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TMI Blog1985 (3) TMI 280X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... -1983, disposing of Appeal Nos. 117-167/ASM/83, and communicated to him on 23-8-1983, the Applicant filed one Single Appeal in the Tribunal on or about 28-10-83. That Appeal was registered as Appeal No. ED(SB)2326/83-D ; (b) the Registry of this Tribunal, however, informed the Applicant, by letter dated 6 2-84, that separate Appeals corresponding to the number of Appeals disposed of by the Collector (Appeals) and desired to be appealed against have to be filed; (c) citing the Order of the West Regional Bench of this Tribunal in the case reported in 1983 ETR 345 (Unique Pharmaceutical v. Collector of Customs, Bombay) in support, the Applicant submitted by letter dated 27-2-1984, that it was difficult in the prevailing circumstances, to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot those occurring after the expiry of limitation (Reliance on AIR 1981 SC 133 - Ajit Singh v. State of Gujarat); (iii) there is no question of construing the expression sufficient cause liberally just because the party seeking condonation happens to be the Government. [Reliance on 1964 (3) SCR 467 - Union of India v. Ram Charon and Others. (iv) further, each day s delay after the efflux of the period of limitation has also, necessarily, to be explained ; (v) the Application not being in conformity with the aforesaid requirements, the delay cannot be condoned. 4. It appears to us on a perusal of the records and the submissions made and otherwise that- (a) prior to the constitution of the Tribunal, it had been almost and inv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not barred by limitation); and the Supplemental Appeals even before he was reasonably satisfied about such a requirement; (g) in AIR 1953 S.C. 419 (Narahari v. Shankar), it was held by the Hon ble Supreme Court that where the Plaintiff preferred two Appeals from two decrees in one suit, and one of the Appeals was barred by limitation, the Plaintiff/Appellant should have been given the benefit of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, because, there was a conflict of decisions in regard to the number of Appeals that were, actually, required to be filed. The facts in these Applications for condonation of delay are not different seeing that there was a conflict between the decision of the West Regional Bench of this Tribunal and the views of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed time and this has always been understood to mean that the explanation has to cover the whole period of delay, vide Sitaram Ramcharan v. M.N. Nagarshana (1960) 1 SCR 875 at 889 ; (AIR 1960 S.C. 260 at pp. 265-66). However, it is not possible to lay down precisely as to what facts or matters would constitute sufficient cause under S.5 of the Limitation Act. But those words should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or any inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party, i.e., the delay in filing an appeal should not have been for reasons which he would have or should ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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