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TMI Blog2003 (8) TMI 473X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a, JJ INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: Applicability of the provisions of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 is in question in this set of appeals which arise out of a common judgment and order dated 20.3.1997 passed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. The appellants herein are engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of articles relating to art and craft manufactured from ivory. The appellants herein imported ivory from African countries. They have manufactured certain articles out of the same. It is not in dispute that the said import had legally been made as there did not exist any restriction in that regard. The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act' for the sake of brevity) was enacted to provide for the protection of wild animals, birds and plants and for matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto or incidental therewith. Indian elephant was brought within the purview of Schedule A of the Act on or about 5.10.1977. The Union of India also banned export of ivory in the said year. Chapter V of the said Act deals with trade or commerce in wild animals, animal articles and trophies. By Act No. 28 of 1986 Chapt ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mals should also be permitted to be dealt in. It was urged that even assuming that the Amending Act of 1991 was a valid piece of legislation, in the year 1991 having regard to the subsequent event viz. increase in the population of Elephant worldwide the same may be held to be ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Motor General Traders and Another vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others [(1984) 1 SCC 222], Rattan Arya and Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Another [(1986) 3 SCC 385] and Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others [(1990) 1 SCC 109]. The learned counsel would submit that in any event the Amending Act being vague in nature, the same should be held ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi and Another vs. Union of India and Others [(1960) 2 SCR 671]. Mr. Sanghi, would further submit that the ivory which has legally been imported by the appellants herein prior to coming into force of the 1991 Amendment Act, having not vested in the Government, the appellants should be held to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be construed only with reference to its objective sought to be achieved without considering the constitutionality thereof. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Rustom Cavasjee Cooper vs. Union of India [(1970) 3 SCR 530]. The learned counsel would further submit that the High Court wrongly applied the principle of 'res extra commercium' in the instant case which is per se inapplicable. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS: Mr. Malhotra and Mr. Panjwani, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would submit that having regard the purpose and object, the said Act seeks to achieve, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the Parliament has the requisite legislative competence. By reason of the provisions of the Amending Act 28 of 1986, trade in various articles had been prohibited. Imported ivory was, however, brought within the purview of Act 44 of 1991. The learned counsel would contend that a bare perusal of the provisions of the 1986 and 1991 Amending Acts would clearly go to show that the intention of the Parliament was that those who carry on trade or business in the imported African ivory should dispose of the same withi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... whole or any part of such animal [has been used, and ivory imported into India and an article made therefrom]; (11) "dealer" in relation to any captive animal, animal article, trophy, uncured trophy, meat or specified plant, means a person, who carries on the business of buying or selling any such animal or article, and includes a person who undertakes business in any single transaction; (14) "Government property" means any property referred to in section 39; [or section 17H;] (36) "wild animal" means any animal specified in Schedules I to IV and found wild in nature;" Chapter V of the Act deals with trade or commerce in wild animals, animal articles and trophies. Section 39(1)(c) occurring in Chapter V of the said Act provides that every ivory imported into India and an article made from such ivory in respect of which any offence against this Act or any rule or order made there-under has been committed, shall be the property of the State Government. Section 40 provides for declaration. Sub-section (1) whereof is in the following terms : 40. Declarations.--(1) Every person having at the commencement of this Act the control, custody or possession of any captive anim ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... .- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (2) and (4) of section 40 of this Act, the Central Government may, by notification, require any person to declare to the Chief Wild Life Warden or the authorised officer, any captive animal, animal article, trophy or uncured trophy derived from animals specified in Schedule I or Part II of Schedule II in his control, custody or possession, in respect of which no declaration had been made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (4) of section 40, in such form, in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed. (2) Any action taken or purported to be taken for violation of section 40 of this Act at any time before the commencement of the Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2002 shall not be proceeded with and all pending proceedings shall stand abated. (3) Any captive animal, animal article, trophy or uncured trophy declared under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed." Section 41 deals with inquiry and preparation of inventories which is in the following terms : 41. Inquiry and preparation of inventories.-- (1) On receipt of a declaration made ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in with himself for his bona fide personal use. (2) On receipt of a declaration under sub- section (1), the Chief Wild Life Warden or the authorised officer may take all or any of the measures specified in Section 41 and for this purpose, the provisions of Section 41 shall, so far as may be, apply. (3) Where, in a declaration made under sub- section (1), the person making the declaration expresses his desire to retain with himself any of the items of the stocks specified in the declaration for his bona fide personal use, the Chief Wild Life Warden, with the prior approval of the Director, may, if he is satisfied that the person is in lawful possession of such items, issue certificates of ownership in favour of such person with respect to all, or as the case may be, such of the items as in the opinion of the Chief Wild Life Warden, are required for the bona fide personal use of such person and affix upon such items identification marks in such manner as may be prescribed : Provided that no such items shall be kept in any commercial premises. (4) No person shall obliterate or counterfeit any identification mark referred to in sub- section (3). (5) An appeal shall ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... imprisonment shall not be less than three years but may extend to seven years and also with fine which shall not be less than twenty-five thousand rupees. (1A) Any person who contravenes any provisions of Chapter VA, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than [three years] but which may extend to seven years and also with fine which shall not be less than [ten thousand rupees].] (1B) Any person who contravenes the provisions of section 38J shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both: Provided that in the case of a second or subsequent offence the term of imprisonment may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees. Section 63 empowers the Central Government to makes rules. INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT: The provisions of the said Act must be construed having regard to the purport and object it seeks to achieve. Not only inter alia wild animal is to be protected but all other steps which are necessary therefor so as to ensure ecological and environmental security of the country must be enforced. The interp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of individual whales to monitor catches and trade. Similar proposals were presented without success at the most recent CITES conferences in 1997 and 2000. This year's debate is likely to involve issues related to science, sustainable use, possible enforcement problems, and the international Whaling Commission's moratorium on commercial whaling." Further, in the Press Release of 12th November, 2002, the following appears: "CITES has conditionally accepted proposals from Botswana, Namibia and South Africa that they be allowed to made one - off sales of 20, 10 and 30 tonnes, respectively, of ivory. The ivory is held in existing legal stocks that have been collected from elephants that dies of natural causes or as a result of government - regulated problem - animal control. Similar proposals from Zambia and Zimbabwe for 17 and 10 tonnes, respectively, were not accepted. Today's decisions by CITES must still be formally adopted by the full Plenary on Friday, when the current two - week conference ends." The rival contention as regard the interpretation and application of the said Act must be considered having regard to the aforementioned principles as also the international ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of J K, (1967) 3 SCR 50 : AIR 1967 SC 1368) it was held that there was right to do business even in potable liquor. It was not necessary to say whether it is good law or not. But this must be held that the reasoning therein would apply with greater force to industrial alcohol." In Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. The International Airport Authority of India and Others [AIR 1979 SC 1628 : 1979 (3) SCR 1014], this Court held: "...We fail to see how the plea of contravention of Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 can arise in these cases. The Government's power to sell the exclusive privilege set out in Section 22 was not denied. It was also not disputed that these privileges could be sold by public auction. Public auctions are held to get the best possible price. Once these aspects are recognised, there appears to be no basis for contending that the owner of the privileges in question who had offered to sell them cannot decline to accept the highest bid if he thinks that the price offered is inadequate. It will be seen from these observations that the validity of clause (6) of the Order dated January 6, 1971 was upheld by this Court on the ground that having regard to the object of ho ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onable lies upon the State. If the law requires that an act which is inherently dangerous, noxious or injurious to the public interest, health or safety or is likely to prove a nuisance to the community shall be done under a permit or a licence of an executive authority, it is not per se unreasonable and no person may claim a licence or a permit to do that act as of right. Where the law providing for grant of a licence or permit confers a discretion upon an administrative authority regulated by rules or principles, express or implied, and exercisable in consonance with the rules of natural justice, it will be presumed to impose a reasonable restriction. Where, however, power is entrusted to an administrative agency to grant or withhold a permit or licence in its uncontrolled discretion the law ex facie infringes the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g). Imposition of restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right may be in the form of control or prohibition. "20. The tests of reasonableness have to be viewed in the context of the issues which faced the legislature. In the construction of such laws and in judging their validity, courts must approach the problem from the poin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... restrained. It was pointed out that the stocks declared by the traders at the commencement of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 are used as a cover for such illegal trade. The Parliament in its wisdom thought to amend the said Act further in the year 1991 in terms whereof the following changes were made: "(i) It substituted new section for sections 9, 29 and 55 of the Principal Act; (ii) It omitted sections 10, and 13 to 17 of the Principal Act; (iii) It inserted two new chapters, namely, Chapter IIIA and Chapter IVA, in the Principal Act; and (iv) It inserted new Schedule, namely, Schedule VI, in the Principal Act." At this juncture, we may usefully take notice of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act. "Poaching of wild animals and illegal trade of products derived therefrom, together with degradation and depletion of habitats have seriously affected wildlife population. In order to check this trend, it is proposed to prohibit hunting of all wild animals (other than vermin). However, hunting of wild animals in exceptional circumstances, particularly for the purpose of protection of life and property and for education, research, scientific manageme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f an ivory whether by a trader or a person is completely banned. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that a law which was at one point of time was constitutional may be rendered unconstitutional because of passage of time. We may note that apart from the decisions cited by Mr. Sanghi, recently a similar view has been taken in Kapila Hingorani Vs. State of Bihar [JT 2003 (5) SC 1] and John Vallamattom and Anr. Vs. Union of India [JT 2003 (6) SC 37]. In this case, however, we are faced with a different situation. We are concerned with the reason and object for which the amendments have to be made. We must take into consideration the text and context of the amending Acts and the circumstances in which they had to be brought about. The provisions of the statute are also required to be considered keeping in view Article 48-A and Article 51A(g) of the Constitution of India which are in the following terms: "48-A. Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and wild life.-- The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country." "51-A. Fundamental duties. -- It shall be the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... culative dealings in 'essential commodities' (such as cotton), during a period of emergency, the State may impose a temporary prohibition of all normal trading on such commodities. In the later case of Narendra Vs. Union of India (supra), the Supreme Court has sustained even a permanent law leading to the elimination of middle-men from the business in essential commodities in order to ensure the supply of such goods to the consumers at a minimum price." The Amending Acts satisfy also the strict scrutiny test. The stand of the State that by reason of sale of ivory by the dealers, poaching and killing of elephants would be encouraged, cannot be said to be irrational. Mr. Sanghi, as noticed hereinbefore, has drawn our attention to the changes sought to be effected in CITES at the instance of Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The question as to whether a reasonable restriction would become unreasonable and vice-versa would depend upon the fact situation obtaining in each case. In the year 1972 when the said Act was enacted there might not have been any necessity to preserve the elephant as also ivory. The species might not have been on the brink of extinction. The O ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... antagonistic poles; without stability the law becomes not a chart of conduct, but a gare of chance: with only stability the law is as the still waters in which there is only stagnation and death." Although in that case Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act was declared unconstitutional but we are of opinion that legal principles enunciated therein will have to be applied for the purpose of judging the constitutionality of impugned provisions keeping in view the subsequent changes. Submission of Mr. Sanghi to the effect that the Amending Acts provide for arbitrary unguided and unbridled power is stated to be rejected. The submission of learned counsel was made on the premise that after ban was imposed on trade in ivory, all traders become non- traders and, thus, traders and non-traders could not have been treated differently. When a trade is prohibited as has sought to be done by reason of the 1991 Amendment Act by inserting Chapter VA, the matters incidental thereto or connected therewith must be dealt with accordingly. For all intent and purport the statute would treat the traders on a different footing than non-traders. They form a different and distinct class. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be incapable of giving a fixed meaning and, thus, was held ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution being vague in nature. We do not find any such vagueness in any of the provisions of the impugned Acts including the definition of 'wild animal'. It is clear and unambiguous. Reliance placed by Mr. Sanghi on Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (supra)is equally mis-placed. In that case, this Court was dealing with nationalization of banks. The Court held that the provisions impugned therein are ultra-vires. In that situation, it was held: "Impairment of the right of the individual and not the object of the State in taking the impugned action, is the measure of protection. To concentrate merely on power of the State and the object of the State action in exercising that power is therefore to ignore the true intent of the Constitution." There is no quarrel with the aforementioned propositions inasmuch as herein we are upholding vires of the statutes holding that the restrictions imposed is reasonable. The Amending Acts in our opinion are constitutional, legal and valid. RES-EXTRA COMMERCIUM: We, however, agree with Mr. Sanghi that in a case of this nature the doctrine of ' ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on, occupation, trade and business. Their fields may overlap, but each of them does certainly have a content of its own, distinct from the others. Be that as it may one thing is clear - imparting of education is not and cannot be allowed to become commerce. A law, existing or future, ensuring against it would be a valid measure within the meaning of clause (6) of Article 19. We cannot, therefore, agree with the contrary proposition enunciated in Sakharkherda Education Society v. State of Maharashtra (air 1968 Bom LR 690) Andhra Kesari Education Society v. Govt. of A.P. (AIR 1984 AP 251 : (1984) 1 APLJ 45)and Bapuji Educational Assn. v. State.(AIR 1986 Kant 80)" An 11-Judge Bench of this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka [(2002) 8 SCC 481], however, held that imparting of education would come within the purview of the definition of occupation within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. This court following Sodan Singh Vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee [(1989) 4 SCC 155] opined: "In Unni Krishnan's case (Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P. (1993) 1 SCC 645 at p. 687) while referring to education, it was observed as follows :- "It may ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a due licence therefor. The law was upheld negativing the contention that the restriction was unreasonable. It was not held therein that trade of liquor is impermissible in all situations. Restriction in trade, therefore, would depend upon the nature of the article and the law governing the field. By reason of judicial vagaries, fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution cannot be further restricted. (See Krishna Kumar Narula Vs. The State of Jammu and Kashmir Ors. AIR 1967 SC 1368). Dr. D.D. Basu in his Commentary on the Constitution of India (Sixth Edition) Volume L at page 238 stated: "In Chamarbaugwala's case (supra) as well as in Fatehchand's case (AIR 1977 SC 1825), the Court relied upon the observations of Taylor, J. in Mansell's case (1956) C.L.R. 550, in support of the theory of res extra commercium, but as appears from the following observations of Wynes (1970), p. 263, the doctrine has not had a peaceful career in Australia, and has produced conflicting decisions which are not beyond criticism: "The question whether exceptions to the otherwise express provisions of s.92 based upon inherent quality of goods can be made has not been set ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pecified in Section 40 of the Act. By reason thereof another chance has been given to the non-traders to make a declaration. All the appellant traders on the other hand had admittedly applied within the period of 30 days as specified in Section 44 of the Act. Hence, the object and purpose of Section 40-A is limited to individual non-traders and does not discriminate the traders or inter se the traders. In any event after the incorporation of Chapter V-A and the inclusion of ivory in the said Chapter the appellant traders are governed by the provisions of Chapter V-A. The provisions of Chapter V which includes Section 40-A is not applicable to the appellant traders. Chapter V-A is a complete Code in itself and it would be a fallacy to read into or extend by implication the mitigating provision of Section 40-A into Chapter V-A. The Legislature, had it so desired could have incorporated a similar provision in Chapter V-A. Section 49-C provides that every person carrying on the business or occupation referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 49-B, within thirty days from the specified date, declare to the Chief Wild Life Warden or the authorised officer, his stocks, if any, as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rohibited. Despite such provision, however, a person carrying on a business or occupation or dealing in trophies, animal articles etc. derived from scheduled animals would be, in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 49-C of the Act, entitled to file a declaration disclosing his stocks of ivory imported into India or articles made therefrom. Once such a declaration is made and in the event such person makes a declaration expressing his desire to retain with himself any of the items specified therein for his bona fide use, a certificate of ownership may be granted for such item or items which in the opinion of the Chief Wild Life Warden are required therefor. Only in relation to items for which such certificate of ownership has been granted, a transfer thereof is permissible subject to the restrictions imposed under sub-section (6) of Section 49-C. Sub-section (7) of Section 49-C, however, provides for prohibition of such ivory imported into India or any article made therefrom from being kept under the control of the trader for sale or offer for sale or transfer to any person whatsoever. The upshot of the aforesaid provisions is that any trader who has imported ivory legally into ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ter of trade or commerce can only be kept for personal use. Such personal use must be a bona fide one. Once the requirement for keeping the possession of such article by a trader had specifically been laid down, it cannot be said that the Chief Wild Life Warden had been conferred with unguided and uncanalized power. In the event, an order is passed, the person dissatisfied therewith, may prefer an appeal in terms of sub-section (5) thereof. Against such original orders or appellate orders, even a judicial review would be maintainable. Sub-section (7) of Section 49-C would be applicable only in relation to such items or articles wherefor certificate of ownership has not been granted. If a person keeps under his control, sells or offers for sale or transfers the same to any other person, he would be subject to a penalty as provided under sub-section (1-A) of Section 51 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 51 empowers the competent court to direct that such property be forfeited by the Government, in which event, clause (c) of Section 39 would be attracted. We, therefore, do not find that the provisions of the said Act are anomalous in nature. It is true, as has been poi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... having regard to sub-section 7 of Section 49-C of the Act; adjudication therefor must be made by a competent court of law having jurisdiction in this behalf. Before a person is convicted a Court has to arrive at the finding that the accused has committed an offence wherefor a full-fledged criminal trial would be necessary. In absence of such criminal trial and offence having been found committed, Section 39 may not have any application. In that view of the matter it is evident that the properties do not stand vested in the Government in terms thereof. HOW THE DICHOTOMY SHOULD BE RESOLVED? The question, however, would remain as to what would happen to the property in question. In our opinion, the answer must be found out by reading all the provisions in their entirety. It is now well-settled that for the purpose of interpretation of statute the entire statute is to be read in entirety. The purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect. Furthermore, in a case of this nature, principles of purposive construction must come into play. In Chief Justice of A.P. Vs. L.V.A. Dikshitulu [AIR 1979 SC 193 : (1979) 2 SCC 34], this Court observed: "The primary ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... their origin. We will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences." In District Mining Officer Vs. Tata Iron Steel Co. [JT 2001 (6) SC 183 : (2001) 7 SCC 358], this Court stated: "A statute is an edict of the legislature and in construing a statute, it is necessary, to seek the intention of its maker. A statute has to be construed according to the intent of them that make it and the duty of the court is to act upon the true intention of the legislature. If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation, the court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the legislature. This task very often raises difficulties because of various reasons, inasmuch as the words used may not be scientific symbols having any precise or definite meaning and the language may be an imperfect medium to convey one's thought or that the assembly of legislatures consisting of persons of various shades of opinion purport to convey a meaning which may be obscure. It is impossible even for the most imaginative legislature to forestall exhaustively situations and circumstances ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be struck down by applying the said principle when its applicability even in administrative law sphere is not fully and finally settled." In High Court of Gujarat and Another Vs. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and Others[(2003) 4 SCC 712] this Court noticed: "In Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless Co. reported in 1987(1) SCC 424, this Court said:- "Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the basis of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must lo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it. Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. vs. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd. (1971 AC 850) provides an instance of this; but in that case the three conditions that must be fulfilled in order to justify this course were satisfied. First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with an eventuality that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law. Unless this third condition is fulfilled any attempt by a court of justice to repair the omission in the Act cannot be justified as an exercise of its jurisdiction to determine what is the meaning of a written law ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a conjunction 'and' between the said two sub-clauses, in which event the clause would have read thus : 'in case it is a non-residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family and if he or any member of his family is not occupying any such building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own; and in case it is any other non- residential building, if the landlord or member of his family is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own'. If the two sub-clauses are not so read, it would lead to an absurd result. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Ors. reported in (1990) 3 SCC 682, this Court held: "The court has to interpret a statute and apply it to the facts. Hans Kelsen in his Pure Theory of Law. (p. 355) makes a distinction between interpretation by the science of law or jurisprudence on the one hand and interpretation by a law-applying organ (especially the court) on the other. According to him "jur ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the assumption that the two contradictory norms annul each other. In all these cases, the law to be applied constitutes only a frame within which several applications are possible, whereby every act is legal that stays within the frame." In S. Gopal Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (1996) 4 SCC 596 this Court observed : "It is a well-known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The courts must look to the object which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary." (See also M/s. DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Edu. Charit. Trust Vs. State of Haryana Ors. 2003 (2) SCALE 145) The words, which are used in declaring the meaning of other words may also need interpretation and the legislature may use a word in the same statute in several different senses. In that view of the matter, it would not be correct to contend that the expression as defined in the interpretation clause would necessarily carry the same meaning throughout the statute. Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rrying on trade. He also cannot remain in control over the animal article. The logical consequence wherefor would be that he must be deprived of the possession thereof. The possession of the animal article including imported ivory must, therefore, be handed over to the competent authority. In a case of this nature where a statute has been enacted in public interest, restriction in the matter of possession of the property must be held to be implicit. If Section 49(7) is not so construed, it cannot be given effect to. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the appellants have no right to possess the articles in question. Keeping in view of the fact that the provisions of the statute have been held to be intra vires the question of compensating the appellants would not arise as vesting of possession thereof in the State must be inferred by necessary implication. ARE THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDING ACT VIOLATIVE OF THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY OF THE APPELLANTS? It is true that right to property is a human right as also a constitutional right. But it is not a fundamental right. Each and every claim to property would not be property right. Control of property by the State short ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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