Statutory Interpretation of 'words and phrases' - Indian Laws - General

Statutory Interpretation of 'words and phrases'- A passage from the Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 9th Edn. 2004, at p. 86, would throw immense insight: No word , says PROFESSOR H.A. SMITH has an absolute meaning, for no words can be defined in vacuo, or without reference to some context . According to SUTHERLAND there is a basic fallacy in saying that words have meaning in and of themselves , and reference to the abstract meaning of words , states CRAIES, if there be any such thing, is of little value in interpreting statures . In the words of JUSTICE HOLMES: A word is not a crystal transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used. Shorn of the context, the words by themselves are slippery customers . Therefore, in determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute the first question to be asked is what is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute? It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature that it is proper to look for some other possible meaning of the word or phrase . The context as already seen in the construction of statures means the statute as a whole, the previous state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, the general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy. In Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth - 1977 (9) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT , Bhagwati, J. opined as follows: I mean it in its widest sense 'as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia and the mischief which--the statute was intended to remedy' [ YOGENDRA KUMAR JAISWAL AND ORS. VERSUS STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.- 2015 (12) TMI 1703 - SUPREME COURT] The concept of context has also been emphasised in Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P.- 1976 (11) TMI 210 - SUPREME COURT- A word can have many meanings. To find out the exact connotation of a word in a statute, we must look to the context in which it is used. The context would quite often provide the key to meaning of the word and the sense it should carry. Its setting would give colour to it and provide a cue to the intention of the legislature in using it, A word, as said by Holmes, is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used. In the case of Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal- 2003 (1) TMI 693 - SUPREME COURT , a three-Judge Bench of this Court, made it clear that the Court's jurisdiction cannot be invoked to interpret a statute so as to add or subtract words or read something into a provision which is not there. Infact, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, states, where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The decision in this case , said Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in a revenue case , calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. The desirability or the undesirability of one conclusion as compared with another cannot furnish a guide in reaching a decision. [Shop and Store Developments Ltd. v. I.R.C. (1967) 1 A.C. 472, per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest at p. 493. But see I.R.C. v. Bates (1965) I W.L.R. 1133, per Lord Denning M.R., affirmed in H.L. at (1967) 2 W.L.R. 60 sub. Nom. Bates v. I.R.C.; Luke v. I.R.C. (1963) A.C. 557, per Lord Reid.] Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be. [Cartledge v. E. Jopling Sons, Ltd. (1963) A.C. 758. Cf. Miller v. Salomons (1853) 7 Ex. 475, per Pollock C.B.; Re British Farmers', etc., Company (1878) 48 L.J. Ch. 56, per Jessel M.R.; Magor and St. Mellons R.D.C. v. Newport Corporation (1952) A.C. 189.] The interpretation of a statute is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just and expedient: [Gwynne v. Burnell (1840) 7 Cl. and F. 572 per Coleridge J.] words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded. [Whitehead v. James Stott Ltd. (1949) 1 K.B. 358; Galashiels Gas Co. Ltd. v. O'Donell (1949) A.C. 275.] Tindal, C.J. in the Sussex Peerage (1844) 11 Cl and F 85, p. 143 case , summarised this principle as follows: If the words of the Statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the law giver. This cardinal principle of construction was first stated by the United States Supreme Court in its landmark decision of Caminetti v. United States 242 U.S. 470, 485(1917), whereby Justice Day observed, where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise.