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TMI Blog1994 (9) TMI 344X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t;amending Act"), or it is to be granted in all proceedings pending before the Courts on 24-9-1984. 3. To appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the principal Act. Section 3(d) defines 'Court' to mean a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has appointed a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. In the context of the other provisions and the scheme of the Act, it means the Court to which the reference is made by the Collector under Section 18 of the principal Act. 4. Section 11 empowers the Collector, among other things, to enquire into the value of the land on the date of the publication of the notification for acquisition of the land under Section 4(1) and to make an award of the compensation which in his opinion, should be allowed for the land. 5. Section 15 requires the Collector while determining the amount of compensation, to be guided by the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. 6. Section 16 empowers the Collector to take possession of the land when he has made the award under Section 11 of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is payable is not paid into the Court within one year from the date on which possession is taken. The interest is to be paid from the date of expiry of the said period of one year. 10.Section 28-A enables the persons interested in all the other lands covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) and aggrieved by the award made by the Collector, to make a written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court requiring that the amount of compensation payable to them be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court to the applicants who had sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act to the Court, if the amount of compensation awarded to such applicants by the Court is in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector, although the persons concerned may not have similarly applied for a reference under Section 18 to the Court. On such application being made, the Collector is required to hold inquiry to make an award redetermining the award of compensation payable to such applicants. Any person who does not accept the award of the Collector redetermining the amount of compensation, is given a right to re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... emed to have applied, also to, and in relation to,- (a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the People], in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date; (b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act. (2)The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People] and before the commencement of this Act. The date of the introduction of the Bill of the amending Act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court, shall be excluded. This provision like the one for solatium in sub-section (2) of Section 23, is a substantive one. Unless therefore, there is a statutory mandate, neither this provision nor the provision for the increased solatium can be given retrospective effect. It is here that the role of Section 30 of the amending Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Section 30') which makes provisions for the transitional period, viz., the period between the introduction of the Bill of the amending Act and the commencement of the said Act, comes into play. It is the interpretation of the said Section 30 and its bearing on the provisions of Section 23 which has become a matter of controversy and a subject of conflicting decisions of this Court as stated at the outset. 15.The relevant provisions of Section 30 have already been reproduced. An analysis of the section shows that it deals separately with the two different benefits which the amending Act has conferred on the landowners. Sub-section (1) thereof deals exclusively with the provisions of sub- section (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act while sub- ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... them. This is as it should be, for Section 15 of the principal Act requires the Collector to take into consideration the provisions contained in Sections 23 and 24 while determining the amount of compensation to be awarded. To get his due compensation, every landowner need not be obliged to ask for a reference under Section 18 nor is every landowner in a financial position to do so. It is common knowledge that many a land acquisition proceedings come to an end at the stage of the Collector, and only some cases travel to the reference Court and thereafter to the appellate Courts. Secondly, Section 30(1) while giving the power to the Collector to grant the benefit of Section 23(1 A), also pl aces a restriction on the said power. The Collector is empowered to grant the said benefit only in those proceedings which are pending before him on 30-4-1982 and in which no award has been made by him before that date. That is understandable since the proceedings would be pending before him on 30-4-1982 even after he has made his award, either for making a reference or for payment and distribution of the compensation. In such cases, he is not empowered to give the said benefit by reopening the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ad already made before 30-4-1982 in proceedings pending before him on that day. This was, as, stated above, for the reason that those of the awards made by him in such proceedings which were the subject-matter of reference under Section 18 could be taken care of by the reference Court under Section 23. On the other hand, those of such awards which were not questioned and, therefore, had become final, should not be reopened. 19.What is, therefore, necessary to note is that Section 30(1) deals exclusively with the powers of the Collector and it has no bearing on the powers of the reference Court under Section 23. What is more, clause (a) of the said Section 30(1) is not retrospective in operation. It speaks of power of the Collector in the proceedings pending before him on 30-4-1982 in which lie has yet to make the award. It Is only clause (b) of the said section which gives a limited retrospectivity to the power of the Collector when it enables him to reopen the award made by him before the commencement of the amending Act, viz., 24-9-1984 in proceedings started after 30-4-1982. 20.The reference Court in its turn in the matters pending before it on the date of the commencement of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... "It was said that the operation of the statute was confined to persons who had become widows after the Act was passed, and that the presumption against a retrospective statute being intended supported this construction; but we have shown before that the statute Is in its direct operation prospective, as it relates to future removals only, and that it is not properly called a retrospective statute because apart of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing." In this case the words 'shall be removed' were thus found appropriate to cover all cases of future removals irrespective of whether the husband had died prior to the Act but they were not found wide enough to nullify completed removals prior to the Act, even if the widow was removed within twelve months of her husband's death. This principle was approved by our Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 394, 398 and in T.K. Lakshmana Iyer v. State of Madras (1968) 3 SCR 542 : AIR 1968 SC 1489. In Trimbak Damodhar Raipurkar v. Assaram Hiraman Patil AIR 1966 SC 1758 : 1962 Supp (1) SCR 700, it was observed by the Constitution Bench: "....wher ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eedings were started prior to or after 30-4-1982. In fact the plain language of Section 23 enjoins upon the reference Court to grant the said benefit in all proceedings pending before it on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. For the same reason, neither the reference Court nor the appellate Court like the High Court and the Supreme Court can give the benefit of Section 23(1-A) in proceedings which were closed before the reference Court before 24-9-1984. This is so, because unlike sub-section (2) of Section 30 which extends the benefit of the amended Section 23(2) and Section 28 of the principal Act to the awards made by the reference Court after 30-4-1982 and before 24-9-1984 or to any order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal against such award, sub-section (1) of Section 30 does not extend the benefit of Section 23(1-A) to such awards of the reference Court and to the orders of High Courts and the Supreme Court in appeal against such award. 25. The above interpretation is also in conformity with the object of the legislation. It must be remembered in this connection that according to the Agricultural Census of 1985-86 [All-India Report on Agric ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ount of the spiraling of the prices. To remedy the situation, the Law Commission as early as in 1958 observed as follows: "It is noteworthy, however, that the State Governments themselves admit that the delay is largely due to the tardy manner in which the machinery of the Government moves in the matter. They also admit that, if the land acquisition officers are made to work methodically and expeditiously, the pace can be quickened. Any proposal for the reform of the law should, therefore, aim at overcoming these evils. Most of the delay occurs in the initial stages of the proceedings between the date of the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6. Further delays arise in the making of the award by the Collector, with the result that as under the existing law, the Government cannot obtain possession until the award is made and th e taking of possession is indefinitely delayed." The report submitted in 1970 which suggested a time-frame for completion of the acquisition proceedings, particularly to relieve the poor landholders whose only means of livelihood was taken away, recommended as follows: "The Land Acquisition Act is over 75 years ol ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the amending Bill, we have been animated by our concern of ensuring that the person who loses his property right in land, particularly one who belongs to the weaker sections of the community, is adequately compensated for his loss.... As it is well known, a number of land acquisition proceedings have been pending for the award of the Collector for years on end. In some cases, the preliminary notification under Section 4(1) was issued many years ago. Payment of compensation to the interested parties on the basis of the market value of the land prevailing on the one of the preliminary notification will be purely unfair. To remedy this unfairness, the Bill provides for payment, in every proceeding for acquisition of land where the award of the Collector had not been given on 30-4-1982, an additional payment of 10 per cent per annum from the date of the preliminary notification to the date of the payment or deposit of compensation." 28. It is, therefore, clear that the intention of the legislature in enacting the amending Act and in particular Section 23(1-A) with which we are concerned, was to give additional amount to the deprived landowners in all the proceedings which wer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... powers only of the Collector, Section 30(2) speaks of powers of the Collector, the reference Court and also of the appellate Court. An attempt to project the provisions of Section 30(2) into the provisions of Section 30(1) and consequently III Section 23(1 A) is no less responsible for the erroneous interpretation of the powers of the reference Court under Section 23 to rant the benefit of Section 23(1 A). 30. The relevant decisions of this Court may now be referred to. There are three decisions directly on Section 23(1-A), viz., Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedeln Vasco De Gama (1990) 1 SCC 277; Union of India v. Zora Singh(1992) 1 SCC 673 and the referring judgment in K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala(1992) 1 SCC 684. The other decisions, viz., Union of India v Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754 which is a Constitution Bench decision and K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer(1985) 1 SCC 582; Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (1985) 3 SCC 737 and State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh (1986) 1 SCC 365 are all on the interpretation of amended Sections 23(2) and 28 of the principal Act and, therefore on the interpretation of Section 30(2) of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Court might have made its award before 24-9-1984." The above observation, according to me, ignores that in cases where (a) acquisition proceedings were pending on 30-4-1982 and the award is made by the Collector after that date and (b) where acquisition proceedings had started after 30-4-1982 and the Collector made award after that date but before the commencement of the amending Act, i.e., 24-9-1984, the Collector is given power to reopen the award and give the benefit of Section 23(1 A). The reference Court under Section 23 has no power to reopen the award made by it before 24-9-1984 to give the benefit of Section 23(1 A), since the provisions of Section 23(1-A) have no retrospective effect. The retrospective effect is given only to the powers of the Collector to reopen the awards made by him before 24-9-1984. For the similar reason, the observations made by the Court to the same effect in paraaraph 15, with respect, cannot be accepted. 33. As regards the referring judgment in K.S. Paripoorna case8 the facts in that case show that notification under Section 4(1) was issued on 21-3-1978. The Collector made his award on 30-12-1980 and the reference Court gave its award ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se is against all canons of the interpretation of statutes. 8 (1992) 1 SCC 684 35. Coming now to the decisions of this Court on Section 23(2), 1 find that on the language of Section 30(2) of the amending Act, this Court in Kamalajammnaniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer10 has with respect taken the correct view of the law. In that case, the notification under Section 4(1) was issued on 28-11-1957 and the Collector and the Court made their awards either in 1970 or prior to it. The Court held that the provisions of Section 23(2) read in the light of Section 30(2) of the amending Act did not apply to the said case. This judgment is also relevant for yet another reason in that it states that it is only the awards made by the Collector under Section 11 and the reference Court under Section 18 which are 'awards' proper under the Act. This observation supports the view I have taken. 36. 1 am, however, unable to agree with the decision in Bhag Singh, which was also a decision under Section 23(2) and Section 28 of the principal Act read with Section 30(2). In that case, notification under Section 4(1) of the principal Act was issued on 19-10-1974. The Collector made his a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ehalf was that he should not reopen the awards already made by him in proceedings which were pending before him on 30-4-1982 to give the benefit of Section 23(1- A) to such awarders. This was as stated earlier, for two reasons. If the said awards are pending before the reference Court on the date of the commencement of the amending Act, viz., 24-9-1984, the reference Court would be able to give the said benefit to the awardees. On the other hand, if the awardees in question had accepted the awards, the same having become final, should not be reopened. As regards the increased benefit under Sections 23(2) and 28, the intention of the legislature was to extend it not only to the proceedings pending before the reference Court on 24- 9-1984 but also to those where awards were made by the Collector and the reference Courts between 30-4-1982 and 24- 9-1984. Hence these awards could not only be reopened but if they were the subject matter of the appeal before High Courts or the Supreme Court, the appellate orders could also be reopened to extend the said benefits. 39. The difference made in the transitional provisions of Section 30 between payment of the additional amount under Section 2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ates only to the powers of the Collector. It has no relation to or bearing on the powers of the reference Court. It is erroneous to read its provisions and the limitations placed by and the distinction made by it between acquisition proceedings commenced prior to and after 304-1982, into the provisions of Section 23 including of sub-section (1-A) thereof. (ii) Under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of the said Section 30, the Collector has power to grant benefit of Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act in every proceeding for the acquisition which is pending before him on 30-4-1982 but in which he has made no award before that date. (iii) Under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of the said Section 30, the Collector has power to give the benefit under Section 23(1- A) in every proceeding for the acquisition commenced after 30-4-1982 whether or not he has made his award in such proceeding before 24-9-1984. Where he has made his award in such proceeding before that date, he is empowered to reopen the same and grant the said benefit. (iv) Section 23 does not make any distinction in the acquisition proceedings pending before the reference Court on 24-9- 1984, between those which had commence ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in every case where the reference was pending before the reference Court oil the date of commencement of the amending Act even though the award of the Collector was made prior to 30-4-1982. 45. In all these matters preliminary notification under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 was published on 21-3-1979 and the notification under Section 6 of the said Act was published on 15-5-1979. The Land Acquisition Officer made the award on 30-12-1980. The reference under Section 18 was decided by IInd Additional Subordinate Judge, Trivandrum on 28-12-1985, after the commencement of the amending Act. The amending Act also repealed the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 and extended the principal Act as amended to Kerala with effect from 24-9-1984. The civil Court enhanced the compensation and awarded interest 12% per annum from 11-3-1981 till the deposit of the excess amount of compensation awarded by it. The High Court rejected the claim for additional amount at the rate of 12% per annum payable under Section 23(1-A) on the view that the said provision was not attracted in view of Section 30(1) of the amending Act. The said view is assailed by the petitioners on the basi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... purpose of the present controversy are those introduced in Section 23 of the Act. Sub-section (1- A) inserted after sub-section (1) in Section 23 reads as under: " (1-A) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Explanation.- In computing the period referred to in this sub section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court shall be excluded." 48. In sub-section (2) of Section 23 solatium was enhanced from 15% to 30%. The rate of interest prescribed in Sections 28 and 34 was enhanced from 6% to 9%. 49. Section 30 of the amending Act contains the following transitional provisions: "30. Transitional provisions.- (1) The provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n 30 of the amending Act are differently worded, the construction that is placed on one set of provisions has a bearing on the construction of the other set. Since the provisions of Section 23(2) of the principal Act and Section 30(2) of the amending Act came up for consideration before this Court earlier than the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act, we will briefly refer to the decisions wherein Section 23(2) of the principal Act as amended and Section 30(2) of the amending Act have been construed before we come to the decisions on Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act. 51. In K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer10 a two-Judge Bench of this Court rejected the contention that the amendment in the provisions of Section 23(2) regarding enhanced solatium at the rate of 30% was applicable to all proceedings in regard to compensation which had not become final whether they be pending before the Collector, Court, High Court or Supreme Court and held that the amended provisions of Section 23(2) would apply to awards made after the commencement of the amending Act and in view of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he amending Act, any proceedings for determination of compensation were pending before the Collector under Section 11 of the Act or before the Court on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would admittedly be applicable to such proceedings", the Court posed the question: (SCC p. 743, para 5) "But if an award were made by the Court on a reference under Section 18 prior to the commencement of the amending Act and an appeal against such award was pending before the High Court under Section 54 at the date of the commencement of the amending Act, which provisions would the High Court have to apply in deciding the appeal and determining the amount of compensation : the amended provisions in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 or the unamended provisions." The said question was thus answered: (SCR pp. 958-59 : SCC pp. 743-44, para 5) "The answer can only be that the High Court would have to apply the provisions in the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28. The appeal against the award would be a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section 18 and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ore the Collector or before the Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court, even though they have finally terminated before the enactment of the Amendment Act. 53. The said decision in Bhag Singh11 has been reversed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754 wherein the earlier decision in K. Kamalajammanniavaru (1985) 1 SCC 582 has been affirmed. Accepting the contention of the learned Attorney General that if Parliament had intended that the benefit of enhanced compensation should be extended to all pending proceedings it would have said so in clear language and that on the contrary the terms in which Section 30 is couched indicate a limited extension of the benefit. Pathak, C.J. speaking for this Court, has stated: (SCR pp. 339-40 : SCC p. 781, para 33) "The Amendment Act has not been made generally retrospective with effect from any particular date, and such retrospectivity as appears is restricted to certain areas covered by the parent Act and must be discovered from the specific terms of the provisions concerned. Since it is necessary to spell out the degree of retrospectivity from the language of the relevant provisi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (L.A.) v. B. Venkata Seshamma AIR 1987 AP 136: (1987) 1 Andh LT 137 (FB) took the view that the amended provisions of Section 23(1-A) were applicable to all pending cases, whether pending before the Collector or on reference or appeal on the date of commencement of the amending Act i.e. 24-9-1984, and the operation of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 was not cut down by the transitory provisions contained in subsection (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act. A Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana took the same view in Maya Devi v. Union Territory of Chandigarh 1988 Punj LJ 189. The Kerala High Court in the judgment under appeal has, however, taken a different view and has held that the retrospectivity of Section 23(1-A) stands regulated by Section 30(1) of the amending Act in the same mode as Section 30(2) regulates the retrospectivity of Section 23(2) and that in cases where the acquisition proceedings commenced before 30-4-1982 amount would be payable under Section 23(1 A) only if no award was made before 30-4-1982. 56.The question of applicability of Section 23(1-A) to pending proceedings was considered by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Fil ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e acquisition The conclusion has also been rested on the mandatory words of Section 23(1- A). It was said that it enjoins a duty on the Court to award the amount in every case and that mandate of the legislature could not be ignored. The decision of this Court in Bhag Sitigh II appears to be the single motive force guiding the approach and reaching the conclusion. But it may be noted that the aforesaid phraseology used in Section 30 sub- section (1) is quite similar to that used in Section 30 sub-section (2). The scope of those words has already been examined and no more need to be stated in that regard since Bhag Singh II has been overruled in Raghubir Singh9. The view taken by the High Courts of Karnataka and Bombay, therefore, could no longer be ~'dered as good law and the said decisions are accordingly overruled." It may be mentioned that the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Soma Gopal Gow~dal3 which was reversed by Jagannatha Shetty, J. in Filip ~Tiago (1990) 1 SCC 277 was also rendered by Shetty, J. in the High Court. 11 (1985) 3 SCC 737 9 (1989) 2 SCC 754 58. The said view in Filip Tiago6 has been reversed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Zora Sing ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ad been made by the Collector before that. At first glance this would appear to suggest that the additional amount referred to in Section 23(1-A) could not be awarded where the Collector had made his award before 30-4- 1982. But this provision cannot be allowed to cut down the benefits available to the claimants on a plain reading of Section 23(1 A). This is clear from the use of the word ,also' in the opening part of Section 30(1). In our opinion, the view taken by the Bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court in that case cannot be accepted as correct as it is too narrow and unduly cuts 6 (1990) 1 SCC 277 7 (1992) 1 SCC 673 down the operation of the benefit conferred under the plain language of Section 23(1 A) of the said Act." 59. The decision in Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754 was distinguished on the ground that it was mainly concerned with the provisions of Section 30(2) of the amending Act with which the Court was not directly concerned. The correctness of the said view in Zora Singh (1992) 1 SCC 673 + (1992) 1 SCC 684 has been doubted by a two-Judge Bench in the order of reference. 60. The learned counsel appearing for the claimants have urged that Zor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tor's award is no more than an offer of compensation made by the Government to the claimant whose property is acquired and that if the offer is acquiesced by total acceptance the right to compensation does not survive but if the offer is not accepted or is accepted under protest and reference is sought by the claimant under Section 18, the right to receive compensation must be regarded as having survived and kept alive which the claimant prosecutes in civil Court. In support of the said submission reference has been made to the decision in Khorshed Shapoor Chenai (Mrs) v. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty25. The learned counsel have also placed before us the Statements of Objects and Reasons for the Bills which led to the enactment of the amending Act and the debates in the Lok Sabha to show that the intention of Parliament in enacting Section 23( 1 A) was to remove the hardship caused to the affected parties oil account of pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods which renders unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them. 61. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for Union of India and the other counsel appearing for the States have, on the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it affects, even if for the future only, the character or consequences of transactions previously entered into or of other past conduct. By virtue of the presumption against retrospective applicability of laws dealing with substantive rights transactions are neither invalidated by reason of their failure to comply with formal requirements subsequently imposed, nor open to attack under powers of avoidance subsequently conferred. They are also not rendered valid by subsequent relaxations of the law, whether relating to form or to substance. Similarly, provisions in which a contrary intention does not appear neither impose new liabilities in respect of events taking place before their commencement, nor relieve persons from liabilities then existing, and the view that existing obligations were not intended to be affected has been taken in varying degrees even of provisions expressly prohibiting proceedings. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, paras 921, 922, 925 and 926.) 65. These principles are equally applicable to amendatory statutes. According to Crawford: "Amendatory statutes are subject to the general principles ... relative to retroactive operation. L ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of a contrary intention in an amending enactment, the substantive rights of the parties to an action fall to be determined by the law as it existed when the action was commenced and this is so whether the law is changed before the hearing of the case at the first instance or while an appeal is pending. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, para 922.) Similar is the approach of the courts in India. In United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum26 Sulaiman, J. has observed: (FCR p. 163) "Undoubtedly, an Act may in its operation be retrospective, and yet the extent of its retrospective character need not extend so far as to affect pending suits. Courts have undoubtedly leaned very strongly against applying a new Act to a pending action, when the language of the statute does not compel them to do so." To the same effect are the observations of Varadachariar, J., who has stated: (FCR pp. 185-186) "There can be little doubt that there is a well-recognised presumption against construing an enactment as governing the rights of the parties to a pending action. ... There are two recognised principles, (1) that vested rights should not be presumed to be affected and (2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e considered is whether any indication has been given by Parliament that Section 23(1-A) will have retrospective operation so as to be applicable to acquisition proceedings which were commenced prior to the date of the enactment of the said provision. The learned counsel for the claimants have urged that such an indication has been given by the words "in every case" used in Section 23(1-A). We are, however, of the view that Parliament has given a clear indication of its intention in this regard in Section 30(1) of the amending Act. Since express provision is contained in Section 30(1) of the amending Act indicating the intention of Parliament as to the extent to which the provision of Section 23(1-A) would apply to pending proceedings there is no scope for speculating about the said intention of Parliament by reading Section 23(1-A) in isolation without reference to Section 30(i) of the amending Act. 71. Section 30 of the amending Act bears the heading "Transitional provisions". Explaining the role of transitional provisions in a statute, Bennion has stated: "Where an Act contains substantive, amending or repealing enactments, it commonly also includes tr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the approach in Zora Singh7 is not different from that in Bhag Singhl 1 on the construction of Section 23(2). This approach was disapproved by the Constitution Bench in Raghubir Singh9 on the ground that the terms in which Section 30 is couched indicate a limited extension of the benefit. The Full Bench decisions of the High Courts of Karnataka, Bombay and Andhra Pradesh were given after Bhag Singh 1 (1985) 3 SCC 737 but before Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754 and while construing Section 23(1-A) they adopted the same approach as in Bhag Singhl1. Keeping in view the decision in Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754 the two-Judge Bench in Filip Tiago (1990) 1 SCC 277 29 Thornton on Legislative Drafting, 3rd Edn., 1987, p. 319, quoted in Britnell v. Secretary of State for Social Security (1991) 2 All ER 726, 730 Per Lord Keith rightly disapproved the view taken in these Full Bench decisions. The learned Judges on the three-Judge Bench in Zora Singh (1992) 1 SCC 673 while reversing the said view in Filip Tiago6 have failed to take note of the basic premise underlying the decision in Raghubir Singh9. 73. A perusal of the various amendments that have been introduced in the principal Act by th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982, clause (b) deals with proceedings which commenced after 30-4-1982. By virtue of clause (a), Section 23(1-A) has been made 6 (1990) 1 SCC 277 24 (1832) 5 Bligh NS 1 : 5 ER 499 30 (1974) 2 SCC 33, 53 : (1975) 1 SCR 504, 519 applicable to proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4- 1982 if no award had been made by the Collector in those proceedings before 30-4-1982. It covers (1) proceedings which were pending before the Collector on 30-4-1982 wherein award was made after 30-4-1982 but before the date of the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made by the Collector after the date of the commencement of the amending Act. Similarly Section 30(1)(b) covers (i) proceedings which had commenced after 30-4-1982 wherein award was made prior to the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made after the commencement of the amending Act. It would thus appear that both the clauses (a) and (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 30 cover proceedings for acquisition which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act and to which the provisions of Section 23( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ext it is also necessary to bear in mind the rule of statutory construction that even where a statute is clearly intended to be to some extent retrospective, it is not to be construed as having a greater retrospective effect than its language renders necessary. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, para 924.) There is, therefore, no scope for extending the ambit of retrospective operation of sub- section (1-A) of Section 23 beyond the limits specified in Section 30(1) of the amending Act so as to apply it to all proceedings initiated prior to the date of coming into force of the amending Act which were pending before the civil Court on reference under Section 18 of the principal Act irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector. For the reasons aforementioned we are unable to subscribe to the view taken in Zora Singh7 that sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 would apply to all proceedings pending in the reference Court on the date of commencement of the amending Act irrespective of the date on which award was made by the Collector. In our opinion, the provisions of Section 23(1 A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act have ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... asons show that the object underlying the enactment of Section 23(1-A) was to remove the hardship to the affected parties on account of pendency of acquisition proceedings for a long time which renders unrealistic the amounts of compensation offered to them. Our attention has also been invited to the speeches made by members at the time when the Bill was considered and was adopted by Parliament. It has been urged that a construction which advances the said object must be adopted. We are unable to accept this contention. As regards the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill the law is well settled that the same cannot be used except for the limited purpose of understanding the background and the state of affairs leading to the legislation but it cannot be used as an aid to the construction of the statute. (See Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose32; State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose33 per Das, J.; State of W.B. v. Union of India34.) Similarly, with regard to speeches made by the members in the House at the time of consideration of the Bill it has been held that they are not admissible as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of the statutory provisions though the speec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e by Collector prior to 30-4-1982, would not render the provisions of Section 30(1) of the amending Act unconstitutional. The question of expanding the field of retrospectivity so as to cover all the awards made by the Collector prior to the commencement of the amending Act irrespective of the date when they were made, therefore, does not arise. 79. Relying upon the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 3 1 A of the Constitution which prescribes that- "where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof." Shri K.C. Jain has submitted that compensation for the land acquired under the Act must be paid on the basis of the market value of the prope ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r consideration in the light of this order. R.M. SAHAI, J. (dissenting)- How to construe Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (for short 'the Amendment Act'), a substantive provision added in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') after 90 years, for striking a proper balance 'between the need of acquisition of land for private purpose and the rights of the individual whose land is acquired' is the simple issue but of far-reaching consequence both for the State or the acquiring body and the owners who, by process of law are deprived of their land. Should the interpretative process, which in public welfare measures has to be purpose oriented, further the legislative objective by taking recourse even to the debates in the House, if necessary, to find out the mischief the legislature intended to remedy or it should resort to strained or unduly restrictive construction by adding or subtracting words to the otherwise plain and simple language on assumptions of limited retrospectivity drawn from the transitional provision. Even a decade has not elapsed since the amendment was made yet there are no less than six decisions, o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... between issuing of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act and compensation due to distance of time between the two notifications, in many cases, became nugatory. Yet it took 34 years, even from the date the country became independent for the elected representatives, most of whom came from rural background, to intervene in favour of that class of persons who not only form bulk of the society and for whom land is not only property but their bread and butter, their life and soul, to relieve them of the effect of compulsory taking over of their land by restructuring and making the provisions more economically viable. Even though our country is vast, bristling with varied cultures yet the economy, basically being agricultural right from Kashmir to Kanyakumari, irrespective of the fertility of land, the love and lure for it is the same. An agriculturist of Tamil Nadu is as much concerned as a cultivator in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. But with the development of different States, the potential value of land etc. is vastly different. An acre of land in one State due to irrigation facility and development activity may cost more than in any other State. Therefore, the high ratio of com ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... into consideration certain factors in Section 23 and ignoring those in Section 24. Section 28 empowers the Court to award interest on difference in the amount awarded by the Collector and determined by the Court whereas Section 34 entitles Collector to award interest if the amount determined is not paid before taking possession. Nature of the proceedings for determination of the compensation both by the Court and the Collector are statutorily regarded as award. That is apparent, amongst others, from sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the Act. 86. Right to receive compensation accrues to the owner, under the Act, when possession is taken by the Collector. Section 16 vests the land in the State absolutely free from all encumbrances when the Collector takes possession after making the award. But between Sections 4 and 6 notifications and thereafter between Sections 6 and 11 there occurred at times much delay. The Act did not provide for any time-frame. And this affected the landowners vitally as the market value of the land under Section 23 is to be determined on the date the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 was issued whereas the award has to be made after declaration u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ground that observance of law would have meant delay. The executive mind considered the delay in acquiring possession as a matter of great importance but the delay in payment of compensation to poor landowners as of no consequence. This callous indifference was manifested again and again. Many of the sufferers lost their hereditary occupation also which alone provided them with some sort of economic security. As a result quite an appreciable number of citizens were completely uprooted and turned into refugees in their own land of birth." (emphasis supplied) There can thus be no dispute that there existed a lacuna in the Act which did not provide for compensating for the rise in price of land due to delay rendering the compensation illusory in many cases. To overcome this and similar defects Parliament introduced the Bill in 1982. It was withdrawn as it suffered from certain defects. It was reintroduced in 1984. One of the suggestions in the House was that the determination of value of the land may again be restored to the date the declaration was published under Section 6 of the Act. But the Hon'ble Minister who piloted the Bill expressed his inability due to various diff ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is not made by the Collector within two years of the publication of notification under Section 6 of the Act. Present is protected by Section 23(1-A) and past by Section 30. It is the understanding of scope of these two sections and their interrelation which shall be decisive of fate of these petitions. For this purpose Section 23(1-A) of the Act is extracted below: "23. (1-A) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of th e notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) , in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Explanation.- In computing the period referred to in this subsection, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded." 88.It is added to Section 23 which provides for considerations which may be taken into account for determination of co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... government servant who was recruited 1 (1848) 12 QB 120, 127: 17 LJMC 172: 116 ER 811 2 AIR 1953 SC 394, 398 3 (1968) 3 SCR 542 : AIR 1968 SC 1489 4 AIR 1966 SC 1758: 1962 Supp (1) SCR 700 5 AIR 1965 SC 1567 :(1965) 1 SCR 693 and appointed earlier to the date when the rule was made by the Government could not be retired in exercise of power under this rule otherwise it would amount to application of the rule retrospectively. The submission was repelled and it was held that the rule could not be struck down on the ground that it was retrospective in operation as all that it provided was that from the date it came into force the age of retirement became 55 years. 90. In St. Whitechapell the law intended to secure that a widow residing in a parish with her husband shall not be removed for twelve months after his death. The benefit of the law was extended even when the husband had died before coming into force of the Act and it was observed : "It was said that the operation of the statute was confined to persons who had become widows after the Act was passed, and that the presumption against a retrospective statute being intended supported this construction; but we have sh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... statute creating new right on past transactions cannot be held to be prospective. How does this principle help the State? Section 23(1-A) does not create any right on past transactions. Misconception appears to be prevailing due to fixation of the period for which additional compensation shall be paid. The two termini, that is, issuance of notification under Section 4(1) and publication of declaration under Section 6 are erroneously understood as creating right or furnishing starting point from which the section shall apply. The right which is substantive in nature is to get additional compensation at the rate of twelve per cent. The right is not created on past transactions. It operates in future, that is, confers benefit of additional compensation from the date it came into force and not from a date prior to coming into force of the provisions. 92.A substantive law is held to be prospective as a matter of legal policy since it is founded on public policy that no right be so created as to work to the disadvantage for whom it is created as if it be so, "it would be betrayal of what the law stands for" (Bennion on Statutory Interpretation). Section 23(1-A) does not suffer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... icular conduct the ground for an application for eviction. The necessary condition for the application of Section 9(1)(ii) may commence even before the Act came into force and past conduct, which is as relevant for the clause as conduct after the coming into force of the Act, cannot be overlooked." 94. The substantive right to evict was enforced prospectively but the necessary facts for its enforcement were taken even from before coming into force of the Act. The law was not held to be retrospective on that account. In Master Ladies Tailors Organisation v. Minister of Labour & National Service17, a question arose if an order passed by the Minister fixing remuneration for work and holding was ultra vires the Act as it applied retrospectivity. It was held that the effect of the provision relating to accrued remuneration being merely to determine and limit the quantum to be made the order could not be construed as having retrospective operation. It was observed by the Court that if a prospective benefit is in certain cases to be measured by or depends on antecedent facts does not make the provision retrospective. This decision makes it clear that a substantive provision is not r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... intention of the legislature was to make the provisions of the said subsection applicable to cases where the Collector had yet to make his award or the trial Court hearing the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act had still to make its award after the coming into force of the said sub-section on 24-9-1984." (emphasis supplied) Whereas in K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala (1992) 1 SCC 684, the order by which reference was made to the larger bench it was observed : (SCC p. 690, para 9) "The legislature having designed the horizontal growth in such manner, the collective scheme which has been made operational prospectively on 24-9-1984 and onwards becomes plain because that is the date on which the amendment comes into effect. When we import this understanding to the scheme of things it becomes evident that a Court when applying sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 would do so only if it has in hand an acquisition based upon a notification under Section 4 of the Act issued on 24-9-1984 or thereafter and not to any such notification issued earlier to that date. Same would be the role of the Collector at his end when employing Section 15 and making an award und ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re not intended by the legislature and may leave the mischief as it was. Such impractical or inconvenient result should be avoided. In Municipal Council of Sydney v. Margaret Alexandra Troy31, in more or less similar circumstances when rate of interest payable on compensation was increased from four to six per cent, it was held that the increase in the rate of interest was payable in respect of land acquired before the date the Act came into force and such construction did not result in making the provision retrospective as, "the provision being substantive one which was not made to depend on any reference to corresponding provision in the earlier statute". Similarly, the substantive part of Section 23(1- A) also does not depend on any reference to the corresponding provision in the principal Act. It has been explained earlier that it stands on its own. Even otherwise when the Court proceeds to determine compensation after September 1984 it cannot ignore sub-section (1 A) added to Section 23. That would be against plain and simple language of the section. 98. The additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) was thus payable on every matter which was pending in Court on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... every case which was before it on the day the Act came into operation. But that could not have served the legislative purpose, therefore, Section 30 was added to serve as transitional provision to extend the benefit of Section 23(1-A) by bridging the gap and providing for payment of additional compensation to even those who were not covered otherwise in Section 23(1-A). The section has two sub- clauses. Clause (a) takes back applicability of the Section 23(1-A) to all those proceedings in which notifications had been issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and proceedings were pending on 30-4-1982 as no award had been made by the Collector before that date. Clause (b) extends the benefit of Section 23(1-A) to the proceedings which had commenced after 30-4-1982. This date was chosen as the Bill for amending the Act was initiated in 1982. It provides that where notification had been issued after 1982 the landowner is entitled to additional compensation whether the award had been made before September 1984 or not. 100. In acquisitions in which notification had been issued prior to 1982 the legislature placed them in two categories, one, where award had been made and oth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ich the proceedings had become final before the Collector. Such construction would be highly unjust and inequitable. The benefit of additional compensation could not be denied on oft chance of the award having been made. There must be some rationale for giving benefit to that class of landowners in whose cases due to delay for one or the other reasons the proceedings could not be finalised and others where award had been made. A construction which leads to anomalous and illogical results should be avoided. True once the award is made right to compensation accrues but Section 23(1-A) does not on its own make a distinction for purposes of payment of additional compensation between pendency of proceedings and making of award. A transitional provision cannot curtail operation of the substantive provision. The field of operation of Section 30 being narrow, namely, to extend the benefit of Section 23(1-A) to all those landowners whose land has been notified to be acquired before 1982 and in which no award has been made by Collector, it cannot be taken help of for determining the scope of the main provision and hold that what is not covered by it stands excluded from Section 23(1 A). A tr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ield of operation is different and they serve different purposes. The amendment in sub-section (2) of Section 23 brings about a change in existing ratio of solatium from 15% to 30%. And sub-section (2) of Section 30 makes it operative from 30-4-1982 in relation to any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award. Both the decisions, i.e., Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh which was held to be incorrectly decided and Raghubir Singh9 agreed to the extent that the retrospectivity visualised by the sub-section applied to the award made by the Collector or Court. But difference arose as to whether 30% enhanced solatium was payable in appeals pending in the High Court and this Court irrespective of the date of award. The interpretation turned on the expression "such award" used in the sub-section. In Bhag Singh (1985)3SCC737 it was extended even to the appeals pending in the High Court or Supreme Court against award of the Collector or the Court whereas in Raghubir Singh9 it was confined to those appeals in High Court or this Court which arose out of "such award". The question ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o 30%. But this enhanced amount was not to be paid to those landowners whose land had been acquired much before 1982 but its final adjudication was pending in appeal in the High Court or this Court. The legislature must be presumed to be aware that such disputes in which land had been acquired much earlier were still pending and could not be disposed of due to heavy workload in higher courts. Therefore, the legislature in its wisdom considered it proper to confine the benefit of enhanced solatium to those landowners whose appeals arose out of the award made after 1982. 102. Same rationale which in fact furnished basis in K.Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (1985) 1 SCC 582 and was approved in Raghubir Singh (1985) 3 SCC 737 cannot be applied to references pending before the Court under Section 18 of the Act. The legislature for good reason, therefore, used different language in two sub-sections. And the construction of one cannot furnish basis for construing the other in same manner. 103.Although Brother Sawant, J. has agreed with me on construction of Section 23(1 A) of the Amendment Act but he has written a separate order to highlight the difference betwee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... determination of compensation at the stage of reference under Section 18 in respect of acquisitions which had started even before 1982. 105.Having explained the scope of Section 23(1-A) and Section 30, their interrelation and the field of their operation, it may now be seen as to how these provisions have been dealt with by this Court in various decisions which came before it. When Section 23(1-A) was added Section 23(2) providing for solatium was amended and from 15% it was raised to 30%. Its operation during transitional period was regulated by Section 30(2) of the Act. This provision came up for consideration earlier in point of time and by 1989 there were at least four decisions one of them being Constitution Bench Union of India v. Raghubir Singh(1989) 2 SCC 754. Since this decision has been considerably influenced the decisions on Section 23(1-A) which have been rendered since 1990 it may be adverted to first. The following question was referred for consideration by the Constitution Bench : (SCC p. 763, para 1) "Whether under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 the claimants are entitled to solatium at 30 per cent of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e contrary extends in all those cases where reference was pending at the stage of making the award by the Court under Section 18 could be curtailed or negatived by taking recourse to the transitional provision. The question cropped up first in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (1990) 1 SCC 277 when this Court while recognising that Section 23(1-A) enjoined a duty on the Court to award the additional amount on 12% on the market value of the land observed as under: (SCC p. 286, para 20) "But this again is a part of the scheme for determining compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act. It also operates on the market value of the land acquired. It is plainly and distinctly prospective in its operation since market value has to be determined as on the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1). But the legislature has given new starting point for operation of Section 23(1-A) for certain cases. That will be found from Section 30 sub-sections (1)(a) and (b) of the Transitional Provisions." 109. Consequently the Court held that a landowner was entitled to additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) only if the acquisition proceedings ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ate it came into force that is 24-9-1984. If it came into force on that date and the section requires the Court to pay additional compensation in every case then the ambit of the section cannot be narrowed by confining its operation to those cases where notification is issued after coming into force of the Act. The scope of Section 23(1-A) has already been explained. It has also been explained, at length, as to what was the objective and purpose of it. In light of that it would not be reasonable to restrict the operation of this section to those proceedings which will be taken for determination of compensation after the Act came into force in September 1984. The expression "in addition to" is only descriptive rather explanatory by directing that in all those cases where the Court was awarding compensation after coming into force of the Act it shall award an additional amount as provided in sub-section (1) of the Act. 110. For all these reasons the questions raised in these petitions are answered as below : (1) Section 23(1-A) providing for additional compensation is attracted in every case where reference was pending under Section 18 before the Court [Section 23(1-A)]. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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