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TMI Blog1958 (12) TMI 31X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ver its delegate. Therefore, reading s. 4 along with s. 3(2) of the Act it cannot be said in the special circumstances of this case that there was excessive delegation to the Central Government by s. 3(1). We are, therefore, of opinion that the Act cannot be struck down on the ground of excessive delegation. In this case the appellant was serving in connection with the affairs of the State of Punjab, and, therefore, the Punjab Government would have authority to institute the enquiry against him. The Central Government would only come into the picture after the enquiry is concluded and if it is decided to impose one of the three punishments mentioned in r. 4(1). This contention must also be rejected. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs to the State of Punjab. - Civil Appeal No. 426 of 1958. - - - Dated:- 11-12-1958 - WANCHOO, K.N., DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ), DAS, S.K., GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B., HIDAYATULLAH, M. JJ. N.C. Chatterjee, I. M. Lal and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant. S.M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State, of Punjab, Mohinder Singh Pannum, Additional Advocate-General for the State of Punjab and D. Gupta, for the respondent B. Sen and T. M. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ticle and Parliament could not delegate this function to the Central Government, and, therefore, s. 3 of the Act was invalid; (5)In any event, the delegation made by s. 3 of the Act was excessive and, therefore, section 3 should be struck down; and (6)The Punjab Government has no authority to institute these proceedings under the Rules. Re. 1, 2 3. These three points may conveniently be taken together. Article 392- provides that the President may, for the purpose of removing any difficulties, particularly in relation to the transition from the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the provisions of this Constitution, by order direct that this Constitution shall, during such period as may be specified in the order, have effect subject to such adaptations, whether by way of modification, addition or omission, as he may deem to be necessary or expedient ; provided that no such order shall be made after the first meeting of Parliament duly constituted under Chapter 11 of Part V . The purpose of this provision is obvious from the very words in which it was made. Further Art. 379 provided that until both Houses of Parliament have been duly constituted and summoned ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd the States. Reliance in this connection is placed on Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar ([1952] S.C.R. 89), where dealing with an adaptation made in Art. 368, by the same order, this Court observed that the adaptation leaves the requirement of a special majority untouched . It is urged that if the President had made the adaptation in the way suggested by learned counsel that would have left the requirement of a resolution supported by requisite majority untouched and would have been within the power of the President; but inasmuch as the entire portion was omitted the President had exceeded his power. It is enough to say that Sankari Prasad Singh's case (1) does not lay down that if the adaptation in Art. 368 had been made in some other manner it would have been invalid and unconstitutional. Reference to the fact that adaptation left the requirement of a special majority untouched was made obviously for the purpose of emphasising that there was no real ground of grievance and not for indicating that in the absence of the retention of that provision the adaptation would have been bad. Indeed, it was pointed out in that 'case that Art. 392 was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... opinion, completely baseless. The reappearance of these words in Art. 312 has nothing to do with the vires of the Rules. The rules were framed under the power given to the Central Government by the Act, and if the Act was valid when it was passed, the Central Government would have power to frame rules under it, as it is a permanent measure. The Rules framed in 1955, therefore, cannot be challenged on the ground that the omitted words reappeared in Art. 312. The Rules derive their force from the Act and the form in which Art. 312 emerged, after the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No. 11 came to an end in 1952, would not have any effect on the Rules. There is no force, therefore, in any of these three points, and we reject them. Re. 4. It is contended that Art. 312 lays down a mandate on Parliament to make the law itself regulating the recruitment and the conditions of service of all-India services, and therefore, it was not open to Parliament to delegate any part of the work relating to such regulation to the Central Government by framing Rules for the purpose. Now, it is well settled that it is competent for, the legislature to delegate to other authorities the powe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vide); Art. 139, (namely, Parliament may by law confer); and Art. 148 (3), (namely, as may be determined by Parliament by law). In contrast to these Articles, our attention was drawn to the words of Art. 173 (c), (namely, by or under any law made by Parliament), and Art. 293 (2), (namely, by or under any law made by Parliament). It is urged that when the Constitution uses the words may by law confer or may by law provide , no delegation whatsoever is possible. We are of opinion that these words do not necessarily exclude delegation and it will have to be seen in each case how far the intention of the Constitution was that the entire provision should be made by law without recourse to any rules framed under the power of delegation. Let us, therefore, examine Art. 312 from this angle, and see if the intention of the Constitution was that regulation of recruitment and conditions of service to an all-India service should only be by law and there should be no delegation of any power to frame rules. Regulation of recruitment and conditions of service requires numerous and varied rules, which may have to be changed from time to time as the exigencies of public service require. This ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... jea, J. (as he was then), in Re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 ([1951] S.C.R. 747) at p. 982 The essential legislative function consists in the determination or choosing of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct. It is open to the legislature to formulate the policy as broadly and with as little or as much details as it thinks proper and it may delegate the rest of the legislative work to a subordinate authority who will work out the details within the framework of that policy. I So long as a policy is laid down and a standard established by statute no constitutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the legislation is to apply'. It is said that in this case Parliament did not even exercise the essential legislative function inasmuch as it did not determine or choose the legislative policy and formally enact that policy into a binding rule of conduct. Apparently, if one looks at the Act, there seems to be some force in this contention. But a close reading of s. 4 of the Act and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e are, therefore, of opinion that the Act cannot be struck down on the ground of excessive delegation. Re. 6. The last contention is that the Punjab Government has no authority to institute these proceedings under the Rules. It would be necessary in this connection to refer to the Rules. Rule 3 provides for penalties, which are seven in number. Rule 4 provides for the authorities, who can impose the penalties, and three of the penalties, namely, dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, can only be imposed by the Central Government, while the other four penalties can be imposed by the State Government. Rule 5 provides the procedure for imposing penalties. The argument is that as in this case the charge against the appellant is serious, he is likely to be dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired, and therefore, the Central Government should have instituted enquiry in this case. We are of opinion that there is no force in this contention. In the first place, it cannot be postulated at the very outset of the enquiry whether there would be any punishment At all, and even if there is going to be punishment, what particular punishment out of the seven mentioned in r. 3 would ..... 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