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2025 (4) TMI 1526 - HC - Indian LawsSeeking quashing/setting aside of order of cognizance as well as summoning order - Criminal conspiracy - Whether a public servant against whom sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 has been expressly declined by the competent authority where the denial of sanction has not even been challenged by the prosecuting agency and who is not charged with any independent or substantive offence under the Indian Penal Code can nonetheless be prosecuted solely for criminal conspiracy u/s 120-B IPC when the sole object of that conspiracy is the commission of an offence under the PC Act? HELD THAT - In the present case the foundation of the alleged conspiracy rests entirely on an offence under the PC Act. With sanction expressly refused by the competent authority to which no challenge has been made by the prosecuting agency any attempt to prosecute the petitioner for conspiracy alone when the object of that conspiracy is itself legally non-prosecutable amounts to a colourable exercise of power. It constitutes a clear attempt to achieve indirectly what the law prohibits directly thereby undermining the statutory mandate and rendering the protection under Section 19 illusory. This Court has perused the material placed on record including the transcripts of telephonic conversations. On a prima facie evaluation there is no cogent or credible material to suggest any express or tacit agreement between the petitioner and the co-accused to demand or accept illegal gratification. In fact the charge sheet itself particularly paragraph 16.44 which stands extracted hereinunder records that the petitioner declined the request made on behalf of the associate of the complainant and proceeded with lawful enforcement action. Such conduct negates rather than supports the inference of a conspiratorial understanding. Thus the central question whether the petitioner a public servant not charged with any substantive offence under the PC Act and against whom sanction has been expressly refused can be prosecuted for conspiracy alone must be answered in the negative when admittedly no other distinct IPC offence has been alleged against the petitioner. The attempt to invoke Section 120-B IPC in such a scenario amounts to a colourable exercise of power intended to circumvent the statutory protection under Section 19 of the PC Act. It is a well-settled principle of law that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Allowing the prosecution of a public servant under Section 120-B IPC for conspiracy to commit an offence under the PC Act despite the denial of sanction would effectively render the provision of Section 19 of the PC Act nugatory. Such an approach would circumvent the legislative safeguards designed to protect public servants by enabling a colorable prosecution under Section 120-B IPC bypassing the procedural requirement of sanction. Conclusion - i) This Court is of the considered view that a public servant in respect of whom sanction to prosecute has not been granted under Section 19 of the PC Act and who is therefore not charged with any substantive offence under the said Act cannot be proceeded against solely under Section 120-B of the IPC when the alleged object of the conspiracy is the commission of offences under the PC Act. ii) The charge of conspiracy under Section 120-B of the IPC in such circumstances is legally unsustainable as it amounts to an indirect prosecution for an offence which is otherwise barred by statute. Petition allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered by the Court were:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1: Validity of prosecution under Section 120-B IPC in absence of sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act Legal framework and precedents: Section 19 of the PC Act mandates prior sanction from the competent authority before prosecuting a public servant for offences under the Act. This sanction is a substantive safeguard against frivolous prosecution. The IPC offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B is an independent offence but must relate to a substantive offence. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Pavana Dibbur Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, which held that a conspiracy charge cannot be sustained in isolation and must relate to a substantive scheduled offence. The Court also examined the Supreme Court's observations in A. Sreenivasa Reddy's case, which allowed prosecution under IPC offences distinct and independent from the PC Act even in absence of sanction under the PC Act, but stressed that this principle applies only where independent IPC offences exist. Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act is not a mere procedural formality but a substantive bar to prosecution. Where sanction is expressly denied and not challenged, prosecution cannot be sustained, directly or indirectly. The Court reasoned that criminal conspiracy charges cannot be divorced from the object of the conspiracy. If the object is an offence under the PC Act for which sanction is denied, the conspiracy charge cannot survive independently. The Court emphasized that allowing prosecution under Section 120-B IPC in such circumstances would amount to circumventing the statutory protection and render Section 19 illusory. Application of law to facts: In the present case, the competent authority declined sanction to prosecute the petitioner under the PC Act. The prosecution did not allege any independent IPC offence except conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC. The alleged conspiracy related exclusively to the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act (demand for illegal gratification). Hence, the Court found that the prosecution could not proceed solely on conspiracy charges when the substantive offence was barred due to denial of sanction. Treatment of competing arguments: The CBI argued that sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act is not required for prosecuting IPC offences, including conspiracy. They relied on A. Sreenivasa Reddy's case, which the Court distinguished on facts, noting that in that case, independent IPC offences such as forgery and cheating were involved. The Court rejected the CBI's reliance on other precedents as factually distinguishable and not applicable to the present scenario where no independent IPC offence was alleged. Conclusions: The Court concluded that prosecution of the petitioner solely under Section 120-B IPC, when sanction under the PC Act was expressly refused and no other IPC offence was alleged, was impermissible and amounted to a colorable exercise of power circumventing the statutory bar. Issue 2: Whether cognizance and summoning without sanction under PC Act is lawful Legal framework and precedents: Section 19(1) of the PC Act bars courts from taking cognizance of offences under the Act without prior sanction. The Court relied on established principles that such sanction is mandatory and courts cannot override the competent authority's decision. The Court also referred to the principle that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the Trial Court erred in taking cognizance and issuing summons against the petitioner without sanction under the PC Act. Since the sanction was denied and not challenged, the Trial Court's order was legally infirm. The Court emphasized that allowing cognizance under Section 120-B IPC to circumvent the statutory bar would undermine the legislative intent and protections. Application of law to facts: The Trial Court took cognizance under Section 120-B IPC despite the absence of sanction for prosecution under the PC Act and no independent IPC offence alleged. The Court found this to be an impermissible circumvention of the statutory mandate. Treatment of competing arguments: The CBI contended that cognizance under IPC offences does not require sanction under the PC Act. The Court rejected this argument, clarifying that where the conspiracy's object is the PC Act offence barred by denial of sanction, cognizance under Section 120-B IPC cannot be sustained. Conclusions: The Court set aside the order of cognizance and summoning against the petitioner as legally unsustainable. Issue 3: Sufficiency of material to prima facie establish conspiracy Legal framework and precedents: Conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC requires proof of a prior meeting of minds or common design. Mere suspicion, conjecture, or tenuous associations cannot sustain a conspiracy charge. Court's interpretation and reasoning: On prima facie evaluation, the Court found no cogent or credible material to suggest any express or tacit agreement between the petitioner and co-accused to demand or accept illegal gratification. The charge sheet itself recorded that the petitioner declined a request to not arrest an associate of the complainant and proceeded with lawful action, negating the inference of conspiracy. Application of law to facts: The Court carefully examined the relevant paragraph of the charge sheet and found that the petitioner's conduct contradicted the prosecution's case of conspiracy. Treatment of competing arguments: The prosecution relied on electronic evidence and witness statements to assert conspiracy, but the Court found these insufficient to establish the requisite meeting of minds. Conclusions: The Court concluded that the conspiracy charge lacked prima facie material and was legally untenable. Issue 4: Applicability of precedents cited by the parties Legal framework and precedents: The Court analyzed the precedents cited by the CBI including State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Kandimalla Subbaiah, Shadakshari Vs. State of Karnataka, Ajay Aggarwal Vs. Union of India, and A. Sreenivasa Reddy Vs. Rakesh Sharma. Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court found these precedents factually distinguishable. Notably, in A. Sreenivasa Reddy's case, the accused faced independent IPC offences separate from the PC Act offences, which justified prosecution without sanction under the PC Act. The present case, by contrast, involved no independent IPC offence apart from conspiracy related solely to the PC Act offence. Conclusions: The Court held that the precedents relied upon by the CBI did not support prosecution in the present facts and were thus inapplicable. 3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS "The foundational facts are not in dispute; the charge sheet dated 30.11.2022 alleges the commission of offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act and Section 120-B of the IPC. ... Sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the PC Act has been duly accorded in the case of accused Rohit Sharma ... In contrast, the competent authority has expressly declined to accord sanction against petitioner ..." "It is a settled principle of law that while conspiracy constitutes an independent offence under the IPC, it cannot be assessed in isolation from its object. The viability of a conspiracy charge is inextricably tied to the lawfulness of the act sought to be achieved. Where the object of the alleged conspiracy is an offence for which the law prohibits prosecution ... the ancillary charge of conspiracy cannot independently survive." "The statutory protection under Section 19 of the PC Act is not a procedural technicality but a substantive safeguard conferred upon public servants. Once the competent authority ... declines to grant sanction, the embargo under Section 19 (1) becomes operative and bars the court from taking cognizance of the offence." "Any attempt to prosecute the petitioner for conspiracy alone-when the object of that conspiracy is itself legally non-prosecutable-amounts to a colourable exercise of power. It constitutes a clear attempt to achieve indirectly what the law prohibits directly, thereby undermining the statutory mandate and rendering the protection under Section 19 illusory." "Conspiracy cannot be inferred from conjecture, suspicion, or tenuous associations. The mere allegation that an act was done, 'on behalf of' another, without any concrete material to establish a prior meeting of minds or common design, cannot suffice to sustain a charge under Section 120-B, IPC." "What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Allowing the prosecution of a public servant under Section 120-B IPC for conspiracy to commit an offence under the PC Act, despite the denial of sanction, would effectively render the provision of Section 19 of the PC Act nugatory." "In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the considered view that a public servant, in respect of whom sanction to prosecute has not been granted under Section 19 of the PC Act, and who is, therefore, not charged with any substantive offence under the said Act, cannot be proceeded against solely under Section 120-B of the IPC, when the alleged object of the conspiracy is the commission of offences under the PC Act." "The charge of conspiracy under Section 120-B of the IPC, in such circumstances, is legally unsustainable, as it amounts to an indirect prosecution for an offence which is otherwise barred by statute." Final determination: The petition was allowed, and the impugned order of cognizance and summoning against the petitioner was set aside.
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