion with the A.C.C.E., considering practical problems.
Issue 5: Imposition of Penalty
The Tribunal set aside the penalty of Rs. 250 imposed on the appellants for breach of Rule 173Q, finding that the imposition of the penalty was not warranted under the circumstances.
Conclusion:
The appeals were partly allowed. The lower authorities were directed to rework the Central Excise duty chargeable to the appellants in light of the Tribunal's decision and observations.
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1984 (9) TMI 287
Issues Involved:
1. Nature of proceedings under Section 129B of the Customs Act.
2. Admissibility and reliability of confessional statements by co-accused.
3. Reliance on contradictory statements from witnesses.
4. Factual inaccuracies in the Tribunal's findings.
5. Applicability of Section 123 of the Customs Act.
6. Appreciation of evidence by the Tribunal.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Nature of Proceedings under Section 129B of the Customs Act:
The applicants contended that the proceedings before the Collector of Customs under Section 129B are quasi-criminal, requiring the application of principles from the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr. P.C.) and the Evidence Act. The Tribunal rejected this argument, stating that the proceedings were conducted fairly and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal found the appellants guilty based on facts and materials, and the learned Counsel failed to substantiate the claim that principles of natural justice were not applied.
2. Admissibility and Reliability of Confessional Statements by Co-Accused:
The applicants argued that confessional statements by a co-accused are akin to accomplice evidence and require corroboration. The Tribunal clarified that the appellants are not accused in the strict sense, and the rules relating to co-accused evidence do not apply here. The Tribunal referred to a Madras High Court judgment, which held that departmental proceedings under Section 112 of the Customs Act are not vitiated merely by considering confessions of co-accused. The Tribunal found the statements to be corroborated by other materials and thus reliable.
3. Reliance on Contradictory Statements from Witnesses:
The applicants claimed that the Tribunal's preference for the earlier statements of the drivers over their later contradictory statements violated natural justice principles. The Tribunal dismissed this contention, stating that quasi-judicial authorities are entitled to weigh evidence and that the earlier statements were found to be true and voluntary, corroborated by other materials on record.
4. Factual Inaccuracies in the Tribunal's Findings:
The applicants argued that the Tribunal's findings regarding the relationships and roles of the appellants and drivers were factually incorrect. The Tribunal noted that the connection between the appellants and the drivers, and the interest in the vehicle, were relevant factors. Even if there were minor factual discrepancies, they were deemed insignificant in the context of the overall charge against the appellants.
5. Applicability of Section 123 of the Customs Act:
The applicants contended that Section 123 of the Customs Act should not apply to them and criticized the Tribunal's reliance on Supreme Court rulings. The Tribunal clarified that it had not applied Section 123 against the appellants and had based its findings on other facts and circumstances. The Tribunal found the appellants connected with the contraband goods on the materials on record, making the argument about Section 123 inapplicable.
6. Appreciation of Evidence by the Tribunal:
The applicants challenged the Tribunal's appreciation of evidence, particularly regarding appellant Haji Abdulkhader. The Tribunal emphasized that evidence appreciation is a factual matter unless proven perverse or arbitrary. The mere possibility of a different view does not constitute a question of law for reference. The Tribunal found no legal basis to question its evidence appreciation.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal rejected all the reference applications, finding no merit in the applicants' arguments. The Tribunal's findings were based on factual considerations, and no questions of law arose for reference to the High Court. The applications were dismissed as devoid of substance.
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