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TMI Blog2003 (9) TMI 546X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... March, 1991, the respondent herein terminated the agreement. As a result of termination of agreement, the appellant herein made another reference on 26th June, 1991 and put in second claim on 27th September, 1991. The Arbitrator appointed, with the consent of the parties, gave an Award on 25th February, 1994. Thereafter the Arbitrator filed an Award for being made a Rule of the Court. The appellant filed an objection before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Mapusa, in the State of Goa. The learned Civil Judge in terms of the order dated 6th July, 1995 elaborately considered the contentions raised by the appellant herein and came to the following conclusion : '20. There appears some glaring mistake under item Nos. 1 and 2 when the arbitrator mentioned that the earth excavation is nil though the quantity appear to have been admitted by the respondent. But on this ground the award cannot be set aside. 21. Similarly, the claim No. 2 though the arbitrator has stated "could not be ascertained" there is no explanation as to why he could not do so and if it would not be ascertained what would be the finding to that effect.' 3. The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, observed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... two points were required to be determined. The said order has attained finality. The same, thus, cannot be permitted to be reopened. The submission of Mr. Prashant Bhushan to the effect that before the period for filing the revision application expired, the Arbitrator resigned and, thus, there was no occasion for the appellant to question the said order is misconceived. Irrespective of the resignation of the Arbitrator, the judgment of the learned Civil Judge remained operative and enforceable. If, thus, the appellant was in any manner aggrieved thereby, the only remedy open to it was to move the High Court. It having failed to do so cannot now be permitted to raise the said question again before this Court. It is trite that what could be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. So far the second submission is concerned, it is relevant to set out section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which reads as under : "16. Power to remit award.-(1) The Court may from time to time remit the award or any matter referred to arbitration to the arbitrators or umpire for reconsideration upon such terms as it thinks fit- (a )Where the award has left undetermined any of the matte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... le in the present case. The Parliament advisedly has restricted sub-section (3) of section 16 of the Act to an Award which would mean the whole Award or a part of it. The valid part of the Award always remains enforceable in a Court of law. What can be held to be void is that part of the Award which has not been made a Rule of Court by sustaining the objections raised with regard thereto inter alia on the ground that the same suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or for any other reason; in the event the Arbitrator or Umpire fails to reconsider it and submits his decision within the time fixed therefor by the Court. In other words, the word 'Award' within the meaning of sub-section (3) would also include a part of the Award, which has been the subject-matter of the order of remission by the competent Court. In any view of the matter the applicability of sub-section (3) of section 16 of the Act, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, does not arise inasmuch as the matter is still pending before the Arbitrator. This view of ours find support from the following: Johnson v. Latham 1851 (20) Law Journal 236 at 238 reads : "Suppose an award good as to th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ire to reconsider it and submit his decision within the time fixed, but there is no provision to cover the case where instead of the award, 'any matter referred to arbitration' is remitted. In re Aitken's Arbitration, (1857) 3 Jur. (M.S.) 1296, only one question out of several left undecided was remitted. Apparently in a case like this, section 16(3) has no application." Even so, we do not think it necessary to decide finally this aspect of the matter in the facts and circumstances of the present case. For the reasons, however, already given the question of superseding the arbitration under section 19 of the Act on the ground of 'the Award' being void, does not arise at all.' Page 494 of Russell on the Law of Arbitration states : "Invalidity of remitted award An award when remitted may cease to have any validity. An award made by an arbitrator appointed to assess compensation under the Lands Clauses Act, 1845 was remitted at the request of the claimants. For seven months nothing was done, and then, on the claimants notifying their desire to have the compensation settled by a jury, the railway company applied for an extension of time to make the amended award. The C.A., on acco ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the first award as to matters not sent back which he could not alter "as it were with a dry pen", thus the fresh award would embrace all matters originally referred, and in the result the first award would become null and inoperative, see (1851) 20 LJ QB 236 at pp. 239 and 240. In that case it was held that as the first award became thus null, the Master's allocatur for costs issued under it also became null though the second award repeated the terms of the first award as to costs. In this context the observation in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. II, Art. 122, page 57 to the effect that where only a part of the award is remitted, the remainder is valid and enforcible, appears to be too broad. I am, however, inclined to think that where the order of reference back of one or some of the matters referred to arbitration specially directs the arbitrator to make his fresh award limited to the matters remitted to him, the fresh award must be limited to those matters and consequently the first award with regard to the matters not remitted to the arbitrator would remain operative." (p. 586) 10. In Goverdhan Dass v. Gaya Prasad ILR 1981 All. 310, K.N. Singh, J., (as His Lord ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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