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1994 (9) TMI 373
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal partly, stating that the Librarian was not entitled to the pay-scale upgrade due to lacking educational qualifications, but the amount paid need not be recovered from him. The principle of equal pay for equal work does not apply to the scales prescribed by the University Grants Commission.
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1994 (9) TMI 372
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of anticipatory bail application under Section 438 CrPC after issuance of process by Magistrate.
2. Legality of interim order restraining arrest under Section 438 CrPC.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of Anticipatory Bail Application under Section 438 CrPC after Issuance of Process by Magistrate:
The primary issue in this case is whether an anticipatory bail application under Section 438 CrPC is maintainable after a Magistrate has issued process under Section 204 CrPC or at the stage of committal to the Sessions Court. The police initially registered a case against two accused based on the complainant's information and filed a charge-sheet. Subsequently, the complainant filed a private complaint against five additional persons, leading the Magistrate to issue non-bailable warrants against them. Two of these accused then filed for anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC.
The State contended that anticipatory bail is not maintainable once the Court has taken cognizance or issued process, citing a Rajasthan High Court decision in Rawat Dan v. State of Rajasthan. However, the petitioner argued that other High Courts, including Punjab and Haryana and Andhra Pradesh, have taken a contrary view, supporting the maintainability of such applications even after the issuance of process.
The judgment discusses various precedents:
- In Rawat Dan v. State of Rajasthan, the Court held that anticipatory bail was not maintainable once the case was committed to the Sessions Court.
- Contrarily, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Puran Singh v. Ajit Singh held that anticipatory bail is maintainable irrespective of whether the Magistrate has issued bailable or non-bailable warrants.
- The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Sheik Khasim Bi v. State, agreed with the Punjab and Haryana High Court, emphasizing that filing a charge-sheet does not terminate the power under Section 438 CrPC.
The judgment also references a decision by this Court in Ramsewak v. State of M.P., which supported the maintainability of anticipatory bail applications even after the issuance of process.
The Court analyzed the legislative intent behind Section 438 CrPC, which aims to protect individuals from false accusations and malicious arrests. It concluded that the provision's language does not restrict its applicability to arrests solely by the police and not by a Magistrate's warrant. The Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 438 is to provide relief to individuals who apprehend arrest on accusations of non-bailable offenses, regardless of the stage of the proceedings.
The Court held that anticipatory bail applications are maintainable even after the issuance of process by a Magistrate or during the committal stage to the Sessions Court, if circumstances justify invoking the provision. The Court disagreed with the Rajasthan High Court's restrictive interpretation.
2. Legality of Interim Order Restraining Arrest under Section 438 CrPC:
The second issue addressed is whether the Court can pass an interim order restraining arrest on an anticipatory bail application under Section 438 CrPC. The judgment refers to a previous decision by a Division Bench (including Bhat, C.J. and Tamaskar, J.) in Misc. Cr. Case No. 4758 of 1993, which held that the Court cannot pass such interim orders.
The Court affirmed this view, indicating that interim orders restraining arrest are not permissible under Section 438 CrPC. The provision allows for the imposition of conditions but does not authorize interim relief to prevent arrest.
Conclusion:
The High Court concluded that:
1. An application for anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC is maintainable even after a Magistrate has issued process under Section 204 CrPC or at the stage of committal to the Sessions Court.
2. The Court cannot pass an interim order restraining arrest under Section 438 CrPC.
The matter was directed to be placed before the appropriate Single Judge for the disposal of the application.
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1994 (9) TMI 371
Issues:
Release of passport for business purposes; Conditions imposed by Special Judge on passport impoundment; Review of Special Judge's order under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; Maintenance of proceedings in light of previous judgments; High Court's inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code.
Analysis:
The petitioner, Chairman-cum-Managing Director of a public limited company, sought the release of his passport to travel abroad for business purposes related to setting up a Cold Rolling Plant. The petitioner had obtained financial assistance for the project and planned to visit various countries. However, the Special Judge had impounded his passport as a condition of bail, preventing him from leaving the country during the case's pendency. The High Court considered the petitioner's undertaking to return for investigation and set interrogation dates before his departure, addressing concerns of non-availability. The petitioner also agreed to return to India within four weeks of departure, with no extension allowed. Additionally, the petitioner undertook to increase the bail amount before leaving the country.
The High Court rejected the argument that the proceedings were not maintainable based on a previous judgment, asserting its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. While acknowledging the limitations on the Special Judge's authority to modify or review orders, the High Court clarified that such restrictions did not apply to its powers under Section 482. Consequently, the High Court allowed the petition, directing the Regional Passport Officer to return the petitioner's passport immediately. Moreover, the petitioner was instructed to provide a detailed travel itinerary to the CBI before departure and submit an affidavit to the Special Judge confirming compliance with the court's directions and undertakings.
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1994 (9) TMI 370
Issues:
Stay of proceedings against Accused No. 5 until final adjudication against Accused No. 1 to 4 for charges under Sections 302 and 392, IPC.
Analysis:
The judgment deals with a petition filed by Accused No. 5 seeking a stay of proceedings against him until the final adjudication against Accused No. 1 to 4 for charges under Sections 302 and 392, IPC. The substance of the accusation is that Accused No. 1 to 4 killed a businessman and took cash from him, while Accused No. 5 harbored them and shared the stolen property. Accused No. 5 is charged with the offense of harboring the offenders and receiving stolen property. The petitioner argues that he cannot be tried until Accused No. 1 to 4 are convicted. The prosecution argues that all accused can be charged and tried together under Section 223 of the CrPC. The key issue revolves around the interpretation of Section 212, IPC, which requires proof of harboring an offender.
The petitioner contends that for an offense under Section 212, IPC, there must be an offender who has committed an offense and that Accused No. 1 to 4 must be convicted before he can be considered an offender. The prosecution argues that under Section 223, CrPC, persons accused of different offenses in the same transaction can be charged and tried together. The court examines the provisions of Section 212, IPC, which require proof of harboring an offender who has committed an offense. The court also considers previous case law interpreting similar provisions.
The court analyzes the requirements of Section 212, IPC, which include the presence of an offender who has committed an offense and the knowledge of the accused in harboring the offender. The court distinguishes previous cases where accused were charged only under Section 212, IPC, from the present case where the petitioner is also charged under Section 411, IPC, for receiving stolen property. The court holds that all accused, including the petitioner, should be tried together as the offenses are part of the same transaction, as mandated by Section 223, CrPC. The court concludes that there are no grounds to stay the proceedings against the petitioner, and the petition is dismissed.
In conclusion, the judgment clarifies the interpretation of Section 212, IPC, in the context of harboring offenders and receiving stolen property. It emphasizes the importance of trying all accused together when offenses are part of the same transaction, as per Section 223, CrPC, to avoid multiplicity of trials. The court's decision highlights the necessity of considering all relevant charges and circumstances in determining the course of trial proceedings.
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1994 (9) TMI 369
Issues:
1. Eligibility restrictions in awarding contracts for dealership or distributorship of petroleum products by Government of India Undertakings.
2. Constitutionality of eligibility criteria based on relationships for dealership/distributorship.
3. Discrimination in eligibility criteria between physically handicapped candidates and others.
4. Interpretation of guidelines regarding partnerships for dealership/distributorship.
5. Right to practice profession or carry on business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
6. Validity of guidelines in relation to economic and social justice principles of the Constitution.
Analysis:
1. The judgment concerns appeals and petitions related to eligibility restrictions imposed by the Government of India Undertakings in awarding contracts for dealership or distributorship of petroleum products. The cases involve individuals and associations seeking relief from these restrictions based on various relationships with existing dealers.
2. The primary issue addressed is the constitutionality of the eligibility criteria based on relationships for dealership or distributorship. The guidelines set by the government include restrictions on awarding new contracts if close relatives of the applicant already hold a dealership of petroleum products. The petitioners argued that such restrictions violate their rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
3. Another aspect considered is the alleged discrimination in eligibility criteria between physically handicapped candidates and others. The petitioners contended that the criteria unfairly differentiate between these categories of applicants, particularly concerning the inclusion of certain relatives as grounds for ineligibility.
4. The judgment also delves into the interpretation of guidelines regarding partnerships for dealership or distributorship. It is highlighted that partnerships must ensure that all partners individually meet the eligibility criteria, and if one partner or their relatives already hold a dealership, the partnership may be deemed ineligible to apply for a new contract.
5. The court examined the right to practice a profession or carry on a business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution in relation to the restrictions imposed on dealership contracts. The petitioners argued that they should not be made ineligible based on their relationships with existing dealers as it is their individual business.
6. Lastly, the validity of the guidelines was assessed in light of economic and social justice principles of the Constitution. The court emphasized that the government's policy of distributing dealership contracts aims to prevent concentration of wealth and ensure fair distribution of resources, aligning with the constitutional objectives of economic equality and common good.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the eligibility restrictions imposed by the government, emphasizing the reasonable nexus between the guidelines and the constitutional principles of economic and social justice. The court dismissed the appeals and writ petitions, ruling that the guidelines were not arbitrary or unjust, and costs were imposed on the petitioners.
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1994 (9) TMI 368
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, stating that the appellant was entitled to promotion from the date his immediate junior was promoted due to the illegal foundation on which the D.P.C. had proceeded being dropped. The acquittal of the appellant on the charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act led to the conclusion that the delinquent was entitled to reinstatement without the need for a departmental enquiry.
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1994 (9) TMI 367
Issues Involved:
1. Refusal of registration of share transfers by Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (the company).
2. Applicability of Section 153 of the Companies Act, 1956.
3. Compliance with Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Regulations.
4. Legal recognition of SHCIL's role as custodian for mutual funds.
5. Practical implications of non-registration of transfers.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Refusal of Registration of Share Transfers by Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.:
The company refused registration of share transfers lodged by Stock Holding Corporation of India Limited (SHCIL) under Section 22A of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. The refusal was based on five grounds, primarily citing Section 153 of the Companies Act, 1956, which prohibits taking notice of any trust. The company argued that registering shares in the name of SHCIL (Account XXX Mutual Fund) would violate this provision.
2. Applicability of Section 153 of the Companies Act, 1956:
Section 153 states, "No notice of any trust, express, implied or constructive, shall be entered on the register of members or of debenture-holders." The company argued that registering shares in the name of SHCIL (Account XXX Mutual Fund) would mean recognizing a trust, thus violating Section 153. The judgment confirmed that Section 153 is a mandatory and prohibitive clause, and no exceptions have been provided for shares held in trust by companies on behalf of mutual funds.
3. Compliance with Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Regulations:
SHCIL argued that as a custodian for mutual funds, it must follow SEBI regulations, which require maintaining separate accounts for each mutual fund. SHCIL contended that identifying securities as "Account XXX Mutual Fund" is necessary for compliance. However, the judgment noted that SEBI regulations do not override Section 153 of the Companies Act, 1956, and there is no provision in the SEBI guidelines that mandates such registration in the company's register of members.
4. Legal Recognition of SHCIL's Role as Custodian for Mutual Funds:
SHCIL's role as a custodian involves maintaining separate accounts for mutual funds and ensuring that properties do not get mingled. Despite this, the judgment held that SHCIL's internal management and custodial agreements do not alter the legal position under Section 153, which prohibits the company from recognizing any trust in its register of members.
5. Practical Implications of Non-Registration of Transfers:
The judgment acknowledged the practical difficulties SHCIL would face due to the refusal of registration, such as issues with dividend distribution, rights/bonus issues, and potential revenue loss from stamp duty. However, it emphasized that the company must adhere to the provisions of law, and Section 153 remains mandatory. The judgment suggested that Section 153 has become redundant due to the insertion of Section 187C, which requires declarations of beneficial interest to be noted in the register of members, thereby diluting the spirit of Section 153.
Conclusion:
The judgment confirmed the decision of the company to refuse registration of the impugned share transfers, citing the mandatory nature of Section 153 of the Companies Act, 1956. It recognized the practical issues faced by SHCIL but emphasized compliance with the existing legal provisions. The judgment suggested the removal of Section 153 from the statute book due to its redundancy in light of Section 187C but confirmed the company's refusal in the present case. The references were answered accordingly, with no order as to costs.
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1994 (9) TMI 366
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the arbitration award.
2. Alleged misconduct of one of the arbitrators.
3. Errors and omissions in the award.
4. Award of damages and interest.
Summary:
1. Validity of the Arbitration Award:
The arbitration award concerning the construction of the Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dam was challenged by the appellant, State of Rajasthan, on various grounds, including misinterpretation of contract clauses and improper consideration of evidence. The Court held that the arbitrators had not taken into consideration any matter outside the scope of reference and had relied upon materials on record to base their findings. The Court concluded that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the findings were fanciful or without basis. The award was upheld as it did not demonstrate any gross error apparent on the face of the record or misconduct by the arbitrators.
2. Alleged Misconduct of One of the Arbitrators:
The appellant contended that one of the arbitrators, Sri A.B. Rohatgi, had disqualified himself by accepting a brief from the respondent in a different case. The Court noted that the appellant was aware of this fact but did not raise any objection during the arbitration proceedings. It was held that the appellant's participation in the proceedings without objection amounted to acquiescence, and the objection raised after 270 days was time-barred u/s 119 of the Limitation Act. Thus, the objection was rejected.
3. Errors and Omissions in the Award:
The appellant alleged various errors and omissions in the award, such as misinterpretation of contract clauses and improper consideration of evidence. The Court emphasized that an arbitrator is the final arbiter of the dispute, and errors in fact or law do not constitute misconduct warranting interference with the award. The Court reiterated that it is not open to challenge the award on the ground that the arbitrator has drawn his own conclusion or failed to appreciate the facts. The award was upheld as it was not patently unjust or perverse.
4. Award of Damages and Interest:
The respondent contractor sought modification of the award to include interest from the date of breach and at an enhanced rate. The Court held that the arbitrators had quantified the total damages suffered by the respondent at Rs. 1 crore, taking into consideration all relevant facts. The Court declined to award interest from the date of breach or to enhance the rate of interest. The appellant was allowed to withdraw the amount realized from the sale of the respondent's assets after satisfying the award. The prayer for additional costs was also rejected.
The application was disposed of without any order as to costs, and the interim application was also disposed of.
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1994 (9) TMI 365
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of Section 20 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.
2. Alleged restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court.
3. Alleged arbitrariness and discriminatory nature of the Board's powers under Section 20.
4. Compliance with Article 14 of the Constitution.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Constitutionality of Section 20 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985:
The petitioners sought a declaration that Section 20 of the Act is ultra vires and unconstitutional, arguing that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution. The learned single judge rejected this contention, and the appeals were made against this decision.
2. Alleged Restriction on the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the High Court:
The appellants argued that Section 20 imposes restrictions on the High Court's jurisdiction, giving unbridled power to the Board, which can lead to arbitrary and discriminatory actions. The court noted that Section 20 allows the Board, after inquiry and consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances, to recommend the winding up of a sick industrial company to the High Court. The High Court, on receiving the Board's opinion, may order the winding up and proceed with it according to the Companies Act, 1956. The court clarified that the High Court is not precluded from examining the correctness of the Board's opinion and can decide whether to proceed with the winding up.
3. Alleged Arbitrariness and Discriminatory Nature of the Board's Powers under Section 20:
The court examined the procedural safeguards in place, noting that the Board acts as a judicial body consisting of experts, including a chairman qualified to be a High Court judge. The Board must record its opinion with reasons after considering all relevant facts and hearing all concerned parties. The court emphasized that the Board's opinion forms the basis for the High Court's decision but does not bind the High Court to order winding up without examining the opinion's correctness.
4. Compliance with Article 14 of the Constitution:
The court rejected the contention that Section 20 violates Article 14, stating that the Board's procedure ensures no arbitrariness or discrimination. The Board acts judicially, following a consistent procedure for all cases. The decision to recommend winding up depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each company, and there is no scope for arbitrary or discriminatory actions. The court concluded that Section 20 is not violative of Article 14.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ appeals, upholding the constitutionality of Section 20 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, and confirming that it does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The court found no merit in the contentions regarding the restriction on the High Court's jurisdiction or the alleged arbitrariness and discrimination in the Board's powers.
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1994 (9) TMI 364
Issues Involved:
1. Contempt of Court for disobeying the order dated 2.6.1988.
2. Entitlement of instructors to the same pay scale as squad teachers.
3. Financial burden and liability of the State of Haryana and Union of India.
4. Willful disobedience and the standard of proof for contempt.
Summary:
1. Contempt of Court for disobeying the order dated 2.6.1988:
The petitions were filed for initiating contempt proceedings against the respondents for disobeying the Supreme Court's order dated 2.6.1988 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 597 of 1986. The petitioners alleged that the respondents failed to pay the arrears of salary to the instructors as directed by the Court.
2. Entitlement of instructors to the same pay scale as squad teachers:
The petitioners, working as instructors under the Adult and Non-formal Education Scheme, claimed they were entitled to the same pay scales as squad teachers under the State Social Education Scheme. The Supreme Court upheld this claim, stating that both instructors and squad teachers were employees of the same employer performing similar duties, invoking the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" as per Article 39(d) of the Constitution. The Court directed that instructors be given the same pay scale as squad teachers from the date of their initial appointment.
3. Financial burden and liability of the State of Haryana and Union of India:
The State of Haryana argued that the financial burden created by the Court's direction amounted to about 28 crores of rupees. The State sought a contribution from the Union of India to bear part of this burden. The Court noted that the Union of India was not initially a party to the writ petition and was added later as a proforma respondent. The Court acknowledged the State's difficulty in arranging funds and noted that about 20 crores had already been paid to the instructors.
4. Willful disobedience and the standard of proof for contempt:
The Court emphasized that for contempt to be established, there must be "willful disobedience" to its orders. The Court must be satisfied that the disobedience was intentional and not due to compelling circumstances. In this case, the Court found no willful disobedience on the part of the respondents. The Court noted that the financial burden created by its direction was not anticipated and that significant payments had already been made. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, concluding that the respondents had not committed contempt.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the contempt petitions, finding no willful disobedience by the respondents in complying with its earlier direction to pay instructors the same pay scale as squad teachers. The Court recognized the financial burden on the State of Haryana and noted the substantial payments already made to the instructors.
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1994 (9) TMI 363
Issues:
1. Validity of raising the period of practice as an advocate for appointment against the posts of Presiding Officers of the Labour Courts.
2. Interpretation of Section 8(3)(c) of the M.P Industrial Relations Act, 1960.
3. Legality of short-listing criteria for interview candidates.
4. Application of principles for conducting interviews in the selection process.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission challenging the validity of raising the period of practice as an advocate from five years to seven and a half years for the appointment of Presiding Officers of the Labour Courts. The Commission's decision to call for interviews only those applicants with seven and a half years of practice was questioned by the respondents as exceeding the statutory requirement of five years of practice as per Section 8(3)(c) of the Act.
2. Section 8(3)(c) of the Act stipulates that an advocate or pleader must have practiced in Madhya Pradesh for a minimum of five years to be eligible for the post of Presiding Officer of the Labour Courts. The Court emphasized that altering the period of practice for short-listing candidates did not violate the statutory criterion but was part of the selection process. The Court clarified that the Commission's decision to call only candidates with seven and a half years of practice for interviews did not conflict with the Act's eligibility requirements.
3. The Court delved into the legality of the short-listing criteria for interviews, highlighting the importance of rational and objective short-listing to assess candidates' personality and merit effectively. The Court emphasized that short-listing candidates based on reasonable criteria did not amount to altering or substituting the eligibility criteria outlined in statutory rules. The Court cited previous cases to support the necessity of limiting the number of candidates for interviews to ensure a thorough and fair evaluation process.
4. In discussing the principles for conducting interviews in the selection process, the Court highlighted the importance of selecting the best candidates and conducting interviews in a thorough and scientific manner. The Court referred to expert opinions and previous judgments to emphasize the significance of rational short-listing to evaluate candidates effectively. Ultimately, the Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and emphasized that short-listing candidates based on practice duration for interviews was a legitimate part of the selection process, not a violation of statutory criteria.
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1994 (9) TMI 362
... ...
... ... ..... peal. The permission sought for, is granted. The appeal is dismissed as withdrawn. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (9) TMI 361
Issues Involved:
1. Classification of Melamine Faced Particle Boards (MFPBs) under the relevant tariff item.
2. Eligibility of MFPBs for exemption u/r 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, as per Exemption Notification No. 55 of 1979.
3. Interpretation of exemption provisions in case of ambiguity.
Summary:
1. Classification of Melamine Faced Particle Boards (MFPBs):
The appellant, engaged in the manufacture of particle boards, claimed that MFPBs should be classified as 'unveneered particle boards' under Item No. 6 of the table appended to Exemption Notification No. 55 of 1979, thereby qualifying for total exemption from duty. The Tribunal, however, classified MFPBs under Tariff Item-68, making them dutiable. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that MFPBs cannot be considered 'unveneered particle boards' as they undergo a different manufacturing process and are commercially distinct products.
2. Eligibility for Exemption:
The appellant argued that MFPBs should benefit from the exemption provided by Notification No. 55 of 1979. The Tribunal rejected this claim, and the Supreme Court agreed, noting that the melamine facing process results in a product that is not 'unveneered particle boards'. The Court emphasized that in commercial parlance, MFPBs and unveneered particle boards are not considered the same, and thus, MFPBs do not qualify for the exemption.
3. Interpretation of Exemption Provisions:
The appellant contended that any ambiguity in the exemption notification should be resolved in favor of the assessee. The Supreme Court disagreed, citing precedents that exemptions from taxation should be construed strictly. The Court stated that a person claiming an exemption must clearly establish their eligibility. In this case, the term 'unveneered particle boards' did not encompass MFPBs, and thus, the appellant could not benefit from the exemption.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Tribunal's classification of MFPBs under Tariff Item-68 and denying the exemption under Notification No. 55 of 1979. The Court also ordered the appellant to pay the arrears of duty and allowed the respondents to encash the bank guarantees provided by the appellant.
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1994 (9) TMI 360
Issues Involved:
1. Justiciability of rights and privileges claimed by sub-lessees.
2. Validity of the Government Orders (G.O.Ms. No. 402 and G.O.Ms. No. 417).
3. Compliance with principles of natural justice.
4. Applicability of Section 4A of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957.
5. Legality of the withdrawal of consent under Rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Justiciability of Rights and Privileges Claimed by Sub-lessees:
The sub-lessees filed writ petitions challenging the cancellation of sub-leases by the Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development Corporation Limited (Lessee-Corporation) following the Government Orders (G.O.Ms. No. 402 and G.O.Ms. No. 417). The learned single Judge allowed the writ petitions, holding that the sub-lessees were not given an opportunity to be heard before the cancellation, which violated the principles of natural justice. The Division Bench referred the matter to a larger Bench due to its public significance.
2. Validity of the Government Orders (G.O.Ms. No. 402 and G.O.Ms. No. 417):
The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O.Ms. No. 402, canceling all sub-leases and reserving the entire Barytes deposits for exclusive exploitation by the Lessee-Corporation, based on the recommendations of a House-Committee. Subsequently, G.O.Ms. No. 417 withdrew the consent given to the Lessee-Corporation to enter into sub-leases. The learned single Judge quashed these orders, finding that they were issued without giving notice to the sub-lessees, thus violating natural justice principles.
3. Compliance with Principles of Natural Justice:
The learned single Judge quashed the impugned orders on the ground that the sub-lessees were not given an opportunity to be heard before the cancellation of their sub-leases, which violated the principles of natural justice and Section 4A(3) of the Act. The Division Bench upheld this finding, emphasizing that even if the orders were issued under executive power, compliance with natural justice was mandatory.
4. Applicability of Section 4A of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957:
Section 4A(1) of the Act allows for the premature termination of mining leases by the Central Government in consultation with the State Government for specified reasons. Section 4A(3) mandates that no order making a premature termination of a mining lease shall be made without giving the holder of the lease a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Division Bench found that the impugned orders did not purport to be issued under Section 4A, and even if they were, the requirements of Section 4A(3) were not met.
5. Legality of the Withdrawal of Consent under Rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960:
Rule 37 requires the previous consent in writing of the State Government for the transfer of a mining lease. The Division Bench held that once the consent resulted in the execution of sub-leases, it worked out itself and could not be withdrawn. The State Government's attempt to withdraw the consent under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act was found to be invalid as the consent had already culminated into a contract, and mining operations had commenced.
Conclusion:
The Division Bench upheld the learned single Judge's decision to quash the impugned orders (G.O.Ms. No. 402 and G.O.Ms. No. 417) and the consequent cancellation of sub-leases, citing violations of natural justice and non-compliance with statutory requirements. The State Government was directed to maintain the status quo for three months, allowing it to issue fresh notices if it intended to terminate the sub-leases or withdraw consent, thus giving the sub-lessees an opportunity to be heard.
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1994 (9) TMI 359
Issues Involved:
1. Authority to institute the suit.
2. Suppression of material facts.
3. Disputes between the directors and shareholders.
4. Validity of the general and board meetings.
5. Jurisdiction and applicable law.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Authority to institute the suit:
The court determined that the Managing Director of the plaintiff company did not have the authority to institute the suit on behalf of the company. The Articles of Association required the Managing Director to act under the control and supervision of the Board of Directors and in consultation with the Chairman. There was no evidence that the Board of Directors authorized the institution of the suit or the appointment of a constituted attorney. The court cited the judgment in AIR1991Delhi25 (Nibro Limited v. National Insurance Company Ltd.) to support the argument that a suit on behalf of the company can only be filed by a director specifically empowered by the Board. The court concluded that the suit was instituted without due and proper authority and was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.
2. Suppression of material facts:
The plaintiff was found to have suppressed material facts and made deliberate false statements in the petition. It was falsely stated that the shares of the defendant were still held in the name of Ahmed and Chowdhury, giving the impression that the agreement dated 30th April 1988 was not given effect. It was also suppressed that the entire control of Loyal Shipping Pvt. Ltd. had come into the hands of the plaintiff and that the vessel was owned by Loyal Shipping Pvt. Ltd. at the time. The court emphasized that a person who makes an ex parte application to the court is under an obligation to make the fullest possible disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge.
3. Disputes between the directors and shareholders:
The court noted that there were serious disputes between the two groups of directors and shareholders of the plaintiff company. The Board of Directors and members were divided into two groups with equal shareholding. The Chairman had a casting vote, making it impossible for the Managing Director to get any resolution passed without the Chairman's consent. The court highlighted an agreement between the Chairman and the Managing Director dated 12th September 1990, which indicated that there were ongoing disputes and that money due from Loyal Shipping Pvt. Ltd. was not to be recovered.
4. Validity of the general and board meetings:
The court found that the notice for the general meeting issued by the Secretary was null and void as the Secretary had no power to issue such notice. The meetings held pursuant to the notice were also void, and the resolutions passed thereat were of no legal effect. The court referred to the judgment in AIR1966Cal512 (Ramshankar Prosad v. Sindri Iron Foundry (P) Ltd.) to support its conclusion that the purported meetings were not properly held and the resolutions were null and void.
5. Jurisdiction and applicable law:
The court held that the entire alleged cause of action arose in Bangladesh, and the municipal laws applicable were those of Bangladesh. The court decided not to exercise its admiralty jurisdiction and left the parties to pursue their remedies in the appropriate courts having municipal jurisdiction in the matter.
Conclusion:
The suit was dismissed with costs, and the interim order dated 7th July 1994 for the arrest of the vessel 'M.V. Loyal Bird' was vacated. The court ordered the release of the vessel without security and appointed a special referee to determine the quantum of losses and damages suffered by the petitioner due to the interim order. The plaintiff was held liable for the costs, charges, and expenses incurred by the petitioner, including the remuneration of the Marshall.
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1994 (9) TMI 358
Issues:
1. Interpretation of the term "Security" in response to a court call.
2. Acceptance of bank guarantee as security.
3. Production of documents from defendant No.3's custody.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Interpretation of the term "Security"
The judgment involved a dispute regarding whether a person or institution can provide security themselves or if it must come from a third-party surety. The court examined various definitions of "security" from legal sources, emphasizing that security aims to make the enforcement of a right more secure and certain. It was noted that a security does not always require a third-party surety, and bank guarantees are commonly accepted as securities, especially in civil disputes. The court concluded that the bank guarantee provided by the plaintiff satisfied the requirement of security, even though it was from the plaintiff itself.
Issue 2: Acceptance of bank guarantee as security
The plaintiff bank sought to withdraw a sum deposited by defendant No.3 along with accrued interest, after furnishing a bank guarantee as security. Defendant No.3 objected, arguing that security should involve a third-party surety. However, the court held that the bank guarantee fulfilled the security requirement, as it offered protection and assurance for the enforcement of rights. The court clarified that the bank guarantee extended to cover the interest accrued on the principal amount, allowing the plaintiff to withdraw the sum under this condition.
Issue 3: Production of documents from defendant No.3's custody
Another aspect of the judgment involved an application seeking the production of documents from defendant No.3's custody under Order II Rule 14 Civil Procedure Code. Defendant No.3 resisted, claiming a banker's lien on the documents. The court ruled that the relevancy of the documents at trial was undisputed and ordered defendant No.3 to produce certified true photocopies of the documents. The court specified that the banker's lien, if any, would not be lost by producing photocopies, with the defendant undertaking to provide the originals when required.
In conclusion, the judgment clarified the interpretation of "security," accepted a bank guarantee as a valid form of security, and addressed the production of documents from defendant No.3's custody, ensuring the protection of rights and obligations in the legal dispute.
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1994 (9) TMI 357
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of educational qualifications as a basis for classification under Article 16.
2. Validity of specific provisions in Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board Service Regulations and Tamil Nadu Agriculture Engineering Service Rules.
3. Validity of the ratio for promotion between degree-holders and diploma-holders in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Service Regulations.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Educational Qualifications as a Basis for Classification:
The court examined whether educational qualifications can form a valid basis for classification under Article 16 of the Constitution. It referred to multiple precedents, including the landmark case of State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa, where it was held that educational qualifications can indeed form the basis of a valid classification. The court emphasized that while educational qualifications can be used for classification, it is essential to maintain a balance between excellence and equality. The court also noted that classifications should not be overly restrictive to the point of jeopardizing the chances of promotion for certain groups.
2. Validity of Specific Provisions in Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board Service Regulations and Tamil Nadu Agriculture Engineering Service Rules:
The court addressed two specific grievances:
- Proviso to Regulation 19(2)(b): The proviso allows diploma-holders to be eligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer only if they exhibit "exceptional merit." The court upheld this proviso, stating that it is favorable to diploma-holders by providing them a pathway to promotion based on merit.
- Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules for Tamil Nadu Agriculture Engineering Service: This rule prescribes a promotion ratio of 3:2 between degree-holders and diploma-holders. The court upheld this classification, noting that higher educational qualifications are relevant for the higher post due to the nature of the duties involved. The court also considered the historical context and found the ratio to be reasonable and not violative of Article 16.
3. Validity of the Ratio for Promotion in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Service Regulations:
The court examined the challenge against the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board's decision to fix a promotion ratio of 3:1 between degree-holders (Junior Engineers) and diploma-holders (Supervisors). The court upheld this ratio, noting that the classification is based on higher educational qualifications, which are relevant for certain types of work. The court also considered the potential disruption that changing the ratio could cause, given that the decision had been in place since 1974 and affected a large number of employees. The court found no constitutional infirmity in the classification or the prescribed ratio.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed all the writ petitions, appeals, and special leave petitions, upholding the validity of the classifications and ratios based on educational qualifications in the respective service regulations. The court emphasized the importance of maintaining a balance between social justice and the need for higher education, ensuring that classifications do not unduly restrict promotion opportunities while also recognizing the relevance of higher qualifications for certain posts. The parties were left to bear their own costs.
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1994 (9) TMI 356
Issues:
1. Quashing of complaint and order of summoning under Section 482, Cr. PC.
2. Interpretation of provisions of notification No. 140/83-CE dated 5.5.1983 regarding central excise duty exemption.
3. Alleged violation of provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944.
4. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal in matters of penalty and prosecution.
5. Validity of prosecution against petitioners while penalty matter is pending before the Tribunal.
Analysis:
The petitioners sought to quash a complaint and order of summoning under Section 482, Cr. PC related to the manufacture of specific products subject to central excise duty exemption. The complaint alleged violations of provisions leading to initiation of penalty and prosecution proceedings. The petitioners argued that since the Tribunal had stayed recovery and confiscation ordered by the Collector, no cause of action existed for the Department to file a complaint. However, the respondents contended that the petitioners were rightly proceeded against under Section 9 of the 1944 Act for non-payment of duty as per rules and notifications.
The judge, after hearing both parties, concluded that there was no basis to quash the complaint or stay the proceedings. The Collector, as the Assessing Authority, had found the petitioners liable for penalty and prosecution after issuing a show-cause notice for contraventions of rules and notifications. The argument that prosecution could not proceed due to pending penalty decision before the Tribunal was rejected. The judge clarified that under the Act, contraventions could lead to both penalty imposition and prosecution. If the Tribunal ruled in favor of the petitioners, they could seek appropriate relief or discharge during trial.
Consequently, the petition was dismissed without costs, allowing the petitioners to present their defenses during the trial. The judge directed the parties to appear before the trial court on a specified date. The judgment emphasized that any observations made would not impact the case's merits, and the records were to be returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
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1994 (9) TMI 355
Issues involved:
The judgment involves consideration of adverse possession rights, validity of a lease deed, application of Transfer of Property Act, and principles of adverse possession.
Adverse Possession Rights:
The defendant's appeal contested the High Court's decision upholding the appellate court's decree in favor of the plaintiff-respondent, denying the defendant's claim of acquiring rights through adverse possession. The trial court dismissed the suit based on adverse possession, but the appellate court reversed this decision and decreed the suit. The High Court did not interfere in the second appeal.
Validity of Lease Deed:
The plaintiff claimed possession of an area leased to them by the lambardar, with a deed executed in 1949 and registered in 1950. The defendant-appellant, who trespassed on the land, argued that the deed was void under the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950. However, the courts held that the registration of the deed post-execution still conferred ownership to the plaintiff, as per Section 47 of the Registration Act.
Application of Transfer of Property Act:
The appellant contended that the lease was invalid as it was not signed by the respondent and was a unilateral act of the lambardar, contrary to the Transfer of Property Act. The court ruled that since agricultural leases are excluded from the Act under Section 117, the provisions of Section 107 did not apply, and the principles of the Act could not be extended to such leases.
Principles of Adverse Possession:
Regarding adverse possession, it was acknowledged that the appellant initially possessed the land under a license from the respondent for a brick-kiln. However, to establish adverse possession, hostile animus and possession adverse to the real owner's knowledge must be proven. The appellate court found that the possession was not adverse, and the evidence presented did not support a claim of adverse possession. The Supreme Court declined to interfere, stating that the appellant had not suffered any injustice warranting remedy.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.
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1994 (9) TMI 354
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Nagar Nigam Karamachari Privarik Kalyan Yojna scheme.
2. Applicability of Section 30 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956.
3. Jurisdiction of the State Government under Section 421 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Nagar Nigam Karamachari Privarik Kalyan Yojna Scheme:
The Jabalpur Municipal Corporation had implemented a scheme known as Nagar Nigam Karamachari Privarik Kalyan Yojna (Family Benefit Fund Scheme) to provide financial benefits to the dependents of employees who died while in service. The scheme involved monthly contributions from employees and paid out a sum upon the employee's death or retirement. The Government of Madhya Pradesh questioned the scheme's validity, considering it potentially violative of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, and the Insurance Act, 1938. Subsequently, the government directed the suspension of the scheme, but later allowed the continuation of deductions until further orders. The High Court, however, ruled in favor of the scheme, stating that it did not fall within the ambit of life insurance business and that the State Government had no jurisdiction to suspend or cancel it under Section 421 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956.
2. Applicability of Section 30 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956:
Section 30 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, grants the Life Insurance Corporation of India the exclusive privilege of carrying on life insurance business in India. The term "Life Insurance Business" is defined under Section 2(11) of the Insurance Act, 1938, as the business of effecting contracts of insurance upon human life, including any contract whereby the payment of money is assured on death or any contingency dependent on human life. The Supreme Court found that the scheme run by the Jabalpur Municipal Corporation had the attributes of life insurance business, as it assured payment upon the death or retirement of the employee. Consequently, Section 30 was applicable, and the scheme was deemed illegal since it was not run by the Life Insurance Corporation of India. The High Court's narrow interpretation of life insurance business was found to be incorrect.
3. Jurisdiction of the State Government under Section 421 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956:
Section 421 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, empowers the State Government to suspend any resolution or order of the Municipal Corporation if it is not in conformity with law or likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public. The Supreme Court held that since the scheme violated Section 30 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the State Government was within its rights to exercise its power under Section 421 to stop the scheme. The High Court's view that the scheme did not fall within the ambit of Section 421 was found to be erroneous.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, holding that the scheme run by the Jabalpur Municipal Corporation was a form of life insurance business, thus falling under the exclusive domain of the Life Insurance Corporation of India as per Section 30 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The State Government's action to suspend the scheme under Section 421 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, was upheld as valid. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed with costs.
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