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2005 (10) TMI 495

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..... 2. Arbitration in India was earlier governed by the Indian Arbitration Act, 1859 with limited application and the Second Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Then came the Arbitration Act, 1940. Section 8 of that Act conferred power on the Court to appoint an arbitrator on an application made in that behalf. Section 20 conferred a wider jurisdiction on the Court for directing the filing of the arbitration agreement and the appointment of an arbitrator. Section 21 conferred a power on the Court in a pending suit, on the agreement of parties, to refer the differences between them for arbitration in terms of the Act. The Act provided for the filing of the award in court, for the making of a motion by either of the parties to make the award a rule of court, a right to have the award set aside on the grounds specified in the Act and for an appeal against the decision on such a motion. This Act was replaced by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which, by virtue of Section 85, repealed the earlier enactment. 3. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was intended to comprehensively cover international and commercial arb .....

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..... it has to be Page 1800 understood as taking in the courts or any other judicial fora. Section 7 defines an arbitration agreement and insists that it must be in writing and also explains when an arbitration agreement could be said to be in writing. Section 8 confers power on a judicial authority before whom an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement, to refer the dispute to arbitration, if a party applies for the same. Section 9 deals with the power of the Court to pass interim orders and the power to give interim protection in appropriate cases. It gives a right to a party, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral arbitral award but before its enforcement in terms of Section 36 of the Act, to apply to a court for any one of the orders specified therein. Chapter III of Part I deals with composition of arbitral tribunals. Section 10 gives freedom to the parties to determine the number of arbitrators but imposes a restriction that it shall not be an even number. Then comes Section 11 with which we are really concerned in these appeals. 5. The marginal heading of Section 11 is 'Appointment of arbi .....

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..... r a person or institution designated by him to appoint the sole or the third arbitrator in an international commercial arbitration. Sub- Section (10) deals with Chief Justice's power to make a scheme for dealing with matters entrusted to him by sub-Section (4) or sub-Section (5) or sub- Section (6) of Section 11. Sub-Section (11) deals with the respective jurisdiction of Chief Justices of different High Courts who are approached with requests regarding the same dispute and specifies as to who should entertain such a request. Sub-Section 12 clause (a) clarifies that in relation to international arbitration, the reference in the relevant sub- sections to the 'Chief Justice' would mean the 'Chief Justice of India'. Clause (b) indicates that otherwise the expression 'Chief Justice' shall be construed as a reference to the Chief Justice of the High Court within whose local limits the principal Court is situated. 'Court' is defined under Section 2(e) as the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district. 6. Section 12 sets out the grounds of challenge to the person appointed as arbitrator and the duty of an arbitrator appointed, to discl .....

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..... proceedings under the Act as it applies to proceedings in Court. 7. We will first consider the question, as we see it. On a plain understanding of the relevant provisions of the Act, it is seen that in a case where there is an arbitration agreement, a dispute has arisen and one of the parties had invoked the agreed procedure for appointment of an arbitrator and the other party has not cooperated, the party seeking an arbitration, could approach the Chief Justice of the High Court if it is an internal arbitration or of the Supreme Court if it is an international arbitration to have an arbitrator or arbitral tribunal appointed. The Chief Justice, when so requested, could appoint an arbitrator or arbitral tribunal depending on the nature of the agreement between the parties and after satisfying himself that the conditions for appointment of an arbitrator under sub-Section (6) of Section 11 do exist. The Chief Justice could designate another person or institution to take the necessary measures. The Chief Justice has also to have the qualification of the arbitrators in mind before choosing the arbitrator. An arbitral tribunal so constituted, in terms of Section 16 of the Act, has the .....

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..... the functions. For, under our dispensation, no judicial or quasi-judicial decision can be rendered by an institution if it is not a judicial authority, court or a quasi-judicial tribunal. This aspect is dealt with later while dealing with the right to designate under Section 11(6) and the scope of that designation. 10. The appointment of an arbitrator against the opposition of one of the parties on the ground that the Chief Justice had no jurisdiction or on the ground that there was no arbitration agreement, or on the ground that there was no dispute subsisting which was capable of being arbitrated upon or that the conditions for exercise of power under Section 11(6) of the Act do not exist or that the qualification contemplated for the arbitrator by the parties cannot be ignored and has to be borne in mind, are all adjudications which affect the rights of parties. It cannot be said that when the Chief Justice decides that he has jurisdiction to proceed with the matter, that there is an arbitration agreement and that one of the parties to it has failed to act according to the procedure agreed upon, he is not adjudicating on the rights of the party who is raising these objections. .....

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..... an appeal, when the objection is upheld and only in an appeal against the final award, when the objection is overruled. Sub-section (5) enjoins that if the arbitral tribunal overrules the objections under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), it should continue with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award. Sub-section (6) provides that a party aggrieved by such an arbitral award overruling the plea on lack of jurisdiction and the exceeding of the scope of authority, may make an application on these grounds for setting aside the award in accordance with Section 34 of the Act. The question, in the context of Sub-Section (7) of Section 11 is, what is the scope of the right conferred on the arbitral tribunal to rule upon its own jurisdiction and the existence of the arbitration clause, envisaged by Section 16(1), once the Chief Justice or the person designated by him had appointed an arbitrator after satisfying himself that the conditions for the exercise of power to appoint an arbitrator are present in the case. Prima facie, it would be difficult to say that in spite of the finality conferred by sub-Section (7) of Section 11 of the Act, to such a decision of the Chief Justic .....

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..... ain a request for appointing an arbitrator or for constituting an arbitral tribunal under Section 11 of the Act. It has to be noted that under Section 9 of the Act, the District Court or the High Page 1805 Court exercising original jurisdiction, has the power to make interim orders prior to, during or even post arbitration. It has also the power to entertain a challenge to the award that may ultimately be made. The framers of the statute must certainly be taken to have been conscious of the definition of 'court' in the Act. It is easily possible to contemplate that they did not want the power under Section 11 to be conferred on the District Court or the High Court exercising original jurisdiction. The intention apparently was to confer the power on the highest judicial authority in the State and in the country, on Chief Justices of High Courts and on the Chief Justice of India. Such a provision is necessarily intended to add the greatest credibility to the arbitral process. The argument that the power thus conferred on the Chief Justice could not even be delegated to any other Judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court, stands negatived only because of the power given .....

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..... 5 constituted the District Judge as an appellate authority under that Act, it was a case where the authority was being conferred on District Judges who constituted a class and, therefore, the appellate authority could not be considered to be persona designata. What can be gathered from P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, 2005, is that "persona designata" is a person selected to act in his private capacity and not in his capacity as a judge. He is a person pointed out or described as an individual as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class or as filling a particular character. It is also seen that one of the tests to be applied is to see whether the person concerned could exercise the power only so long as he holds office or could exercise the power even subsequently. Obviously, on ceasing to be a Chief Justice, the person referred to in Section 11(6) of the Act could not exercise the power. Thus, it is clear that the power is conferred on the Chief Justice under Section 11(6) of the Act not as persona designata. 14. Normally a persona designata cannot delegate his power to another. Here, the Chef Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice .....

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..... incongruous to hold that the Chief Justice cannot decide the question of his own jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator when in a parallel situation, the judicial authority can do so. Obviously, the highest judicial authority has to decide that question and his competence to decide cannot be questioned. If it is held that the Chief Justice has no right or duty to decide the question or cannot decide the question, it will lead to an anomalous situation in that a judicial authority under Section 8 can decide, but not a Chief Justice under Section 11, though the nature of the objection is the same and the consequence of accepting the objection in one case and rejecting it in the other, is also the same, namely, sending the parties to arbitration. The interpretation of Section 11 that we have adopted would not give room for such an anomaly. 16. Section 11(6) does enable the Chief Justice to designate any person or institution to take the necessary measures on an application made under Section 11(6) of the Act. This power to designate recognized in the Chief Justice, has led to an argument that a judicial decision making is negatived, in taking the necessary measures on an application, .....

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..... f the Act is not conferred on the Supreme Court or on the High Court, but it is conferred on the Chief Justice of India or the Chief Justice of the High Court. One possible reason for specifying the authority as the Chief Justice, could be that if it were merely the conferment of the power on the High Court, or the Supreme Court, the matter would be governed by the normal procedure of that Court, including the right of appeal and the Parliament obviously wanted to avoid that situation, since one of the objects was to restrict the interference by Courts in the arbitral process. Therefore, the power was conferred on the highest judicial authority in the country and in the State in their capacities as Chief Justices. They have been conferred the power or the right to pass an order contemplated by Section 11 of the Act. We have already seen that it is not possible to envisage that the power is conferred on the Chief Justice as persona designata. Therefore, the fact that the power is conferred on the Chief Justice, and not on the court presided over by him is not sufficient to hold that the power thus conferred is merely an administrative power and is not a judicial power. 18. It is al .....

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..... se aspects. On the other hand, Section 9 insists that once approached in that behalf, "the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of and in relation to any proceeding before it". Surely, when a matter is entrusted to a Civil Court in the ordinary hierarchy of Courts without anything more, the procedure of that Court would govern the adjudication [See R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar and Anr. v. R. Chandrasekhara Thevar (AIR 1948 P.C. 12)] 19. Section 16 is said to be the recognition of the principle of Kompetenz - Kompetenz. The fact that the arbitral tribunal has the competence to rule on its own jurisdiction and to define the contours of its jurisdiction, only means that when such issues arise before it, the Tribunal can and possibly, ought to decide them. This can happen when the parties have gone to the arbitral tribunal without recourse to Section 8 or 11 of the Act. But where the jurisdictional issues are decided under these Sections, before a reference is made, Section 16 cannot be held to empower the arbitral tribunal to ignore the decision given by the judicial authority or the Chief Justice before the reference to it was made. The compet .....

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..... when moved under Section 11(6) of the Act, was not discussed or decided upon. 21. In Wellington Associates Ltd. v. Kirit Mehta it was contended before the designated Judge that what was relied on by the applicant was not an arbitration clause. The applicant contended that the Chief Justice of India or the designate Judge cannot decide that question and only the arbitrator can decide the question in view of Section 16 of the Act. The designated Judge held that Section 16 did not exclude the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice of India or the designated Judge to decide the question of the existence of an arbitration clause. After considering the relevant aspects, the learned Judge held: "I am of the view that in cases where --- to start with - there is a dispute raised at the stage of the application under Section 11 that there is no arbitration clause at all, then it will be absurd to refer the very issue to an arbitrator without deciding whether there is an arbitration clause at all between the parties to start with. In my view, in the present situation, the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice of India or his designate to decide the question as to the "existence" of the arbitration .....

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..... has to be decided upon. If it is held that an order under Section 11(6) is a judicial or quasi-judicial order then the said order would be amenable to judicial intervention and any reluctant party may frustrate the entire purpose of the Act by adopting dilatory tactics in approaching a court of law even against an order of appointment of an arbitrator. Such an interpretation has to be avoided in order to achieve the basic objective for which the country has enacted the Act of 1996 adopting the UNCITRAL Model." 23. The Court proceeded to say that if it were to be held that the order passed was purely administrative in nature, that would facilitate the achieving of the object of the Act, namely, quickly setting in motion the process of arbitration. Great emphasis was placed on the conferment of power on the Chief Justice in preference to a court as was obtaining in the model law. It was concluded " The nature of the function performed by the Chief Justice being essentially to aid the constitution of the arbitral tribunal immediately and the legislature having consciously chosen to confer the power on the Chief Justice and not a court, it is apparent that the order passed by the Chi .....

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..... itution of an arbitral tribunal, it could not be taken that the exercise of power is an administrative power. While constituting an arbitral tribunal, on the scheme of the Act, the Chief Justice has to consider whether he as the Chief Justice has jurisdiction in relation to the contract, whether there was an arbitration agreement in terms of Section 7 of the Act and whether the person before him with the request, is a party to the arbitration agreement. On coming to a conclusion on these aspects, he has to enquire whether the conditions for exercise of his power under Section 11(6) of the Act exist in the case and only on being satisfied in that behalf, he could appoint an arbitrator or an arbitral tribunal on the basis of the request. It is difficult to say that when one of the parties raises an objection that there is no arbitration Page 1813 agreement, raises an objection that the person who has come forward with a request is not a party to the arbitration agreement, the Chief Justice can come to a conclusion on those objections without following an adjudicatory process. Can he constitute an arbitrary tribunal, without considering these questions? If he can do so, why should suc .....

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..... ) was doubted in Konkan Railway Cooperation Ltd. v. Rani Construction Pvt. Ltd. The reconsideration was recommended on the ground that the Act did not take away the power of the Court to decide preliminary issues notwithstanding the arbitrator's competence to decide such issues including whether particular matters were "excepted matters", or whether an arbitration agreement existed or whether there was a dispute in terms of the agreement. It was noticed that in other countries where UNCITRAL model was being followed, the court could decide such issues judicially and need not mechanically appoint an arbitrator. There were situations where preliminary issues would have to be decided by the court rather than by the arbitrator. If the order of the Chief Justice or his nominees were to be treated as an administrative one, it could be challenged before the single Judge of the High Court, then before a Division Bench and then the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, a result that would cause further delay in arbitral proceedings, something sought to be prevented by the Act. An order under Section 11 of the Act did not relate to the administrative functions of the Chief .....

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..... serts that there is an arbitration agreement. Acceptance of such an argument, with great respect, would reduce the high judicial authority entrusted with the power to appoint an arbitrator, an automaton and sub-servient to the arbitral tribunal which he himself brings into existence. Our system of law does not contemplate such a situation. 30. With great respect, it is seen that the court did not really consider the nature of the rights of the parties involved when the Chief Justice exercised the power of constituting the arbitral tribunal. The court also did not consider whether it was not necessary for the Chief Justice to satisfy himself of the existence of the facts which alone would entitle him or enable him to accede to the request for appointment of an arbitrator and what was the nature of that process by which he came to the conclusion that an arbitral tribunal was liable to be constituted. When, for example, a dispute which no more survives as a dispute, was referred to an arbitral tribunal or when an arbitral tribunal was constituted even in the absence of an arbitration agreement as understood by the Act, how could the rights of the objecting party be said to be not aff .....

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..... this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. That would give this Court, an opportunity of scrutinizing the decision of the Chief Justice on merits and deciding whether it calls for interference in exercise of its plenary power. Once this Court declines to interfere with the adjudication of the Chief Justice to the extent it is made, it becomes final. This reasoning is also supported by sub-section (7) of Section 11, making final, the decision of the Chief Justice on the matters decided by him while constituting the arbitral tribunal. This will leave the arbitral tribunal to decide the dispute on merits unhampered by preliminary and technical objections. In the long run, especially in the context of the judicial system in our country, this would be more conducive to minimising judicial intervention in matters coming under the Act. This will also avert the situation where even the order of the Chief Justice of India could be challenged before a single judge of the High Court invoking the Article 226 of the Constitution of India or before an arbitral tribunal, consisting not necessarily of legally trained persons and their coming to a conclusion that their constitution by the Ch .....

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..... the Privy Council held that a judge exercises judicial powers not only when he is deciding suits between the parties but also when he exercises disciplinary powers which are properly appurtenant to the office of a judge. By way of illustration, Lord Dening stated "Suppose, for instance, that a judge finding that a legal practitioner had been guilty of professional misconduct in the course of a case, orders him to pay the costs, as he has undoubtedly power to do (see Myers v. Elman, per Lord Wright). That would be an exercise of the judicial powers of the judge just as much as if he committed him for contempt of court. Yet there is no difference in quality between the power to order him to pay costs and the power to suspend him or strike him off." 34. The above example gives an indication that it is the nature of the power that is relevant and not the mode of exercise. In Shankarlal Aggarwal and Ors. v. Shankar Lal Poddar and Ors. this Court was dealing with the question whether the order of the Company Judge confirming a sale was merely an administrative order passed in the course of the administration of the assets of the company under liquidation and, therefore, not a judicial o .....

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..... from this narrow standpoint, it is possible to hold that there was a lis before the Company Judge which he decided by passing the order. On the one hand were the claims of the highest bidder who put forward the contention that he had satisfied the requirements laid down for the acceptance of his bid and was consequently entitled to have the sale in his favour confirmed, particularly so as he was supported in this behalf by the Official Liquidators. On the other hand, there was the first respondent and the large body of unsecured creditors whose interests, even if they were not represented by the first respondent, the court was bound to protect. If the sale of which confirmation was sought was characterized by any deviation subject to which the sale was directed to be held or even otherwise was for a gross undervalue in the sense that very much more could reasonably be expected to be obtained if the sale were properly held, in view of the figure of Rs. 3,37,000/- which had been bid by Nandlal Agarwalla it would be duty of the court to refuse the confirmation in the interests of the general body of creditors, and this was the submission made by the first respondent. There were thus .....

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..... uch existence is strongly disputed by the other side who appears on issuance of notice. Controversies are also raised as to whether the claim that is sought to be put forward comes within the purview of the concerned arbitration clause at all. The Chief Justice has necessarily to apply his mind to these aspects before coming to a conclusion one way or the other and before proceeding to appoint an arbitrator or declining to appoint an arbitrator. Obviously, this is an adjudicatory process. An opportunity of hearing to both parties is a must. Even in administrative functions if rights are affected, rules of natural justice step in. The principles settled by Ridge v. Baldwin [(1963) 2 ALL ER 66] are well known, therefore, to the extent, Konkan Railway (supra) states that no notice need be issued to the opposite party to give him an opportunity of being heard before appointing an arbitrator, with respect, the same has to be held to be not sustainable. 37. It is true that finality under Section 11 (7) of the Act is attached only to a decision of the Chief Justice on a matter entrusted by sub- Section (4) or sub-Section (5) or sub-Section (6) of that Section. Sub- Section (4) deals with .....

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..... he party making the motion has approached the right High Court. He has to decide whether there is an arbitration agreement, as defined in the Act and whether the person who has made the request before him, is a party to such an agreement. It is necessary to indicate that he can also decide the question whether the claim was a dead one; or a long barred claim that was sought to be resurrected and whether the parties have concluded the transaction by recording satisfaction of their mutual rights and obligations or by receiving the final payment without objection. It may not be possible at that stage, to decide whether a live claim made, is one which comes within the purview of the arbitration clause. It will be appropriate to leave that question to be decided by the arbitral tribunal on taking evidence, along with the merits of the claims involved in the arbitration. The Chief Justice has to decide whether the applicant has satisfied the conditions for appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act. For the purpose of taking a decision on these aspects, the Chief Justice can either proceed on the basis of affidavits and the documents produced or take such evidence or get suc .....

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..... istrict judge to perform the functions under Section 11(6) of the Act. This restriction on the power of the Chief Justice on designating a district judge or a non-judicial authority flows from the scheme of the Act. 41. In our dispensation of justice, especially in respect of matters entrusted to the ordinary hierarchy of courts or judicial authorities, the duty would normally be performed by a judicial authority according to the normal procedure of that court or of that authority. When the Chief Justice of the High Court is entrusted with the power, he would be entitled to designate another judge of the High Court for exercising that power. Similarly, the Chief Justice of India would be in a position to designate another judge of the Supreme Court to exercise the power under Section 11(6) of the Act. When so entrusted with the right to exercise such a power, the judge of the High Court and the judge of the Supreme Court would be exercising the power vested in the Chief Justice of the High Court or in the Chief Justice of India. Therefore, we clarify that the Chief Justice of a High Court can delegate the function under Section 11(6) of the Act to a judge of that court and he woul .....

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..... ary to notice in this context that this conclusion of ours would really be in aid of quick disposal of arbitration claims and would avoid considerable delay in the process, an object that is sought to be achieved by the Act. 44. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an arbitral tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating his grievances against the award including any in-between orders that might have been passed by the arbitral tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the arbitral tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The arbitral tribunal is after all, the creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract b .....

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..... stice or the judge designate. (v) Designation of a district judge as the authority under Section 11(6) of the Act by the Chief Justice of the High Court is not warranted on the scheme of the Act. (vi) Once the matter reaches the arbitral tribunal or the sole arbitrator, the High Court would not interfere with orders passed by the arbitrator or the arbitral tribunal during the course of the arbitration proceedings and the parties could approach the court only in terms of Section 37 of the Act or in terms of Section 34 of the Act. (vii) Since an order passed by the Chief Justice of the High Court or by the designated judge of that court is a judicial order, an appeal will lie against that order only under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to the Supreme Court. (viii) There can be no appeal against an order of the Chief Justice of India or a judge of the Supreme Court designated by him while entertaining an application under Section 11(6) of the Act. (ix) In a case where an arbitral tribunal has been constituted by the parties without having recourse to Section 11(6) of the Act, the arbitral tribunal will have the jurisdiction to decide all matters as contemplated by Secti .....

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..... n Act, 1940 (Act X 1940). As has been said, protracted, time consuming, atrociously expensive and complex court procedure impelled the commercial-world to an alternative, less formal, more effective and speedy mode of resolution of disputes by a Judge of choice of the parties which culminated into passing of an Arbitration Act. Experience, however, belied expectations. Proceedings became highly technical and thoroughly complicated. The provisions of the Act made 'lawyers laugh and litigants weep'. Representations were made from all quarters of the society to amend the law by making it more responsive to contemporary requirements. Moreover, apart from arbitration, conciliation has been getting momentum and worldwide recognition as an effective instrument of settlement of disputes. There was no composite statute dealing with all matters relating to arbitration and conciliation. 3. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted a Model Law in 1985 on International Commercial Arbitration. The Page 1825 General Assembly of the United Nations recommended member - States to give due consideration to the Model Law to have uniformity in arbitration pro .....

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..... -section (2), in an arbitration with three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and the two appointed arbitrators shall appoint the third arbitrator who shall act as the presiding arbitrator. (4) If the appointment procedure in Sub-section (3) applies and- (a) a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within thirty days from the receipt of a request to do so from the other party; or (b) the two appointed arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within thirty days from the date of their appointment; Page 1826 the appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him. (5) Failing any agreement referred to in Sub-section (2), in an arbitration with a sole arbitrator, if the parties fail to agree the appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him. (6) Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties, - (a) a party fails to act as required under that procedure; or (b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to reach an agreement expected of them under that procedure; or (c) a person, includin .....

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..... s the arbitrator to disclose the disqualification, if any. It also permits parties to challenge such arbitrator. Whereas Section 13 lays down procedure for challenge, Sections 14 and 15 deal with special situations. Chapter IV relates to jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunals. Section 16 is another important provision and confers power on the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. It reads thus ; "16. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction.-(1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, and for that purpose. - (a) an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract; and (b) a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the submission clause. (2) A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence; however, a party shall not be precluded from raising such a plea merely because that he has appointed, or .....

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..... pendent and impartial arbitrator. Sub-section (10) enables the Chief Justice to frame a scheme dealing with matters entrusted to him by Sub-sections (4) to (6). Section 11 came to be interpreted by this Court in few cases. In Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd., a two Judge Bench was called upon to consider whether under Section 9 of the Act, the 'court' had jurisdiction to pass interim orders before arbitral proceedings commenced and before an arbitrator was appointed. Considering the scope of the said provision, this Court held that the 'court' had no jurisdiction to entertain application under Section 9 before initiation of arbitration proceedings. 7. The Court, however, taking note of UNCITRAL Model Law, observed: "Under the 1996 Act, appointment of Arbitrator(s) is made as per the provision of Section 11 which does not require the Court to pass a judicial order appointing Arbitrator(s)". (emphasis supplied) It is, no doubt, true that the question about nature of function to be performed by the Chief Justice under Section 11 did not strictly arise in that case and, hence, the above observation could not be termed as 'ratio'. As I will presently sh .....

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..... nciated the object of the legislation that it was intended to minimize the supervisory role of the court in arbitral process. According to the Court, when the matter is placed before the Chief Justice or his nominee under Section 11 of the Act, it is imperative for the Chief Justice or his nominee to bear in mind the legislative intent. The Chief Justice or his nominee is not expected to entertain contentious issues between the parties and decide them. Section 16 of the Act empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. Combined reading of Sections 11 and 16 make it crystal clear that questions as to qualifications, independence and impartiality of Arbitral Tribunal as also of the jurisdiction of the tribunal can be raised before the arbitrator who will decide them. The function of the Chief Justice or his nominee is just to appoint an arbitrator without wasting time. The nature of the function to be performed by the Chief Justice is essentially to aid the constitution of the tribunal and is administrative. If the function is held to be judicial or quasi-judicial, the order passed by the Chief Justice or his nominee would be amenable to judicial intervention and a .....

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..... . 9. In view of the contentions raised before a two-Judge Bench, an order was passed directing the Registry to place the papers before Hon. the Chief Justice for passing appropriate orders. Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. I was thus placed before a Constitution Bench of five Judges. The Constitution Bench, Page 1831 considered the relevant provisions of the Act and the scheme framed by the Chief Justice of India known as "The Appointment of Arbitrators by the Chief Justice of India Scheme, 1996". Discussing the Statement of Objects and Reasons and considering the relevant provisions of the Act, the Court held that the only function the Chief Justice or his designate was required to perform was to fill the gap left by a party to the arbitration agreement or two arbitrators appointed by the parties and nominate an arbitrator or umpire so that Arbitral Tribunal is expeditiously constituted and arbitration proceedings commenced. According to the Constitution Bench, the order passed by the Chief Justice or his designate under Section 11 nominating an arbitrator could not be said to be 'adjudicatory order' and the Chief Justice or his designate could not be described as 'Tri .....

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..... ice or his designate on any controversy that the other party may raise, even in Page 1832 regard to its failure to appoint an arbitrator within the period of thirty days. That the Chief Justice or his designate has to make the nomination of an arbitrator only if the period of thirty days is over does not lead to the conclusion that the decision to nominate is adjudicatory. In its request to the Chief Justice to make the appointment the party would aver that this period has passed and, ordinarily, correspondence between the parties would be annexed to bear this out. This is all that the Chief Justice or his designate has to see. That the Chief Justice or his designate has to take into account the qualifications required of the arbitrator by the agreement between the parties (which, ordinarily, would also be annexed to the request) and other considerations likely to secure the nomination of an independent and impartial arbitrator also cannot lead to the conclusion that the Chief Justice or his designate is required to perform an adjudicatory function. That the word 'decision' is used in the matter of the request by a party to nominate an arbitrator does not of itself mean tha .....

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..... tion." Regarding the scheme, the Court observed that such scheme could not govern the Act. Since Section 11 did not contain any element of 'adjudication' and the function of the Chief Justice or his designate was purely administrative, there was no question of issuing notice to affected persons or to afford opportunity of hearing. The scheme, however, contained Clause 7 (Notice to affected persons) and expressly provided for issuance of notice to persons likely to be affected thereby. It thus went 'beyond terms of Section 11' and was, therefore, bad. The Court, in this connection, observed ; "The schemes made by the Chief Justices under Section 11 cannot govern the interpretation of Section 11. If the schemes, as drawn, go beyond the terms of Section 11 they are bad and have to be amended. To the extent that The Appointment of Arbitrators by the Chief Justice of India Scheme, 1996, goes beyond Section 11 by requiring, in Clause 7, the service of a notice upon the other party to the arbitration agreement to show cause why the nomination of an arbitrator, as requested, should not be made, it is bad and must be amended. The other party needs to be given notice of the .....

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..... udication affects rights of parties. The 'duty to act judicially' is, therefore, implicit and the decision is judicial or quasi-judicial. I am unable to uphold the argument. In my view, it is based on the misconception that wherever a statute requires certain matters to be taken into account and the authority is obliged to apply its mind to those considerations, the action, decision or adjudication must be held judicial or quasi-judicial. With respect, this is not the legal position. 12. It is settled law that in several cases, an appropriate authority may have to consider the circumstances laid down in the Act, apply its mind and then to take a decision. Such decision may affect one or the other party and may have far reaching consequences. But from that it cannot be concluded that the decision is judicial or quasi-judicial and not administrative. Before more than fifty years, in State of Madras v. C.P. Sarthy, the Constitution Bench of this Court, while interpreting the provisions of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 held that the action of the Government of referring or refusing to refer the matter for an adjudication to Labour Court or Industrial Tribun .....

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..... ces have been held administrative, for instance, an order of acquisition or requisition of property; an order making an appointment to a civil post, an order granting sanction to prosecute a public servant; etc. It cannot be gainsaid that there must be an 'arbitration agreement' between the parties. It also cannot be denied that there must be default or failure on the part of one party to appoint an arbitrator. But that will not make the function performed by the Chief Justice as judicial or quasi-judicial. Chapter II (Arbitration Agreement) precedes Chapter III (Composition of Arbitral Tribunal). Therefore, when the question as to composition of Arbitral Tribunal and appointment of an arbitrator comes up for consideration, it can safely be assumed that there is an arbitration agreement, inasmuch as it is in consonance with the legislative scheme and the question as to the appointment of arbitrator arises only in view of such agreement. Moreover, before exercising the power to appoint an arbitrator, the Chief Justice must peruse the relevant record relating to an agreement and failure by one party in making an appointment which would enable him to act. There is, however, n .....

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..... de the question of 'existence' of the arbitration agreement. The said section did not declare that except the Arbitral Tribunal, none else could determine such question. "Merely because the new Act permits the arbitrator to decide this question, it does not necessarily follow that at the stage of Section 11, the Chief Justice of India or his designate cannot decide the question as to the existence of the arbitration clause." [See also Malaysian Airlines System v. Stic Travels (P) Ltd., (2001) 1 SCC 509; Nimeet Resources INC v. Essar Steels Ltd.; (2000) SCC 497; Shin Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. and Anr.]. 17. It was then argued that Sub-section (7) of Section 11 empowers the Chief Justice to decide the question and uses the expression 'decision' which is significant. Whenever a statute confers power on an authority to pass an order or to take a decision, it must be held that the function is judicial or quasi-judicial and duty to act judicially must be inferred. Even this contention is not well founded. Sub-section (7), no doubt, uses the term 'decision'. But as I have already observed earlier, the Chief Justice forms prima facie opinion as .....

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..... portant reason why the function of the Chief Justice under Section 11 should be considered administrative. All the three Sub-sections, (4), (5) and (6) of the said section empower the Chief Justice or 'any person or institution designated by him' to exercise the power of the Chief Page 1838 Justice. No provision similar to the one in hand was present in 1940 Act. Parliament, therefore, has consciously and intentionally made the present arrangement for the first time allowing exercise of the power by the Chief Justice himself or through 'any person or institution designated by him', since the function is administrative in character and is required to be performed on prima facie satisfaction under Sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act. 21. Now, let us consider Section 16 of the Act. This section is new and did not find place in the old Act of 1940. Sub-section (1) of that section enables the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. It further provides that the jurisdiction of the tribunal includes ruling on any objections with respect to existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) lay down procedure of raising plea a .....

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..... age 1839 may rule on its substantive jurisdiction that is, as to (a) whether there is valid arbitration agreement; (b) whether the tribunal is properly constituted; and (c) what matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement. Any such ruling may be challenged by any arbitral process of appeal or review or in accordance with the provisions of Part I of the Act, notably by an application under Section 32 or by a challenge to the award under Section 67. (emphasis supplied) Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter in their work on "Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration", (4th edn.), (para 5-34) also said: When any question is raised as to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, a two stage procedure is followed. At the first stage, if one of the parties raises 'one or more pleas concerning the existence, validity or scope of the agreement to arbitrate', the ICC's Court must satisfy itself of the prima facie existence of such an agreement [ICC Arbitration Rules 6(2)]. If it is satisfied that such an agreement exists, the ICC's Court must allow the arbitration to proceed so that, at the second stage, any decision as to .....

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..... ng that it lacks jurisdiction for want of a valid arbitration agreement, because it does so on the basis of French arbitration law, and not on the basis of the arbitration agreement held to be non-existent or invalid. Similarly, it is perfectly logical for the interested party to rely on that award in other jurisdictions, provided that those other jurisdictions also recognize the competence-competence principle. As we shall now see, the legal basis for the principle does not prejudice the subsequent review by the courts, in France or in the country where recognition is sought, of the arbitrators' finding that the arbitration agreement is non-existent or invalid. Even today, the competence-competence principle is all too often interpreted as empowering the arbitrators to be the sole judges of their jurisdiction. That would be neither logical nor acceptable. In fact, the real purpose of the rule is in no way to leave the question of the arbitrators' jurisdiction in the hands of the arbitrators alone. Their jurisdiction must instead be reviewed by the courts if an action is brought to set aside or to enforce the award. Nevertheless, the competence- competence rule ties in wit .....

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..... themselves, subject to subsequent review by the courts, and by inviting the courts to refrain from intervening until the award has been made. Nevertheless, the interests of parties with legitimate claims concerning the invalidity of the arbitration agreement are not unduly prejudiced, because they will be able to bring those claims before the arbitrators themselves and, should the arbitrators choose to reject them, before the courts thereafter. The competence-competence rule thus concerns not only the positive, but also the negative effects of the arbitration agreement. 25. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. and Anr., considering the relevant provisions of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961, this Court held that the arbitrator or umpire is competent to provisionally decide his own jurisdiction, if the arbitration agreement so provides, however, subject to final determination by a competent court. The Court stated: "As explained earlier the scheme that emerges on a combined reading of Sections 3 and 7 of the Foreign Awards Act clearly contemplates that questions of existence, validity or effect (scope) of the arbitration agreement itself, .....

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..... ory provision cannot invest itself with the jurisdiction which it otherwise does not possess. But it is always open to a competent Legislature to invest a tribunal of limited jurisdiction with the power to decide or determine finally the preliminary or jurisdictional facts on which exercise of its jurisdiction depends. In such cases, the finding recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged by certiorari. (Vide Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. 27. As a general rule, neither in England, nor in India, such jurisdiction is granted on a court of limited jurisdiction or on an inferior tribunal. In Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th edn. vol. 1; para 56); it has been stated; It is possible for an inferior tribunal to be vested with power to determine conclusively questions demarcating the limits of its own jurisdiction. Such a grant of power must now be regarded as exceptional, in view of the very restrictive interpretation placed by the courts on statutory formulae purporting to exclude their inherent supervisory jurisdiction, and their reluctance to be precluded by subjectively worded grants of power from determining judicially ascertainable matters delimiting the area of competence of i .....

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..... he jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to Page 1844 determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction." (emphasis supplied) 29. The above statement of law has been quoted with approval by this Court in several cases. In Chaube Jagdish Prasad and Anr. v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi the Court stated: "These observations which relate to inferior courts or tribunals with limited jurisdiction show that there are two classes of cases dea .....

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..... tted by Mr. Venugopal that once the Chief Justice is satisfied as to fulfillment of conditions for the exercise of power to appoint an arbitrator and his decision is 'final', it would be impossible to hold that the Arbitral Tribunal can go behind the decision of the Chief Justice and hold otherwise. Mr. Venugopal suggested that Section 16 should be so construed that it would apply only to the cases covered by Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 11 and not to Sub-section (6) of Section 11 and the appointment of an arbitrator made by the Chief Justice. By such interpretation, submitted the counsel, both the provisions can be harmoniously interpreted and properly applied. Though the majority observed it to be 'one of the ways of reconciliation', I have my own reservation in accepting it. Firstly, the function of the Court is to interpret the provision as it is and not to amend, alter or substitute by interpretative process. Secondly, it is for the Legislature to make a law applicable to certain situations contemplated by it and the judiciary has no power in entering into 'legislative wisdom'. Thirdly, as held by me, the 'decision' of the Chief Justice .....

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..... ether an arbitrator can be appointed. The second stage allows nomination of an arbitrator. According to Mr. Nariman, the first part is essentially a judicial function, which cannot be delegated to 'any person or institution' and at the most, it can be delegated to any Judge of the court. The second stage, however, is more or less ministerial and at that stage, the Chief Justice may, if he thinks fit, take help of any person or institution so that proper and fit person is appointed as arbitrator. Though the submission weighed with the majority, I express my inability to agree with it for several reasons. Firstly, as earlier noted, it proceeds on the basis that the function of the Chief Justice is judicial or quasi- judicial, which is not correct. In my view, it is administrative which is apparent from the language of Section 11 and strengthened by Section 16 which enables the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. Secondly, a court of law must give credit to Parliament that it is aware of settled legal position that judicial or quasi-judicial function cannot be delegated and if the function performed by the Chief Justice is judicial or quasi-judicial in nature, .....

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..... Hence, the decision of a single Page 1847 Judge can further be challenged by filing a Letters Patent Appeal or Intra-court Appeal under the relevant clause of the Letters Patent applicable to the High Court concerned. Finally, an order passed by the Division Bench can always be made subject-matter of challenge before this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Thus, an interpretation sought to be adopted for the purpose of reducing litigation and speedy disposal of proceedings would really result in increase of litigation and delay in disposal of cases. I must admit that once it is held that the order passed by the Chief Justice is administrative, it can be challenged in Writ Petition, Letters Patent Appeal and in Special Leave Petition. But in my opinion, while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court would consider the provisions of the Act, such as, limited judicial intervention of Court (Section 5); power of Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction and the effect of such decision (Section 16). It will also keep in mind the legislative intent of expeditious disposal of proceedings and may not interfere at that sta .....

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..... contemplated can be raised and agitated before the Arbitrator appointed by the Designated Judge under Section 11(6) of the Act. From the perusal of the said provisions of the Act, it is clear that there is hardly any area of dispute which cannot be decided by the Arbitrator appointed by the Designated Judge. If that be so, since an alternative efficacious remedy is available before the Arbitrator, writ court normally would not entertain a challenge to an order of the Designated Judge made under Section 11(6) of the Act which includes considering the question of jurisdiction of the Arbitrator himself. Therefore, in our view even though a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is available to an aggrieved party, ground available for challenge in such a petition is limited because of the alternative remedy available under the Act itself." (emphasis supplied) The above observations clearly go to show that though the constitutional remedy cannot be taken away and an aggrieved party can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court against an order passed by the Chief Justice, the Writ Court will be circumspect in entertaining a petition and in exercising extraordinary jurisdi .....

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..... of being heard. In exercise of power under Sub-section (10) of Section 11 of the Act, the Chief Justice of India had framed a scheme, known as "The Appointment of Arbitrators by the Chief Justice of India Scheme. 1996". Clause 7 provided for issuing notice to affected persons and read thus; "Notice to affected persons.- Subject to the provisions of paragraph 6, the Chief Justice or the person or the institution designated by him shall direct that a notice of the request be given to all the parties to the arbitration agreement and such other person or persons as may seem to him or is likely to be affected by such request to show cause, within the time specified in the notice, why the appointment of the arbitrator or the measure proposed to be taken should not be made or taken and such notice shall be accompanied by copies of all documents referred to in paragraph 2 or, as the case may be, by information or clarification, if any, sought under paragraph 5." 39. In Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. II, the Constitution Bench held the function of the Chief Justice of appointment of an arbitrator under Sub- section (6) of Section 11 as administrative and not judicial. In the light of the .....

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..... t apply to administrative functions, but another concept which developed at a later stage and accepted in public law field and found place in Administrative Law of 'duty to act fairly' would apply to administrative actions as well. 41. By now, it is well settled that when an administrative action is likely to affect rights of subjects, there would be a duty on the part of the authority to act fairly. In Pearlberg v. Varty (Inspector of Taxes), Lord Pearson said; "A tribunal to whom judicial or quasi-judicial functions are entrusted is held to be required to apply those principles (i.e. the rules of natural justice) in performing those functions unless there is a provision to title contrary. But where some person or body is entrusted by Parliament that administrative or executive functions there is no presumption that compliance with the principles of natural justice is required although, as 'Parliament is not to be presumed to act unfairly', the courts may be able in suitable cases (perhaps always) to imply an obligation to act with fairness." 5 (emphasis supplied) In R. v. Commissioner for Racial Equality, Lord Diplock stated; "Where an act of Parliament confe .....

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..... several cases, Krishna Iyer, J. stated : "Once we understand the soul of the rule as fairplay in action -and it is so - we must hold that it extends to both the fields. After all, administrative power in a democratic set-up is not allergic to fairness in action and discretionary executive justice cannot degenerate into unilateral injustice. Nor is there ground to be frightened of delay, inconvenience and expense, if natural justice gains access. For fairness itself is a flexible, pragmatic and relative concept, not a rigid, ritualistic or sophisticated abstraction. It is not a bull in a china shop, nor a bee in one's bonnet: Its essence is good conscience in a given situation; nothing more - but nothing less." (emphasis supplied) In Nally Bharat Engineering Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, the Government, on an application by a dismissed workman transferred his case from one Labour Court to another Labour Court without issuing a notice or giving opportunity to the employer. Setting aside the order and referring to several cases, the Supreme Court invoked the 'acting fairly' doctrine. The Court stated: "Fairness, in our opinion, is a fundamental principle of good administr .....

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..... , may require basic procedural Page 1853 protection which would involve 'duty to act fairly'. [Wade & Forsyth; 'Administrative Law'; (2005); pp. 492-94; de Smith; "Judicial Review of Administrative Action", (1995); pp. 397-98] 'Acting fairly' is thus an additional weapon in the armoury of the court. It is not intended to be substituted for another much more powerful weapon 'acting judicially'. Where, however, the former ('acting judicially') cannot be wielded, the court will try to reach injustice by taking resort to the latter - less powerful weapon ('acting fairly'). [See C.K. Thakker : "From Duty to Act Judicially to Duty to Act Fairly",]. 43. As the Chief Justice is performing administrative function under Sub- section (6) of Section 11 in appointing an arbitrator, mere is no 'duty to act judicially' on his part, nonetheless there is 'duty to act fairly' which requires him to issue notice to the other side before taking a decision to appoint an arbitrator. I am, therefore, of the view that Clause 7 of the scheme as stood prior to the amendment, could neither be held bad in law nor inconsistent with Section 11 of .....

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