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TMI Blog2007 (4) TMI 670X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pondent Company by letters dated 15.4.1995. Contending that the said orders of termination were unauthorized, arbitrary and illegal, as no domestic enquiry was held prior thereto, they raised an industrial dispute. The State of West Bengal, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 10(1)(c) read with Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 referred the following dispute for its adjudication to the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal. Whether the termination of service of (1) Shri Bikash Bhusan Ghosh (2) Shri Pradip Kumar Mukherjee and (3) Shri Shyama Charan Mallick is justified? What relief, if any, are they entitled to? Before the said Tribunal, inter-alia a contention was raised that the State of West Bengal had no jurisdiction to make the reference. Parties to the reference, however, adduced their respective evidences on merit of the matter. The question in regard to maintainability of the said reference was determined by the Tribunal in terms of an order dated 30.3.1999 holding the same to be maintainable. By reason of an Award dated 10.10.2002, the Tribunal opined that the orders of termination passed against the appellants were illegal and they ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would contend that no conciliation proceeding was pending in regard to the order of transfer as alleged or at all. It was submitted that in fact, the appellants categorically stated before the Industrial Tribunal that they would not question the orders of transfer, but only would question the orders of termination. Having regard to the fact that the orders of transfer dated 3.10.1994 were given effect to by relieving the workmen of the charges they had been holding at Calcutta, they would be deemed to have been attached to their transferred places and as they failed to join, their services were lawfully terminated. As the Division Bench of the High Court did not enter into the merit of the matter, we do not intend to deal with the questions as to whether any conciliation proceedings was, in relation to the orders of transfer passed as against the appellants, in fact pending before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, West Bengal or not. Appellants, however, in our opinion could not have questioned the orders of transfer in view of the nature of the industrial dispute referred to by the State of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the jurisdiction of the Mysore Government. We may notice that in Paritosh Kumar Pal v. State of Bihar and others [1984 LAB. I.C. 1254], a full Bench of the Patna High Court held; 13. Now an incisive analysis of the aforesaid authoritative enunciation of law would indicate that three clearcut principles or tests for determining jurisdiction emerge, therefrom. For clarity these may be first separately enumerated as under: (i) Where does the order of the termination of services operate? (ii) Is there some nexus between the industrial dispute arising from termination of the services of the workman and the territory of the State? (iii) That the well-known test of jurisdiction of a civil Court including the residence of the parties and the subject matter of the dispute substantially arising therein would be applicable. Referring to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was held that the situs of the employment of the workman would be a relevant factor for determining the jurisdiction of the court concerned. The High Court, however, has relied upon a decision of the said Court in Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal [2005- ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ateral. If the orders of transfer were to be set aside, they would be deemed to be continuing to be posted in Calcutta. The legality of the orders of transfer, thus, had a direct nexus with the orders of termination. What would constitute cause of action, has recently been considered by this Court in Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India and Another [(2006) 6 SCC 207] wherein it was held; 12. The expression cause of action has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled with he right itself. Compendiously, as noted above, the expression means very fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in cause of action . (See Rajasthan High Court Advoc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e jurisdiction of the Court. In Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others [A.I.R. 1954 SC 340], this Court held; (6) ... If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was coram non judice and that its judgment and decree would be nullities. The question is what is the effect of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on this position. (7) Section 11 enacts that notwithstanding anything in section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure an objection that a Court which had no jurisdiction over a suit or appeal had exercised it by reason of overvaluation or under-valuation, should not be entertained by an appellate Court, except as provided in the section. Then follow provisions as to when the objections could be entertained, and how they are to be dealt with. The drafting of the section has come in \026 and deservedly \026 for considerable criticism; but amidst much that is obscure and confused, there is one principle which stands out clear and conspicuous. It is that a decree passed by a Court, which would have had no jurisdiction to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Welfare Housing Organisation v. Sumangal Services (P) Ltd [(2004) 9 SCC 619] } Yet again appellants being workmen, their services were protected in terms of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. If their services were protected, an order of termination was required to be communicated. Communication of an order of termination itself may give rise to a cause of action. An order of termination takes effect from the date of communication of the said order. In State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika [ A.I.R. 1966 SC 1313], this Court held; (11) ... It is plain that the mere passing of an order of dismissal would not be effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. If the appointing authority passed an order of dismissal, but does not communicate it to the officer concerned, theoretically it is possible that unlike in the case of a judicial order pronounced in Court, the authority may change its mind and decide to modify its order. It may be that in some cases, the authority may feel that the ends of justice would be met by demoting the officer concerned rather than dismissing him. An order of dismissal passed by the appropriate authority and kept with itse ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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