|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 2152 Records
-
2018 (9) TMI 2156
Levy of maximum marginal rate on the income assessed instead of normal tax rates applicable to the Society - assessee is a Trust registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 - HELD THAT:- CIT(A) held that the maximum marginal rate is applicable in the case of the assessee, who is having exempt income as well as taxable income, but there is no such distinction provided under section 167B of the Act. This Tribunal in the case cited supra held that normal rates are applicable in the case of the Society registered under Societies Act.
Thus, we hold that the income of the assessee is to be taxed at normal rates, but not at maximum marginal rates. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the Ld.CIT(A) and allow the appeal of the assessee.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2155
Claim of deduction @100% u/s 80IC - “substantial expansion” - initial assessment year - fresh claim on undertaking substantial expansion from the year of completion of substantial expansion - HELD THAT:- For orders, see M/S ADMAC FORMULATIONS [2018 (10) TMI 1001 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] as relying on M/s Classic Binding Industries [2018 (8) TMI 1209 - SUPREME COURT] dealing with the issue whether the assessee who had availed deductions at the rate of 100% for first five years on the ground that they had set up a manufacturing unit as prescribed under sub section (2) of Section 80IC of the Act can start claiming deduction at the rate of 100% again for the next five years as they had undertaken substantial expansion during the period mentioned in sub section (2) thereof. The answer was given in the negative. Decided against aseessee.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2154
Validity of proceedings u/s. 147 - Addition on account of on money paid in cash by the assessee - as argued no necessary approval for issuance of notice u/s 148 was obtained as mandated by Section 151(2) - HELD THAT:- In the case of the present assessee, prior to the reopening of assessment u/s. 147 of the Act, there was no assessment completed u/s.143(3) of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of section 151(2) of the Act, as it existed during the relevant assessment year would apply.
As per the said provision, in a case where four years have expired from the end of the relevant assessment year, no notice u/s. 148 of the Act can be issued by the AO without obtaining the sanction of the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (JCIT).
Thus, as per the statutory mandate contained u/s. 151(2) of the Act, the appropriate authority from whom the AO should have obtained sanction/approval before issuing notice u/s. 148 is the JCIT and not the CIT. Therefore, the notice issued u/s.148 of the Act, in the present case, does not satisfy the condition of section 151(2) of the Act as the Department has failed to bring any material before the Bench to demonstrate that sanction/approval for issuance of notice u/s 148 of the Act was obtained from the JCIT. That being the case, the mandatory requirement of section 151(2) of the Act having not being fulfilled, the assessment order passed u/s. 143 read with section 147 of the Act is invalid.
It is relevant to observe, in course of assessment proceedings, the assessee has specifically objected to the validity of the proceedings initiated u/s. 147 of the Act. However, before completion of assessment, the Assessing Officer has not disposed of the objections of the assessee. For that reason also the assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) read with section 147 of the Act has to be declared as invalid, hence, deserves to be quashed.
AO rejected assessee’s claim of non-payment of on money - As evident, in course of assessment proceedings the assessee has repeatedly requested the AO to communicate and bring to his notice the adverse materials in his possession for effective rebuttal.
AO has refused to divulge any information available with him which were ultimately utilized against the assessee. Even though the statements of third parties were utilized for making the addition, no opportunity for cross-examination was offered to the assessee. This, in our view, is in gross violation of rules of natural justice. It is further relevant to observe, the AO has not conducted any enquiry worth its name independently to ascertain the fact whether the assessee has actually paid on money in cash or not.
Non-furnishing of details by the assessee as alleged by the Assessing Officer certainly cannot prevent him from making any further enquiry and investigation to ascertain the truth. Simply relying upon the statement of third parties, the Assessing Officer cannot make the addition purely on conjectures and surmises and in the process ignore the evidence brought on record by the assessee by way of payment made through banking channel and the documentary evidence thereof. CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition made by the Assessing Officer - Decided in favour of assessee.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2153
Doctrine of separation of power - Whether disqualification for membership can be laid down by the Court beyond Article 102 and the law made by the Parliament Under Article 102(e)? - whether any disqualification can be read as regards disqualification for membership into the constitutional provisions? - HELD THAT:- It is well settled in law that the Court cannot legislate. Emphasis is laid on the issuance of guidelines and directions for rigorous implementation. With immense anxiety, it is canvassed that when a perilous condition emerges, the treatment has to be aggressive. The Petitioners have suggested another path. But, as far as adding a disqualification is concerned, the constitutional provision states the disqualification, confers the power on the legislature, which has, in turn, legislated in the imperative.
hus, the prescription as regards disqualification is complete is in view of the language employed in Section 7(b) read with Sections 8 to 10A of the Act. It is clear as noon day and there is no ambiguity. The legislature has very clearly enumerated the grounds for disqualification and the language of the said provision leaves no room for any new ground to be added or introduced.
Criminalization of politics - HELD THAT:- Criminalization of politics was never an unknown phenomenon in the Indian political system, but its presence was seemingly felt in its strongest form during the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts which was the result of a collaboration of a diffused network of criminal gangs, police and customs officials and their political patrons. The tremors of the said attacks shook the entire Nation and as a result of the outcry, a Commission was constituted to study the problem of criminalization of politics and the nexus among criminals, politicians and bureaucrats in India.
In ANUKUL CHANDRA PRADHAN ADVOCATE SUPREME COURT VERSUS U.O.I. [1997 (7) TMI 651 - SUPREME COURT], the Court, in the context of the provisions made in the election law, observed that they have been made to exclude persons with criminal background, of the kind specified therein, from the election scene as candidates and voters with the object to prevent criminalization of politics and maintain propriety in elections. Thereafter, the three-Judge Bench opined that any provision enacted with a view to promote the said object must be welcomed and upheld as subserving the constitutional purpose.
Role of Election Commission - HELD THAT:- This Court in a catena of judgments has elucidated upon the role of the Election Commission and the extent to which it can exercise its power under the constitutional framework - In ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA VERSUS SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY (DR.) [1996 (4) TMI 497 - SUPREME COURT], this Court ruled that the opinion of the Election Commission is a sine qua non for the Governor or the President, as the case may be, to give a decision on the question whether or not the concerned member of the House of the Legislature of the State or either House of Parliament has incurred a disqualification.
As regards the issue that there is a vacuum which necessitates interference of this Court, the first Respondent has contended that this argument is untenable as the provisions of the Constitution and the Act are clear and unambiguous and, therefore, answering the question referred to in the affirmative would be in the teeth of the doctrine of separation of powers and would be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and to the law enacted by the Parliament.
Analysis of the Election Symbols Order - HELD THAT:- Sub-clause (1) of Clause (5) of the Symbols Order, a priori, segregates the symbols for the purposes of this Symbols Order into two simon pure categories, i.e., 'Reserved' or 'Free'. Therefore, a symbol under the Symbols Order can either be reserved or it can be free. Before decoding Sub-clause (2) of Clause (5), we may first decipher Sub-clause (3) which gives a negative definition to a free symbol. As per Sub-clause (3) of Clause (5), a symbol is free if is not reserved under the Symbols Order. Sub-clause (2) of Clause (5) which defines a reserved symbol stipulates that except as otherwise provided in the Symbols Order, a reserved symbol is one which is reserved for a recognised political party for exclusive allotment to the contesting candidates set up by such political party.
What comes to the fore is that when a candidate has been set up in an election by a particular political party, then such a candidate has a right Under Sub-clause (3) of Clause (8) to choose the symbol reserved for the respective political party by which he/she has been set up. An analogous duty has also been placed upon the Election Commission to allot to such a candidate the symbol reserved for the political party by which he/she has been set up and to no other candidate.
A time has come that the Parliament must make law to ensure that persons facing serious criminal cases do not enter into the political stream. It is one thing to take cover under the presumption of innocence of the Accused but it is equally imperative that persons who enter public life and participate in law making should be above any kind of serious criminal allegation. It is true that false cases are foisted on prospective candidates, but the same can be addressed by the Parliament through appropriate legislation. The nation eagerly waits for such legislation, for the society has a legitimate expectation to be governed by proper constitutional governance. The voters cry for systematic sustenance of constitutionalism. The country feels agonized when money and muscle power become the supreme power. Substantial efforts have to be undertaken to cleanse the polluted stream of politics by prohibiting people with criminal antecedents so that they do not even conceive of the idea of entering into politics. They should be kept at bay.
Conclusion - The separation of powers doctrine prevents the judiciary from legislating disqualifications for candidates. The Election Commission must operate within the framework of existing laws.
Petition disposed off.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2152
Ceiling limit for exemption from payment of income tax on leave encashment benefit enjoyed by Central or State Government employees - contention is when Section 10(10AA)(i) of Income Act, 1961 does not prescribe any ceiling limit under clause (ii), such a limit of “ten months” is prescribed for the employees like the petitioner who happen to retire from employment of a nationalized bank - HELD THAT:- The petitioner has not pointed out that Central or State Government employees get cash equivalent to leave salary for period in excess of ten months. As per their service conditions, leave encashment at the time of retirement is limited only to 300 days. Vide clause (ii) identical period is stipulated for petitioner but word employed is “ten months”.
Hence, the plea of discrimination is unsustainable. Even otherwise, when employees are under different employers and in different sectors with different service conditions, material on record is insufficient to claim parity. Service conditions of Government servants cannot be compared with employees in banking sector.
Petition is rejected as no case made out.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2151
Reopening of assessment - reasons to believe - denial of Deduction u/s. 80IA - notice after expiry of 4 years - disallowance of the claim of assessee in respect of ‘Bus Shelter’ and ‘Foot Overbridge’ expenditure - HELD THAT:- While recording ‘Reasons’, it is incumbent upon the AO to firstly make an allegation in the ‘Reasons’ recorded and then also to make out a case that there was a failure on the part of the assessee in disclosing fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for the impugned assessment year. Perusal of the ‘Reasons’ recorded by the AO reveals that no such allegation has been made in the ‘Reasons’.
Nothing has been recorded by the AO in the ‘Reasons’ about any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the framing of original assessment. It has nowhere been mentioned by the AO which fact or material was not disclosed by the assessee. Thus, vital link between ‘Reasons’ and his findings has not been established by him.
This vital link is the safeguard against arbitrary reopening of the concluded assessment. The ‘Reasons’ recorded cannot be supplemented by way of further observations in the assessment order or in any other manner. The validity of the reopening can be examined on the basis of ‘Reasons’ alone and not in supplementary material.
Reopening has been done without complying with the mandatory jurisdictional condition precedent as stipulated in first proviso to section 147. Thus, reopening is invalid on this ground and the CIT (A) rightly decided this legal issue challenged before him
We concur with the CIT (A) that the AO without satisfying the jurisdictional pre-condition as stipulated in the first proviso to sec. 147 of the Act lacks jurisdiction to reopen the original assessment completed u/s. 143(3) after four years. Therefore, all proceeding subsequently made is ‘null’ in the eyes of law and so, Ld. CIT (A) rightly annulled the reopening of regular assessment u/s. 148/147 and subsequent reassessment order of the AO is, therefore, null in the eyes of law. Decided against revenue.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2150
Money Laundering - seeking grant of bail - petitioner submitted that the learned Judge has failed to exercise his jurisdiction without appreciating the mandate of law and rejected the bail application in a mechanical and cryptic manner by not considering the provision of section 50 of the said Act, 2002 - violation of principles of natural justice - twin conditions of Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) satisfied or not - HELD THAT:- It is found from the amended provision of section 45 of the Act that no person accused of an offence under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless he is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm or is accused either on his own or along with other accused of money laundering a sum of less than one crore rupees, may be released on bail, if the Special Court so directs.
It appears prima facie from the entirety of the complaint and final report submitted after investigation that the accused petitioner along with other accused persons collected funds and laundered the proceeds of crime generated through cheating the public at large who were motivated to invest their money through agents of Rose Valley with high rate of interest.
Bearing in mind the serious nature of the offence under section 45 of PMLA, 2002 and amended provision thereto, it is not required to enlarge the accused petitioner on bail even though the charge sheet has been submitted - application dismissed.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2149
Disallowance on account of advance from customers - Accrual of income - These advances in fact constitute receipt in the hands of the assessee in view of its nature of business activities - assessee-company is engaged in the business of marketing, selling, installing, commissioning, service, repairs, maintenance and modernization of elevators and escalators - AO following the earlier years' assessment orders held that advance received by the assessee from the customers is income of the assessee - HELD THAT:- This issue is quite similar to the issue raised by the Department because the CIT (A) held that in so far as advances received for maintenance of elevators under annual maintenance contract should be routed through P&L account and this issue was decided against the assessee by the ld. CIT(A) in the earlier years.
Since similar issue and facts are permeating in this year also, therefore, following the precedence of the earlier years, we hold that the addition sustained by the CIT(A) is to be deleted because assessee has been correctly accounting its income on periodical basis in view of regular accounting standard followed by it. Accordingly, grounds No. 3 and 3.1 is treated as allowed.
Disallowance of expenses claimed under the head 'advances written off - assessee has written off certain advances given to the suppliers for supply of raw material, however parties had neither supplied the material nor refunded the amount paid as advances - main reason for making the disallowance was that this amount was never form part of the income; therefore, it failed the conditions given in Section 36(2) - HELD THAT:- Here, the assessee has given an advance for supply of material which neither supplied nor the amount paid could be recovered. Such a claim cannot be disallowed as a bad debt, and therefore, to hold that condition of Section 36(2) has not been satisfied would be wholly erroneous. The claim has to be allowable u/s. 37(1) r.w.s. 28 of the Act, being the loss incurred in carrying out the operation of the business. This principle is covered by the judgment of Mysore Sugar Co. Ltd [1962 (5) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT] Accordingly, grounds as raised by the assessee is allowed.
Disallowance of TDS recoverable written off and rent deposit written off in the books - as contended that the assessee has disclosed the income pertaining the aforesaid debtors in the earlier years, and therefore, it is bad debt allowable u/s. 36(1)(vii) r.w.s. 36(2) - HELD THAT:- Once the aforesaid facts has not been disputed either by the Assessing Officer or by the ld. CIT(A), we do not find any reason as to why such a bad debt should not be allowed because if the assessee has booked the amount of TDS recoverable in its books of account and is offered for its income this writing off the same from the books of account when it was not recoverable same has to be allowed in terms of Section 36(1)(vii) r.w.s. 36(2). Accordingly, this issue is also decided in favour of the assessee.
Disallowance on account of rent deposit written off - if the amount withheld by the landlord from the security deposit on the ground that certain repair expenses have been incurred by the landlord on such premises which has not been claimed by the assessee in its books of account then benefits arising out of such repairs having been enjoyed by the assessee exclusively for carrying out its business activities has to be allowed as deduction because it falls in the nature of expenditure and repairs. If the amount shown as refundable deposit has not been received as stated to be spent on repairs without debiting the same to the P&L account then writing off of such an amount has to be allowed as deduction and it cannot be held that conditions of Section 36(2) requires to be fulfilled.
'Excess deposit of TDS' written off - when the assessee came to know its mistake, it had to recover the same from the department. Learned Assessing Officer held that TDS amounts cannot be claimed as business losses and disallowed the same which has been confirmed by the ld. CIT(A) also. If it is not in dispute that excess TDS has been deposited and could not be recovered from the Department, then same has to be allowed u/s. 37(1) r.w.s. 28 of the Act. Accordingly, the same is directed to be allowed.
CIT(A) admitting additional ground of appeal which the assessee had neither raised at the stage of scrutiny proceedings nor in its revised return and directing AO to verify the claim of the appellant from its record and allow depreciation on the goodwill - HELD THAT:- After hearing both the parties, we find that such an additional ground raised by the assessee before the ld. CIT(A) was purely a legal ground admissible in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Smiff Securities Ltd. [2012 (8) TMI 713 - SUPREME COURT] that depreciation has to be allowed on account of intangible assets. Accordingly, depreciation of WDV of the goodwill was allowed. Since both on the issue of admissibility and on the issue of deprecation the matters stands covered, we do not find any substance on the ground by the Revenue and the same is dismissed.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2148
Legality of notice dated 20.08.2018 calling for election for the Board of Directors and RGB members for the third respondent Society - direction to respondents 1 to 3 to issue a fresh notice for the said election strictly in accordance with the bye-laws of the third respondent Society, Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 and the Rules framed thereunder - HELD THAT:- Mr. V. Sivasubramanian, Retired District Judge, No. 1/349, Judges Avenue, Y. Pudupatti, Arumbanoor Post, Madurai - 625 104 [Mobile No. 94430 15316] appointed as Observer. The initial remuneration for the Observer is fixed as Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh and Fifty Thousand only) and the same be paid by the third respondent Society within a week. Both the Observer and the fourth respondent - Returning Officer are hereby directed to ensure that all the voters are carrying their share certificates along with the identity cards issued by the Railway Department. The petitioners shall also issue a fresh list of dead persons within two days from today.
Petition disposed off.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2147
Possession of contraband - violation of Section 42 of Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - HELD THAT:- From a reading of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in KARNAIL SINGH VERSUS STATE OF HARYANA [2009 (7) TMI 1144 - SUPREME COURT] it would appear that the law laid down in this regard is that the requirements of Section 42(1) and 42(2) of the Act should normally precede the entry, search and seizure by the Officer but in special circumstances the recording of information in writing and sending and copy thereof to the superior officer may be postponed by a reasonable period and may be effected after the search, entry and seizure. Such an exception illustratively has been laid down by the Constitution Bench to be in a case where the accused may escape or the goods or evidence may get destroyed or removed.
In the present case PW-1, who is the Investigating officer, in his deposition has stated that the information i.e. the contraband was being carried from the Indo-Nepal Border identified in a vehicle, details of which had also been provided, had been received in the evening of 2nd July, 2007.
Though, the investigating officer has stated that he had moved to Raxaul along with a team and two independent witnesses, the said independent witnesses were not examined. No explanation is forthcoming on this count also. That apart from the materials on record it appears that no memos including the seizure memo were prepared at the spot and all the papers were prepared on reaching the police station at Patna on 4th July, 2007.
The accused-appellant is entitled to acquittal - The conviction and sentence passed by the Courts below is set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2146
Duty on the samples cleared by the appellant in their own factory for testing - Revenue is of the view that as goods are complete in nature and cleared for testing, therefore, they are required to pay duty on these samples - HELD THAT:- Considering the fact that the in this case, the appellant are sending goods for testing in their own factory and the goods has not been cleared for the sale, moreover, without testing, the goods cannot be removed from the factory. In these circumstances, the goods are in-complete before the testing is done, therefore, no duty can be demanded on the samples which has been destroyed during the course of testing.
The impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2145
Adhoc disallowance of expenses - addition of general expenses and staff welfare expenses and disallowances on account of sales promotion expenses and freight expenses - expenses which are not verifiable - as argued absence of conducting any specific enquiry before making addition, these disallowances acquires the character and nature of ad-hoc disallowances, which are not permissible within the scope and realm of taxation laws - HELD THAT:- As coming out from assessment order itself, that from time to time assessee has provided answer to the questionnaire issued by the AO and has also produced books of account along with bills and vouchers, which were test checked. When all these documents were there before the Department, asking for further presentation of these documents before the CIT(A) seems to be a meaningless exercise.
The power of the ld. CIT(A) being co-terminus with that of the AO has also not gone into the merits of the case regarding disallowances and has summarily disposed of the appeal confirming the additions made by the AO - We take guidance from the decision of J.J. Enterprises [2001 (9) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT] wherein it has been categorically held that addition to the income of the assessee made on the basis of pure guess work was unsustainable.
In the instant case, as we have examined, all the disallowances were made on adhoc basis and on the basis of pure guess work, therefore, relying on various judicial pronouncements on the issue, we set aside the order of the ld. CIT(A) and direct deletion of these adhoc disallowances thereby allowing the appeal of the assessee.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2144
Delay of 382 days in filing of appeals before the CIT(A) - HELD THAT:- There was inordinate delay of 382 days in filing of the appeal before the CIT(A). Though the assessee has tried to explain the delay in filing of the appeal but do not find any merit therein. Therefore, do not notice any infirmity in the order of the CIT(A). Accordingly, confirm the same. Appeal of the assessee is dismissed.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2143
Levy of luxury tax - ayurveda services provided, boat charges, taxi charges and laundry charges received from the guests of the hotel, being included in the total turnover for the purpose of applying the rate of tax on luxury as provided under Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 1976 - HELD THAT:- The boat hire charges, taxi hire charges and ayurveda treatment charges said to be facilities availed outside the premises of the hotel. It cannot at all be contended that the charges were not received by the hotel and the services were also not provided from the hotel.
The assessee then claimed that ayurveda charges are with respect to the facilities offered by a unit situated in a separate building, which has been leased out to one Ayurveda Doctor. However, it is clear that the petitioner-hotel owns the building and lease has been granted to the Doctor for providing ayurveda treatment facilities to the guests, for which charges are taken by the hotel and which is included in the total amounts received. The Assessing Officer was perfectly right in having computed, along with the charges for accommodation, for the purpose of levying luxury tax, charges for other amenities and services provided in a hotel in addition to the accommodation provided.
Appeal of Revenue allowed.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2142
Liquidation of the corporate debtor - Section 33 (2) of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - HELD THAT:- In the absence of any resolution plan and for want of time beyond statutory CIRP period; there is no other alternative but to order, in conformity with the unanimous decision of the CoC, for liquidation of the corporate debtor under Section 33 of the Code.
The application is allowed by ordering liquidation of the corporate debtor, namely M/s Moser Baer India Limited in the manner laid down in the Chapter IT of Part II of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 along with conditions imposed - application allowed.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2141
Constitutional validity of the Goa Rural Improvement and Welfare Cess Act, 2000 and the Goa Rural Improvement and Welfare Cess Rules, 2006 - Validity of demand notices issued under the impugned enactments and the notification issued on 8 October 2010 - HELD THAT:- Considering substance and object of the Goa Cess Act and Rules vis-a-vis the MMDR Act and the Rules framed there under, it is found that there is no irrevocable conflict between the concerned Union Legislation and the State Legislations. The Goa Cess Act and Rules are targeted for augmentation of revenue to provide infrastructures in the State without impinging on the mineral regulation. The Act is traceable to the entries relied upon by the State.
Sufficient evidence placed on record of spending the money, both on road infrastructure and welfare activities. It cannot be said that the Petitioners do not benefit at all from the services rendered and that there is not even a remote connection. The Goa Cess Act and the Rules are a device for the State to augment its resources. The services rendered by the collection of the levy benefits the Petitioner as well, and there exists a co-relationship. Therefore, the Goa Cess Act and the Rules, whether it imposes a tax or fee, cannot be said to be unconstitutional - It needs to be noted that by Notification dated 6 April 2016 the levy where royalty is paid to the Government has been reduced to 'nil'.
Thus, the challenge of the Petitioner on the constitutional validity of the Goa cess Act and the Rules on the ground of legislative competence must fail.
Retrospective levy of the Cess - HELD THAT:- The State has argued that when the notification dated 23 January 2006 was published, it was clear that 1 February 2006 would be the appointed date on which the Act would come into force, as well as the same would be the date on which the levy would be made applicable and collected, and it was only a typographical error that Section 3(1) was not mentioned. A corrigendum to that effect was issued. Perusal of the said notification shows that it a corrigendum to the original Notification dated 23 January 2006, by which it was clarified that under Section 1(3) and 3(1), the Goa Cess Act notified the appointed date as 1 February 2006 for the purpose of Section 1(3) and for the purpose of Section 3(1). Therefore, it cannot be held that the power to levy cess was available only after 8 October 2010.
The impugned enactments cannot be struck down on the basis of the challenge levied by the Petitioner. The impugned Notification is valid and lawfully issued and the demands made under the impugned Act, Rule and Notification are valid and legal. This being the position, there is no question of refund of the cess collected. The Petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this Petition.
The Writ Petition is dismissed.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2140
Refusal to grant the input tax credit - Section 28(2)(i) U.P. VAT Act - HELD THAT:- After perusal of record, there is no justification that the Tribunal has allowed the appeal and has ignored the findings recorded by the First Appellate Authority while remanding the matter back to the Assessing Authority to reexamine the material and evidence against the claim by the assessee.
The matter is remanded to the Assessing Authority with the direction that the entire proceedings must be concluded, after providing an opportunity to the assessee, within a period of three months from today - Revision allowed.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2139
Validity of action of the respondents of not releasing goods provisionally without permission/compliance of the conditions for transport/storage of hazardous cargo - HELD THAT:- Without commenting upon the merit of the subject writ petition and in view of willingness on the part of the petitioners to furnish full bank guarantee towards security for the amount of Rs. 9 lakhs for releasing goods provisionally, the respondent authorities are directed to release the seized goods of subject matter upon petitioner furnishing the bank guarantee within 7 days from today subject to adjudication qua the notice dated 13.04.2018 and also outcome of the sample testing report by CRCL, New Delhi.
This writ petition is disposed off.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2138
Validity of assessment order - levy of Entry Tax - HELD THAT:- After the perusal of record, there is no justification that the Tribunal has allowed the appeal and has ignored the findings recorded by the First Appellate Authority while remanding the matter back to the Assessing Authority to re examine the material and evidence against the claim by the assessee.
The order of the Tribunal is set aside - The revision is allowed by directing the assessing authority to pass an appropriate reasoned order, as directed by the First Appellate Authority, in accordance with law, after providing adequate opportunity to the assesse opposite party.
-
2018 (9) TMI 2137
Jurisdiction - power of NCLT to strike down the provisions of Section 36A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations 2016 - expression of interest already issued.
HELD THAT:- At this stage, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. However, it is pointed out that in some cases, the "Expression of Interest" has already been issued by the Resolution Professionals. This Court is of the view that the process in those cases, need not be interdicted.
Therefore, it is directed that the impugned order dated 05.09.2018 passed by NCLT in the matter of State Bank of India vs. Su Kam Power Systems Ltd. [2018 (9) TMI 2103 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI PRINCIPAL BENCH] shall not come in the way of the matters where "Expression of Interest" has already been issued.
List on 27.11.2018.
........
|
9911796707
