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2012 (9) TMI 385 - AT - CustomsCondonation of delay of beyond 30 days - Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal on limitation, after observing that the order of the Original Adjudicating Authority was issued on 23-9-2006 whereas the appellant has shown the date of receipt as 21-3-2009 - whether the despatch of order by speed post by itself is sufficient to reflect upon the fact of receipt of the same or not Held that - It cannot be presumed that the dispatch of the order by speed post, in the absence of any proof of delivery, results in communication of the order. There is no scope for presumption in taxing matters and the deemed services provisions under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 do not apply - matter remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) Decision in Margra Industries Ltd. v. C.C., New Delhi (2006 (7) TMI 18 - CESTAT, NEW DELHI) followed.
Issues:
1. Appeal dismissal on limitation grounds. Analysis: The appeal before the Appellate Tribunal was based on the dismissal of the appeal by the Commissioner (Appeals) on the grounds of limitation. The Commissioner observed that the order of the Original Adjudicating Authority was issued on a specific date, but the appellant claimed a different date of receipt. The Commissioner concluded that the appeal was filed after the limitation period and could not be condoned. The Tribunal acknowledged that the Commissioner did not have the authority to condone delays beyond the specified period. However, the key issue revolved around determining the actual date of receipt of the order by the appellant. The Revenue argued that since the order was sent via speed post and not returned, it was deemed received. The Tribunal referenced a previous judgment by the Larger Bench, emphasizing that the mere dispatch of an order via speed post does not automatically imply receipt, especially without proof of delivery. Based on the above analysis, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the Commissioner (Appeals) for a fresh decision on the date of receipt of the order and its impact on the limitation period. The decision was guided by the legal principles established in the earlier judgment by the Larger Bench. Consequently, the appeal was allowed for further proceedings through remand, and the stay petition was also disposed of accordingly.
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