9911796707
TMI Blog1984 (3) TMI 397X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... minate or predominates in weight. Explanation. - This Item does not include asbestos cement products. 68. All other goods, not elsewhere specified, excluding - 2. Initially, the subject housings were classified by the Department under Item 68. On 5-12-80, the Assistant Collector issued a notice calling upon the appellants to show cause as to why the classification should not be changed to Item 22F(4). The ground given for the proposed change in the classification was that glass fibre predominated in the housing. This notice did not say specifically that any differential duty for the past period was also proposed to be recovered from the appellants. On 28-2-81, the Assistant Collector directed the appellants to assess the goods provisionally pending his decision on the re-classification. However, within a month, on 30-3-1981 to be precise, the Assistant Collector was able to decide the matter. In his Order-in-Original he maintained the classification under Item 68 on the ground that the goods were not manufactured from mineral fibres or yarn but were the products manufactured from the manufactures of mineral fibre and yarn. The Collector was tentatively of the view that t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct goods, they stood excluded from the entry because of the words manufactures therefrom in the opening para of the main entry 22F. The appellants maintained that these words restricted the scope of the entry and consequently the entry covered only those products which had been made directly from mineral fibres and yarn. Since their goods were manufactured from glass fabrics as the starting material, they did not fall under Item 22F(4) but fell under the residuary Item 68. (2) The appellants purchased glass fabrics from the market. These fabrics were themselves a manufacture of mineral fibres and yarn and had been assessed at `nil rate of duty under Item 22F(4) read with exemption Notification No. 87/76-C.E., dated 16-3-76. Since the fabrics themselves had already been taxed at the appropriate rate as a manufacture and were thereafter used for making another manufacture, that is, the subject housing, the latter product could not be taxed again under the same tariff sub-item. They relied on the order of this Tribunal passed in the appeal of M/s. Golden Paper Udyog [1983 E.L.T. 1123 (CEGAT)]. (3) It was an established proposition of law that there was no room for intendmen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it covers also the products made from glass fabrics which in turn are made from glass fibres/yarn. In other words, glass fabrics are an intermediate stage between glass fibres/yarn and the subject housing. The material words in Item 22F read as mineral fibres and yarn and manufactures therefrom . The words manufactures therefrom are capable of a simple and straightforward meaning that the goods should be manufactured from mineral fibres and yarn. The word directly does not occur in the tariff item and the appellants are not entitled to read that word into the entry. If glass fibres/yarn have first to be woven into fabrics before they can be used in the manufacture of the housing, the housing would not cease to be a manufacture of glass fibres/yarn. The point can be illustrated by simple examples which we come across in everyday life. Bread made from wheat flour, and not directly from wheat, still remains wheat bread. A shirt stitched from cotton cloth continues to be considered as a cotton shirt although it is well known that cotton fibre cannot be turned into a shirt directly and the fibre must first undergo the intervening processes of spinning into yarn and thereafter weav ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... before they could be taxed again. We observe that in the appellants case, the entry 22F(4)- other manufactures is a group entry. It is not restricted to one specific commercial product but covers all manufactures [of course, excluding those covered by the earlier entries 22F(1) to (3)] in which mineral fibres/yarn predominate, the appellants have relied on our orders in the case of M/s. Golden Paper Udyog. The situation in that case was different inasmuch as the entry 17(2) relevant to that case was specific for paper and paper-board and by a further inclusive description the entry placed both treated and un-treated papers and paperboards on the same footing; in other words, both were to be regarded as paper and paperboard. On the other hand, the entry 22F(4) is worded on the pattern of Item 68 (All other goods, not elsewhere specified) both of which are residuary entries covering a number of diverse products. To take an example, components of a lathe machine fall under Item 68. The complete lathe machine also falls under Item 68. A manufacturer of the complete lathe machine cannot take the argument that the complete machine cannot be taxed because the components had already be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d why other appropriate order should not be passed. The review show cause notice did not specifically refer to the duty having been short levied during the period prior to its issue, nor did it call upon the appellants to show cause why the differential duty should not be demanded from them. In the Collector s final order, there was a reference to the appellants objection that the show cause notice was time-barred, having been issued more than 6 months after the date of the Assistant Collector s order. The Collector observed that the period for review of the Assistant Collector s order was one year and not six months and therefore the question of show cause notice being time-barred did not arise. He went on to say that the party s objection would be only valid so far as the demand of duty was concerned, which would be restricted to six months prior to the date of demand notice . It is apparent from the context that what the Collector had in mind was the review show cause notice which had already been issued and not a demand notice which was yet to be issued; the error can probably be attributed to the use of the word demand used earlier in the same sentence. In other words, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erefore, be held as valid prospectively, that is, on and after the date of the review show cause notice. But where the Collector s final order sought to demand duty for an earlier period, prior to the date of the review show cause notice, it is not sustainable. Firstly, and most important, the show cause notice did not specifically call upon the appellants to show cause against such a demand, as required under sub-section (3) (b) (a sweeping reference to such order as may be deemed fit or appropriate order is clearly not a sufficient compliance with this provision). Secondly, even if the show cause notice had proposed to demand duty for the earlier period, it would have been hit by the time-limit in sub-section (3) (b). 12. We accordingly hold that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the differential duty is payable by the appellants only from 12-10-81 onwards which was the date when the Collector s show cause notice was issued for changing the classification. The demand issued by the Superintendent on 30-4-83 was only a consequential action pursuant to the Collector s order and the date of the said demand by itself can, therefore, have no significance. 13. Accor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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