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TMI Blog2014 (2) TMI 1102X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lodgement of a caveat would not deprive the Court of its power to pass an order even if the caveator was not informed of the dale of hearing of the matter. As the lodgement of a caveat is merely a right to be informed of the hearing date and it has no effect by way of curtailing the powers of a Civil Court to pass an appropriate order on the merits of the case - no reason to review or recall judgment dated 01.10.2013 - Decided against Petitioner. - Review Pet. 526/2013 & CM Nos. 14330, 14331 & 14332/2013 in WP(C) No.5889/2013 - - - Dated:- 15-1-2014 - S. Ravindra Bhat And Najmi Waziri,JJ. For the Petitioner : Mr. Deepak Khosla, Advocate. For the Respondent : Sh. Nishant Datta and Ms. Garima Hooda, Advocates, for Resp. No.1. ORDER Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat 1. This a review petition filed against the order and judgment of this Court in WP(C) No. 5889/2013, dated 1.10.2013. In this writ petition, directions were sought, inter alia, to the Company Law Board to frame regulations in respect of lodging caveats before that body (hereafter the CLB ) as well as to this Court, to regulate filing of caveats, under Section 148-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). Mor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the Company Law Board regulations to say that in such circumstances, if anyone had a grievance, an appeal under Regulation 32 (2) had to be preferred by the other party. 4. After considering the arguments advanced by the petitioner, this Court dismissed the writ petition inter alia, holding: 7. The question as to whether an order of stay made without hearing the caveator is unenforceable or is a nulllity was considered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Reserve Bank of India Employees Association v. The Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1981 AP 246, where the court held as follows: It follows, therefore, that the order passed by a Court without giving a notice to the caveator cannot be treated as a nullity. If a statute intends to demolish the ordinary powers of a Civil Court, it is well settled proposition of law that it can only be done by a direct piece of legislation enacted for that purpose and not by the effect of an indirect legislation as if it were by a side wind. The powers of a Civil Court are too sacrosanct to be allowed to be diluted or to be curtailed by a mere remote implication. I, therefore, hold that as there is no specific provision declaring any action tak ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itioners in this case also have an alternate remedy available under Section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956 for any grievances that may arise from the orders of the CLB. In such a case, to bypass the relevant statutory framework and engage this Court s writ jurisdiction would be incorrect. 5. Impugning this judgment, Mr. Deepak Khosla, the second petitioner, and counsel for the first petitioner, Mr. RP Khosla, has filed the present review petition, indicating a total of 21 grounds of review. First, it was argued that certain facts were not placed before the Court during the hearing of the writ petition, as they could not have been produced before the Court despite the petitioners due diligence. It is argued that although the petitioners did produce a copy of the order passed on 12.9.2013, they were unable to produce a copy of the Bench Officer s order which earlier acknowledged the registration of the caveat. Accordingly, reliance is sought to be placed on note-sheet of the proceedings, which have been obtained under the Right to Information Act, 2005, received by the petitioners on 30.9.2013. Mr. Khosla relies on the note-sheet for the following observations, which he claims cl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ty), if the caveat is registered, and moreover, instantly creates a right to be heard on the caveat itself. It is argued that the judgment also omitted to duly appreciate the argument that if lodging of a caveat was, in the opinion of the opposite party, erroneous, being a judicial order, that party had every right to challenge it in the manner provided in law, before complying with the same and providing the petition. Further, it has been further argued that the right to prefer an appeal against lodgement of the caveat in the instant case was on the petitioners in the Company Petition, who had 15 days to take recourse to file an appeal under Company Regulation No. 32(2). On these grounds, it is argued that the judgment must be reviewed and recalled, as these various arguments were not appreciated. It was also argued that this was not a case where a caveat was inadvertently not served, but rather, was blatantly reviewed by a Bench Officer who did not have the duty to do so. Thus, it was submitted that the order reviewing the order registering the caveat is a nullity in law an argument which, Mr. Khosla submits, was not appreciated in the impugned judgment. On this ground, too, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... der Section 10F involves various steps, and is a longer route than a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further, it is argued that even if the reasoning of an alternate remedy is considered correct, i.e. an appeal ought to have been filed under Section 10F, the Court could very well have directed that the writ petition would be treated as an appeal by it under Section 10F, and then proceeded to deal with the (converted) appeal itself, or at the highest, remanded it to the Company Court for an urgent hearing. On these various grounds, it is submitted that the judgment and order of 01.10.2013 are liable is liable to be set aside. 8. The present review petition and arguments advanced by Mr. Khosla canvass a rather broad set of alleged inconsistencies with the judgment of 1.10.2013 in question. First, as regards Mr. Khosla s argument that no finding was recorded by the Court as regards the prayer that directions to frame rules must be made, the Court notes that paragraph 5 of the impugned judgment deals with that argument, and given the broad provisions of Rule 44 of the Company Law Board Regulations, 1991, which are adequate, and grant Benches of the CLB discre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , where the Court held as follows: It follows, therefore, that the order passed by a Court without giving a notice to the caveator cannot be treated as a nullity. If a statute intends to demolish the ordinary powers of a Civil Court, it is well settled proposition of law that it can only be done by a direct piece of legislation enacted for that purpose and not by the effect of an indirect legislation as if it were by a side wind. The powers of a Civil Court are too sacrosanct to be allowed to be diluted or to be curtailed by a mere remote implication. I, therefore, hold that as there is no specific provision declaring any action taken by the Court contrary to its mandatory duty under Sub-section (3) to give a notice would be void, the order passed by the Court below on 30-10-1980 is not a nullity. In other words, il appears to me that the mere lodgement of a caveat would not deprive the Court of its power to pass an order even if the caveator was not informed of the dale of hearing of the matter. As the lodgement of a caveat is merely a right to be informed of the hearing date and it has no effect by way of curtailing the powers of a Civil Court to pass an appropriate order on t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on 10F of the Companies Act to appeal that order. The revisioner s argument that Section 10F involves a longer route than that under Article 226, and thus should not be insisted upon is not persuasive. The revisioner does not contest that an alternate remedy does lie, as a matter of law, under Section 10F. Rather, it is contended that such a remedy is not equally effective. However, no reasons have been provided by the petitioner as to why an appeal under Section 10F is not effective, apart from the mere fact that it involves certain additional steps as compared to a petition under Article 226. The mere fact that a statutory remedy involves additional steps to be taken (in this case, under the Companies Act, 1956) cannot and should not lead to the conclusion that the remedy is not effective, or unduly burdensome in any way. Indeed, if such a conclusion were to be reached, then a writ petition under Article 226 could be preferred for all cases where an order of the CLB is impugned as opposed to the statutory remedy under Section 10F. Such reasoning would render Section 10F defunct, and indeed, open the floodgates under Article 226. In fact, the holding of the Supreme Court in Commis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on or a previously binding judicial precedent, the correct remedy is to appeal that order under the available mechanisms, rather than label the order a nullity which, without any further judicial intervention, has no force of law. 13. Finally, on the question of impleading a judicial member of the CLB, the Court notes that the revisioner s argument that Savitri Devi (supra) does not bar impleadment of judicial officers in any and every case is correct. However, cases such as the present one, are precisely the set of circumstances that the dictum in Savitri Devi (supra) applies to. The petitioners questioned a judicial act/order of the CLB (passed by the CLB member) on the ground of its legality and consonance with the CPC and other legal provisions. The impugned order, thus, was an order of the CLB, and not a private act of the judicial officer, who was, independent of the rightness or wrongness of the decision, acting in his judicial capacity. There arose no occasion to array the judicial member as a party. In fact, the holding of the Court in Savitri Devi (supra) is apt in such cases: 14. Before parting with this case it is necessary for us to point out one aspect of the mat ..... 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