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TMI Blog2012 (7) TMI 562X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ect from 1-10-2008. 3. It is on such grounds the appeals had been admitted for examining the following common substantial question of law: Whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that it is entitled to extend the stay beyond a period of 365 days which is contrary to Section 254 of the Act? 4. Revenue is represented by Sri K V Aravind, learned standing counsel and the respondent-assessees are represented by Sri Chaithanya K K and Sri A Sai Prasad in ITA Nos 160 of 2012 and 161 of 2012 respectively. 5. We have heard learned standing counsel for the revenue and the learned counsel for the assessees. 6. Sri Aravind has submitted that though the main appeals wherein the interim orders have been passed by the tribunal have themselves been subsequently disposed of, the question being one of interpretation of the provisions of the Act, particularly the third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act and one arising frequently and with the tribunal acting contrary to the statutory provisions time and again, it is necessary that the legal position should be clarified one way or the other and therefore, notwithstanding a preliminary objection that the main appeals are disposed of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not, in any case, exceed three hundred and sixty-five days, the order or stay shall stand vacated after the expiry or such period or periods, even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee. submission of Sri Aravind is that the third proviso has made it amply clear that the reason for non-disposal of the main appeal within a period of 365 days, whether it is attributable to the assessee or otherwise, and even if it is not attributable to the assessee, nevertheless, the interim order of stay granted by the tribunal stands automatically vacated by operation of the statute and in the wake of the intention of the legislature coupled with the second proviso, it is obvious that the tribunal is positively mandated not to pass orders having the effect of extending an interim order of stay beyond the maximum period of 365 days. Submission is that the tribunal is virtually restrained by statute from passing an order having the effect of extending the stay beyond 365 days and is divested of its power to pass such orders. 9. Sri Aravind has also drawn our attention to a judgment of the Bombay High Court, rendered in the case of COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to understand the provisions as one restricting the power of the tribunal to extend a stay order beyond the period of 365 days is virtually missing the main purpose and object of this provision; that this view is well supported by the authority of the Judgment of the Supreme Court and that judgment of the Supreme Court is though not on the very statutory provision, the Supreme Court while examining an analogous provision occurring in another taxing statute such as Central Excise Act, 1944, it had opined that the provisions should not be understood as one restricting the power of the tribunal to pass orders of stay beyond the stipulated period. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, AHMEDABAD vs KUMAR COTTON MILLS PVT LTD [2005 (180) ELT 434]. Particular reliance is placed on the contents of paragraph 6 of this judgment. 16. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the assessees that while the provisions in the Central Excise Act and the contents of third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act are almost identical, a distinction is to be found in the corresponding provisions in the Karnataka Value Added Ta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... plied for understanding and interpreting the provisions of Section 253(2A) of the Act, more particular for understanding the third proviso to this Section. 20. Perused the orders impugned and the submissions made at the bar in the wake of the authorities cited and referred to above. 21. Sri.K.V.Aravind learned standing counsel has taken us through the notes on clauses of the Finance Act, 2008, particularly clause 46 of the notes on clauses relating to the amendment to Section 254 of the Act, reading as under: Sub-section (2A) of the said section provides that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, where it is possible, may hear and decide an appeal within a period of four years from the end of the financial year in which such appeal is filed under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 253. The first proviso to this sub-section provides that the said Appellate Tribunal may, on merit, pass an order of stay in any proceedings relating to an appeal. However, such period of stay cannot exceed 180 days from the date of such order and the said Appellate Tribunal shall dispose of the appeal within the specified period of stay. The second proviso to this sub-section provides t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is no question of availing this right of appeal, independent or de hors the statutory provisions. If the statute regulates the manner of availing the appellate remedy and also imposes restrictions and limitations in the manner of consideration of the appeal and disposal of the appeal, the Appellate Tribunal is bound by that. The Appellate Tribunal cannot go beyond the limits stipulated by its creator, the legislature. Such legal position is very well settled. It is, therefore, necessary that we have to look into the statutory provisions to find out the scope of the power and jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal to pass orders particularly in the matter of granting or extending an order of stay and the duration up to which such order of stay can be prolonged. 25. Insofar as the decisions of Bombay High Court referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the assessees and also the Bombay Bench of the Tribunal are concerned, we find that none of these decisions have any significance or an impact on the amendment brought about to the third proviso to the Section by way of Finance Act 2008. We respectfully disagree with the view expressed by the learned Jud ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he interim order beyond the stipulated period and has therefore urged that a like interpretation of the present statutory provisions is inevitable. 29. While it is no doubt true that any law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is one to be followed and applied by all courts in the Country in view of the mandate under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, it is only such law that is declared in a particular context and in respect of the particular statutory provision and not in general. An interpretation placed in a particular enactment cannot be just engrafted to the provisions of another enactment, assuming that the same provision or similar analogous and the language is more or less similar. The provisions of Section 254(2A) has its own legislative history and amendments have been brought about against this provisions and therefore, we are afraid that we cannot just accept any interpretation which has been placed on a statutory provision occurring in a different legislation, wherein the circumstances could have been quite different. 30. Be that as it may, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in KUMAR COTTON MILLS PVT. LTD., (supra) cannot constitute law declared for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd the view taken by this court to be followed by the Tribunal functioning within the domain of territorial jurisdiction of this court, it is the responsibility of this Court, not only to clarify the legal position if there is a doubt, and also to impress upon the Tribunal functioning within the territorial jurisdiction to act within the sphere of the statutory provision and not to permit the tribunal to assume jurisdiction not vested in it. 34. In this appeal which is brought to this court under Section 260-A of the Act, even though we are conscious that the interim order appealed against has not remained independently as of now and it has got merged with the order passed on the main appeal, we have examined this question as a matter of duty and responsibility of this Court to clarify the legal position and also to ensure that the Tribunal which is functioning within the territorial limits of this court abides by the statutory provisions. 35. Viewed from any angle, we are of the opinion that the Appellate Tribunal has committed a positive error in consciously extending the interim order of stay granted in the pending appeal beyond the period of 365 days, which is the outer limit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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