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TMI Blog1968 (8) TMI 187X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Board made its report to the State Government under section 10 of the Act on April 17, 1968. On April 26, 1968, the State Government made the order detaining the petitioners for a period of one year. This detention is challenged before us. The petitions were argued by Mr. Ramamurthy together. The law points raised by him in these cases were common and will be dealt with together. Part of the facts were also common although some special features were pointed out in some cases. We propose to deal with the common,points of law and facts together and then to consider the special facts separately. The points of law were (1 ) that the detention was illegal as the report of the District Magistrate was not submitted forthwith as required by section 3(3) of the Act, (2) that the detention was again illegal as the order of approval of State Government under s. 3 (3) was not communicated to the petitioners, (3) that the detention was illegal as the State Government had not reported the fact to the Central Government as soon as possible and without avoidable delay. The common points of fact are that the grounds were vague and the detention was for a collateral purpose and mala fide. The ord ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... worst that this country has witnessed. The Bombay police had a most difficult task to perform in securing life and property, and the authorities must have been working at high pressure in maintaining law and order. It is obvious that the Commissioner was not sleeping over the orders which he had passed or lounging supinely over them. The delay such as it is, is due to causes not of his making, but to causes to which the activities of the petitioners very largely contributed. We have no hesitation in accepting the affidavit, and we hold that the delay in sending the report could not have been avoided by the Commissioner and that when they were sent by him, they were sent "forthwith" within the meaning of section 3(3) of the Act." In the present case the delay is much shorter. The 10th and 1 ith of February were close holidays. The communication was (1) [1956] S.C.R. 653 at pages 658-660. on the 13th. Thus there was only delay because the report was not made on the 12th. Explaining the delay the District Magistrate in his affidavit says: "I say that 10th February, 1968 was a holiday, being the second Saturday of the month and 11th February, 1968 was Sunday. I s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... revailed for making a distinction between an order passed and an order communicated do not obtain here. In Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab([1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 713) an order of dismissal of a public servant passed by the Minister on the file was not communicated and it was held 'that it was only provisional fill communicated. This case is not in point. The next case Biren' Dutta and others v. Chief Commissioner of Tripura and another ([1964] 8 S.C.R. 295) deals with detention under the Defence of India Rules 1962 rules 30(1)(b) and 30A(8). The reason of rule 30A(8) was stated by this Court to be that it is in the nature of an independent decision and further detention can be justified only if the decision is recorded as required by the rule, and it must be in writing clearly and unambiguously to indicate the decision. It was further observed that the decision must be communicated. This case is really no authority in the context of the present ease. Section 3 (3 ) of the Preventive Detention Act does not specify that the order of approval is anything more than an administrative approval by the State Government. If this be so the necessity of communication of the app ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the time from February 9 but we do not think that is possible. Time can only be calculated from the moment the matter reached the State Government. The State Government took a week to consider these cases and it is reasonable to think that there might be a few more cases which are not before us. Having reached the decision on the February 19, the action of the State Government in communicating the matter to the Central Government on February 22 cannot be said to be so delayed as to render the detention illegal. Various things have to be done before the report to the Central Government can be made and a gap of 3 days is understandable. We see no forces in this point. This brings us to the merits of the detention. Here the charge is that the grounds furnished to the detenus were vague and the detention itself mala fide. The grounds are practically the same except for very minor changes to which attention will be drawn when we deal with individual cases. We may set down the grounds of detention from Petition No. 89 of 1968 as sample. "You are being detained in pursuance of the Detention order made under sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (a) of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... relevant and irrelevant matters have been included. Reference is made to two cases decided recently by this Court in which the grounds were found insufficient. They are: Rameshwar Lal Patwari v. State of Bihar([1968] 2 S.C.R. 505) and Motilal Jain v. State of Bihar & Others ([1968] 3 S.C.R. 587). We find no such vagueness in the grounds as was found established in the two cases. The grounds begin by stating generally what the activities were. They consisted of instigation of tribal people to practise jhuming and preventing the authorities from delivering paddy to Government under the procurement schemes. This instigation it is said was through mass and secret meetings and resulted in violent resistance to Government. Having said this the grounds then specify the places where and the dates on which the meetings were held and the date on which and place at which the resistance took place. In our judgment more detailed information was not necessary to give .the detenus an opportunity to make their representations. The grounds here are specific and very unlike those in the cases relied upon. We reject the contention. As regards mala fides and collateral purpose alleged to be the real ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ; Result 25-11-67 18-6-67 16-12-67 21-6-67 26-12-67 &n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... office and threatened individual shop-keepers to keep their shops closed, but no details are supplied. It is submitted that this brings the case within the rulings of this Court. We think this case is distinguishable from the case of a black marketer who is charged with having sold contraband articles or at higher prices or hoarded goods. General allegations there without concrete instances would be difficult to represent against. Here the matter is different. It is an integrated conduct of instigation against law and order which is being charged. Several aspects of it are mentioned. They range from jhuming in forests and resistance to procurement to arranging for strikes. Instances Of mass and secret meetings are furnished and the ramifications of conduct in other directions are mentioned. In these circumstances the petitioner is expected to represent against the instances and if he convinces that he took no part in the agitation, the other aspects of his activity will be" sufficiently answered. A_case of this type stands on slightly different footing from the cases of black marketing earlier decided by this Court. In our judgment no successful ground has been' made out and th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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