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TMI Blog1974 (4) TMI 95X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Respondent: B. N. Lokur, Arun Kumar Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi JUDGMENT: CHANDRACHUD, J. This is a plaintiff's appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution.On March 24, 1953 defendant 1 executed on behalf of himself and 'his minor son defendant 2, a deed of mortgage in favour of the plaintiff. Defendant 3 is also a son of defendant 1 but he was born, after the mortgage deed, on September 30, 1955. On January 11, 1956 a registered deed of partition was executed amongst the defendants under which the mortgaged property was allotted to the share of defendants 2 and 3. On September 1, 1956 the mortgagee filed Civil Suit No. 3A of 1956 to enforce the mortgage. On September 20, 1958 the trial court passed a preliminary decree for sale of defendant 1's interest in the mortgaged property. It held that part of the consideration for the mortgage was not supported by legal necessity and the, balance of the debt incurred on the mortgage was tainted with immorality. Though, therefore, defendant 1 had executed the mortgage as a manager of the joint Hindu family consisting of himself and defendant 2, th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted a further sum of Rs. 25,000 towards the satisfaction of the preliminary decree. On February 14, 1968 another Division Bench of the High Court (Tambe and Badkas, JJ.) allowed the application of defendants 2 and 3 for amendment of their Memorandum of Appeal in First Appeal No. 72 of 1959. On an application made by their counsel, the High Court granted to those defendants time till February 23, 1968 to pay the deficit court fees, which they did. The High Court then took up the two First Appeals. for hearing in March, 1968. As the plaintiff had applied that she did not desire to proceed with First Appeal No. 40 of 1959 filed by her, the High-Court dismissed that appeal for non-prosecution. As a consequence of this order the High Court observed that the findings recorded by the trial court in favour of the defendants and adverse to the plaintiff would stand confirmed. In First Appeal No. 72 of 1959 filed by defendants 2 and 3 it was urged by the plaintiff that as the appeal was originally filed to challenge the finding of the trial court on the question of genuineness of the partition. defendants 2 and 3 were not entitled to include now grounds in the Memorandum of Appeal and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y one prayer was originally made in the Memorandum of Appeal that the partition deed be declared as genuine. Counsel for defendants 2 and 3, furnished to the registry of the High Court a written explanation as required by Rule 171 of the High Court Rules that as defendants 2 and 3 were only challenging the finding recorded by the trial court on the question of partition and as they were merely seeking a declaration that the partition was genuine, the fixed court fee of Rs. 20 was properly paid. It is thus clear that the appeal filed by defendants 2 and 3 in the High Court was directed originally not against any part of the preliminary decree but against mere finding recorded by the trial court that the partition was not genuine. The main controversy before us centers round the question whether that appeal was maintainable on this question the position seems to us well-established. There is a basic distinction between the right of suit and the right of appeal. There is an inherent right in every person to bring suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one may, at one's peril, bring a suit of one's choice. It is no answer to a suit howsoever frivolous the cla ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e. If it be correct that defendants 2 and 3 could be said to have been aggrieved by the preliminary decree, it was certainly competent for them to challenge that decree in appeal. But they did not file an appeal against the preliminary decree and therefore the question whether they were aggrieved by that decree and could file an appeal therefrom was irrelevant. While deciding whether the appeal filed by defendants 2 and 3 was maintainable, the High Court digressed into the question of the competence of defendants 2 and 3 to file an appeal against the preliminary decree and taking the view that it was open to them to challenge that decree even though the suit was wholly dismissed against them, the High Court held that the appeal, which in fact Was directed against a finding given by the trial court, was maintainable. It the High Court had appreciated that the-two questions were distinct and separate, it would not have fallen into the error of deciding the latter question by considering the former. Adverting to the question which the High Court did consider, namely, whether defendants 2 and 3 could be said to be aggrieved by the preliminary decree, there is nothing in the terms of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... plausible reason to assign for the inordinate delay caused in applying for an amendment of the appeal, they preferred not to file an application for condonation of delay at all. The appeal was filed on January 4, 1959 while, the application for amendment was made on August 2, 1966. Event though no explanation was offered for the long delay of over 7-1/2 years, the High Court allowed the amendment with a laconic order "Application for amendment allowed". Thus, the appeal filed by defendants 2 and 3 being directed against a mere finding given by the trial court was not maintainable; defendants 2 and 3 were not denied by the preliminary decree the right to pay the decretal amount; and the two defendants could even have applied under Order 21, Rule 89, for setting aside the sale in favour of the appellant but they failed to do so as, presumably, they were not interested in paying the amount. The High Court was therefore wholly in error in allowing the amendment of the Memorandum of Appeal, particularly when defendants 2 and 3 had neither explained the long delay nor sought its condonation. The preliminary decree had remained unchallenged since September 1958 and by lapse of time a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y on which the learned counsel for the respondents relies in support of this submission, a suit for preemption was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of limitation. In an appeal filed by the plaintiff, the District Court reversed that finding but confirmed the decree dismissing the suit on the ground that the sale effected by defendants 4 and 5 in favour of defendants 1, 2 and 3 was not validly registered and there being no "sale", there can be no right of preemption. Defendants 1 to 3 preferred an appeal to the High Court against the finding recorded by the District Court that the sale effected in their favour by defendants 4 and 5 was not valid as it was not lawfully registered. On a preliminary objection raised by the plaintiffs to the maintainability of the appeal, the High Court of Calcutta, held that though under the Code of Civil Procedure there can be no appeal as against a mere finding, "it may be taken to be the view of courts in India generally, that a party to the suit adversely affected by a finding contained in a judgment, on which a decree, is based, may appeal; and the test applied in some of the, cases for the purpose of determining whether a party has been ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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