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TMI Blog1973 (12) TMI 79X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... such an inquiry pending in or decided by the, Civil Courts. It arises out of the following facts : The lands in dispute are situated in village Kadakalla, Taluk Palakonda. On June 13, 1950, the then State Government issued and published a notification under the, Madras Estates (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (for short, Rent Reduction Act) in respect of this village. Subsequently, the Settlement Officer of Srikakulam suo motu made an enquiry as to whether this village was an "estate" or not within the contemplation of s. 9(2) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short, called Abolition Act) and by an order, dated September 2, 1950, held that it was not an 'inam estate' within the meaning of s. 2(7) of the Abolition Act. The Settlement Officer further recorded a finding that village Kadakalla became an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (3rd Amendment) Act, 1936. Against that order of the Settlement Officer, the appellants herein carried an appeal to the Estates Abolition Tribunal, Vizianagaram. The 'Tribunal by its order, dated September 16, 1952 dismissed the appeal in limine, with the observation that the decision of the Settlement ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vocates for the parties filed a joint memo to the effect that "both parties agree to abide by the final decision whether in the High Court or in the Supreme Court, as the case may be, in the appeal or revision, arising out of O.S. No. 47 of 1953 on the file of this Court on the question whether the, suit village Kadakalla is not an estate under s. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, as amended upto date". As a result of this compromise, it was held that the decision of Issues 1, 6 and 8 would follow the final decision in O.S. 47 of 1953. The remaining Issues were tried and decided on merits. On March 28, 1958, the trial court keeping in view the joint memo filed by the parties and its findings on the other Issues, passed a decree in these terms : "In case it is ultimately decided by the High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, in the appeal or revision arising out of O.S. No. 47 of 1953 on the file of this Court that the suit village Kadakalla is not an estate within the meaning of s. 3 (2) (d) of the Estates Land Act, the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of Rs. 3,000/- with in- terest at 5-1/2 per cent per annum from 26-3- 1958 with interest thereon an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n was made by the respondents praying that Exhts. B-196 and B-197, being copies of the order, dated September 2, 1950, of the Settlement Officer and the order dated September 16, 1952, of the Estate Abolition Tribunal, respectively, be read as additional evidence. It was contended that the Amending Act 20 of 1960 had added s. 9A to the Abolition Act, as a result of which, the order of the Settlement Officer had acquired 'statutory validity'; and since the appellants did not file an appeal within two months from the commencement of the Amendment Act, the decision of the Settlement Officer became final and binding on all the parties including the appellants. In spite of opposition by the, appellants, the High Court by its order, dated August 23, 1956, allowed this additional evidence and the setting up of the new plea. The appeal and the cross-objections were heard together in August. 1966. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the suit itself was incompetent as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide whether the suit village is an estate, or not and, therefore, any decision given by the High Court in appeal (A.S. 668 of 1954) would not bind the parties and the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... obscurity, the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, (18 of 1936), substituted for the original sub-clause (d) in s. 3(2), this new clause. "(d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the Government 'notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors-in-title of the grantee or grantees."' Section 3(2)(d) was further amended by Madras Estates Land Amendment Act II of 1945 with retrospective effect from the date on which the Third Amendment Act 18 of 1936 came into force. It inserted (among others) Explanation 1, to this clause, which reads "Where a grant as an inam is expressed to be of a named village. the area which forms the subject-matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name would have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purposes." Explanation I makes it clear that (apart from being made, confirmed, or recognised by the Government), an inam grant in order to come within the purview of "estate" under s. 3(2) (d) has to be a grant expr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e to examine all such documents as he has reason to believe are in the possession of the Government and have a bearing on the question before him and give him decision in writing. (4) (a) Any person deeming himself aggrieved by a decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section (3) may within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal. (b) Where any such appeal is preferred, the Tribunal shall cause to. be Publisher in the village in the prescribed manner a notice requiring all persons who have applied to the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1) or filed before him before it, and after giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, give its decision. (c) The decision of the Tribunal under this sub-section shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any court of law. (5) No decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section (3) or of the Tribunal under sub-section (4) shall be invalid by reason of any defect in the form of the notice referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (4) as the case may be, or the manner of its publication. (6) Every decision of the T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Government against a decision of the Settlement Officer on the ground that the Government were not competent to file an appeal under this clause or that such appeal was time-barred, the Tribunal shall on an application filed by the Government within one year from the commencement of the Amendment Act aforesaid, vacate the order already passed by it and pass a fresh order on merits." In clause (b) of s.9(4) of the Abolition Act, after the words where such appeal is preferred", the words "by an aggrieved person, the Tribunal shall give notice to the Government and in the case of all appeals whether by the ;Government or by an aggrieved person" were inserted. The second Amending Act was Andhra Pradesh Act 18 of 1957, section 2 of which substituted the following section for sub-section (3) of s. 1 of the Abolition Act 665 "It applies to all estates as defined in section 3, clause (2), of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, (Madras Act 1 of 1908)." This Act further substituted the following clause for clause (7) of s.2 of the principal Act: "In an estate" means an estate within the meaning of section 3, clause (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 (Madras Act 1 of 1908)". ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al Act (such finding being to the effect that the inam village become an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936 (Madras Act XVIII of 1936), shall be deemed to be invalid or ever .to have been invalid merely on the ground. (a) that before issuing the notification no fresh inquiry was made by the Settlement Officer under the said section 9 after the said date; or (b) that the landholder or other person aggrieved had no. occasion to appeal to the Tribunal against the decision and finding of the Settlement Officer; and all such notifications issued and actions taken in pursuance thereof during the period aforesaid shall be deemed always to have been validly issued and taken in accordance with law. (2) No suit or other proceeding challenging the validity of any such notification or action or for any relief on the ground that such notification or action was not validly issued or taken shall be maintained or conti- nued in any court, and no court shall enforce any decree or other holding any such notification or action to be invalid or grant any relief to any person." The first question that falls for decision is : To what extent and in what circum ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ther the grant is of an "inam village" is referred to in s. 9(1) itself as some extrinsic fact which must preexist before the Settlement Officer can embark on the enquiry contemplated by that provision and the Abolition Act as it stood at the date relevant to this-appeal, makes no provision for this being the subject of enquiry by the Settlement Officer. Where therefore persons appearing in opposition to the proceedings initiated before the Settlement Officer under s. 9 question the character of the property as not falling within the description of an "inam village", he has of necessity to decide the Issue, for until he holds that this condition is satisfied he cannot enter on the further enquiry which is the one which by s. 9(1) of the Act he is directed to conduct. On the terms of s. 9 (1), the property in question being an "inam village" is assumed as a fact on the existence of which the competency of the Settlement Officer to determine the matter within his jurisdiction rests and as there are no words in the statute empowering him to decide finally the former be cannot confer jurisdiction on himself by a wrong decision on this preliminary condition to his jurisdiction. Any de ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e material date, the enquiry by the Settlement Officer could legitimately be confined to the ascertainment of only two issues of fact, viz.(1) Was Kadakalla an "inam village" ? (2) if so, was it an 'inam estate' as defined in s. 2 (7) of the Abolition Act? Once issue (2) was determined, the enquiry would be complete and the limits of his exclusive jurisdiction ,circumscribed by s. 9(1) reached; and, if he went beyond those limits to investigate and determine further something which was unnecessary or merely incidental or remotely related to issue (2), then such incidental or unnecessary determination, could be questioned in the civil court. Again, any finding recorded by the Settlement Officer regarding the property in question being an 'inam village' or not, is not final or conclusive it being a finding of a jurisdictional fact, only, the preexistence of which is a sine qua non to the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction by the Settlement Officer. Investigation as to the existence or otherwise of this preliminary fact is done by the Settlement Officer to ascertain whether or not he has jurisdiction to determine that the particular property is an 'inam estate'. If upon such inves ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a Venkata. Narasayya v. State of Madras, A. I. R. 670 which was approved by this Court in Desika Charyulu's case (supra). The main contention of the appellants in this suit was that the village Kadakalla was not in 'inam village' as the grant did not comprise the whole village and consequently, it is not an 'estate' within the definition in s.3 (2) (d) of the 1908 Act. The trial court accepted this contention and decreed the suit. The High Court confirmed that decision, holding that when the grant was made (in 1774), it was neither of the whole village nor of a named village within the meaning of Explanation 1 to s.3 (2) (d) of the 1908 Act. In Original Suit 101 of 1954, also, the relief of rent or damages is conditional and dependent upon and linked up (by an agreement between the parties) with the determination of the main question involved in the former suit. We have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the common question in both these suits regarding Kadakalla being an estate or not, on the ground that it was not an inam village, was within the competence of the civil court. Further point to be considered is : whether the jurisdiction of the civil court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Acts were published in the Government Gazette on December 23, 1957, and will therefore be deemed to have come into force from that date only. The provisions, of these Amending Statutes are not merely Procedural but affect substantive rights,, and impose. new obligation' and disabilities. In them, the Legislature has not spoken in clear language that they would unsettle, settled claims or take away or abridge rights already accrued, or cause abatement of pending actions. These Amending Acts, 'therefore, can be construed as having a prospective operation only. They cannot be interpreted as taking away the rights of the litigants in Suits O.S. 47 of 1953 and O.S. 101 of 1954 (which were at the commencement of these Amendments pending at the appellate or original stage) to have their respective claims determined in, accordance with the law in force at the time of the institution of the actions. Before we come to the Amending Act 20 of 1960, it is necessary to examine whether the decrees in O.S. 47 of 1953 and O.S. 101 of 1954 had attained finality. And, if so, when and to what extent ? So far as the decree of the High Court (in A.S. 668 of 1954 arising out of O.S. 47 of 1953) is co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vision Bench ,decision in Srinivasa v. Tathachariar A. I. R. 1918 Mad. 546. The High Court did not discuss or distinguish this decision. Nor did it say in so many words that the whole of the decree including the part based on compromise, was under challenge in the appeal. It rejeited the contention with the remark that it had already "observed that the appeal is but a continuation of the, suit and there could be no estoppel against a statute". Perhaps, it was assumed that in the Memo of Appeal, every bit of the decree was being challenged by the appellants. We think, with all respect, that such an assumption was contrary to the well established principle that in construing a pleading or a like petition, in this ,country, the court should not look merely to its form, or pick out from it isolated words or sentences; it must read the petition as a whole, gather the real intention of the party and reach at the substance of the matter. Thus construed, the Memo of Appeal in this, case could not be said to contain a challenge to that part of the decree which was in terms of the compromise agreement between the parties. Order 23, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure, not only permits a partia ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt, the principle of estoppel underlying 196(3) became operative and the decree to the extent it was in terms of that agreement, became final and binding between the parties. And it was as effective in creating an estoppel between the parties as a judgment on ,contest. Thus, the determination in A.S. 668-that Kadakalla was not an 'estate'-became as much binding on the respondents, as on the parties in that appeal. In the view we take, we can derive support from the ratio of this Court's decision in Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. State of Orissa [1956] S.C.R. 72. In that case, there was a compromise decree between the predecessors-in-title of the appellant therein on the one hand, and the Secretary of State on the other, that Kanika Raj was an 'estate' as defined by Orissa Estates Abolition Act of 1951. This Court held that the appellant was estopped by the compromise decree from denying that the Raj was not such an 'estate'. In the light of the above discussion, we would hold that part of the decree in Suit No. 101 of 1954 which was in terms of the compromise agreement had become, final between the parties, and, the appeal from that decree could not be said to be a contin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... possible with vested-eights as applicable whenever we reach the line at which the words of the section cease to be plain. That is a necessary and logical corollary of the, general proposition that you ought not to give a larger retrospective power to a section, even in an Act which is to some extent intended to be retrospective, than you can plainly see the Legislature meant." With the above principle in mind, let us now examine the provisions of the Amending Act 20 of 1960. In this Act, also no back date for its commencement has been mentioned. It will, therefore, be deemed to have commenced on June 23, 1960, which is the date on which it was published in the Govt. Gazette. It does not say (excepting in s. 12 inserted by it which obviously does not apply to the facts of this case) that the amendment would have effect and would be deemed always to have had effect from the inception of the parent Act, nor does it use any equivalent expressions or similar words which are usually found in Amending Acts intended to have retrospective operation without any limit.' Section 9-A inserted by this Amending Act in the parent Act, does not begin with any non-obstante cause, whatever having ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ay that the decision of the Settlement Officer on the question whether a particular property is an 'inam village' or not, would be conclusive and final and would always be deemed to have been so." In view, of what has been said above, we are of the opinion that s.9-A takes in its retrospective sweep only those decisions of the settlement Officer or the Tribunal which at the commencement of the Amending Act 20 of 1960 were subsisting and had not been totally vacated or rendered non- est by a decree of a competent court. The decision dated September 2, 1950 of the Settlement Officer in the instant case, was not such a decision. It had ceased to exist as 'a result of the inter-linked decree in O.S. 47 of 1953 and O.S. 101 of 1954, passed before the enactment of this Amending Act. The Amending Act of 1960, therefore, does not in any way, affect the finality or the binding effect. of those decrees. Quite, a number of authorities were cited by the learned Counsel on both sides, but it is not necessary to notice all of them because in lost of them the facts were materially different. Only one of those cases in which the interpretation of ss. 9-A and 64-A was involved reserves to be noti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... us proceedings, was not a 'decision' within the meaning of s. 64-A(2). In the case before us, as already observed, the State had contested this issue regarding Kadakalla being an estate or not, right upto the High Court. It would, therefore, operate as res judicata between the State and the land-owners. The same binding effect is produced by estoppel raised by the consent decree in the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen. Thus, this ruling does not, advance the case of the respondents. For all the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal, reverse the judgment of the High Court and send the case back to it for decision on the remaining issues in accordance with law. We make no orders as to the costs of this Court. KRISHNA IYER, J.-The judgment just delivered has my concurrence. But a certain juristic thought expressed therein and consecrated in an authoritative passage which has fallen from Bowen, L.J., in Reid v. Reid [1886] 31 Ch.D.402;408 persuades me to break my silence not so much in dissent but in explanatory divagation. The proposition there expressed and here followed relates to the presumption against vested rights being affected by subsequent legislation. Cert ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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