2004 (12) TMI 668 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether the tenant had failed to make out a case for grant of leave to defend as she had failed to raise any triable issue? Whether application for the eviction of the appellant on the ground that she required the premises for her bona fide personal need invoking the provisions of Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 which, according to her, entitled her to immediate possession of the premises in question being a widow landlady valid?

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Applicability of Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
2. Interpretation of the term "let out" in Section 14D.
3. Relationship between landlord and tenant.
4. Legislative intent and statutory interpretation.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:

The respondent, a widow, filed an eviction petition under Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, claiming bona fide need for the premises for her own residence. The Additional Rent Controller and the High Court both upheld her claim, stating that the conditions for Section 14D were met since she was a widow requiring the premises for her own residence. However, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the respondent, who acquired the premises by purchase, could invoke Section 14D.

2. Interpretation of the term "let out" in Section 14D:

The appellant contended that Section 14D only applies if the premises were let out by the widow or her husband. The Supreme Court noted a conflict between two previous judgments: Surjit Singh Kalra vs. Union of India, which supported the appellant's view, and Kanta Goel vs. B.P. Pathak, which suggested a broader interpretation. The Court concluded that the term "let out by her, or by her husband" in Section 14D must be strictly interpreted to mean that the premises must have been let out by the widow or her deceased husband, not by any other person.

3. Relationship between landlord and tenant:

The appellant argued that there was no landlord-tenant relationship with the respondent since the premises were not let out by her or her husband. The Supreme Court agreed, emphasizing that Section 14D specifically requires the premises to have been let out by the widow or her husband. Therefore, the respondent, who purchased the premises, could not establish the requisite landlord-tenant relationship under Section 14D.

4. Legislative intent and statutory interpretation:

The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the literal interpretation of statutes unless it leads to absurdity. It stated that every word in a statute is presumed to have a purpose, and the expression "let out by her, or by her husband" in Section 14D was intentional and specific. The Court rejected the broader interpretation that would render these words redundant. It also noted that Sections 14B to 14D were exceptions to the general rule under Section 14(1)(e) and must be construed strictly.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court concluded that the respondent could not invoke Section 14D as the premises were not let out by her or her husband. The Court preferred the reasoning in Surjit Singh Kalra and found that the High Court erred in its interpretation. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the eviction order under Section 14D was set aside. The application filed by the respondent under Section 14D was dismissed.