REASONED ORDER

[Mr. M. GOVINDARAJAN]

The principle of natural justice has twin ingredients-
* the person who is likely to be adversely affected by the action of the authorities should be given notice to show cause thereof and granted an opportunity of being heard;
* the order so passed by the authorities should give reason for arriving at any conclusion showing proper application of mind.

Violation of either of them could in the given facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate the order itself. Such rule being applicable to the administrative authority certainly requires that the judgment of the Court should meet with this requirement with higher degree of satisfaction. The order of an administrative authority may not provide reasons like a judgment but the order must be supported by the reasons of rationality. The distinction between passing of an order by an administrative or quasi-judicial authority has practically extinguished and both are required to pass reasoned order.

Non recording of reasons could lead to dual infirmities, it may cause prejudice to the affected party and secondly more particularly, hamper the proper administration of justice.
Justice Roslyn Atkinson, Supreme Court of Queensland, at AIJA Conference at Brisbane on September 13, 2002 spoke in relation to judgment writing. He says that the first matter to consider is the purpose of the judgment. To his mind there were four purposes for any judgment that is written:
* to clarify your own thoughts;
* to explain your decision to the parties;
* to communicate the reasons for the decision to the public; and
* to provide reasons for an appeal Court to consider.

In 'Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd., V. Union of India and another' - AIR 1976 SC 1785 the Supreme Court held as under-

"If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of Natural Justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere presence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law"

In 'Mc Dermott International Inc. V. Burn Standard Co. and others' - (2006) SLR 345, the Supreme Court clarified the rationality behind providing of reasons and stated the principle as follows:

"Reason is a ground or motive for a belief or a course of action, a statement in justification or explanation of belief or action. It is in this sense that the award must state reasons for the amount awarded.

The rationale of the requirement of reasons is that reasons assure that the arbitrator has not acted capriciously. Reasons reveal the grounds on which the Arbitrator reached the conclusion which adversely affects the interests of a party. The contractual stipulation of reasons means, as held in 'Poyser and Mills' Arbitration in Re, 'proper adequate reasons'. Such reasons shall not only be intelligible but shall be a reason connected with the case which the Court can see is proper. Contradictory reasons are equal to lack of reasons".
In 'Gujarat Singh Fijji V. State of Punjab' - (1979) 2 SCC 368 while dealing with the matter of selection of candidates who could be under review, if not found suitable otherwise, the Court explained the reasons being a link between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions and held, that where providing reasons for proposed supersession were essential, then it could not be held to be a valid reason that the concerned officer's record was not such as to justify his selection was not contemplated and thus was not legal. In this context, the Court held-

"Reasons" are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. The Court accordingly held that the mandatory provisions of Regulation 5(5) were not complied with by the Selection Committee. That an Officer was 'not found suitable' is the conclusion and not a reason in support of the decision to supersede him. True, that it is not expected that the Selection Committee should give anything approaching the judgment of Court, but it must at least state, as briefly as it may, why it came to the conclusion that the officer concerned was found to be a suitable for inclusion in the selection list."
The principle has been extended to administrative actions on the premise that it applies with greater rigor to the judgments of the Courts. In 'State of Maharashtra V. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan' - (1981) 4 SCC 129, while remanding the matter to High Court for examination of certain issues raised, the Supreme Court observed that it would be for the benefit of the Court that a speaking judgment is given.

In the cases where the Courts have not recorded reasons in the judgment, legality, propriety and correctness of the orders by the Court of competent jurisdiction are challenged in absence of proper discussion. The requirement of recording reasons is applicable with greater rigor to the judicial proceedings. The orders of the Court must reflect what weighed with the Court in granting or declining the relief claimed by the applicant. In this regard some judgments may be referred to.

A Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of M/s Pipe Arts India Private Limited V. Gangadhar Nathuji Golamare' - 2008 (6) Maharashtra Law Journal 280- wherein the Bench was concerned with an appeal against an order, where prayer for an interim relief was rejected without stating any reasons in a writ petition challenging the order of the Labor Court noticed, that legality, propriety and correctness of the order was challenged on the ground that no reason was recorded by the learned Single Judge while rejecting the prayer and this has seriously prejudiced the interest of justice. After a detailed discussion on the subject, the Court held that the Supreme Court and different High Courts have taken the view that it is always desirable to record reasons in support of the Government actions whether administrative or quasi judicial. Even if the statutory rules do no impose an obligation upon the authorities still it is expected of the authorities concerned to act fairly and in consonance with basic rule of law. These concepts would require that any order, particularly, the order which can be subject matter of judicial review, is reasoned one.

In 'Chabungabambohal Singh V. Union of India and others' - 1995 (Suppl) 2 SCC 83, the Supreme Court held - "His assessment was, however, recorded as 'Very Good' whereas qua the appellant it had been stated unfit. As the appellant was being superseded by one of his juniors, we do not think if it was enough on the part of the Selection Committee to have merely stated unfit, and then to recommend the name of one of his juniors. No reason for unfitness, is reflected in the proceedings, as against what earlier Selection Committees had done to which reference has already been made".

In the case of 'State of UP V. Battan and others' - (2001) 10 SCC 607, the Supreme Court held that the High Court has not given any reason for refusing to grant leave to file appeal against acquittal. The manner in which appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the High Court leaves much to be desired. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons, however brief, in its order. The absence of reason has rendered the High Court order not sustainable.
In the case of 'State of Punjab and others V. Surinder Kumar and others' - (1992) 1 SCC 489, while noticing the jurisdictional distinction between Article 142 and Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court stated that powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 are much wider and the Supreme Court would pass orders to do complete justice. The Supreme Court further reiterated the principle with approval that the High Court has the jurisdiction to dismiss petitions or criminal revisions in limini or grant leave asked for by the petitioner byt for adequate reasons which should be recorded in the order. The High Court may not pass cryptic order in relation to regularization of service of the respondents in view of certain directions passed by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Absence of reasoning did not find favor with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also stated the principle that powers of the High Court were circumscribed by limitations discussed and declared by ju8dicial decision and it cannot transgress the limits on the basis of whims or subjective opinion varying from Judge to Judge.

Lord Denning, M.R. in 'Breen V. Amalgamated Engineering Union' observed that the giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration. In 'Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Limited V. Crabtree' it was observed that failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are links between the minds of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the inscrutable face of the sphinx, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to indicate the application of mind to the matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the statutory requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking-out. The 'inscrutable face of sphinx' is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or a quasi judicial performance.

The Supreme Court in the case of 'State of Rajasthan V. Rajendra Prasad Jain' - Criminal Appeal No.360/2008 stated that reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion and without the same it becomes lifeless.

Patrica Wald, Chief Justice of D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in the Article, Blackrobed Bureaucracy or Collegiability Under Challenge, observed as - "my own guiding principle is that virtually every appellate decision requires some statement of reasons. The discipline of writing even a few sentences or paragraphs explaining the basis for the judgment insures a level of thought and scrutiny by the Court that a bare signal of affirmance, dismissal or reversal does not. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that a losing litigant has a cause to plead and a right to challenge the order if it is adverse to him. Opinion of the Court alone can explain the cause which led to passing of the final order. Whether an argument was rejected validly or otherwise, reasoning of the order alone can show. To evaluate the submissions is obligation of the Court and to know the reasons for rejection of its contention is a legitimate expectation on the part of the litigant."

Another fact of providing reasoning is to give it a value of precedent which can help reduction of frivolous litigation. Paul D. Carrington Daniel J Meador and Maurice Rosenburg, Justice on Appeal 10 (West 1976) observed as - When reasons are announced and can be weighed, the public can have assurance that the correcting process is working. Announcing reasons cal also provide public understanding of how the numerous decisions of the system are integrated. In a busy Court, the reasons are essential demonstration that the Court did in fact fix its mind on the case at hand. An unreasoned decision has very little claim to acceptance by the defeated party, and is difficult or impossible to accept as an act reflecting systematic application of legal principles. Moreover, the necessity of stating reasons not infrequently changes the results by forcing the judges to come to grips with nettlesome facts or issues which their normal instincts would otherwise cause them to avoid."

In 'Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department V. Shukla & Brothers' - 2010 -TMI - 76374 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA the Supreme Court held that providing of reasons in orders is of essence in judicial proceedings. Every litigant who approaches the court with a prayer is entitled to know the reasons for acceptance or rejection of such request. Either of the parties to the lis has a right of appeal and, therefore, it is essential for them to know the considered opinion of the Court to make the remedy of appeal meaningful. It is the reasoning which ultimately culminates into final decision which may be subject to examination of the appellate or other higher Courts. It is not only desirable but, in view of the consistent position of law, mandatory for the Court to pass orders while recording reasons in support thereof, however, brief they may be. Brevity in reasoning in support of judicial orders is impermissible, the brief reasoning would suffice to meet the remedy of appeal purposeful and meaningful. It is a settled canon of legal jurisprudence that the Courts are vested with discretionary powers but such powers are to be exercised judiciously, equitably and in consonance with the settled principles of law. Whether or not, such judicial discretion has been exercised in accordance with the accepted norms, can only be reflected by the reasons recorded in the order impugned before the higher Court. Often it is said that absence of reasoning may ipso facto indicate whimsical exercise of judicial discretion.