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TMI Blog2004 (12) TMI 668X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') which, according to her, entitled her to immediate possession of the premises in question being a widow landlady. The appellant filed an affidavit and prayed for leave to defend on the ground that the petition raised many triable issues. The Additional Rent Controller, Delhi by his judgment and order dated 12th November, 1997 after considering the submissions urged before him came to the conclusion that the tenant had failed to make out a case for grant of leave to defend as she had failed to raise any triable issue. He, therefore, allowed the petition under Section 14D of the Act and passed an order of eviction. The appellant then moved the High Court in C.R.No.70/98 and C.M.No.298/98 impugning the order of eviction passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi. The High Court concurred with the view of the Additional Rent Controller and held that since the landlady was a widow, and the premises were required by her for her own residence, the conditions for the applicability of Section 14D of the Act were fulfilled and hence the learned Additional Rent Controller committed no mistake in refusing leave to defend to the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t appeared that the respondent claimed to be the owner of the suit premises, and that she required the premises for her own use. The appellant replied to the said notice denying that the respondent was the owner or landlord of the suit premises and asserting that the appellant was residing in the premises for over 35 years paying a rent of ₹ 7/- per month to the owner, Parmanand Khemka. In September, 1994 respondent filed an Eviction Petition No.S- 233/1994 under Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 claiming that she was a widow and bona fide needed the premises for her own use. It was claimed that she had purchased the suit premises in the year 1982, and since the accommodation available to the appellant was insufficient and unsuitable, she required the suit premises for her own use and occupation. She narrated the inconveniences caused to her, including family differences, while residing in the house left behind by her husband. In the circumstances she was compelled to shift to her own house, namely the suit premises, which she had purchased from the erstwhile owner in the year 1982. The appellant applied under Section 25B(4) of the Act for leave to defend. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... categories of classified landlords who have been conferred a right to recover immediate possession of premises in certain circumstances. The language of Sections 14B to 14D is unambiguous and the right to recover immediate possession has been ensured by applying the summary procedure under Section 25B of the Act. For the application of Section 14D, counsel contended, the widow who applies for eviction of the tenant in occupation of the premises must establish that the premises were let out by her late husband or that the premises were let out by her and that she requires the same for her own residence. The language employed leaves no room for doubt that the widow upon whom a special right has been conferred to claim immediate possession of premises after evicting the tenant must satisfy the condition that the premises were let out by her or by her husband. Clearly, therefore, if this condition is not fulfilled Section 14D will not apply. On the other hand counsel for the respondent heavily relied on the decision of this Court in Kanta Goel (supra) and submitted that for the application of Section 14D it is not necessary that the premises must have been let out either by the pet ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ax : AIR 1964 S.C. 766). It is well settled that literal interpretation should be given to a statute if the same does not lead to an absurdity. In Nasiruddin and others vs. Sita Ram Agarwal : (2003) 2 SCC 577 this Court stated the law in the following terms :- 37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of the expression shall or may is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ication for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under sub-section (1), on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso thereto, unless a period of five years have elapsed from the date of the acquisition. Sections 14B to 14D were inserted in the Act of 1958 by Act 57 of 1988 which came into force w.e.f. 1st December, 1988. The aforesaid provisions are reproduced below for ready reference :- 14B. Right to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to members of the armed forces, etc. (1) Where the landlord (a) is a released or retired person from any armed forces and the premises let out by him are required for his own residence ; or (b) is a dependent of a member of any armed forces who had been killed in action and the premises let out by such member are required for the residence of the family of such member, such person or, as the case may be, the dependent may, within one year from the date of his release or retirement from such armed forces or, as the case may be, the date of death of such member, or within a period of one year from the date of commencement of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, whichever is later, ap ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. (2) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to her to make an application under that sub-section in respect of any one of the premises chosen by her. Sections 14Ato 14D carve out an exception to Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. The said provisions envisage recovery of immediate possession of the tenanted premises by (i) the members of Armed Forces, (ii) the Central Government and Delhi Administration employees who have retired or who would be retiring and (iii) where the landlord is a widow. All the aforementioned provisions refer to the immediate necessity of the landlord. The provisions contained in Section 14A to 14D being in the nature of exception to the main provision, they must be construed strictly. Where the statute provides for an exemption from the rigours of a beneficial statute for tenants, the landlord with a view to obtain immediate possession thereof must plead and prove the requirements envisaged therein. In other words the conditions precedent contained therein must be complied wit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as heir, steps into his father's shoes who owned the building in his own name and let it out himself. He represents the former owner and lessor and squarely falls within Section 14A. The accent on 'name' is to pre-empt the common class of benami evasions, not to attach special sanctity to nominalism. Refusing the rule of ritualism we accept the reality of the ownership and landlordism as the touchstone. .. .. . . The admitted fact is that on the same ground of the government's order to vacate, the first respondent had evicted a dwelling house on the first floor and is keeping it vacant. He is again using the same order to vacate passed by the government to evict the appellant's dwelling house. This is obviously contrary to the intendment of Section 14A and is interdicted by the proviso to Section 14A(1). It is true that when an officer is sought to be evicted by the government from its premises he has to be rehabilitated in his own house by an accelerated remedial procedure provided by Section 14A read with Section 25B of the Act. But this emergency provision available merely to put the government servant back into his own residential accommodation cannot ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the premises if an application is made within one year from the date of release or retirement or the date of death, as the case may be, seeking recovery of immediate possession of such premises for his own residence or for the residence of the family of such member, as the case may be. Sub-section (3) of Section 14B further provides that in case the landlord has let out more than one premises, he can apply under sub-section (1) of Section 14B in respect of only one of the premises chosen by him. An argument was raised before this Court that since the Amending Act 57 of 1988 which carved out a class of classified landlords did not make corresponding amendments particularly to sub- sections (4) and (5) of Section 25B, the tenant's right to contest the application for eviction on the grounds specified in Section 14(1)(e) cannot be denied even as against the classified landlords falling under Section 14B to 14D of the Act. The submission was rejected as its acceptance would practically obliterate the purpose and object of classification of landlords under Sections 14B to 14D who were carved out from the general category of landlords. It was noticed that the remedy under section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is bona fide and he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Section 14(1)(e) does not preclude the landlord from seeking eviction of more than one premises provided he establishes the need. The observations in the aforesaid judgments no doubt support the case of the appellant. This Court did clearly lay down that the expression, the premises let out by him in Section 14B of the Act did mean that it is he who has let out alone could evict, and in case the landlord had been killed in action his dependant could seek immediate eviction of the premises let out by such person. It is noticeable that the expression, premises let out by him is used in Section 14B and 14C, but the expression, in Section 14D is premises let out by her, or by her husband. Section 14B contemplates two situations, firstly, where the landlord is a released or retired person from any armed forces and secondly, where he was killed in action. In case the landlord was killed in action a right has been given to his dependant within one year of the death of the landlord, to apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of the premises. Section 14C confers a right on a ret ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e premises, or if her husband had let out the premises. If, as observed in Kanta Goel (supra), the expression, the premises let out by him has been used only to convey the idea that the premises must be owned by him directly and the lease must be under him directly, and not that he had himself let out the premises, the legislature would not have then used the expression let out by her, or by her husband. The very fact that the Section specifies that the premises must be one which was let out by the widow or by her husband implies that the provision would not apply to a premises let out by any other person. If the intention of the legislature was to confer an unlimited right on a widow landlord, the use of the words the premises let out by her, or by her husband would have been unnecessary and the Section would have simply read as follows:- Where the landlord is a widow and the premises are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. By expressly providing that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband, the legislature has clearly excluded from the purview of the said prov ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises . Such premises obviously is relatable to the premises let out her or by her husband. It cannot take within its ambit any other premises which may have been let out by any other person. We, therefore, find substance in the submission urged on behalf of the appellant that Section 14D benefits only a class of widows viz. a widow who or whose husband had let out the premises. If the intention was to benefit all widows, the section would have provided that a widow is entitled to obtain immediate possession of the premises owned by her and the expressions, let out by her or by her husband and such premises in Section 14D would be redundant. The High Court, therefore, fell in error in thinking that only two conditions were required to be fulfilled for the application of Section 14D namely, the landlady is a widow, and the premises are required by her for her residence. In addition to these two requirements, in our view, Section 14D insists that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband. A widow or her late husband who acquired a tenanted premises by sale or transfer cannot invoke the provisions ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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