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2015 (3) TMI 1045 - HC - VAT and Sales TaxCondonation of delay - Revision application under section 58 of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008 - Held that - It is noticeable that revision under section 58 lies to this Court in special cases involving question of law. The order under challenge should be an order made under sub-section (7) or sub-section (8) of section 57 other than an order under sub-section (4) of that section summarily disposing the appeal. - An order condoning delay in filing the appeal is not an order covered by sub-section (7) or sub-section (8) of section 57. For the said reason as well, no interference is warranted in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. - Decided against appellant.
Issues:
Delay in filing appeal, condonation of delay, interpretation of limitation period, revisional jurisdiction under section 58 of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008. Analysis: The case involved a revision under section 58 of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008, challenging the Tribunal's order condoning the delay in filing an appeal by the Revenue. The revisionist argued that there was no proper explanation for the delay and questioned the starting point of the limitation period. The revisionist contended that the limitation should start from the date the judgment was received by the Assessing Authority, while the Revenue argued it should start from the date it was received by the State representative. The Court noted that the delay was due to the concerned clerk's medical leave, and the period before the receipt of the proposal for filing the appeal was not significant. The main issue before the Court was whether to interfere in the case under its revisional power, which is limited to correcting errors of law. The Court emphasized the need for a liberal approach in condoning delays, especially considering the procedural delays inherent in governmental functioning. Citing relevant judgments, the Court highlighted that once a delay is condoned, superior courts should generally not interfere unless the exercise of discretion was untenable. In this case, the Court found no grounds for interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Regarding a specific judgment cited by the revisionist, the Court differentiated the circumstances, noting that the law laid down in that case did not apply to the present situation. The Court clarified that the order condoning the delay in filing the appeal was not covered under the relevant provisions for revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court concluded that no interference was warranted in this case, and the revision lacked merit, leading to its dismissal.
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