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1995 (9) TMI 415
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as the appellant failed to produce a copy of the Bond mentioned in the case. No opinion was expressed on the merits of the case. (Case Citation: 1988 (6) TMI 330 - SC)
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1995 (9) TMI 413
Issues:
1. Validity of exercising power under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act.
2. Claim for interest on compensation amount under Section 34 of the Act.
Issue 1: Validity of exercising power under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act:
The appeal arose from a judgment of the Allahabad High Court regarding the exercise of power under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. The Government had dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5-A and issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. The appellant challenged the urgency for dispensing with the enquiry, but the High Court upheld the Government's decision, stating that the court cannot substitute the Government's satisfaction of urgency. The Court noted that constructions had been completed on the acquired land, rendering the question of urgency moot at that stage.
Issue 2: Claim for interest on compensation amount under Section 34 of the Act:
The appellant sought interest on the compensation amount, contending that the delay in making the award entitled them to interest at 12% per annum, citing a previous Supreme Court decision. The Court referenced Section 34 of the Act, which obligates the State to pay interest from the date of possession of the land. However, the Court observed that the interest amount had been calculated and deposited in the appellants' account after the award was passed. As the compensation was deposited promptly upon the award, the Court found no grounds to interfere, emphasizing that the liability to pay interest arises only when the compensation is not deposited upon possession of the land.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded. The judgment clarified the application of Sections 17(4), 34, and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, emphasizing the obligations of the State regarding compensation and interest payments in land acquisition cases.
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1995 (9) TMI 412
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeal in the case with citation 1995 (9) TMI 412 - SC. Justices J.S. Verma and K. Venkataswami delivered the order.
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1995 (9) TMI 411
Issues:
1. Suit for specific performance and temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. Non-registration of agreement to sale and subsequent sale deed.
3. Prima facie case and injunction against subsequent purchaser.
4. Legal interpretation of Section 17 of Gujarat Act No. VII of 1982 and Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908.
5. Suit maintainability against subsequent purchaser based on prior purchaser's claim for specific performance.
6. Consideration of relevant documents for establishing prima facie case.
Analysis:
The judgment by the Gujarat High Court involves a suit for specific performance and a temporary injunction sought by the appellants plaintiffs. The trial Court initially granted an ex parte injunction but later found that the agreement to sale was not registered as required by law, leading to a denial of the injunction. The trial Court also held that since the suit included a prayer to set aside a subsequent sale deed, no relief could be granted in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case and that granting the injunction would cause irreparable loss to subsequent purchasers.
During the Appeal From Order hearing, the appellants' counsel cited a Division Bench decision that clarified the non-registration of the agreement to sale under Section 17 of the Gujarat Act No. VII of 1982. The Court held that the trial Court erred in not considering this legal position and in denying the injunction based on non-registration. Additionally, the Court referenced a 1954 Supreme Court decision to support the maintainability of a suit for specific performance against both the vendor and subsequent purchaser, dismissing the trial Court's reasoning on this point.
The respondents argued that there was a strong prima facie case in their favor based on certain documents. The Court noted that the trial Court's findings were based on incorrect legal premises and failed to consider crucial documents. As a result, the Court set aside the trial Court's judgment and directed the matter to be remanded to another Civil Judge for proper consideration of the relevant documents to establish a prima facie case.
Ultimately, the Appeal From Order was allowed, the trial Court's judgment was quashed, and the matter was remanded for further consideration. The Court emphasized the importance of correctly applying the law and considering all relevant documents in determining the prima facie case.
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1995 (9) TMI 410
Issues:
- Framing of charge under Section 498(A) IPC against respondents 2 and 3 by the High Court.
- Allegations of harassment, cruelty, and demand of dowry against respondents 2 and 3.
- Concession made by the Deputy Government Advocate regarding the framing of charges.
- Applicability of inherent power under Section 482 of the Code.
Analysis:
The case involved a complaint by the appellant against respondents 1, 2, and 3 for demand of dowry, harassment, and cruelty. The police filed a charge sheet against the respondents under Section 498(A) IPC. The Magistrate framed a charge, which was challenged by the accused in a Revision Application before the Additional Sessions Judge, who upheld the charge. Subsequently, respondents 2 and 3 approached the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the charge. The High Court, noting the absence of specific allegations against respondents 2 and 3, allowed the application and quashed the charge against them based on the Deputy Government Advocate's concession that there was no material for framing charges against them.
The appellant contested the High Court's decision, arguing that there were sufficient allegations of harassment, cruelty, and demand of dowry against respondents 2 and 3. The appellant's complaint, supported by statements from family members, detailed instances of physical abuse, demands for money, and denial of food by the in-laws. The Supreme Court, after reviewing the complaint and statements, found that there was indeed substantial material to frame a charge under Section 498(A) against respondents 2 and 3. The Court criticized the High Court for accepting the concession without proper scrutiny and highlighted the responsibility of the Government Advocate in presenting the case diligently.
Moreover, the Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court erred in quashing the charge against respondents 2 and 3, as there was clear evidence of their involvement in the alleged offenses. The Court also noted that the High Court's decision to exercise inherent power under Section 482 of the Code was unjustified, especially considering the prohibition on revisiting decisions already made by the Sessions Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and directed the Judicial Magistrate to proceed with the criminal case against respondents 2 and 3.
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1995 (9) TMI 409
Issues:
1. Competency of the Additional Deputy Commissioner to impose punishment.
2. Validity of the show cause notice in law.
3. Proportionality of the punishment imposed.
Competency of the Additional Deputy Commissioner to impose punishment:
The appellant, a constable, was dismissed from service by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, which was challenged. The appellant contended that the Additional Deputy Commissioner lacked the authority to impose the punishment. The court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Delhi Police Act and Rules. It was established that the Additional Deputy Commissioner, being of the same rank as the Deputy Commissioner, had the power to dismiss a constable. The court referred to Section 19 of the General Clauses Act and Rule 4 of the Delhi Police Rules to support the authority of the Additional Deputy Commissioner to pass such orders.
Validity of the show cause notice in law:
The appellant argued that the show cause notice did not provide reasons for disagreeing with the inquiry officer's conclusions, rendering it invalid. The court acknowledged that the notice lacked specific reasons for disagreement, which could prejudice the delinquent officer. However, since only one charge of using abusive language was partially accepted, the court found the notice not vitiated by an error of law in this case. The court emphasized the importance of providing specific reasons in the show cause notice for effective representation by the delinquent officer.
Proportionality of the punishment imposed:
The court assessed whether the punishment of dismissal from service was proportionate to the offense of using abusive language. It emphasized that each case must be considered based on its unique circumstances. The court concluded that dismissal was harsh and disproportionate in this case. Instead, it directed the imposition of a lesser punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. The court held that the appellant was not entitled to back wages but should receive other consequential benefits.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the dismissal order and directing the imposition of a lesser punishment. The court emphasized the importance of proportionality in disciplinary actions and highlighted the need for specific reasons in show cause notices to ensure fairness in disciplinary proceedings.
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1995 (9) TMI 408
Issues:
- Maintainability of the complaint filed by one of the partners of the firm.
- Proof of liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Analysis:
1. The judgment involves five criminal appeals arising from a common judgment of acquittal by the Judicial Magistrate in five cases. The complaints were filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by the Appellant against the Respondent for dishonoring cheques issued in discharge of a debt.
2. The trial court acquitted the accused, stating the complaint was not properly filed and the liability was not proven under Section 138. The Appellant argued that the complaint, filed by one of the partners of the firm, was maintainable. The Appellant relied on precedent and contended the accused failed to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the Act.
3. The Respondent's counsel argued that the trial court's decision was correct as there was no legal evidence to prove the cheques were issued to discharge any liability. It was also contended that since the Company was not impleaded as an accused, the accused could not be held guilty under Section 141 of the Act.
4. The High Court found the trial court's decision erroneous. It held that the complaint filed by one of the partners was proper, citing precedent. The court also emphasized the presumption under Section 139 of the Act, stating the accused failed to rebut it, and the trial court overlooked this provision.
5. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeals, quashed the trial court's judgment, and directed a fresh decision in accordance with law. The parties were instructed to appear before the Trial Court for further proceedings on a specified date.
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1995 (9) TMI 407
... ...
... ... ..... swami, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (9) TMI 406
Issues involved: Interpretation of the term "debt" as defined in section 2(g) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.
Summary:
1. The suit was filed by Vijaya Bank against an advocate for recovery of a specified amount. The defendant argued that the Tribunal under the Act lacks jurisdiction as the claimed amount does not relate to the bank's business activity as per section 2(g) of the Act.
2. The key issue revolves around defining the term "debt" as per section 2(g) of the Act. The plaintiff's claim involves disputes over rent payments and legal services provided by the defendant, who was on the bank's legal panel.
3. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant did not deposit the full rent amount in court, leading to the suit for recovery of the outstanding balance. The suit includes principal and interest amounts, totaling a significant sum.
4. The central question is whether the suit qualifies as a claim for "debt" under section 2(g) of the Act.
5. The term "debt" is defined in section 2(g) of the Act, encompassing liabilities alleged as due from a person by a bank during its business activities, including interest, and legally recoverable on the application date.
6. The definition of "debt" clarifies that it includes any liability, secured or unsecured, arising during the bank's business activities under applicable laws, and must be legally recoverable at the application date.
7. The defendant's challenge focuses on whether the liability is related to the bank's business activity, as required by the Act.
8. The judgment emphasizes that the term "business activity" in the Act refers to activities necessary for banking operations, such as renting premises for office or staff accommodation. Therefore, the rent deposit transaction falls within the scope of "business activity."
Separate Judgment: The defendant's application challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was dismissed, and the suit was transferred to the Tribunal for further proceedings.
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1995 (9) TMI 405
Issues:
Delay in filing appeals before the State Commission, interpretation of Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, communication of orders by the District Forum, applicability of Haryana Consumer Protection Rules.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a case involving the appellant Housing Board, a statutory body providing housing facilities, and the additional demands raised due to judicial pronouncements enhancing land compensation. The Housing Board issued demand letters to allottees for increased land prices, leading to complaints by respondents before the District Consumer Forum. The Forum rejected objections by the Housing Board, prompting appeals to the State Commission, which were dismissed as time-barred. Subsequent revision petitions to the National Commission were also dismissed. The appellant argued that the appeals were filed within the prescribed period, citing delay in receiving the signed and dated order from the District Forum.
The Court analyzed Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, emphasizing the provision for appeal within 30 days of the District Forum's order, with a discretionary clause for entertaining appeals beyond the period for sufficient cause. The judgment highlighted Rules 4(10) and 8(3) of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, emphasizing the communication of signed orders to parties free of charge for appeal filing. It underscored the Act's objective to protect consumer interests and ensure timely communication of orders to facilitate appeals.
The Court ruled that the starting point for appeal limitation under Section 15 is the date of communication of the signed order, not the pronouncement date. It emphasized the importance of parties receiving orders to formulate grounds for appeal effectively. In this case, the appellant contended delay in receiving the signed order, supported by counsel's affidavit and admission by respondents. The Court determined that the appeals were filed within the limitation period, as the signed orders were received on 30.10.1992, justifying no delay in filing. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, setting aside the National and State Commission's orders and remitting the case to the State Commission for further proceedings.
In conclusion, the judgment clarifies the interpretation of Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, emphasizing the necessity of timely communication of signed orders by District Forums to parties for appeal filing. It underscores the importance of procedural adherence to protect parties' rights and facilitate effective appellate processes in consumer dispute resolution.
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1995 (9) TMI 404
The Supreme Court of India admitted the appeal as four other Tribunals had different views on the classification issue. The stay petition was dismissed as withdrawn. Liberty to mention was granted.
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1995 (9) TMI 403
Issues Involved:
1. Legality and propriety of the Collector's order.
2. Correct determination of the number of spinning machines imported.
3. Alleged undervaluation of the plant and machinery.
4. Eligibility for concessional assessment under Heading 84.66 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
5. Coverage of import licenses for the imported goods.
6. Alleged attempt to defraud the Government of Customs duties.
7. Imposition of fine in lieu of confiscation and penalty.
8. Cross-objection by the respondents regarding the valuation of specific items and dismantling charges.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality and Propriety of the Collector's Order:
The Tribunal examined whether the Central Board of Excise and Customs had properly exercised its power under Section 129D(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. The respondents argued that the Board's order was neither illegal nor improper. The Tribunal found that the Board's action was within the parameters of Section 129D, which allows the Board to act upon the legality and propriety of the Collector's order. The Tribunal dismissed the respondents' objections, noting that the term "propriety" covers correctness, thus validating the Board's examination of the Collector's order.
2. Correct Determination of the Number of Spinning Machines Imported:
The Collector concluded that the respondents imported 8 complete spinning machines and component parts sufficient for assembling 4 additional machines. The Tribunal upheld this finding, rejecting the department's claim that 12 spinning machines were imported. The Tribunal found no evidence to support the department's contention and agreed with the Collector's interpretation of the import license and the list of items attached to it.
3. Alleged Undervaluation of the Plant and Machinery:
The Collector found no undervaluation of the plant from the standpoint of plant capacity, which was linked with the denier of the yarn produced. The Tribunal upheld this finding, noting that the actual production did not exceed the plant capacity. However, the Tribunal remanded the issue of the value of the reconditioned spinning machines and equipment to the Collector for a de novo decision on merits after granting an opportunity to the respondents to make their submissions.
4. Eligibility for Concessional Assessment under Heading 84.66 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975:
The Collector concluded that the benefit of concessional assessment under Heading 84.66 was correctly availed for the goods imported, as they were in accordance with the contract executed on the strength of the proforma invoice. The Tribunal upheld this finding, noting that the imported goods were covered by the import licenses and the contract registered under the Project Imports (Registration of Contract) Regulation, 1965.
5. Coverage of Import Licenses for the Imported Goods:
The Collector found that the import licenses covered the goods imported. The Tribunal upheld this finding, noting that the respondents' import licenses were valid and covered the imported goods. However, the Tribunal left the issue of the valuation of the second-hand spinning machines and equipment open for the Collector's decision afresh.
6. Alleged Attempt to Defraud the Government of Customs Duties:
The department alleged that the respondents attempted to defraud the Government of Customs duties amounting to Rs. 119,64,46,555.80. The Tribunal found this charge unsustainable. The demand was based on an across-the-board increase of 100% on the declared value of the goods, which was found to be unsustainable. The Tribunal also found that the charge of importing four additional spinning machines without a license was not sustainable, except for the limited issue of the value of the reconditioned machines, which was remanded to the Collector for a fresh decision.
7. Imposition of Fine in Lieu of Confiscation and Penalty:
The Tribunal noted that the question of fine in lieu of confiscation and penalty is linked with the de novo decision to be taken by the Collector regarding the value of the reconditioned spinning machines and equipment. The Tribunal remanded this issue to the Collector for a fresh decision.
8. Cross-Objection by the Respondents:
The respondents filed a cross-objection challenging the Collector's order to appraise the value of screw pump motors and booster pump motors and to add dismantling charges to the assessable value of the last imported consignment. The Tribunal dismissed the cross-objection, noting that the issue of dismantling charges had been decided against the respondents in a previous Tribunal decision (Bombay Dyeing v. Collector, 1990). The Tribunal also found that the issue of reappraising the value of the booster pump motor and screw pump motor lost its importance as the entire issue of valuation was being reconsidered.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal upheld the Collector's order in most respects, except for the issue of the value of the reconditioned spinning machines and equipment, which was remanded to the Collector for a fresh decision. The cross-objection filed by the respondents was dismissed. The appeal and cross-objection were disposed of on these terms.
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1995 (9) TMI 402
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the property of an individual who is not the proclaimed person can be attached under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. Whether the Police Officer is under an obligation to furnish the inventory of seized articles to the Magistrate forthwith as required under Section 25 of the Bihar Police Manual 1978.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Attachment of Property Under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
The primary issue was whether the property of an individual who is not the proclaimed person can be attached under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner, mother of the absconder Ashok Soni, contested the seizure of her property. The court examined the provisions of Sections 82 and 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 82 empowers the court to issue a proclamation requiring an offender to appear at a specified place and time. Section 83 allows the court to order the attachment of any property, movable or immovable, belonging to the proclaimed person. The court emphasized that the property attached must belong to the accused and not to any other individual. The Chief Judicial Magistrate initially refused to release the properties without holding an enquiry, which was later set aside by the Revisional Court, directing an enquiry. The Judicial Magistrate, after enquiry, found that the petitioner was the owner of the seized properties. However, the Chief Judicial Magistrate again refused to release the properties, misapprehending the facts and law by presuming ownership by Ashok Soni due to his residence in the same house. The court concluded that the property of the petitioner could not be seized for the fault of Ashok Soni, as there was no evidence showing his specific interest in the seized property. This view was supported by precedents like Bisi Bihari v. Emperor and Baleshwar Singh v. The State of Bihar.
2. Obligation to Furnish Inventory Under Section 25 of the Bihar Police Manual 1978:
The second issue was whether the Police Officer was obligated to furnish the inventory of seized articles to the Magistrate forthwith. The seizure occurred in March 1995, and despite repeated directions from the Judicial Magistrate and the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the Officer-in-charge of Argora Police Station failed to produce the inventory. The court noted that the Police Manual mandates police officials to furnish an inventory of seized articles to the Magistrate without delay. The failure of the Officer-in-charge to comply with this requirement was seen as deliberate negligence. The court referenced a similar case, Umesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Ors., where the officer-in-charge was directed to pay compensation for such negligence. The court criticized the erstwhile Officer-in-charge, Srivastava, for his arbitrary actions and awarded a compensation of Rs. 10,000/- to the petitioner, holding Srivastava personally liable to pay the amount within three months. The court directed the Secretary cum-Home Commissioner, Government of Bihar, and the Director General of Police, Bihar, to ensure the payment and to recover the amount from Srivastava if necessary.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the application, setting aside the impugned order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 14.8.1995. It directed the current Officer-in-charge of Argora Police Station to release the seized articles to the petitioner within one week. The court also mandated compensation of Rs. 10,000/- to be paid by the erstwhile Officer-in-charge, Srivastava, for his illegal and arbitrary actions. Copies of the order were to be sent to the Secretary cum-Home Commissioner, Government of Bihar, and the Director General of Police, Bihar, for necessary action.
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1995 (9) TMI 401
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal due to a small amount involved and did not express any opinion on the legal question raised.
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1995 (9) TMI 400
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals based on the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 3195 of 1979 (The Union of India v. Madras Rubber Factory). (1995 (9) TMI 400 - SC)
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1995 (9) TMI 399
Issues:
Interpretation of the Punjab Government National Emergency (Concession) Rules, 1965 in relation to employees appointed after 1.11.1966 in the Union Territory of Chandigarh.
Analysis:
The judgment in question revolves around the applicability of the Punjab Government National Emergency (Concession) Rules, 1965 to employees appointed after 1.11.1966 in the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The central issue is whether these employees are entitled to the benefits under the 1965 Rules, specifically in terms of increments, seniority, promotion, and pension. The dispute arises from conflicting views between the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court of Punjab and Haryana regarding the application of these rules to post-1.11.1966 appointees.
The judgment delves into the legal framework governing the transition of rules from the erstwhile State of Punjab to the Union Territory of Chandigarh post-1.11.1966. It references the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, which stipulates that administrative orders of the predecessor state remain valid unless modified or repudiated by the successor state. The key question is whether the 1965 Rules were indeed modified, repudiated, or repealed by the Union Territory administration after 1.11.1966, thereby affecting their applicability to the concerned employees.
The analysis further scrutinizes the notifications issued by the Government of India in 1966, particularly SO 3267, SO 3268, and SO 3269, which delegated rule-making powers to the Administrator of the Union Territory of Chandigarh. It highlights Rule 3 of the Conditions of Service of Union Territory of Chandigarh Employees Rules, 1966, which exempts certain employees from the application of these rules concerning probation, confirmation, seniority, and promotion. The judgment concludes that the 1965 Rules continued to apply in the Union Territory of Chandigarh post-1.11.1966 for employees in Class II, III, and IV posts, as the Central Civil Services Rules did not govern these categories.
In the final analysis, the Supreme Court rules in favor of the concerned employees, overturning the decisions of the High Court and the Tribunal. The impugned orders are set aside, and the Union Territory administration is directed to consider and decide the claims of the employees in accordance with the 1965 Rules. The judgment emphasizes the continued validity of these rules for eligible employees in the Union Territory of Chandigarh, ensuring their entitlement to the benefits provided therein.
In conclusion, the judgment clarifies the legal standing of the Punjab Government National Emergency (Concession) Rules, 1965 in the context of post-1.11.1966 appointments in the Union Territory of Chandigarh. It underscores the importance of statutory interpretation, administrative continuity, and adherence to established rules in resolving disputes concerning employee benefits and entitlements.
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1995 (9) TMI 398
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the plaint of the suit has been signed and verified by a duly authorised person?
2. Whether the suit is barred by time?
3. Whether the agreement draft of which was forwarded by the defendant vide letter dated May 14, 1971, after appending his signatures, could not be accepted by the plaintiff on October 16, 1975?
4. Whether there was an agreement to delete Clause 5 of the draft agreement sent by the defendant, either by specific agreement or by estoppel? If so, to what effect?
5. Whether the plaintiff had no right to conclude the agreement on October 16, 1975?
6. Whether the plaintiff is bound by the policy decision contained in Engineering Association of India's letter dated 13/15th Sept. 1969 (Ext. P-11)?
7. Whether the amount of Rs. 75,000 received by the defendant towards the cost of the feasibility/project report is refundable to the plaintiff along with interest @9.5% p.a.?
8. Relief.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue No. 1: Whether the plaint of the suit has been signed and verified by a duly authorised person?
The court found that the plaint was not signed and verified by a duly authorised person. The plaintiff did not produce any government resolution or document to show that the Director of Industries, Shri Dhanendra Kumar, was authorised by the State of Haryana to file the suit and sign the plaint. The witness, Mr. Prem Nath Wadhwa, only identified Dhanendra Kumar's signature but did not claim Kumar was authorised to sign the plaint. Therefore, Issue No. 1 was answered in the negative.
Issue No. 2: Whether the suit is barred by time?
The court determined that the suit was barred by the law of limitation. The plaintiff's cause of action arose when the defendant refused to pay back the amount on 6-10-1976, and the suit should have been filed by 15-10-1979. However, the suit was filed on 30-9-1980, making it beyond the three-year limitation period. The plaintiff's argument that a letter dated 29-8-1979 extended the limitation period was rejected, as the letter did not acknowledge a subsisting liability. Therefore, Issue No. 2 was answered in the negative.
Issue No. 3: Whether the agreement draft of which was forwarded by the defendant vide letter dated May 14, 1971, after appending his signatures, could not be accepted by the plaintiff on October 16, 1975?
The court found that the agreement draft sent by the defendant on 14-5-1971 was not accepted by the plaintiff, who sought modifications. The defendant withdrew from the agreement on 3-10-1974, making it invalid for the plaintiff to accept it on 16-10-1975. Therefore, Issue No. 3 was answered affirmatively in favor of the defendant.
Issue No. 4: Whether there was an agreement to delete Clause 5 of the draft agreement sent by the defendant, either by specific agreement or by estoppel? If so, to what effect?
The court found no agreement to delete Clause 5 of the draft agreement. The plaintiff did not act in reliance on the agreement to its detriment. Therefore, the defendant was not estopped from withdrawing the clause. Issue No. 4 was answered in the negative.
Issue No. 5: Whether the plaintiff had no right to conclude the agreement on October 16, 1975?
The court held that the plaintiff had no right to conclude the agreement on 16-10-1975 after the defendant had withdrawn it on 3-10-1974. Therefore, Issue No. 5 was answered affirmatively in favor of the defendant.
Issue No. 6: Whether the plaintiff is bound by the policy decision contained in Engineering Association of India's letter dated 13/15th Sept. 1969 (Ext. P-11)?
The court found that the letter from the Engineering Association of India was not binding on the plaintiff. The letter was part of the defendant's correspondence and not an independent document from the plaintiff. Therefore, Issue No. 6 was answered in the negative.
Issue No. 7: Whether the amount of Rs. 75,000 received by the defendant towards the cost of the feasibility/project report is refundable to the plaintiff along with interest @9.5% p.a.?
The court acknowledged that the amount of Rs. 75,000 was refundable to the plaintiff as the project was not implemented. However, since the suit was barred by limitation and not signed by a duly authorised person, no decree could be passed. Therefore, Issue No. 7 was answered affirmatively but with no relief granted.
Relief:
The suit was dismissed as it was barred by the law of limitation and was not signed and verified by a duly authorised person. Each party was directed to bear their respective costs.
Conclusion:
The suit was dismissed on the grounds of being time-barred and not signed by a duly authorised person. The court found that the defendant was not liable to refund the amount due to the expiration of the limitation period and procedural deficiencies in the plaint.
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1995 (9) TMI 397
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of summons issued under Section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.
2. Requirement of specifying the nature of investigation or proceedings in the summons.
3. Alleged non-application of mind in issuing the summons.
4. Nexus between the documents requested and the investigation.
5. Alleged violation of fundamental rights under Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Summons Issued Under Section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973:
The court analyzed whether the summons issued under Section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, were valid. The appellants contended that the summons were issued without proper basis, mechanical in nature, and lacked necessary details. The court held that the powers under Section 40 are general and wide, aimed to facilitate the investigatory process without restrictions on person, place, or time. The summons are designed to aid the investigation, and the officer need not disclose the nature or extent of the investigation in the summons itself. The court concluded that the summons were valid as they were issued during the course of an investigation under the Act.
2. Requirement of Specifying the Nature of Investigation or Proceedings in the Summons:
The appellants argued that the summons should specify the nature of the investigation or proceedings. The court held that specifying such details in the summons would defeat the purpose of the investigation, as it could alert the person summoned, potentially leading to manipulation or destruction of evidence. The court emphasized that the summons need only indicate that the officer considers the attendance of the person necessary to give evidence or produce documents in an investigation under the Act. Therefore, the summons need not disclose further details about the investigation.
3. Alleged Non-application of Mind in Issuing the Summons:
The appellants claimed that the summons were issued mechanically, without application of mind, as evidenced by the use of a printed form without scoring out alternative purposes. The court rejected this argument, stating that the summons were issued based on information and materials available to the enforcement authorities. The court found that there was no requirement for the officer to disclose the reasons or materials in the summons itself, and the existence of relevant information in the records was sufficient to justify the summons.
4. Nexus Between the Documents Requested and the Investigation:
The appellants contended that the summons should state the nexus between the documents requested and the investigation. The court held that at the stage of investigation, it is not necessary to disclose the nexus between the documents and the investigation. The purpose of the investigation is to gather information and evidence, and specifying the nexus in the summons could hinder the investigatory process. The court concluded that the summons were valid even without specifying the nexus between the documents and the investigation.
5. Alleged Violation of Fundamental Rights Under Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India:
The appellants argued that the summons violated their fundamental rights under Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India. The court held that the officer issuing the summons is not a police officer, and the person summoned is not in the position of an accused. The investigation under Section 40 of the Act is not of a criminal or penal nature, and the summons are designed to facilitate the investigatory process. Therefore, the alleged violation of fundamental rights was not applicable in this case.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeals, upholding the validity of the summons issued under Section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The court emphasized that the summons were issued to facilitate the investigatory process and did not require disclosure of detailed information about the investigation. The alleged non-application of mind and violation of fundamental rights were also rejected. The court concluded that the appellants should comply with the summons and assist in the investigation.
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1995 (9) TMI 396
Issues:
1. Application under Order 7 rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure dismissed by the learned single Judge.
2. Allegations of mala fides against the defendants for not opening part II of the tender documents.
3. Claim for damages by the plaintiff due to alleged mala fides.
4. Interpretation of the plaint to determine if it discloses a cause of action.
5. Application of Order 7 rule 11 CPC and principles laid down in relevant case laws.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The appeal arose from the dismissal of the application under Order 7 rule 11 CPC by the learned single Judge based on the contention that the plaint discloses a cause of action. The appellants, a public sector Government Company, invited tenders for handling iron and steel materials, with the first respondent being one of the tenderers. The first respondent alleged that the appellants did not open part II of the tenders to benefit a contractor, M/s. S.K. Sharma, leading to a suit for damages against the appellants.
2. The key issue revolved around the allegations of mala fides against the appellants for not opening part II of the tender documents, which the plaintiff claimed was to benefit a specific contractor. The plaintiff contended that this action caused loss and rendered them ineligible for future work opportunities. The appellants argued that the suit should be dismissed as the plaint lacked material particulars of malice, but Order 6 rule 10 CPC allows for allegations of malice to be stated as facts without detailed circumstances.
3. The plaintiff sought damages based on the alleged mala fides of the appellants, claiming that the failure to open part II of the tenders was intentional to favor a specific contractor. The plaintiff asserted that this action caused financial loss and prevented them from being awarded the handling contract. The appellants defended by stating that they had the right to accept or reject tenders as per the terms of the invitation to tender.
4. The interpretation of the plaint was crucial to determine if it disclosed a cause of action. The court emphasized that the strength or weakness of the plaintiff's case should not be a factor in considering the application under Order 7 rule 11 CPC. The court analyzed the allegations of mala fides and the impact of not opening part II of the tenders on the plaintiff's eligibility for future work opportunities.
5. The court applied the principles laid down in relevant case laws to conclude that a meaningful reading of the plaint disclosed a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff. The court highlighted that the mere allegation of malice without detailed circumstances was sufficient under Order 6 rule 10 CPC. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed as the court found no merit in challenging the learned single Judge's decision to reject the application under Order 7 rule 11 CPC.
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1995 (9) TMI 395
Issues Involved:
1. Revocation of Arbitrator's authority.
2. Allegation of bias against the Arbitrator.
3. Refusal to allow witnesses.
4. Arbitrator's personal interest in the case.
5. Fee schedule and expenses.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Revocation of Arbitrator's Authority:
The appellant, Lucky Home Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited, sought the revocation of the Arbitrator's authority and the appointment of a new Arbitrator, preferably a retired Judge. The application was initially dismissed by the learned Single Judge, leading to this appeal. The appellant argued that the Arbitrator had become disqualified due to bias.
2. Allegation of Bias Against the Arbitrator:
The appellant presented several grounds alleging bias:
- First Ground: On 20th April 1992, the Arbitrator suggested that the contractor could pay Rs. 300 on behalf of the appellant, allegedly indicating that the Arbitrator had made up his mind to favor the contractor. The court found that the appellant did not raise any objection at the time and continued participating in the proceedings, implying waiver of objections. The Arbitrator and the respondent denied the allegations, and the court concluded that the direction to pay Rs. 300 could not be treated as an indication of bias.
- Second Ground: The Arbitrator refused to allow the appellant to examine witnesses. The court noted that the Arbitrator had provided detailed reasons for his decision, including the appellant's failure to file necessary documents and the need to complete the case within the stipulated time. The refusal to examine witnesses, while potentially an error, did not automatically indicate bias. The court emphasized that misconduct and bias are distinct concepts, and mere refusal to permit oral evidence does not prove bias.
- Third Ground: The Arbitrator's statement about his prestige being involved and incurring expenses from his pocket was interpreted by the appellant as showing personal interest. The court investigated the Arbitrator's travel expenses and found that he had charged TA for only one hearing out of six and had shifted the expenses to another case. The court concluded that the Arbitrator's actions did not indicate bias or personal interest.
- Fourth Ground: The appellant mentioned that the Arbitrator had been removed in another case by the High Court. The court clarified that the removal was based on consent and did not substantiate any bias in the present case.
3. Refusal to Allow Witnesses:
The appellant argued that the Arbitrator's refusal to allow witnesses indicated bias. The court examined the Arbitrator's detailed order, which cited reasons such as the appellant's failure to file documents and the need to complete the case within the stipulated time. The court found no evidence of bias in the Arbitrator's decision and noted that the learned Single Judge had already allowed the appellant to examine its witnesses.
4. Arbitrator's Personal Interest in the Case:
The appellant contended that the Arbitrator's statement about incurring expenses from his pocket showed personal interest. The court investigated and found that the Arbitrator had shifted the expenses for five out of six hearings to another case. The court concluded that the Arbitrator's actions did not indicate any bias or personal interest.
5. Fee Schedule and Expenses:
The appellant raised a subsidiary contention about the Arbitrator's fee schedule, which was provided after the Arbitrator's appointment. The court noted that the appellant continued participating in the proceedings after receiving the fee schedule and extended the time by consent. The court found the fee proposed by the Arbitrator to be reasonable and concluded that there was no extra burden on the appellant.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeal, finding no grounds to attribute bias to the Arbitrator or to revoke his authority. The court emphasized the need for substantial evidence of bias and misconduct, which was not present in this case. The Arbitrator's actions were found to be within the scope of his duties, and the appellant's objections were deemed to have been waived by their continued participation in the proceedings.
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