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TMI Blog2002 (9) TMI 799X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. So far as question l(b) is concerned, this is really the same question, as in question l(a) and, therefore, we reiterate that when an application of a land owner under Section 18 is dismissed on the ground of delay, then the said land owner is entitled to make an application under Section 28-A, if other conditions prescribed therein are fulfilled. The receipt of compensation with or without protest pursuant to the award of the Land Acquisition Collector is of no consequence for the purpose of making a fresh application under Section 28-A. If a person has not filed an application under Section 18 of the Act to make a reference, then irrespective of the fact whether he has received the compensation awarded by the Collectors with or without protest, he would be a person aggrieved within the meaning of Section 28-A and would be entitled to make an application when some other land owner’s application for reference is answered by the reference Court. It is apparent on the plain language of the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act. Otherwise, it would amount to adding one more condition, not contemplated or stipulated by the Legislatur ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erence could be made to a Bench of five learned Judges. In view of the aforesaid Constitution Bench decision, the very reference itself made by the two learned judges was improper and we would have sent the matters to a Bench of three learned judges for consideration. But since the questions involved are pending in many cases in different High Court and certain doubts have arisen with regard to the interpretation to the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, we thought it appropriate to answer the two questions referred Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act reads thus: 28 A. Re determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court- (1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., [1995] 2 SCC 689, In Babua Ram, the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act came up for consideration and a Bench of two learned judges came to hold that the period of three months prescribed for making an application for rehttp:// determination of compensation must be computed from the date of earliest award of the Court made under Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act and not from the date of Judgment and decree of the Court of appeal. It was also held that successive award made by the reference Court at different times in respect of the land covered by the same notification do not furnish a fresh cause of action. In the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Karnail Singh and Ors., [1995] 2 SCC 728, a Bench of two learned Judges reiterated the aforesaid view expressed in Babua Ram and held that the earliest award of the reference Court by which the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer stood enhanced, would be the starting point of limitation of three months, enabling the land owners whose lands had also been acquired under the same notification and who had not made any reference under Section 18 of the Act earlier. The views expressed i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... applicant. As has been stated earlier in Jose Antonio Cruz s case, the High Court had followed the decision of this Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Pradeep Kumari and Ors., referred to supra, but the two learned Judges doubted the correctness of the ratio in Pradeep Kumari and had referred the matter to a larger Bench of five learned Judges. When the cases had been placed before the learned Chief Justice, the Chief Justice was not persuaded to constitute a larger Bench of five learned Judges and on the other hand directed that the cases be placed before a three Judge Bench and then ultimately the three Judge Bench disposed of the matter by Judgment dated 20th November, 1996, since reported in [1996] 6 SCC 746. Out of the two questions referred to by the two Judge Bench, the Court answered the first question by observing that there is no difference of opinion on the question that the period of limitation would start to run from the date of reference Court order and the period of three months would start from the order of the reference Court and not from the order of the Court passed in appeal against the same. On the second question, as to whether successive awards would giv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssion under this part in sub-section (1) of Section 28 and by adding the word or order after the word award in the proviso. According to the learned counsel, thus construed, the application under Section 28-A can be filed even within three months from the appellate order or the second appellate order and it should not be restricted to the award of the reference court alone. Mr. Gambhir contended that both Pradeep Kumari as well as subsequent three Judge Bench decision in Jose Antonio Cruz must be held to have been wrongly decided. Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would be the correct interpretation of Section 28-A, we think it appropriate to bear in mind certain basic principles of interpretation of statute. The rule stated by Tindal, CJ in Sussex Peerage case, (1844) 11 Cl F.85, still holds the field. The aforesaid rule is to the effect: If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver. It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute that when lang ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion, it may be permissible for the court to reject the surplus words, so as to make the statute effective. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, let us now examine the provisions of the Section 28-A of the Act, to answer the questions referred to us by the Bench of the two learned Judges. It is no doubt true that the object of Section 28-A of the Act was to confer a right of making a reference, who might have not made a reference earlier under Section 18 and, therefore, ordinarily when a person makes a reference under Section 18 but that was dismissed on the ground of delay, he would not get the right of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act when some other person makes a reference and the reference is answered. But the Parliament having enacted Section 28-A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice if a literal interpretation is given to the expression had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18 in Section 28-A of the Act. The aforesaid expression would mean that if the land-owner has made an application for reference under Section 18 and that reference is entertained and answered. In other words, it may not be permissible for a land owne ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng one more condition, not contemplated or stipulated by the Legislature itself to deny the benefit of substantial right conferred upon the owner. So far as the argument of learned Solicitor General on the correctness of the Pradeep Kumari s case is concerned, it may be stated that the said question does not appear to be a question, which has been referred to this Constitution Bench. As has been stated earlier that question had been referred by a Bench of two learned Judges in Jose Antonio Cruz s case, [1966] 1 SCC 88, as question No. 2, but a Bench of three learned Judges in [ 1966] 6 SC 746, while answered the first question, did not think it necessary to answer the second question, even though some doubts were raised about the correctness of the three Judge Bench decision in Pradeep Kumari s case. But since that question has neither been referred to us under the order of reference made in the present case nor does it arise in the case in hand, we refrain from answering the same. The questions having thus being answered, these appeals and special leave petitions may not be placed before a Bench of two learned Judges for being disposed of. S.K.S: Questions referred answer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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