TMI Blog1968 (11) TMI 96X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt Co. was established in 1903. Though its sugar mill is in U.P. it used to draw its sugarcane requirement mainly from the neighboring areas in Bihar State. The mill in question is within about 100 yards of the Bihar border. The appellant s case is that for the last over 30 years the 208 villages of Bihar, with which we are concerned in this appeal had been the principal source of its supply of sugarcane and that the Bihar authorities used to reserve those villages for it. The appellant claims to have spent huge amount in the development of sugarcane growing areas in the said 208 villages in the course of years. It also claims to have advanced large sums to the sugarcane growers in the said villages, such sums to be adjusted later on against the price of the sugarcane purchased. In 1955 the Central Govern- ment promulgated the order in exercise of its powers under the Essential Commodities Act. One of the main purpose of that order was to regulate the supply and distribution of sugarcane. Reservation of the said 208 villages in favour of the appellant continued under that order. But in view of the agitation carried on by the 5th respondent and others, .during the two seasons 1962 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... te to the Chief Minister on June 15, 1967 praying that the reservation made in favour of the appellant should not be disturbed. Subsequent to that, the appellant made numerous other representations both to the Chief Minister as well as to the Cane Commissioner. One of the Director of the appellant company met the Chief Minister as well as his Private Secretary. Meanwhile the 5th respondent was also making representations, to the Chief Minister as well as to the Cane Commissioner. From the records produced before us, it is clear that the Cane Commissioner was firmly of the opinion that there was no justification for disturbing the reservation made in favour of the appellant. He strongly recommended to the Chief Minister against interfering with the said reservation. According to him it was in the interest of the Sugar industry as well as that of the Sugar mills in Bihar not to disturb the agreement arrived at the meeting of the Sugar Cane Commissioners of U.P. and Bihar. From the records. produced before us it is seen that one of the grounds urged by the 5th respondent in support of his plea was that while it was a Bihar mill, the appellant was a U.P. mill and as such the Bihar vill ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nister passed the following order on the above note. I agree with the notes as at Kha of page 33. 99 villages be left to the New Siwan Mill and 109 villages to the Pratabpur Mill. None of the two mills will have the right to keep the weigh bridge of sugar-cane collecting centre in the area of each other. Sd/- Mahamaya Pd. Sinha 7-11-67. On the basis of this direction the Cane Commissioner made the impugned orders on November 14, 1967, which were duly published in the Gazette. In the High Court the validity of the order made by the Cane Commissioner on November 14, 1967 was challenged on six different grounds i.e. (1 ) that the Cane Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass those orders; (2) in passing those orders, the Cane Commissioner practically abdicated his statutory functions and mechanically implemented the directions issued by the Chief Minister; (3) the orders are vitiated as the proceeding before the authority culminating in those orders was a quasi-judicial proceeding and the authority had failed to afford a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to represent against the orders proposed to be made; (4) even if the proceeding in question should be conside ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ough the Cane Commissioner had consulted the Chief Minister, the impugned orders were really made by the former, hence it cannot be said that he had abdicated his statutory functions. According to him, the proceeding before the Cane Commissioner was administrative in character and to such a proceeding rules of natural justice are not attracted. He further urged that even if it is held that the said proceeding was a quasi-judicial proceeding, there was no contravention of the principles of natural justice as the appellant had represented his case fully both before the Chief Minister as well as before the Cane Commissioner. Before we proceed to examine the contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of law. Clause 5 of the order which deals with the power to regulation, distribution and movement of sugarcane reads as under: (1) The Central Government may, by order notified in the official gazette: (a) reserve any area where sugarcane is grown (hereinafter in this clause referred to as reserved area) for a factory having regard to the crushing capacity of the factory, the availability of sugarcane in the reserved area a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y of the Central Government; (b) a State Government or any officer or authority of a State Government. As seen earlier, the Central Government had delegated its power under cl. (6) to the State Government of Bihar as well as to the Cane Commissioner, Bihar. In the matter of exercise of the power under rule 6(1) the State Government and the Cane Commissioner are concurrent authorities. Their jurisdiction is co-ordinate. There was some controversy before us whether a Cane Commissioner who had reserved an area for a sugar factory for a particular period can alter, amend, or modify the area reserved in the middle of the period fixed. As seen earlier 208 villages With which we are concerned in this case were reserved for the appellant for two seasons i.e. 1966-67 and 1967-68. The contention was that the Cane Commissioner could not have interfered with that reservation within that period. The High Court has come to the conclusion that the Cane Commissioner who had the power to make the reservation in question must be held to have had the power to alter or modify that reservation. But it is not necessary for us to pronounce on this question as we are of the opinion that the impu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... individual cases unless explicit statutory provision has been made for them to be given binding instructions by a superior. In Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji ([1952] S.C.R. 135.) this Court struck down the order purported to have been passed by the Commissioner of Police in the exercise of his powers under the Bombay Police Act and the rules made thereunder as the order in question was in fact that of the Government. The rule laid down in that decision governs the question under consideratiing. This Court reiterated that rule in State of Punjab v. Hari Kishan Sharma (A.I.R. 1966. S.c. 1081.). Therein this Court held that the State Government was not justified in assuming jurisdiction which had been conferred on the licensing authority by s. 5 (1 ) and (2) of the Punjab Cinemas (Regulation) Act. For the reasons mentioned above we hold that the impugned orders are liable to be struck down as they were not made by the prescribed authority. This takes us to the question whether the proceeding which resulted in making the impugned orders is a quasijudicial proceeding or an administrative proceeding. There was some controversy before us whether a proceeding un ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... should be given before a licence can be revoked. The presumption should be rebuttable in similar circumstances to those in which summary interference with vested property rights may be permissible. That the considerations applicable to the revocation of licences may be different from those applicable to the refusal of licences has indeed been recognised by some British statutes and a number of judicial decisions in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. In Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani and Ors.([1950] S.C.R. 621 at p. 725.) Das, J. formulated the following tests to find out whether proceeding before an authority or a tribunal . is a quasijudicial proceeding :-- (i) that if a statute empowers an authority, not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; , red (ii) t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as a quasi-judicial proceeding. In this connection reference may be usefully made to the decision of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in New Zealand Dairy Board v. Okitu Co-operative Dairy Co., Ltd.((1953) New Zealand Law Reports p. 366.). We are referring to that decision because the facts of that case bear a close resemblance to the facts of the present case. Therein as a result of a Zoning Order made by the Executive Commissioner of Agriculture in May 1937, the respondent dairy company, carrying on business in Gisborne and the surrounding district, and the Kia Ora Cooperative Dairy Co. Ltd. became entitled to operate exclusively in a defined area in the Gisborne district. They were excluded from operating outside that area. The zoning conditions so established continued to exist until 1950, when the appellant Board issued the zoning orders which were impugned in that case. It may be noted that the zoning orders were made in the exercise of the statutory power conferred on the appellant board. Before 1942, the respondent Co. was approached by the Health Department with a request that it undertakes the treatment and supply of pasteurised milk to the public schools, and it wa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t of the proceedings before the Supreme Court of New Zealand. That order was to come into force on October 1, 1950. Its effect was to assign exclusively to the Kia Ora Co. the area defined in Zoning Order (No. 30) of 1937 as that in which the two companies could jointly collect cream produced in supplying dairies situated in that area, and to prohibit the res- pondent dairy company after October 1, 1950 from collecting or receiving any cream so produced for the purposes of manufacture into cream or butter. The respondent company and others presented a petition to the Parliament praying for relief and remedy by way of legislation either in the direction of reversing and setting aside the Board s decision in the matter of the zoning order or setting aside such decision and rehearing of the matter by an independent tribunal. The petition was heard by a select Committee of the House of Representatives, which decided to make no recommendation on the petition. On August 4, the Board made an amended Zoning Order (No. 120A) postponing until June 1, 1951, the date of the coming into operation of Zoning Order No. 120 already made, but otherwise confirming that order. The respondent compa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the impugned orders had to be exercised judicially, on the facts of his case we must hold that there was no contravention of the principles of natural justice. He took us to the various representations made by the appellant. According to him the appellant had stated in its representations to the authorities all that it could have said on the subject. Therefore we should not hold that there was any contravention of the principles of natural justice. It is true as observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. The University Kerala and Ors.([1969] 1 S.C.R. 317) that the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The question whether the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case in point, the constitution of the tribunal and the rules under which it functions. In this case what has happened is that both the appellant as welt as the 5th respondent were making repeated representations to the Chief Minister as well as to the Cane Commissioner. The representations made by the 5th respondent or even the substance thereof were not made available to the appellant. T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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